Sunday, September 28, 2014

The Soul of the Censor

The Soul of the Censor

David Levine Alexander Solzhenitsyn

What is censorship?

If the concept of censorship is extended to everything, it means nothing. It should not be trivialized. Although I would agree that power is exerted in many ways, I think it crucial to distinguish between the kind of power that is monopolized by the state (or other constituted authorities such as religious organizations in some cases) and power that exists everywhere else in society. Censorship as I understand it is essentially political; it is wielded by the state.

Not that all states impose sanctions in the same way. Their actions might be arbitrary, but they clothe them in procedures that had a tincture of legality. One of the striking aspects of the dossiers from the Bastille is the effort by the police to ferret out clues and establish guilt by rigorous interrogations, even though the prisoners had no legal defense. Under the pressure of circumstances, trials in the British Raj returned the expected verdicts, yet they adopted elaborate ceremonies to act out the rule of British law and affirm the fiction of freedom of the press. Walter Janka's conviction in Berlin for publishing an author who fell out of favor (Lukács) was a ceremony of a different kind: a show trial orchestrated in Stalinist fashion to launch a purge and to signal a change in the Party line. The line determined legitimacy in a system that had no room for civil rights.

Reading was an essential aspect of censoring, not only in the act of vetting texts, which often led to competing exegeses, but also as an aspect of the inner workings of the state, because contested readings could lead to power struggles, which sometimes led to public scandals. Not only did censors perceive nuances of hidden meaning, but they also understood the way published texts reverberated in the public. Their sophistication should not be surprising in the case of the GDR, because they included authors, scholars, and critics. Eminent authors also functioned as censors in eighteenth-century France, and the surveillance of vernacular literatures in India was carried out by learned librarians as well as district officers with a keen eye for the folkways of the "natives." To dismiss censorship as crude repression by ignorant bureaucrats is to get it wrong. Although it varied enormously, it usually was a complex process that required talent and training and that extended deep into the social order.

It also could be positive. The approbations of the French censors testified to the excellence of the books deemed worthy of a royal privilege. They often resemble promotional blurbs on the back of the dust jackets on books today. Column 16 in the secret "catalogues" of the India Civil Service sometimes read like modern book reviews, and they frequently lauded the books they kept under surveillance. While acting as censors, East German editors worked hard to improve the quality of the texts they vetted. Despite its ideological function, the reworking of texts had resemblances to the editing done by professionals in open societies. From start to finish, the novels of the GDR bore the marks of intervention by the censors. Some censors complained that they had done most of the work.

Negotiation occurred at every level, but especially at the early stages when a text began to take shape. That did not happen in the Raj, where censorship was restricted to post-publication repression, nor did it affect the literature that circulated outside the system in eighteenth-century France. But even Voltaire, when he published legal or quasi-legal works, negotiated with censors, their superiors, influential intermediaries, and the police. He knew how to manipulate all the gears and levers of the power apparatus, and he was an expert in using it for his benefit. For East German authors like Erich Loest and Volker Braun, negotiation was so important that it could hardly be distinguished from the publication process. They sometimes spent more time haggling over passages than writing them. The parties on both sides understood the nature of the give-and-take. They shared a sense of participating in the same game, accepting its rules, and respecting their opposite number.

Consider Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's account of his experience in The Oak and the Calf, published in 1975, a year after his expulsion from the Soviet Union. When you open it, you expect to encounter the voice of a prophet, crying in the wilderness; and you won't be disappointed, for Solzhenitsyn casts himself as a Jeremiah. Yet he recounts much of his story in a surprising register: shrewd, precise, ironic, and sociologically rich observations of how literature functioned as a power system in a Stalinist society. We meet him first in the gulag. During eight years of labor in the prison camps, he writes about the misery around him, and he continues writing after his release while living miserably as a teacher. He writes in isolation and with total freedom, because he knows he cannot publish anything. His words will not be read until long after his death. But he must keep them secret. He memorizes them, writes them in a minute hand on thin strips of paper, and rolls the paper into cylinders, which he squeezes into a bottle and buries in the ground. As manuscript follows manuscript, he continues to hide them in the safest, most unlikely places. Then, to his amazement, Khrushchev denounces the excesses of Stalin at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961, and Aleksandr Tvardovsky, the editor of Novy Mir, the most important review in the USSR, proclaims a readiness to publish bolder texts. Solzhenitsyn decides to take a risk. He rewrites, in milder form, the work that will eventually break through the wall of silence about the atrocities of the gulag under the title "A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich"; and he submits it to Novy Mir.

At this point, Solzhenitsyn's narrative turns into a kind of sociology. He describes all the editors at the review, their rivalries, self-protective maneuvers, and struggles to stifle the bomb that he has planted in their midst. Aleksandr Dementyev, the intelligent, duplicitous agent of the Central Committee of the Party, sets traps and erects barriers during editorial conferences, but Tvardovsky is torn. As a genuine poet with roots in the peasantry, "his first loyalty was to Russian literature, with its devout belief in the moral duty of the writer." Yet he also felt compelled by "the Party's truth." In the end, he prevails over his own doubts and the doubters on the staff, and he goes over the manuscript line by line with Solzhenitsyn, negotiating changes. Solzhenitsyn is willing to make them, up to a point, because he understands that the text must be modified enough to pass through the obstacle course that constitutes literary reality.

The course itself is described—leaked copies, huddled conversations in corridors of power, a reading before Khrushchev in his dacha, and approval by the Presidium (Politburo). The official censors, kept in the dark, are horrified when they see the proofs. But they praise the book when it goes to press, having been informed at the last minute that it received the approval of the Central Committee. The work creates a sensation, and it could have been followed by the other books that Solzhenitsyn has prepared; but he holds them back, unwilling to make the necessary modifications—a strategic mistake, he sees in retrospect, because the window of opportunity will close when Brezhnev succeeds Khrushchev in 1964 and a new wave of Stalinization shuts down genuine literature, driving Solzhenitsyn, now notorious, into exile. For all its vivid detail, backed up by a great deal of documentation, the story does not come across as a journalistic exposé. Nor does it invoke a Western view of freedom of speech. In a specifically Russian idiom, it proclaims a prophetic view of literature as a vehicle of truth.

David Levine Milan Kundera

Milan Kundera writes in a different idiom—ironic, sophisticated, steeped self-consciously in centuries of European literature. He, too, confronted censorship at a moment when Stalinism opened up long enough to expose its fault lines, then closed again, eventually driving him into exile. Literature and other arts, notably film, revived in Czechoslovakia during the 1960s, despite the heavy-handedness of the Communist regime. The Party itself succumbed to reformers determined to install "socialism with a human face" in January 1968, when Alexander Dubček became its first secretary. Censorship was abolished during the wave of reforms known as the Prague Spring, and it was restored soon after the Soviet invasion in August. A year earlier, in June 1967, the Authors Union held a congress, which in retrospect looks like a prelude to the Prague Spring. Kundera and other writers used it as a forum to demand greater freedom. In his address to the congress, Kundera invoked literature as the vital force behind "the very existence of the nation," "the answer to the nation's existential question," and he denounced censorship, after quoting Voltaire, in the language of natural rights:

For the truth can only be reached by a dialogue of free opinions enjoying equal rights. Any interference with freedom of thought and word, however discreet the mechanics and terminology of such censorship, is a scandal in this century, a chain entangling the limbs of our national literature as it tries to bound forward.

Could such a statement appear in print? Literární noviny, the Czech equivalent of Novy Mir, intended to publish it with the proceedings of the congress, including a resolution to abolish censorship. This was too much for the censors in the "Central Publishing Board," which resembled the HV of East Germany. They refused to let the issue go to press and summoned the editor of Literární noviny, Dusan Hamsik, along with members of its editorial board to meet with them and Frantisek Havlícek, head of the Central Committee's Ideological Department, the Czech counterpart to the Culture Division in the Central Committee of the GDR. According to Hamsik's account, the meeting turned into a hard-fought struggle over every article in the issue, above all the text of Kundera's speech. Kundera himself was present, and he wrangled with Havlícek, line by line, fighting over every clause and comma. He could not simply refuse to negotiate, because the writers wanted their manifesto to be published and to reinforce the public's resistance to Stalinism. He won some points and lost others, insisting all the while on "the absurdity of censoring a text that protested against all censorship." In the end, he managed to save nearly everything that he had written. But when he left the meeting, he was miserable. "Why did I knuckle under?" he complained to Hamsik. "I let them make a complete idiot of me….Every compromise is a dirty compromise." Soon afterward, the Party Central Committee phoned to say that it could not accept the compromise after all. The proceedings were never published. And Kundera was enormously relieved.

In Hamsik's description of this episode, Kundera appears as "a difficult customer," a writer of such unbending commitment to his art that he felt sickened by any degree of complicity with the political authorities. When the crisis came, however, he was willing, like Solzhenitsyn, to trim his prose in order to break the Party's hold on literature. He, too, understood literature as a force that forged the national identity, although he associated it more broadly with the rise of European civilization. It had such transcendent importance for him, in fact, that he could not stomach the negotiation and compromise that determined literary life in all Stalinist regimes. By making him complicit in its tyranny, even when he resisted, it violated his sense of his self.

The inner sense of wounded integrity also comes through Norman Manea's account of his dealings with the censors in Communist Romania during the 1980s, when Nicolae Ceaușescu had established a totalitarian regime outside the sphere of the Soviet Union. Manea insists on the "human reality" on both sides of the power divide—corrupt and canny officials pursuing their own ends within the state and ambitious authors, trying to advance their careers in a system dominated completely by the Party. As one of the authors, Manea hoped to make a breakthrough with his novel The Black Envelope, which contained some carefully oblique criticism of the totalitarianism around him. Owing to the fiction that censorship had been abolished, he did not receive the censor's report on his book, only a copy of the text that the censor had vetted. About 80 percent of it was marked for deletion or revision, without any accompanying explanations. Manea struggled to puzzle out the objections and rewrote the text extensively, then submitted it through his publisher, as before. The rewritten version was rejected, again without an explanation.

There seemed to be no way out of this impasse, until the publisher took a chance. He sent the text to an "outside" reader, a retired veteran of the censorship system whom he knew through his contacts in the human network that got things done behind the façades of the official institutions. Coming from a non-censor, this censor's report could be shown to Manea. It gave a penetrating and intelligent reading of the book and proposed major changes. Painful as they were, Manea adopted the recommendations of his "shrewd censor-teacher," for they represented his only hope of continuing to exist in the world of literature. The strategy worked, the edition sold out, and in the wake of its success, Manea was forced into exile. In 1988, he emigrated to America, where he discovered "freedom"—not an order unbound by constraints, but a complex system that required compromises of its own, including some imposed by "the harsh laws of the marketplace." While acknowledging the hard realities of exercising freedom in a democracy, Manea insisted on the distinctions that made it fundamentally different from what he had experienced in Romania. When he looked back on the cuts he had accepted in The Black Envelope, he did not regret the excision of critical passages so much as the whole process of compromise and complicity, and the toll it took on him. In the end, he concluded, "The censor's office won."

Danilo Kiš underwent a similar experience in Communist Yugoslavia, although Stalinism there took a milder form. When he reflected on his attempts to cope with censorship, he stressed its invisible character—the informal pressures exerted by publishers and editors, who acted as censors while exercising their professional functions, and, above all, the pervasive power of self-censorship. The inner, self-appointed censor, he wrote, is the writer's double, "a double who leans over his shoulder and interferes with the text in statu nascendi, keeping him from making an ideological misstep. It is impossible to win out against this censor-double; he is like God, he knows all and sees all, because he comes out of your own brain, your own fears, your own nightmares."

When exiles from the Soviet system invoked "freedom" and "truth," they were not appealing to the protection of the First Amendment or speaking as philosophers. They were using words to describe their experience of censorship as a force operating in specific circumstances, a force that determined the nature of literature in an oppressive political system. "Freedom of speech" served as a standard against which to measure the oppression. It did not apply to constraints of all kinds, although many kinds had weighed on the lives of the writers. Freedom for them was a principle made meaningful by the experience of its violation. Experiences varied, of course, and the variations make it hopeless to search for a general proposition that would encompass all of them, including some that have been studied up close, such as censorship under apartheid in South Africa. They also understood that literature in what Westerners called the "free world" suffered from constraints. Does their experience argue for a relativistic notion of freedom?

To take seriously the testimony of writers who were silenced or who silenced themselves under Stalinist regimes is not, however, to equate their experience with that of anyone who finds it difficult to publish a book. Nor is it to conflate twentieth-century modes of silencing with ways of stifling voices in other times and places. Historians are not equipped to tote up degrees of iniquity in different periods of the past. But we cannot avoid making value judgments, and we should be able to recognize the way our values shade our understanding, just as we acknowledge the conceptual framework that shapes it. Rather than facing either/or alternatives, I would prefer to shift the ground of the debate.

An ethnographic view of censorship treats it holistically, as a system of control, which pervades institutions, colors human relations, and reaches into the hidden workings of the soul. In studying its operations, I have learned to acquire greater respect for principles that I share with other citizens in our peculiar part of the world and our moment in history. I understand that the First Amendment does not extend beyond the jurisdictional limits of the US Constitution, but I believe in the right to freedom of speech with all the fervor of my fellow citizens, despite the scorn of sophisticates who deride "First Amendment pieties." While attempting understanding, one must take a stand, especially today, when the state may be watching every move we make.


Adapted from the conclusion to Robert Darnton's Censors at Work: How States Shaped Literature, which will be published by W. W. Norton on September 22. Copyright 2014, Robert Darnton.

September 17, 2014, 3:42 p.m. 
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This Is What It Was Like To Be the Book Censor for All of New England in 1930 "I

This Is What It Was Like To Be the Book Censor for All of New England in 1930 "I've read more dirty books than any man in New England."

By

To mark its 100th anniversary, The New Republic is republishing a collection of its most memorable articles. This week's theme: Banned books.

This piece originally appeared in The New Republic on April 2, 1930.

He was a small man, not running much over five feet five, but I was physically very much aware of him. He gave off a confusion of qualities which would have put a dog in ecstasies but which can only puzzle a man. His hair was of that slick black kind—combed like a boy's on the side and a little ragged at the extremities—that strongly suggests baldness underneath. Forehead and chin were vertically cleft along the line of a rather flat nose and contrasted with a wide, tight, succulently red mouth. A floppy black Windsor tie dragged on his chest. He wore no coat. A vest buttoned once at the bottom enclosed a yellow and green plaid shirt and supported a mildly straining belly. The pants were dark, wrinkled at the crotch and baggy at the knees. I did not much notice his hands at the time, but I recall that they were muscular and very hairy, and that the left one incongruously exposed a large signet ring. Altogether, I could not keep my eyes off him.

Nor could I have done so in any wise while I remembered his office. He was, this small man, censor of printed matter for an eastern port. As I had had the most excellent reasons to know during my years in the book business, his authority was practically supreme, his opinions irreversible, and his taste above impeachment. It was this authority which had brought me to his office. He was representing, for me, the benevolent side of bureaucracy, for he had agreed to return a certain book to England instead of confiscating it. I was representing my old employer, who was too busy that morning to come in himself. I had brought with me, by the censor's instructions, string, paper, corrugated cardboard, and an addressed label: these the government does not furnish those it favors.

Our initial contact was pleasant. He had the book on his desk, all ready for me, and very agreeably got me some sealing wax and glue. While I was doing up the bundle and burning my fingers on the melting wax, I reflected on the innocuous character of the book in question. It was a volume in a series called The Art of Eastern Love. The series was mostly composed of translation and paraphrase of various Indian texts, and circulated, I knew, freely enough in England. I wondered if perhaps it had not been banned largely on account of its inflammatory title; so I asked him what he found wrong with it. He was eager to talk.

"It's too blasé," he said; and for the rest of the time I was there I had nothing to do but prompt him occasionally. He had the great merit of believing, in his own way, in the dignity of his job and in his own qualifications therefore. "It's too blasé," he repeated. "It's not as bad as some; it's not nearly so bad as a good many. I thought it was dull, myself. But it treats a sacred subject in a blasé way, and nothing like that can get by me. You ought to see the stuff that comes in here. You ought to have the opportunity to see the vile, filthy stuff that comes in here. There's no doubt about it, it's filthy. I read it all and I know. But," he said, drawing himself up a little and raising his voice, "none of it gets by me. The kind of books you fellows get, I mean the ones you don't get, are sweet and virtuous beside the ones I'm thinking of. You can't imagine the vile stuff they try and get in."

I said I thought I could imagine very well, and asked him if he had ever felt that so much contact with filth had not perhaps injured him a little. Had he ever felt the beginning of corruption? He looked at me sharply, and then spoke softly, "Listen," he said. "I'm speaking in my official capacity. As a human being it's different. As a human being I get a big kick out of some of those books. I get a thrill. I'm not any different from the next man." He paused, with a reminiscent illumination on his face. "I been here at this job six years now. I used to hit the high spots. I suppose I've read more dirty books than any man in New England, and I could make the biggest collection of erotica in this country if I wanted to. Why, in the last two years I've seized 272 different titles—thousands of volumes—and I've read them all."

Then, with a genuinely persuasive pathos, he went on. "If everybody was like you and me everything would be all right; that is, it would if we could keep things to ourselves. But you know how it is. You'd do it yourself. I do it myself. As a human being I get a pretty big thrill out of this stuff. I read a dirty book and if it's any good I get a kick. But what do I do? Do I keep it to myself? No. I pick out the juicy spots and tell my friends about them. I hand it around and circulate it. It's only natural. You'd do the same. The same with a dirty picture. If it's got its good points, it's real hot, you want to show it off. Of course you do. Everybody does. I do it myself. And that's just where the trouble comes in. You know and I know that sort of thing can't go on. That sort of stuff gets into the hands of young boys and girls—and what happens? They're too innocent and too immature to handle it the way you and I do, so their minds get polluted. Why sometimes…" He paused; his eyes beaded and glistened. "Why, sometimes it's the contact of innocence with this filthy stuff that sinks a boy into foul habits for a lifetime. Naturally the government steps in here; and that's my job. I don't let anything get by me if I can help it. I act in my official capacity and there's an end to it. But I just wanted you to know I'm a human being."

"Of course," he went on—and somehow the more he talked the more rasping his voice seemed—"there's books and books. I don't see anything wrong, personally, with a book like Balzac's Droll Stories. Those are what you might call snappy stories, that's all. I don't mind them, and mostly I let them get by, especially if they're going to a reputable house. There's some editions that are illustrated, though, and the pictures are too hot. They make a raw book out of it. That makes a difference, and I have to call a halt there. And Straponola, there's nothing wrong with that. Droll Stories and Straponola, those are just snappy stories, and that's all—that is, the best of them. I wish they were all like that."

The gesture was not mightily convincing and had a small air of oratory. I said he must have some difficulty in deciding whether or not to confiscate a particular book. He answered with surprising confidence.

"Oh no. As a matter of fact, I find it easier all the time. It's much easier now than it used to be. You see, well," he said, and then, with that pleased look people wear when proposing conundrums, he asked if I were married, and after my negative he went on: "Well, I am, and that makes a big difference. You'd be surprised. I've been married quite a while now, and the work gets easier all the time. You'll find out what I mean when you get married yourself. I mean you'll be able to decide things like this much better. Why, before I was married, sometimes I'd go easy on the stuff. But marriage makes a big difference. You learn what things are and what they aren't."

I missed the point and inquired if he might not be more explicit. How exactly did his domestic economy affect his judgment of books? How exactly would he decide upon a book in any given instance? It would seem to me, I said, very difficult to devise a system which would apply to more than one book—books being so very different among themselves and serving such contradictory purposes. In any event I admired his courage.

He took me up quickly, gleefully, with that assurance which substitutes in public life for spontaneity as well as for the more intellectual virtues. "It's easy," said he, "and takes no courage. I just figure out whether I can read the book aloud in mixed company. If I can, it gets by; if I can't, it don't, and that's all. You don't need to go any further."

I could not help imagining this small, energetic man in the middle of a great mixed circle of spinster aunts and avuncular beards—all on squeaky wooden benches—reading aloud form, say, the Ulysses of James Joyce. So satisfying was this image that I very nearly kept the peace; but I did offer a trifling suggestion on the ground that some books were what was called literature.

"Literature!" he said, and in his mouth it was an expletive of magnificent proportions, an exhaustive, bursting flatulence. "Literature! Don't speak to me about literature! Or classics." I have not heard a word sound more thoroughly obscene than this simple, if controversial, word "classics." He went on: "Yes, I know. People come in here and they call up and they write letters and try and tell me a thing is literature. I know the argument." He put on a finicky tone. "'You can't suppress this book because it is part of our classic heritage….' That's tripe. Why, I've had people come in here and tell me that Aristophanes' Lysistrata is a classic. It's a treatise on pederasty. Pederasty." He spat the word at me.

I said I thought the play was a little more than that. "No," he said shortly, "that's all it is: pederasty. But I've had worse books than that called classics. Book you never even heard of. Do you know what a classic is? No. Well, I'll tell you. And it's straight. A classic is a dirty book somebody is trying to get by me."

"As for literature. I'm a student of literature myself. I enjoy good literature, and when I Was younger I took a course in comparative literature myself. So you see, I know what I'm talking about. And if somebody don't like what I say, why they can take it to the Secretary of the Treasury, and maybe, by the time thy get through, they'll learn better."

At this point I reminded him that a few months previously Candide had been refused entry, and that later the ban had been raised. Indignant innocence—or was it hurt pride?—raised a husky voice.

"Some swell banker friend of Mellon's put up a howl. That's why that's that. But it don't happen often. There's very times I get overruled, very few times. I can count them. But about Candide, I'll tell you. For years we've been letting that book get by. There were so many different editions, all sizes and kinds, some illustrated and some plain, that we figured the book must be all right. Then one of us happened to read it. It's a filthy book, and I think the ruling ought to have been upheld. And it would have been if that banker fellow hadn't got into it."

As light-heartedly as I could, I mentioned to him the vote taken in the Senate at the instance of the Senator from New Mexico, and suggested that if the action were sustained he might shortly be out of a job, as the censorship of books on the ground of obscenity would then be altogether removed from the tariff.

He was very confident on this matter. "It won't go through. If the Senate doesn't reverse itself, the House will take care of it. The Senate just wasn't thinking what it was about. If that got through everything would be upset and we wouldn't know where we were at. I said so myself to my own Senator. On Armistice Day after his speech, I went up to him and I said, 'Bill, did you know what you were voting for when you voted to amend that book section in the tariff?' He looked at me kind of funny. Then he smiled and said no, he guessed he didn't. 'Well,' he said, 'I'll tell you. You voted to overturn the whole machinery of government. You voted to change the whole procedure of the courts.' I don't think he'll vote the same the next time it comes up."

There was on question I had been very much wanting to ask him, but had been afraid of the answer the oracle might give. He seemed in such a pleasant mood after the story about Senator Bill that I thought I might risk it, at least in a declarative form. So I described my experience over a term of five years in the book business with the demand for such books as his office had refused entry. Bankers, lawyers, scholars, men both socially and professionally reputable, I said, almost exclusively made up the list of customers. Much better men, I said, than either he or I, as I was sure he would admit. Should not their taste and knowledge, their position and reputation, be given some consideration in matters of this kind? Why should we except their judgment on this point alone?

He was ready for me. My verbosity had but let him gather breath. "That's just where you find the dirtiest minds, in the men higher up. I know. When I was younger, I used to hit the high spots. I used to go all round. I've seen all kinds of people. And I never saw a workingman, anyone who worked for a living, who was a pervert. It was all the other kind, men higher up, wealthy men, bankers and lawyers. You work for a living and you'll be all right. I know. I tell you I've seen them all.  The wealthy class is full of perverts. Look at me," he cried, shoving his hands in my face. "Did you ever see a pervert with dirty hands? Did you?"

I looked quickly down and made sure mine were gloved; else I had been suspect. Again he said it, with a ferocious intonation. "Did you ever see a pervert with dirty hands?"

Though we could not agree on this point, we parted amicably. As I walked up the street I looked into the windows and wondered. And I also wondered whether it was because Utah is so far from any customs office that Senator Smoot is enabled to speak so righteously of censorship in the tariff. 

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Thursday, September 25, 2014

The top 10 walks in books

The top 10 walks in books

From Laurie Lee's departure for Spain one sunny morning to Flora's unfortunate sexual odyssey in Cold Comfort Farm, Duncan Minshull chooses the best literary journeys on foot

Read more writers' top 10s

Stroll on … the Bennets take the country air in the 2005 film adaptation of Pride and Prejudice. Photograph: Everett Collection/Rex

I've always been a walker. Age 10, it was the Sunday outing (family bonding); age 13, it was getting away from home (rebellion); and, as a student of 20, I tramped everywhere (no money).

Later I began examining the activity, which meant writing about it, and after that I corralled 200 walkers and their journeys into an anthology, just re-published as While Wandering. This contains characters from fiction, as well as passages from memoirs, plays and poetry. The purpose of the book was to shed some light on our desire to travel by foot.

John Hillaby said he had no idea why he walked, despite crossing deserts, roaming the length of Britain, and writing great books about it all. Funny, I've always believed the opposite. There are a thousand and one reasons for setting out, be they physical, psychological or spiritual, rational or bonkers. I like to think that the following people might inspire us to hit the road, too.

1. A Letter to Henrietta Lund from Søren Kierkegaard

Numerous philosophers have walked and wondered. Kierkegaard did so in countryside near Copenhagen, and suggested that it might be good for his niece, Jette, to do likewise. Prompting her in 1847, he came up with a notion I repeat on my own travels: "I walk myself into a state of wellbeing, and walk away from every illness." (I don't care if people look at me oddly either.)

2. As I Walked Out One Midsummer Morning by Laurie Lee

Lee's memoir about travelling through Spain towards the Spanish civil war is an enduring favourite. I love the beginning as he waves goodbye to his mother on a Sunday morning in Gloucestershire, heading for London. There is early sunshine and youthful optimism, tinged with trepidation. Plus a chunk of cheese and some treacle biscuits in the bag. What a way to go!

3. Pride and Prejudice by Jane Austen

Austen sent her fictional characters across fields and down lanes. In her most famous novel, she dispatches Elizabeth Bennet outdoors to show how she's different from other young women of her class and, crucially, that she can act for herself. Elizabeth gets muddy, her cheeks "glow", and all this happens away from arid society drawing rooms. Out and about she'll also meet Mr Darcy. Enough said.

4. The Shoe Breaker by Daniel Boulanger

In this short story, Pinceloup has a specialist's job. He's paid to wear in the new shoes of the nobility and does so by clomping around the streets of 18th-century Paris. He has softened more than 12,000 pairs, roughly one pair per morning. But now he's up against it with some dress shoes purchased and passed to him by the Baron Petit-Chablis. They are extra rigid, they require extra miles, and Pinceloup is already exhausted. The reader can't help but feel sorry for this urban stroller.

5. On the Black Hill by Bruce Chatwin

This isn't a novel about walking, but there is a network of walks running through it, taking in the gorgeous, lush, rolling landscape of the Shropshire-Powys borders. One character, out with his girl, realises his luck is in and destiny beckons when behind him "she planted her footsteps in his".

6. Of Walking in Ice by Werner Herzog

Herzog the film-maker was friends with Bruce Chatwin. They even talked about walking together. Before that, in 1974, another of Herzog's friends was ailing in Paris, so during a freezing November he set off from Munich to arrive at her bedside. He believed this solitary hike would "will" her back to good health. But did it work? The diary of his journey is as otherworldly as his renowned films.

7. Spandau: The Secret Diaries by Albert Speer

While incarcerated, Hitler's architect described how he succeeded in walking around much of the world, from Europe to Asia, though not by way of China. China, a communist state, had to be avoided. How did he do this? Well, he left his cell for a small prison garden and imagined that every step he took there stood for so many hundreds of miles. It was an exercise of will and an antidote against "endless boredom". You could say that writing about it made Speer an early psychogeographer.

8. The Old Ways by Robert Macfarlane

Go for a walk and take his most recent book with you. Macfarlane captures the age-old rituals of a simple activity, and effortlessly evokes the landscapes he moves through in England, Europe and the Middle East. He is clear-sighted and, like Herzog, open to those strangenesses encountered on the road ahead.

9. Cold Comfort Farm by Stella Gibbons

Collecting material for While Wandering, I found that the early 20th century was a heyday for rambling in Britain – which also meant lots of knickerbockered bores going on about the miles covered and equipment used. In Gibbons' satire, one of these types, Mr Mybug, rambles with Flora the heroine. But his points of reference are all sexual, with phallic symbols looming everywhere: buds are nipples, hills are breasts, hollows are navels … Yes, that'll do. And it's enough for Flora as well, who later vows to walk in solitude. Sometimes the world of walking is easy to spoof.

10. Modern Utopia by HG Wells

I started this list with a mantra, and will end with one. I haven't read many of his novels, but there's a line from one of the non-fiction works that I'll happily take to my deathbed: "There will be many footpaths in Utopia."

• Duncan Minshull is the editor of While Wandering, published by Vintage.

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Should Writers Avoid Sentimentality?

Should Writers Avoid Sentimentality?

SEPT. 23, 2014

Each week in Bookends, two writers take on questions about the world of books. Roland Barthes said, "It is no longer the sexual which is indecent, it is the sentimental." This week, Zoë Heller and Leslie Jamison debate whether sentimentailty is a cardinal sin for writers.

By Zoë Heller

Sentimental fiction is a kind of pablum: Excessive amounts can spoil the appetite for reality, or at least for more fibrous forms of art.

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Zoë Heller Credit Illustration by R. Kikuo Johnson
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From time to time, a writer rises up to chastise our modern squeamishness about sentimentality. In "A Lover's Discourse," Barthes claims we have grown so chilly and clever that we can no longer speak of love without putting the word in mocking quotation marks. Nabokov makes a similar point in his lecture on "Bleak House," when he warns his students against sneering at Dickens's descriptions of orphaned children: "I want to submit that people who denounce the sentimental are generally unaware of what sentiment is. . . . Dickens's great art should not be mistaken for a cockney version of the seat of emotion — it is the real thing."

Neither Barthes nor Nabokov is really defending sentimentality in the contemporary, pejorative sense of the word, however. Both men are invoking an earlier, 18th-century definition — the quality of having or appealing to tender feelings — and urging us not to let our contempt for soppy or cheap appeals to sentiment spill over onto the sentiments themselves. They are surely right: We ought not to become so preening and protective of our rational, modern selves that we end up snickering indiscriminately at any nonironic appeal to human emotion. But this is not to say we should cease to criticize the soppy, cheap stuff — the "cockney version" of sentiment — when we come across it.

As it happens, I think Nabokov is wrong about Dickens's depictions of orphans in "Bleak House": They are sentimental — not because they set out to inspire our pity, but because they insist on idealizing and prettifying what is to be pitied. The distinctive characteristic of sentimental art is not, as is sometimes claimed, that it "manipulates" (all art does this in some measure) but that it manipulates by knowingly simplifying, Photoshopping or otherwise distorting the human experience it purports to represent. It isn't sentimental for Dickens to want us to feel compassion for Jo, the homeless street sweeper; it is sentimental for Dickens to try to secure that compassion by making Jo more virtuous, humble and forbearing than any boy who ever lived.

This sort of pandering to, or babying of, one's audience may not be sinful, exactly. But it isn't entirely without moral hazard either. Sentimental fiction is a kind of pablum: Excessive amounts can spoil the appetite for reality, or at least for more fibrous forms of art. One reason, surely, why readers throw down books when they don't contain sufficiently "likable" characters is that their tolerance for any sort of moral challenge — for being asked, say, to sympathize with homeless little boys who are godless and truculent and a bit smelly — has been eroded by too many fairy tales masquerading as adult literature.

Fairy tales can be immensely pleasurable and affecting, of course. But the fact that they often succeed in making us cry or smile or sigh ought not to inhibit our criticism of their falsehoods. I always weep at the scene in "Bleak House" in which Jo the street sweeper dies, reciting the Lord's Prayer. (I am also inclined to blub at "The Notebook," "Steel Magnolias," "Beaches" and most of the Carpenters' songbook.) And in spite — or perhaps precisely because of — my lachrymal responses, I reserve the right to be conscious and critical of the ways in which these works achieve their effects. If I point out that their portrayals of love, friendship, marriage, sex and death traduce or euphemize everything I understand to be the truth about those phenomena, I am not being a hypocrite. I am merely confessing, with a certain sense of wonder, to having been sold a bill of goods.

Zoë Heller is the author of three novels: "Everything You Know"; "Notes on a Scandal," which was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize and adapted for film; and "The Believers." She has written feature articles and criticism for a wide range of publications, including The New Yorker, The New Republic and The New York Review of Books.

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By Leslie Jamison

I would argue that one of the deep unspoken fears beneath the sentimentality taboo is really the fear of commonality.

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Leslie Jamison Credit Illustration by R. Kikuo Johnson

My first negative review came from my college counselor, who wasn't sure about the essay I'd planned on submitting with my applications. It was an account of my relationship with the little girl I'd spent four years babysitting; she'd gotten cancer when she was 5 years old, while her mother was undergoing chemotherapy for a tumor of her own. The essay came across as a little melodramatic, my counselor warned, and I can't remember if she used the word "sentimental" but that's the word that comes to mind now — the best name for an admonition that would become, for me, a kind of running commentary from the peanut gallery, a constant specter of judgment.

I wrote about my relationship with that little girl for simple reasons: She was important to me and her illness had made me feel powerless. These weren't unusual thoughts and feelings — the world isn't fair; I can't do anything about it — but they were powerful ones. Also, I couldn't shake certain memories: the antiseptic tang of her hospital ward, the pale powder-white of her small bald head, the wrongness of an IV disappearing into the crook of her tiny arm.

But, my counselor told me, Harvard didn't want sob stories that were too — too what? I was made to feel there was something unseemly and even opportunistic about what I'd done. This shame took root as an abiding paranoia that I would mishandle emotions in my writing by inflating or exploiting them — that I'd conscript them in service of my own authorial ego, my desire to produce writing that moved people.

The fear of being too sentimental — writing or even liking sentimental work — shadowed the next decade of my life. The fear was so ingrained in me it became difficult to tell where outside voices ended and internal ones began. But the whole time I wasn't entirely sure what I was afraid of: What was the difference between a sentimental story and a courageously emotive one? We dismiss sentimentality so fully — so instinctively — that we no longer bother justifying the dismissal, or mapping its edges. But it's a useful question: What kind of failure does sentimentality represent? How can it be judged?

Resisting sentimentality means resisting exaggeration and oversimplification; it means resisting flat tragedy and crude emotional manipulation — the cheapening of feeling, the pulling of heartstrings. But I would argue that one of the deep unspoken fears beneath the sentimentality taboo is really the fear of commonality: the fear of being just like everyone else or telling a story just like everyone else's. Nabokov's definition of philistinism gets at something similar: "Philistinism implies not only a collection of stock ideas but also the use of set phrases, clichés, banalities expressed in faded words."

It's worth remembering, of course, that we all have the same stories to tell, and that refusing our commonality is as dangerous as conforming to it too much. It's a fitting irony that Madame Bovary, whose tragic selfishness offers a kind of cautionary tale about the dangers of excessive sentimentality, is also motivated by a fear of commonality. Her attachment to sentimental narratives is fueled by an obsessive desire to separate herself from her surroundings; and our resistance to sentimentality is also fueled by an obsessive attachment to distinction — to the notion that narratives must distinguish themselves through particularity and complication. It's a way of adhering to Pound's old modernist saw: Make it new. Sentimentality is taboo, in part, because it keeps it old. Keeps it trite. Keeps it banal.

But many sentimental narratives have been deeply moving to many people, and it's worth thinking about the things that make them compelling: their emotional intensity, their sense of stakes and values and feeling and friction, their investment in primal truths and predicaments — yes, common; yes, shared. Sentimentality is simply emotion shying away from its own full implications. Behind every sentimental narrative there's the possibility of another one — more richly realized, more faithful to the fine grain and contradictions of human experience.

Leslie Jamison is the author of an essay collection, "The Empathy Exams," winner of the Graywolf Press Nonfiction Prize. Her first novel, "The Gin Closet," was a finalist for the Los Angeles Times Art Seidenbaum Award for First Fiction; and her essays and stories have been published in numerous publications, including Harper's, The Oxford American, A Public Space and The Believer.

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Why Good People Write Bad Prose

Why Good People Write Bad Prose

Steven Pinker brings science to Strunk and White

By · Illustration by
From the October 2014 magazine
Illustration by Benoit Tardif

Not long ago on an Air Canada plane, half-asleep at 35,000 feet, I was roused by a perky flight attendant asking, over and over, "Something from the OnBoard Café? " Her words conjured the mirage, behind the first-class curtain, of rows of plump sandwiches and pastries and a big, hissing espresso machine. It took me a moment to realize that the OnBoard Café was actually the dinky little cart she was pushing up the aisle. Her script, of course, was more effective than "Something from my dinky little cart? " but I was irritated nonetheless.

As Steven Pinker observes in his latest book, The Sense of Style, it's fashionable in this iPhone age to bemoan the decline of language. Fashionable, but hardly new. Grumbling about this deterioration goes "at least as far back as the invention of the printing press," he points out, adding that language "is not a protocol legislated by an authority but rather a wiki that pools the contributions of millions of writers and speakers, who ceaselessly bend the language to their needs."

In fact, he argues, we've become more literate as the written word, albeit of the two-thumbed variety, has supplanted oral communication. Thanks to technology, everyone's now a writer; and college students, he's found, "are writing more than their counterparts in earlier generations did" and "make no more errors per page."

The great pleasure of Pinker's book is his painstaking dissection of the many ways in which language both serves and fails us. A Montreal-born McGill alumnus who went on to glory at MIT and Harvard, the experimental psychologist has mastered the public intellectual's art of adapting scientific inquiry for popular audiences. His research has been widely honoured, his books have been bestsellers, and he chairs The American Heritage Dictionary's usage panel. He's interested in how we acquire language; how it reveals and alters the workings of the mind; and how we use it and, especially, misuse it.

As anyone with an inbox can attest, misused language abounds, and misunderstanding follows. Much of this misunderstanding, Pinker says, flows from what he calls "the Curse of Knowledge"—the writer's difficulty in conceiving what it's like for readers not to know something she knows. He's referring mainly to jargon, shorthand, and specialized vocabulary, the use of which he calls the "single best explanation I know of why good people write bad prose." This seemed to me a great oversimplification until I asked someone I'd just met what he did for a living. He said he was "managing director, digital" at a public relations firm.

"I don't really know what that means."

"I'm a digital and social-media strategist," he explained. "I deliver programs, products, and strategies to our corporate clients across the spectrum of communications functions."

"Sorry to be a doofus, but pretend I'm ten years old. What do you do all day? "

"I teach big companies how to use Facebook."

There. Quite simple, really, but arrived at only after my insistence on my ignorance. Ever tried explaining baseball to a Brit who's never even seen a game? You quickly realize how much you take for granted. Ever tried to make sense of a manual written by Korean automotive engineers who use terms such as "stoichiometric ratio"? They're not showing off arcane knowledge or cloaking themselves in grandeur; they just assume you know what they're talking about.

In his earlier books, such as The Stuff of Thought and The Language Instinct, Pinker used a vast trove of academic studies to refute Benjamin Lee Whorf's famous—and once widely accepted—hypothesis that language determines the nature of thought; that we all live, as Nietzsche put it, in "the prison house of language." Pinker dismantled this notion of linguistic determinism by showing, among other things, that differences in thinking (how we count, how we orient ourselves in the world) are not generally caused by our words but rather by other factors, and merely reflected in our speech.

The Sense of Style further investigates the links between language and thought, and does so in ways that offer practical benefits to anyone wishing to become a better writer. Pinker contends that a "hunger for coherence [drives] the entire process of understanding language." Is it really as simple as "Whenever one sentence comes after another, readers need to see a connection between them"? He makes a persuasive case. What he calls "coherence connectives"—despite, because, however, therefore, nonetheless, and so forth—are, he maintains, "the unsung heroes of lucid prose" and "the cement of reasoning."

Pinker found that underperforming high school students tend to be flummoxed by the challenge of stringing together coherent sentences. A program that trained them to construct arguments, with an emphasis on the connection between successive ideas, dramatically improved their performance. As for troublesome passages in the hundreds of things I've written, and the thousands of pieces I've edited, the problem is, indeed, usually one of coherence: How does this sentence relate to those that precede it? Why are you telling me this now? Where are we going?

This hunger for coherence has important implications. As Pinker shows, the letter sequence m-d-p-h-d-r-s-v-p-c-e-o-i-h-o-p is difficult to remember, though not when chunked as md-phd-rsvp-ceo-ihop. Each chunk contains subsets of meaning; if these unfold coherently, the reader makes sense of them; complexity is rendered into manageable bits. That helps explain how a memory expert dazzles 100 audience members by recalling their names, and it's what makes even a detailed text with a clear hierarchical structure easy for the reader to assimilate: "At any level of granularity, from clauses to chapters, the passage can be represented in the reader's mind as a single chunk, and the reader never has to juggle more than a few chunks at a time as he figures out how they are related."

It's fascinating to learn the science that underlies the stylistic techniques good writers seem to intuit—for example, a list is most easily grasped if the bulkiest item comes at the end (life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness ; or The Wild, The Innocent, and The E Street Shuffle; or Faster than a speeding bullet! More powerful than a locomotive! Able to leap tall buildings in a single bound!). "Light-before-heavy is one of the oldest principles in linguistics," Pinker writes, "having been discovered in the fourth century BCE by the Sanskrit grammarian Pānini." Why? Because the mind must hold the early items in suspension before incorporating the final one, and it's easier to retain simple things than more complex elements.

Much of Pinker's research leads naturally to prescriptive advice; the book doubles as a manual worthy of a place on a shelf just below Fowler's Modern English Usage and Strunk and White's The Elements of Style. "Many experiments have shown that readers understand and remember material far better when it is expressed in concrete language that allows them to form visual images," Pinker tells us. (This explains why white Econoline van is preferable to getaway car; and a mound of flowers, balloons, and teddy bears is more effective than impromptu roadside memorial.) Or this: "It's good for a writer to work with the ongoing newsreel in readers' minds and describe events in chronological order." He showered and put on his new suit before he went to dinner is easier to understand than He went to dinner after he showered and put on his new suit. Similarly, positive statements are more readily grasped than negative ones, and so negation should not be used for no good reason. (That's a joke.) And my favourite Pinkerism of all, the undisputed first rule of worthwhile prose: "a writer has to have both something to talk about (a topic) and something to say (the point)." Are you listening, bloggers of the world?

Language, Pinker reminds us, is always evolving. Silly meant "pious" long before it came to mean "foolish," and the latest edition of Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of English Usage includes a new definition of literally as a mere indicator of emphasis, like "very." Why, then, do I cringe when someone uses fulsome to mean "full," or incredulous to mean "incredible"? If enough people misuse a word, again and again, they're redefining it. In the age of Tim Hortons and Hells Angels, why learn the difference between its and it's? What's an apostrophe here or there? As long as people know what you mean, why bother with rules and conventions at all?

Because clarity and consistency are not the same as needless pedantry; nor is grammar, as Pinker argues elsewhere, "an ordeal of jargon and drudgery," but rather "one of the extraordinary adaptations in the living world: our species' solution to the problem of getting complicated thoughts from one head into another." Syntax he describes as "an app that uses a tree of phrases to translate a web of thoughts into a string of words." (It's a helpful simile, but if you find the accompanying schematics tedious, it's easy enough to skip over them.) The evolution of style and usage doesn't obviate the need for consensual guidelines about what's correct and what's sloppy or erroneous. Today's rules will eventually change; until they do, them's the rules.

Inadvertent miscommunication is one thing; in Pinker's next book, I'd love to gain a fuller understanding of how the calculated misuse of language turns nonsense into received wisdom. How, by drawing clear pictures and eliciting visceral responses, do advertisers and propagandists persuade people of things that are patently untrue? That a dinky cart is an OnBoard Café, for example, or that North Korea is the greatest country on earth? Why, if you repeat a falsehood often enough (I've saved Toronto taxpayers a billion dollars), does it grow less false in people's minds? How does it become part of a Scientologist's beliefs that, 75 million years ago, a galactic tyrant brought billions of people to Earth in spacecraft resembling DC-8s? By what psychological and neurolinguistic means does the careful deployment—and deliberate distortion—of language lead to atrocities large and small?

The 2014 Mazda3, we're told, is "a game changer." Really? If you could drive it right onto the tarmac, flip a switch, and fly it to Winnipeg, now that would be a game changer. The waves of hyperbolic, distorted language that wash over us every waking hour numb us to the deeper, more troubling currents that replace global warming with the somewhat less alarming climate change, or massive layoffs with optimization, or incinerated schoolchildren with collateral damage.

As Humpty Dumpty tells Alice: "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." Now there's an epigram for our times. Call me old-fashioned, but when a sportscaster uses words meaning just what he chooses them to mean—The Blue Jays were literally on fire in late July—I want to unspool a firehose and use it not just to douse the flames but to soak the announcer as well, for his casual disservice to the language Steven Pinker so artfully examines, explains, and celebrates.

Gary Stephen Ross is acting senior editor with The Walrus, based in Vancouver.Benoit Tardif published Sport-o-rama, a children's book, in June.
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Radical Linguistics in an Age of Extinction

Radical Linguistics in an Age of Extinction

Pieter Bruegel the Elder, The Tower of Babel, 1563

. . . words are a way of fending in the world: whole languages, like species, can disappear without dropping a gram of earth weight, and symbolic systems to a fare you well can be added without filling a ditch or thimble. . . .

—A.R. Ammons

Modern linguistics is founded on a radical premise: the equality of all languages. "All languages have equal expressive power as communication systems," writes Steven Pinker. "Every grammar is equally complex and logical and capable of producing an infinite set of sentences to express any thought one might wish to express," says a recent textbook. "The outstanding fact about any language is its formal completeness," wrote Edward Sapir, adding elsewhere for rhetorical effect: "When it comes to linguistic form, Plato walks with the Macedonian swineherd, Confucius with the head-hunting savage of Assam."

Where native speakers are concerned, no language, dialect, or accent can meaningfully be described as primitive, broken, or inferior. The world's 7,000-plus languages are fantastically various, but each one has evolved (in its particular historical, cultural, and ecological niche) to handle all the core communicative demands of daily life. Every language has a complex grammar—an almost invisible glue between words that enables meaning-making—and new vocabulary can always be borrowed or coined. Some languages may specialize in melancholy, or seaweed, or atomic structure, or religious ritual; some grammars may glory in conjugating verbs while others bristle with syntactic invention. Hawaiian has just thirteen phonemes (meaningful sounds) while the Caucasian language Ubykh, extinct as of 1992, had eighty-four. "English" (with all its technical varieties) is said to be adding up to 8,500 words per year, more than many Australian aboriginal languages have to begin with. But these are surface inequalities—questions of personality.

Perceptions of linguistic superiority or inferiority are instead based on power, class, and social status. Historically, it was languages that were swept in with strong political, economic, or religious backing—Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, Hebrew, Arabic, Persian, and Chinese in the Eurasian core—that were held to be the oldest, the holiest, and the most perfect in structure, their "classical" status cemented by the received weight of canonical tradition. By the nineteenth century, the imperial nation-states of Europe were politely shunting them off to the museum and imposing their own equivalents: newly standardized "modern" languages like English and French. Johann Gottfried Herder's Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772) inspired would-be nation-builders to document, restore, and develop their own neglected vernaculars. One by one, the nationalists of Central and Eastern Europe adopted Herder's program, as has virtually every modern nation-state sooner or later: warding off imperial languages from without by establishing a dominant standardized language within, at the expense of minority languages and local varieties. Two speech varieties can be called different languages if they're mutually unintelligible, most linguists hold. But this distinction proves hard to keep up in practice. At least in modern times, a "language" has come to mean something irreducibly, but often invisibly, political, a dialekt mit an armey un a flot (a dialect with an army and a navy) in the famous Yiddish phrase attributed to Max Weinreich.

A "language" has come to mean something irreducibly, but often invisibly, political.

It was just over a century ago when a group of linguists made an effort to go beyond the language politics of imperialism and nationalism. For reasons both scientific and political, they affirmed the equality of all languages. They devoted themselves to documenting languages that were all but invisible to their contemporaries, or else considered beneath notice by all but Christian missionaries. They stressed the natural primacy of oral language (and later sign language among the deaf) over the constructed, elitist character of every written tradition. They shunned the prescriptivism of language teaching—always either a pragmatic exercise in learning rules, or an ideological exercise in promoting standards—and committed linguists to describing the actual, constant variation of real human speech. Their program could be called "radical linguistics."

Their leading figure in the United States was Franz Boas, a German-Jewish immigrant who worked on the languages and folklore traditions of the First Nations of the Pacific Northwest. A committed socialist, he applied his intellectual and political energies to championing human diversity, debunking scientific racism, and establishing the modern disciplines of linguistics and anthropology in America. His student Edward Sapir documented Native languages across the American West and traced the close connections between language, culture, and thought. Boas also had three likeminded collaborators in the Russian-Jewish ethnographer-linguists Vladimir Iochelson, Lev Shternberg, and Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz. All three men were Narodniks—populist, quasi-socialist revolutionaries whose political program centered on "going to the people." Deported to Siberia by the Tsarist government for revolutionary organizing, they indeed went to the people, learning and documenting Nivkh, Orok, Yukaghir, and other Siberian languages that today stand on the brink of extinction.

The Other Extinction

Equality, diversity, respect for orality, descriptivism (not prescriptivism), and "going to the people": these remain fundamental tenets for any program of radical linguistics, and for anyone who cares about human language. But today there are sobering realities. The concept of linguistic equality has done little to change popular perceptions. Nor have two centuries of revolutionary political and social movements, though certain large-enough languages have been elevated to official status in the course of national liberation struggles. Nearly everywhere, a persistent stigma clings to minority languages, provincial dialects, "non-standard" accents, and working-class "sociolects," not to mention the linguistic registers used by women, young people, and LGBTQ speakers. The vitriol routinely trained on Black English in America is representative, although politically committed linguists like William Labov and John Rickford have devoted their careers to documenting and defending its integrity. Debates about language are rarely just about language—they're always about the speakers.

Linguistic chauvinism, now modernized and globalized, is a powerful force contributing to the mass disappearance of languages and cultures, an extinction event with fundamental and incalculable political ramifications. Up to half of all living human languages—mostly those that are undocumented, unwritten, and unknown outside their communities—can be expected to disappear over the next century. Leftists and liberals have recognized the role of global capital and its boundless growth imperative, as well as our own complicity as consumers, in the sixth (and current) mass extinction of biological life forms. So why is there more ambivalence about—or simply less awareness of—a linguistic and cultural emergency equally bound up in centuries of capitalism, imperialism, and nation-building?

Deep diversity endures in places where the world-system is a more recent arrival, like West Africa, the South Pacific, the Himalayas, and the Amazon basin. But the intricate cultural ecology of even those areas is now threatened. In the advanced capitalist core, monoculture is already a foregone conclusion, leavened only by immigration. In the United States, centuries of genocide, displacement, persecution, and assimilation have reduced some 300 distinct and mutually unintelligible Native languages to the point where only a few can still be considered strong. Despite heroic attempts at revival, at least fifty Native American languages are currently on the verge of extinction, each with fewer than ten speakers. Speech communities have always come and gone, but never before have languages vanished at the pace and on the scale they have in recent decades. New natural languages like Nicaraguan Sign and Light Warlpiri, meanwhile, are few and far between, while the specialized "languages" of subcultures and professions remain limited and superficial by comparison.

Linguistic chauvinism, now modernized and globalized, is a powerful force contributing to the mass disappearance of languages and cultures, an extinction event with fundamental and incalculable political ramifications.

In the early 1990s, a small subset of linguists began raising the alarm, trying to reorient a discipline whose well-meaning focus on elusive and trivial "universals" had led it to ignore actually existing linguistic diversity—an unfortunate legacy left by Noam Chomsky, who was a radical and a linguist but not a radical linguist. The new advocates of "language documentation" convincingly demonstrated that language death—when the last native speaker of a language dies—is accelerating dramatically. Would-be radical linguists, this writer included, have been joining local activists in recording, describing, and maintaining threatened languages, though our numbers and resources are still dwarfed by the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a Christian organization of missionary linguists, whose ultimate goal is to translate the Bible into every human language.

Sources of Radical Possibility

There are political, educational, scientific, and cultural reasons to support endangered languages and the communities who speak them. There is the straightforward question of justice and minority rights, since it is always the powerful who impose their languages on the powerless. There are the vast reserves of history, literature, knowledge, and wisdom embedded in these languages, the loss of which leaves all of us impoverished. Children learn best when educated in their mother tongue, but, too obsessed with the imperatives of indoctrination and assimilation, few governments ensure this basic human right. Linguistic and cultural continuity holds people together, boosting the resilience of indigenous communities in crisis. Multilingualism is strongly linked to cognitive development, potentially enhancing our capacity for empathy and open-mindedness. Yet far from being a marker of advanced formal education, multilingualism is actually the preserve of the "bottom billion," who have no choice but to learn their more powerful neighbors' languages.

Leftists, liberals, and progressives have a bigger stake in the future of language than they know. We hardly realize how deeply embedded capitalist mentalities now are in our very language—the ways we talk about time, space, relationships. Liberals intensely aware of privilege based on gender, race, class, or sexuality seldom consider linguistic privilege—English (or Spanish or Chinese or Hausa) is just the air we breathe. The politics of language, when we practice it at all, has been about framing, about keywords, about sloganeering in the major languages. Meanwhile, the ground is shifting under us.

Cultural destruction is an argument against unrestrained capitalism every bit as powerful as the devastation of the natural environment. Radical thinkers on the left have long recognized that standard languages are a critical element of hegemonic control. Oppressed languages have become major vehicles of dissent—from the role of Yiddish in the early-twentieth-century labor movement to the part played by Quechua and Aymara among the cocalero supporters of Evo Morales. Göran Therborn, writing recently in the New Left Review, rightly identifies "pre-capitalist populations" as one of four main social forces in the world able to mount a convincing critique of twenty-first-century capitalism. "They lack both the numbers and the resources to carry much weight, except locally," adds Therborn, "but their struggles can be articulated with wider critical movements of resistance."

They may not remain "pre-capitalist" much longer. "Community languages" spoken in homes and villages are giving way to "official languages" standardized and managed by technocrats, which are yielding in turn to globally important "market languages" backed by money and power—a classic monopoly process. The current extinction is not based on rational choice, but is rather an extension of power and market relations into local communities and private lives. Direct coercion of minority-language speakers has been a common feature of the destructive "deterritorialization" phase, often followed by a period spent in catastrophic cultural limbo—but now cities, jobs, schools, and media are driving a rapid "reterritorialization" on the terrain of global capital. Language competence is being recast as a human capital asset like any other, no longer an expression of allegiance or belonging to a place or a group. Language, too, melts into air.

Irreplaceable sources of radical possibility, variety, and multiplicity are at stake. Though there are certain tendencies and parameters that appear to hold cross-linguistically, the world's languages represent thousands of natural experiments—barely understood pre-capitalist, non-capitalist, and anti-capitalist ways of seeing, understanding, and living in the world. The vanishing languages of hunter-gatherer peoples and nomadic pastoralists attest to ways of life that are deeply different and, by most accounts, more egalitarian than ours. James C. Scott writes that "barbarian was another word states used to describe any self-governing, nonsubject people" and that the manifold, little-known languages and cultures of upland Southeast Asia were in large part "strategic positionings designed to keep the state at arm's length." Similar arguments, he points out, have been made about South America, the Maghreb, and the Sino-Tibetan borderlands—all "regions of refuge" where resistance was quietly kept culturally alive.

The world's languages represent thousands of natural experiments—barely understood pre-capitalist, non-capitalist, and anti-capitalist ways of seeing, understanding, and living in the world.

Cooperative economics has been at its strongest when bolstered by cultural resilience, whether at Mondragon (linked to the Basque revival) or in the kibbutzim strongly associated with the reinvention of Hebrew. Likewise with the muyong, the collective rice terraces of Ifugao in the Philippines, and the traditional ahupua'a system for managing marine resources in Hawaii: complex systems are encoded in each language's lexicon, just as surely as capitalism and the languages of northwest Europe have grown (sometimes painfully) intertwined. You don't have to be an anarcho-primitivist to appreciate successful practices around land tenure, ecological stewardship, gift economies, and familial and communal relations, all expressed and embedded in language that often resists translation. It doesn't take a local currency activist to learn from the remarkable shell money system developed by speakers of Yeli Dnye on Rossel Island in Papua New Guinea.

Vocabulary is a natural first place to measure loss, but the social awareness and intelligence inherent in grammar can go deeper still. In the words of linguist Nicholas Evans, the remarkably diverse grammars developed by different groups over millennia condition "our ability to construct and participate in a shared mental world, to coordinate our attention and our goals, and to keep track of who knows, feels and wants what"—capacities that lie at the secret center of all politics. "Evidential" systems, for example, represented in scattered languages across the Caucasus, the Himalayas, the Americas, and elsewhere, mandate that speakers make grammatically explicit the basis for what they're saying. In English we do this haphazardly when we do it at all, with phrases like "maybe," "probably," "I think that," as well as tone of voice. In Tibetan, however, there is one marker you have to use if you saw something yourself; another one if you drew an inference from something you saw; a third if you're speaking from hearsay, general knowledge, or inference from general facts; and one more if you're being noncommittal, or secretive, or just have a hunch. What might this mean for Tibetan speakers' ideas about law, justice, and ethical behavior? These can be intricate and difficult connections to trace, but time is running out to investigate, let alone learn from, our linguistic differences.

The Politics of Babel

For some individuals, the breakdown of traditional communities is an emancipation; for others a disaster. Even in an atmosphere of tolerance, respect, and support, some individuals and some groups may choose to give up their language while others stick with it. For a nation-state, a homogenous national identity may seem to have benefits in terms of a common national framework, deliberative democracy, efficiency, and social cohesion. Is it possible, then, for Babel to be a social democracy? Liberal theorists of multiculturalism have worked to reconcile democracy and deep diversity, though linguists and language activists—not to mention the actual workings of languages—have barely figured in these debates. Radical linguistics can add a dimension by stressing not just the individual and collective rights of speakers, but the importance of a hyper-diverse linguistic heritage for keeping the cultural and political horizon open.

For instance, Michael Walzer argues that individuals are more likely to flourish as "participants in a common life," anchored in culture and community. An important question, then, is whether we can create communal bonds under contemporary capitalism that are as strong as existing ethnic solidarities. "Subcultures" sometimes look more like market segments; they may be elective affinities, but dissolve far too easily for precisely that reason. Indeed, the traditional cultures that seem to survive under market pressure may be in danger of becoming transient, commodified entities. Another political theorist, Will Kymlicka, justifies the inclusion of cultural communities within the liberal state because they give autonomous individuals "a context of choice." But with "choice" front and center, are we relegating all traditions to the marketplace and turning culture into a popularity contest? While Kymlicka writes that "national minorities should have the same tools of nation-building available to them as the majority nation," the reality is that many majority-language speakers see small languages as primitive and not worth supporting.

Some countries have sought to strike an intricate balance, encouraging distinctive languages and cultures to provide just enough breathing room for identity and solidarity to flourish; the idea is that language communities should be permeable membranes, not impenetrable walls. The political form this usually takes is local cultural autonomy paired with national commitments of a legal and political nature. "Territorial rights" in Switzerland protect language speakers wherever they are most concentrated. Trickier to uphold are "personal rights," such as those applying to French speakers in Canada wherever they go.

These days, however, it's forced assimilation, not the recognition of difference, that is setting countries on the road to separatism. Today's secessionism has everything to do with majority intolerance (or at least insensitivity) to minority needs. Margaret Thatcher is widely held to be the unwitting architect of the Scottish independence movement, just as Franco's chauvinistic tyranny inspired Catalonian nationalism. Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, Vladimir Putin, and their Soviet forebears bear responsibility for the stridency of Ukrainian nationalism, while diehard Ukrainian nationalists can in turn be credited for hardening attitudes among Russian speakers and Tatars in Crimea.

The mass extinction of languages is a process that can be resisted and mitigated, though surely not halted completely. The first imperatives are toleration and accommodation: the cessation of active persecution and a serious struggle against linguistic chauvinism and privilege everywhere, starting at home. Where the remaining indigenous languages look to be in terminal decline, as in the United States, Canada, or Australia, the question is how best to bolster the many new Native-led revitalization programs, as some state and provincial governments are starting to do. Progress is measured in droplets: entries in a new dictionary, a new "apprentice" speaker trained by a "master," the launch of a new vocab-building app. The road to cultural restitution is a long and challenging one.

Meanwhile, with sensitive outside help, "mega-diverse" countries like Indonesia, Tanzania, India, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu might become models. These are places where a "neutral" language like English (or Indonesian or Swahili or Tok Pisin) may already be used in official situations and for intra-group communication, but where local languages are starting to enjoy enhanced respect, at least in some cases. In these countries, the fevered impulse toward monolithic nation-building might be starting to cool.

Struggling languages of a certain size and dynamism can still survive and develop with the right combination of autonomy, economic resources, and sheer grit, as powerfully attested by Maori, Welsh, Catalan, and Hawaiian, all radically reborn since the 1960s. In each case, a broader cultural renaissance was essential, as well as a genuinely political movement focused on achieving local autonomy peacefully. Now imagine a world in which such cases multiply, a diverse, democratic Babel where meaningful differences live, not only among individuals but among the communities we form and we join, as "participants in a common life."


Ross Perlin writes on language, labor, and politics. He is assistant director of the Endangered Language Alliance in New York.

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Saturday, September 20, 2014

George Orwell Wrote One of the Most Incensed Takedowns of American Fashion Magaz

George Orwell Wrote One of the Most Incensed Takedowns of American Fashion Magazines

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To mark its 100th anniversary, The New Republic is republishing a collection of its most memorable articles. This week's theme: some of the wackiest things we've uncovered in our archives.

This piece originally appeared in The New Republic on December 2, 1946.

Someone has just sent me a copy of an American fashion magazine which shall be nameless. It consists of 325 large quarto pages, of which no less than 15 are given up to articles on world politics, literature, etc. The rest consists entirely of pictures with a little letterpress creeping round their edges: pictures of ball dresses, mink coats, step-ins, panties, brassières, silk stockings, slippers, perfumes, lipsticks, nail polish—and, of course, of the women, unrelievedly beautiful, who wear them or make use of them.

One striking thing when one looks at these pictures is the overbred, exhausted, even decadent style of beauty that now seems to be striven after. Nearly all of these women are immensely elongated. A thin-boned, ancient-Egyptian type of face seems to predominate: narrow hips are general, and slender, non-prehensile hands like those of a lizard are quite universal. Evidently it is a real physical type, for it occurs as much in the photographs as in the drawings. Another striking thing is the prose style of the advertisements, an extraordinary mixture of sheer lushness with clipped and sometimes very expensive technical jargon. Words like suave-mannered, custom-finished, contour-conforming, mitt-back, inner-sole, backdip, midriff, swoosh, swash, curvaceous, slenderize and pet-smooth are flung about with evident full expectation that the reader will understand them at a glance. Here are a few sample sentences taken at random:

"A new Shimmer Sheen color that sets your hands and his head in a whirl." "Bared and beautifully bosomy." "Feathery-light Milliken Fleece to keep her kitten-snug!" "Others see you through a veil of sheer beauty, and they wonder why!" "An exclamation point of a dress that depends on fluid fabric for much of its drama." "The miracle of figure flattery!" "Molds your bosom into proud feminine lines." "Isn't it wonderful to know that Corsets wash and wear and whittle you down… even though they weigh only four ounces!" "The distilled witchery of one woman who was forever desirable… forever beloved… Forever Amber." And so on and so on and so on.

A fairly diligent search through the magazine reveals two discreet allusions to gray hair, but if there is anywhere a direct mention of fatness or middle-age I have not found it. Birth and death are not mentioned either: nor is work, except that a few recipes for breakfast dishes are given. The male sex enters directly or indirectly into perhaps one advertisement in twenty, and photographs of dogs or kittens appear here and there. In only two pictures, out of about three hundred, is a child represented.

On the front cover there is a colored photograph of the usual elegant female, standing on a chair while a gray-haired, spectacled, crushed-looking man in shirtsleeves kneels at her feet, doing something to the edge of her skirt. If one looks closely one finds that actually he is about to take a measurement with a yardstick. But to a casual glance he looks as though he were kissing the hem of the woman's garment—not a bad symbolical picture of American civilization, or at least of one important side of it.

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The Decline of Book Reviewing

  The Decline of Book Reviewing   Share The fates of authors and publishers — not to mention the reading public — depend on book reviews — b...