Thursday, March 12, 2015

The Hannah Arendt Guide to Friendship

The Hannah Arendt Guide to Friendship

By

Hannah Arendt was a good friend. When she was a teenage girl, she was forbidden by her mother and stepfather from visiting an acquaintance named Anne Mendelssohn, but she went anyway, walking to a nearby town at night, throwing pebbles at Anne's window, and cementing a lifelong friendship. She came to the rescue of her friend and intellectual sparring partner Mary McCarthy after she suffered a traumatic miscarriage, as Jon Nixon tells us in his engaging biography, Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Friendship, and again while she was going through an emotionally draining divorce. She sent care packages to her former teacher and mentor Karl Jaspers when he and his wife were stuck in Germany, impoverished and hungry, after the war. She protected her husband Heinrich Blucher, as much a friend as a romantic partner, during his professional difficulties as an academic.

Arendt's web of allegiances opens up a new avenue of approach into her career. More than a bodiless thinker, or a walking scandal, Arendt is depicted here as a woman hungry for companionship, and for the exchange of ideas. It also opens up an area of inquiry into the complex and under-explored dynamic of friendship. "Friendships are not the application of some theory of friendship," Nixon writes, "nor do they rely on an ongoing reflective meta-dialogue between the friends regarding the nature of their friendship. ... There is a great deal that is appropriately and courteously implicit in friendship." Nixon intends Arendt to be an exemplar of what he repeatedly hints is a now-lost era.  

Arendt saw friendship as a middle ground between the solitude and solipsism of internal dialogue, and the terror of the public square. It was a protected space in which ideas could be unveiled, sanded down, hardened, and polished. Her friends were her intellectual compatriots, and her boundless loyalty toward them was also an expression of her deep-seated appreciation for their kindnesses. Friendship was an intensely appealing concept for a woman who spent much of her life as a refugee among refugees, a Jew expelled from her country of birth, adrift in foreign countries. It was a protective amulet, as well as a symbol of the higher values crushed under the boot of totalitarianism. Nazism's mission was "to eradicate totally any trace of human freedom," and friendship's playfulness and compassion was a symbol of rebellion against fascism's inhumanity.

 

Hannah Arendt was a bad friend. She stuck by Martin Heidegger after the war, even though she was presumably all too aware of the anti-Semitic line of thinking he pursued in his Black Notebooks, where he convolutedly argued that the Holocaust had been the responsibility of the Jews. Heidegger was her "supreme teacher," according to Nixon, and his "almost complete silence" regarding her own successes, let alone his unforgivable wartime behavior, was not enough to keep Arendt away. "To be recognized by Heidegger," in Nixon's neat phrasing, "was, for Arendt, to be recognized."

Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem argued for the Holocaust as a crime against humanity, in which the German people had first resolved to do harm to the fabric of the world, and only secondarily selected the Jews as their victims. The intention was to render the Shoah a crime against all people, not merely the Jews, but it was another example of her difficulty with the notion of Jews as a people set apart. Invested in friendship, Arendt found being a friend to the Jewish people a challenge too far.

After publishing Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt was targeted for opprobrium by many of her fellow Jewish intellectuals, appalled by what they saw as her shoddy reasoning and misaligned sense of blame. Isaiah Berlin had her blackballed at Oxford. Her old friend and mentor Kurt Blumenfeld rejected her approaches, and died soon after without ever reconciling with her. Her longtime friend Gershom Scholem, with whom she had collaborated to preserve and promote the work of Walter Benjamin, was even angrier. In a letter written soon after Eichmann's publication, he called "the banality of evil" a "catchword" and a "slogan." "He charged Arendt with irresponsibility," Nixon observes, "with misreading the role of the Jewish agencies under Nazi occupation and with lacking a 'love of the Jewish people'—Ahabath Israel."

Arendt had been judged by many of her old friends to have crossed an invisible line that separated thoughtful criticism from outright blasphemy, and unsentimental rationality from thoughtless brutality toward the dead. Loyal to her friends, she was notably lacking in generosity toward her fellow Jews.

 

Hannah Arendt was a fraught friend. Heidegger the self-absorbed German philosopher would likely not have thought much about Arendt in his infatuation with Nazi verve, but what kind of friendship can be founded in hatred for the most fundamental biographical facts of the other? Arendt's continued admiration for Heidegger suggests a strain of self-loathing, or at the very least, a blindness to others' disdain, that renders her an untrustworthy judge of character. 

Arendt would argue, as she did, that "I have never in my life 'loved' any people or collective. … I indeed love 'only' my friends and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the love of persons." Turning a blind eye to such egregious failures of morality led to Eichmann in Jerusalem's missteps, in which Arendt's lack of "Ahabath Israel" made for a perverse accounting of the Holocaust.

Nixon argues that when we look at Arendt's friendships, we are asking all the wrong questions. "The question for her," he says, referring to her decades-long entanglement with Heidegger, "was not 'How can I justify to myself my continuing friendship, affection, and loyalty to this man?,' but 'Given the irreversibility of my original encounter with this man, on what terms should I live out the consequences of that encounter?'"

But we can read Nixon's book as much as a self-help manual as a work of philosophy or biography, in which the missing key to a fulfilled and emotionally healthy life is a sense of genuine friendship being as binding—perhaps more binding, given the divorce rampant in Arendt's social circle—as marriage. "Marriage ends and desire fades," Nixon summarizes Arendt's argument to McCarthy during her divorce from her third husband Bowden Broadwater, "but friendship can and should endure." Nixon depicts Arendt as a role model, in friendship if nothing else.  She is an example to be studied and emulated, Nixon argues, in our moment of constant communication and infrequent communion. 

The implication is that Arendt's is a road not taken, one in which ferocious loyalty to old friends has been replaced by counts of mostly anonymous Facebook friends. Contemporary life favors quantity over quality, new experiences over familiar pleasures. To be loyal to old friends is seen as artificially limiting the panoply of experiences available in the world. But sturdy, stable friendships, as Nixon argues, are our testing ground and our protected space: "We need friendship because it eases the two-way flow between the private and the public, ensuring that we are neither overwhelmed by the world nor in denial regarding its plurality."

The politics of Hannah Arendt's friendships are, in the final accounting, a mixed bag. But Nixon gestures at the lesson we can all take away from her complex, well-examined, ultimately exasperating life: that without genuine, long-lasting friendships, made up of equal parts loyalty and affection and mischievousness and shared struggle, we are entirely alone in the world, our Twitter following be damned. "Friendship, for Arendt as for most of us," Nixon tells us, "was an exercise in lifelong learning. It was—and is—how we learn to live together."

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Shakespeare in Tehran

Shakespeare in Tehran

greenblatt_1-040215.jpg Marco Moretti/Anzenberger/Redux Sheikh Lotfollah Mosque in Isfahan, the last stop on Stephen Greenblatt's trip to Iran

In April 2014 I received a letter from the University of Tehran, inviting me to deliver the keynote address to the first Iranian Shakespeare Congress.

Instantly, I decided to go. I had dreamed of visiting Iran for a very long time. Many years ago, when I was a student at Cambridge, I came across a book of pictures of Achaemenid art, the art of the age of Cyrus and Darius and Xerxes. Struck by the elegance, sophistication, and strangeness of what I saw, I took the train to London and in the British Museum stood staring in wonder at fluted, horn-shaped drinking vessels, griffin-headed bracelets, a tiny gold chariot drawn by four exquisite gold horses, and other implausible survivals from the vanished Persian world.

The culture that produced the objects on display at once tantalized and eluded me. A Cambridge friend recommended that I read an old travelogue about Persia. (I had completely forgotten the name and author of this marvelous book, forgotten even that I had read it, until the great travel writer Colin Thubron very recently commended it to me: Robert Byron's The Road to Oxiana, published in 1937.) Byron's sharp-eyed, richly evocative descriptions of Islamic as well as ancient sites in Iran filled me with a longing to see with my own eyes the land where such a complex civilization had flourished.

In the mid-1960s, this desire of mine could have been easily satisfied. Some fellow students invited me to do what many others had been doing on summer vacations: pooling funds to buy a used VW bus and driving across Persia and Afghanistan and then, skirting the tribal territories, descending through the Khyber Pass into Pakistan and on to India. But for one reason or another, I decided to put it off—after all, I told myself, there would always be another occasion.

By the time the letter arrived inviting me to Tehran, it was difficult fully to conjure up the old dream. I knew from Iranian acquaintances that, notwithstanding some highly sophisticated and justly praised films—many of them shown only abroad—censorship of all media in Iran is rampant and draconian. Spies, some self-appointed and others professional, sit in on lectures and in classrooms, making sure that nothing is said that violates the official line.

Support for basic civil liberties, advocating women's rights or the rights of gays and lesbians, an interest in free expression, and the most tempered and moderate skepticism about the tenets of religious orthodoxy are enough to trigger denunciations and arouse the ire of the authorities. Iranian exiles have detailed entirely credible horror stories of their treatment—pressure, intimidation, imprisonment, and in some cases torture—at the hands of the Islamic Republic. A small number of aid organizations, such as the Scholars at Risk Network and the Scholar Rescue Fund, have struggled tirelessly, though with painfully limited financial resources, to help the victims escape from imminent danger and begin to put their lives together again.

If I went to the Iranian Shakespeare Congress, it would not be with the pretense that our situations were comparable or that our underlying values and beliefs were identical. Sharing an interest in Shakespeare counts for something, as a warm and encouraging phone call from the principal organizer amply demonstrated, but it does not magically erase all differences. A simple check online showed me that one of the scholars who signed my letter of invitation had written, in addition to essays on "The Contradictory Nature of the Ghost in Hamlet" and "The Aesthetic Response: The Reader in Macbeth," many articles about the "gory diabolical adventurism" of international Zionism. "The tentacles of Zionist imperialism," he wrote, "are by slow gradation spread over [the world]." "A precocious smile of satisfaction breaks upon the ugly face of Zionism." "The Zionist labyrinthine corridors are so numerous that their footprints and their agents are scattered everywhere."

Did my prospective host—someone who had presumably grappled with the humane complexity of Shakespeare's tragedies—actually believe these fantasies reminiscent of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion? Was he simply trying to get ahead any way that he could, or did he really think, as he wrote, that "Washington is under the diabolical spell of the Zionists" and that "every step they take is in fact weighed and decided by the Zionist lobby within the US ruling system, and as the Persian saying goes, they are not even allowed to drink water without their [Zionists'] permission"?

If I were to ask him directly—which I did not propose to do—I assume he would distinguish, as the Iranian government does, between Zionists and Jews. But why should I confidently expect that this distinction would actually hold? True, he did not know that, as an eleven-year-old at Camp Tevya, in the New Hampshire woods, I fervently sang "Hatikvah." But from my writing he had to be aware that I was Jewish, and he could have easily learned from my acknowledgments that I have frequently visited Israel, lecturing at its universities and collaborating with its scholars. What did it mean then that he was sending a letter of invitation to me, of all people?

Just after the revolution, the leader of the Iranian Jewish community, Habib Elghanian, was arrested on charges of "contacts with Israel and Zionism," "friendship with the enemies of God," and "warring with God and his emissaries." Elghanian was executed by firing squad. Following this execution, large numbers of Iranian Jews emigrated, and those who stayed are mindful of the fact that "contacts with Israel and Zionism" remain a serious offense. Foreign travelers with any evidence in their passports of visiting Israel are denied admission to Iran. Yet in my case, Shakespeare, it seemed, somehow erased the offense and bridged the huge chasm between us.

Perhaps there was no bridge at all: the invitation was signed by more than one person, and I considered the possibility that there were different positions among the organizing committee and that the more hard-line members had signed off on the invitation in the belief that I would never come or, alternatively, that I would never receive a visa. As it happened, though I was invited in April and duly submitted my visa application, I heard nothing from the Iranian authorities. Months passed. I had almost given up hope and then in November, the day before my scheduled flight to Tehran, the visa was issued. There was no explanation for the delay.

I found myself then on a Lufthansa jet listening to an announcement, just before we touched down at Imam Khomeini Airport, reminding all female passengers that in the Islamic Republic wearing the hijab—the headscarf—was not a custom; it was the law. "Women on board," the flight attendant put it, "must understand that it is in their interest to put on a scarf before they leave the plane." And there, waiting for me when I deplaned at 1:00 AM, was none other than the author of the articles denouncing the secret Zionist investors who controlled the world. He was smiling, gregarious, urbane. Quickly establishing our shared interest in movies, we chatted happily about Michael Haneke's The White Ribbon, Ermanno Olmi's The Tree of Wooden Clogs, and the 1957 classic western 3:10 to Yuma.

We drove into town, past the omnipresent billboards of Ayatollah Khomeini and of the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. It was well after two when we reached the hotel, a former Sheraton rechristened (if that is the right word) the Homa. Though I knew that the conference would begin first thing in the morning, I found myself too wound up to sleep. I lay in bed staring up at an aluminum arrow embedded in the ceiling to show the direction of Mecca. I was anxious about the keynote I was scheduled to deliver. I did not want to stage a provocation: I was less concerned for myself than I was for the organizing committee and the students, since I presumed it would be they who would bear the consequences. But at the same time I did not want to let the occasion simply slip away without somehow grappling with what it meant.

I entered a hall filled with eager faces—everyone rose and applauded as I walked down the aisle. Many held up their phones and took pictures. All the women, of course, wore hijabs; some of them wore chadors. The young men were casually dressed; the faculty wore jackets without ties. I also noticed among the men a few who stood apart and did not seem to be either students or faculty. It was not difficult to imagine who these might be. There was a long prayer, accompanied by a video featuring soft-focus flowers and dramatic landscapes, and then the national anthem, followed by an implausibly long succession of introductions. I felt weirdly nervous as I got up to give my talk.

What did it mean that Shakespeare was the magic carpet that had carried me to Iran? For more than four centuries now he has served as a crucial link across the boundaries that divide cultures, ideologies, religions, nations, and all the other ways in which humans define and demarcate their identities. The differences, of course, remain—Shakespeare cannot simply erase them—and yet he offers the opportunity for what he called "atonement." He used the word in the special sense, no longer current, of "at-one-ment," a bringing together in shared dialogue of those who have been for too long opposed and apart.

It was the project of many in my generation of Shakespeare scholars to treat this dialogue with relentless skepticism, to disclose the ideological interests it at once served and concealed, to burrow into works' original settings, and to explore the very different settings in which they are now received. We wanted to identify, as it were, the secret police lurking in their theater or in the printing house. All well and good: it has been exciting work and has sustained me and my contemporaries for many decades. But we have almost completely neglected to inquire how Shakespeare managed to make his work a place in which we can all meet.

This was the question with which I began. The simple answer, I said, is encapsulated in the word "genius," the quality he shares with the poets—Hafez, for example, or Rumi—who are venerated in Iran. But the word "genius" does not convey much beyond extravagant admiration. I proposed to my audience that we get slightly closer perhaps with Ben Jonson's observation that Shakespeare was "honest, and of an open and free nature; had an excellent fancy, brave notions, and gentle expressions."

Jonson's praise of Shakespeare's imaginative and verbal powers—his fancy, his notions, and his expressions—is familiar enough and, of course, perfectly just. But I proposed to focus for a moment on terms that seem at first more like a personality assessment: "honest, and of an open and free nature." That assessment, I suggested, was also and inescapably a political one. Here is how I continued:

Late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth- century England was a closed and decidedly unfree society, one in which it was extremely dangerous to be honest in the expression of one's innermost thoughts. Government spies carefully watched public spaces, such as taverns and inns, and took note of what they heard. Views that ran counter to the official line of the Tudor and Stuart state or that violated the orthodoxy of the Christian church authorities were frequently denounced and could lead to terrible consequences. An agent of the police recorded the playwright Christopher Marlowe's scandalously anti-Christian opinions and filed a report, for the queen of England was also head of the church. Marlowe was eventually murdered by members of the Elizabethan security service, though they disguised the murder as a tavern brawl. Along the way, Marlowe's roommate, the playwright Thomas Kyd, was questioned under torture so severe that he died shortly after.
To be honest, open, and free in such a world was a rare achievement. We could say it would have been possible, even easy, for someone whose views of state and church happened to correspond perfectly to the official views, and it has certainly been persuasively argued that Shakespeare's plays often reflect what has been called the Elizabethan world-picture. They depict a hierarchical society in which noble blood counts for a great deal, the many-headed multitude is easily swayed in irrational directions, and respect for order and degree seems paramount.
But it is difficult then to explain quite a few moments in his work. Take, for example, the scene in which Claudius, who has secretly murdered the legitimate king of Denmark and seized his throne, declares, in the face of a popular uprising, that "There's such divinity doth hedge a king/That treason can but peep to what it would." It would have been wildly imprudent, in Elizabethan England, to propose that the invocation of divine protection, so pervasive from the pulpit and in the councils of state, was merely a piece of official rhetoric, designed to shore up whatever regime was in power. But how else could the audience of Hamlet understand this moment? Claudius the poisoner knows that no divinity protected the old king, sleeping in his garden, and that his treason could do much more than peep. His pious words are merely a way to mystify his power and pacify the naive Laertes.
Or take the scene in which King Lear, who has fallen into a desperate and hunted state, encounters the blinded Earl of Gloucester. "A man may see how this world goes with no eyes," Lear says; "Look with thine ears." And what, if you listen attentively, will you then "see"?
    See how yond justice rails
    upon yond simple thief. Hark,
    in thine ear. Change places
    and, handy-dandy, which is
    the justice, which is the thief?
Nothing in the dominant culture of the time encouraged anyone—let alone several thousand random people crowded into the theater—to play the thought experiment of exchanging the places of judge and criminal. No one in his right mind got up in public and declared that the agents of the moral order lusted with the same desires for which they whipped offenders. No one interested in a tranquil, unmolested life said that the robes and furred gowns of the rich hid the vices that showed through the tattered clothes of the poor. Nor did anyone who wanted to remain in safety come forward and declare, as Lear does a moment later, that "a dog's obeyed in office."
That Shakespeare was able to articulate such thoughts in public depended in part on the fact that they are the views of a character, and not of the author himself; in part on the fact that the character is represented as having gone mad; in part on the fact that the play King Lear is situated in the ancient past and not in the present. Shakespeare never directly represented living authorities or explicitly expressed his own views on contemporary arguments in state or church. He knew that, though play scripts were read and censored and though the theater was watched, the police were infrequently called to intervene in what appeared on stage, provided that the spectacle prudently avoided blatantly provocative reflections on current events.
Still, such interventions were not unheard of. It is astonishing that in King Lear Shakespeare goes so far as to show a nameless servant rising up to stop his master, the powerful Earl of Cornwall, who is the legitimate coruler of the kingdom, from torturing someone whom he suspects—correctly, as it happens—of treason. "Hold your hand, my lord," the servant shouts:
    I have served you ever since I was a child;
    But better service have I never done you
    Than now to bid you hold.
The original audience must have been as shocked by this interference as the torturer Cornwall. Though the servant is killed by a sword thrust from behind, it is not before he has fatally wounded his master. And what is most shocking is that the audience is clearly meant to sympathize with the attempt by a nobody to stop the highest authority in the land from doing what everyone knew the state did to traitors. Here there is no cover of presumed madness, and though the setting is still ancient Britain, the circumstances must have seemed unnervingly close to contemporary practice.
How could Shakespeare get away with it? The answer must in part be that Elizabethan and Jacobean society, though oppressive, was not as monolithic in its surveillance or as efficient in its punitive responses as the surviving evidence sometimes makes us think. Shakespeare's world probably had more diversity of views, more room to breathe, than the official documents imply.
There is, I think, another reason as well, which leads us back to why after four hundred years and across vast social, cultural, and religious differences Shakespeare's works continue to reach us. He seems to have folded his most subversive perceptions about his particular time and place into a much larger vision of what his characters repeatedly and urgently term their life stories. We are assigned the task of keeping these stories alive, and in doing so we might a find a way, even in difficult circumstances, to be free, honest, and open in talking about our own lives.

My talk took more than an hour, and when I brought it to a close, I expected there to be a rush for the exit. But to my surprise, everyone stayed seated, and there began a question period, a flood of inquiries and challenges stretching out for the better part of another hour. Most of the questions were from students, the majority of them women, whose boldness, critical intelligence, and articulateness startled me. Very few of the faculty and students had traveled outside of Iran, but the questions were, for the most part, in flawless English and extremely well informed. Even while I tried frantically to think of plausible answers, I jotted a few of them down:

In postmodern times, universality has repeatedly been questioned. How should we reconcile Shakespeare's universality with contemporary theory?
You said that Shakespeare spent his life turning pieces of his consciousness into stories. Don't we all do this? What distinguishes him?
Considering your works, is it possible to say that you are refining your New Historicist theory when we compare it with Cultural Materialism?
In your Cultural Mobility you write about cultural change, pluralism, and tolerance of differences while in your Renaissance Self-Fashioning you talk about an unfree subject who is the ideological product of the relations of power: Renaissance Self-Fashioning is filled with entrapment theory. How can an individual be an unfree ideological product of the relations of power and also at the same time an agent in the dialectic of cultural change and persistence?

What the questions demonstrated with remarkable eloquence was the way in which Shakespeare functions as a place to think intensely, honestly, and with freedom. "Do you believe," one of the students asked, "that Bolingbroke's revolution in Richard II was actually meant to establish a better, more just society or was it finally only a cynical seizure of wealth and power?" "I don't know," I answered; "What do you think?" "I think," the student replied, "that it was merely one group of thugs replacing another."

2.

And the Iran I had so longed to see, some fifty years ago? My visa permitted me a few days' stay after the conference, and the principal organizer, an exceptionally kind and hospitable woman, helped me arrange for a car and driver, along with a guide—Americans, I was told, were not permitted to travel unaccompanied. (It was just as well, since I had only learned two or three words of Farsi.) Hussain, the driver, had no English, so I was unable to express directly the admiration I had for the astonishing skill with which he negotiated the insane Tehran traffic.

greenblatt_2-040215.jpg Abbas/Magnum Photos Students in a mosque, studying for exams, Shiraz, 1971

Hassan, the guide, had at least an uneven smattering of English. He was born, he told me, in the year of the Revolution and did not like to think of what Iran was like before then, when women did not wear the hijab and everyone drank alcohol. (He seemed genuinely shocked when I told him that my wife and I had a glass of wine almost every night with dinner.) At least by the admittedly lax standards to which I am accustomed, he was quite religiously observant. He prayed multiple times a day, often in the "prayer rooms" that are a feature of all hotels and other public buildings. In the mosques he joined the crowds of the faithful who ardently kiss the metal railings around the tombs of the saints and then rub the blessings over their faces. He had a serious cold.

Hussain managed to dodge and feint and bully his way through the vastness of Tehran, most of whose twelve million inhabitants seemed to be on the road. The palatial mansions in the north of the city gave way to seemingly endless miles of office blocks, apartment complexes, factories, shopping malls, and huge army barracks. Hassan warned me not to take pictures of the barracks—I was not inclined to, in any case—or of the huge, sinister Evin prison. There were security cameras, he said, that could detect whether anyone in passing cars was trying to take photographs. Billboards advertising computers, detergent, yogurt, and the like alternated with inspirational images of the Ayatollah Khomeini, political slogans, satirical depictions of Uncle Sam and of Israel, and many, many photographs of "martyrs" from the Iran–Iraq war.

There were martyrs along the avenues, in traffic circles, on the sides of buildings, on the walls around the buildings, on overpasses and pedestrian bridges, everywhere. On the light poles, the martyrs' images were generally in twos, and the pairings, which may have been accidental, were sometimes striking: a teenager next to a hardened veteran, a raw recruit next to a beribboned high-ranking officer, a bearded fighter next to a sweet-faced young woman.

It took forever to get out of Tehran, but once we crossed the last martyr-festooned overpass, we were suddenly on a highway through an utterly deserted wasteland that extended all the way to Kashan, 150 miles to the south. Kashan is a celebrated carpet city—we had a Kashan rug in our dining room when I was growing up—but my goal was not the crowded bazaar. I wanted to see the late-sixteenth-century Baghe Fin, one of the walled enclosures that in old Persian were called "paradises." (Other English borrowings from Persian include the words peach, lemon, and orange, along with cummerbund, kaftan, and pajama.) Paradise, in this case, was a relatively small, dusty, square garden with very old cedar trees lined up in rows along very straight paths.

For someone whose taste in gardens runs to Rome's Doria Pamphili or London's Kew or New York's Central Park, so rigid a structure was hard to love, but it made sense against the background of the bleak, parched desert through which we had passed. The crucial feature was water arising from a small nearby natural spring, and for the first time I fully grasped the hyperbolic extravagance of the garden in Genesis, harboring the headwaters of no fewer than four great rivers. The garden in Kashan, emphasizing the pleasures of rationality and control, directed its precious water into straight, narrow channels and a perfectly square pool lined with turquoise tiles. The water also supplied an attached historic hammam, or bathhouse, where a nationalist hero in the nineteenth century was killed by an assassin (another word English has borrowed from Persian).

A twinge of disappointment is built into the fulfillment of any desire that has been deferred for too long, so it is not surprising that my experience of paradise, in the form of the Bagh-e Fin, was a slight letdown. So too Shiraz, the fabled city of nightingales and wine, turned out to have more than its share of traffic and dreary 1970s architecture—and, of course, enormous photographs of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the omnipresent martyrs.

The grand exception to the melancholy that lingered over much of my visit after I left Tehran, and the true fulfillment of my old dream of Iran, was Isfahan. There too, along with a striking absence of tourism, there were the usual grim icons of the Islamic Republic. But the city was largely spared modern architectural depredations. The broad Zayandeh River is spanned by majestic ancient bridges that traditionally featured teahouses. The zealous guardians of morality, fearing that the spaces encouraged the young to flirt with one another, recently shut the teahouses down, but even without them the bridges were full of happy life. And the mosques and gardens and public squares were fantastically beautiful.

Near the close of a long day of sightseeing, Hassan proposed to take me to a church. I thanked him but said that I would be willing to forgo that visit. I was Jewish, and what I would love to see, I told him, was the synagogue that was indicated on my map. He seemed taken aback for a moment, but he quickly recovered and said that in Mashad, the city in which he was raised, he once knew a Jewish family, but they had moved away. We went in search of the synagogue, which seemed from the map to be located on a street adjacent to the city's labyrinthine covered bazaar, but we did not find it. Hassan began to ask shopkeepers and passersby who looked at us quizzically but were unable to help. As we ventured further into a quiet neighborhood—the bazaar had given way to narrow lanes—he knocked on doors and shouted the question up to shuttered windows. Finally, an old lady said that there had once been Jews who had lived in that area, but they were all gone now. She did not know what had happened to the synagogue.

I do not imagine that there was much I would have seen, certainly nothing comparable to the palaces and madrasas, the hammams and the mosques around me. The most beautiful of all was the mosque of Sheikh Lotfollah, on one side of the immense central square where Persian nobles once played polo. The mosque's dome is surprisingly off-center from its elaborate entrance portal, so that you reach the sanctuary by passing through a narrow, winding hallway. I gazed in astonishment at the swirling color of the glazed tiles, their turquoise, green, and ochre drawn into magical patterns of intertwining foliage, elegant arabesques, and kaleidoscopic lozenges. Each of the niches formed by the supporting arches was surrounded by cobalt-blue tiles bearing Koranic verses in the Arabic script that seems to me the most beautiful of all written languages.

I looked up into the dome where I saw suspended from its highest point a magnificent, shimmering gold chandelier. It was only slowly that I realized that there was no chandelier there at all; the gold tiles in the dome were picking up and reflecting the natural light from the sixteen windows that circled its base. For once there was another tourist in the space with me, and I walked over to share my sense of wonderment at what we were witnessing. He was a young, very tall, very thin Dutchman, and we chatted while we both tried to capture the magical effect with our cameras. He had, he told me, quit his job in a bank in Amsterdam and had biked to Iran all the way from Holland. He hoped, he said, to make it to Pakistan. This was a level of adventurousness far beyond anything I had imagined for myself in the 1960s, and I was happy to bequeath to him, so much braver or more reckless than I, the last vestiges of the dream of an honest, free, and wide-open world that I had once cherished and that Shakespeare continues to embody.


This article will appear in a different form in the forthcoming Shakespeare in Our Time: A Shakespeare Association of America Collection, edited by Dympha Callaghan and Suzanne Gossett (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare Publishing Plc, 2016).

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Tuesday, March 10, 2015

美国需要自己的Emoji

美国需要自己的Emoji

达蒙·达兰 2015年03月10日

Ji Lee

我无非是想用绘文字祝未婚妻生日快乐而已。但我没法再现桑德拉·博因顿(Sandra Boynton)经典贺卡上的画谜:河马,小鸟,两只母羊。我的词汇量太有限了。

应该说,是我的智能手机内置的722个符号——面孔、动物和各种物品——形成了一个 非常有限的词库。这些iPhone上自带的绘文字里有鸟,一共七只,有几只非常萌,但没有河马,没有母羊。里面有几只ram(就是雄性绵羊,请对畜牧没什 么了解的读者知悉),一只猪,一头母牛,甚至还有几只龙,但没有母羊。

这个笑话不能翻译为绘文字的原因很简单。它不是日本笑话。而绘文字是日本文字。

从根本上说,绘文字是一种外语,我们试图让它们适应英语和美国习惯。我知道这种腔调听着像个法国文化部官僚在哀叹,法语被computer、Internet之类的英文词给侵蚀了。但那是沙文主义。我不满的是实用性。

绘文字已经成为一种常见的快捷表达方式。Facebook、Twitter、谷歌 (Google)聊天工具和Slack都有自己的绘文字。它们应该接纳新的词汇,就像英语接纳无法翻译的外来词一样,比如德语的 schadenfreude(幸灾乐祸),或法语的flâneur(闲逛的人)。

由于符号的缺失,我有太多的东西无法表达出来。苹果(Apple)有望在今春发布一套修订版iPhone和iPad绘文字。其中主要的改变是在现有的白面孔和手的基础上大幅增加种族多样性,加入黑、棕和黄。(如果这事让你摇头,你大概能想象,已经有人对此hot under the collar[直译"领子下发烫",意即"怒火中烧"。——译注]了。是的,这句美国成语也没法用绘文字表达。)

原版绘文字里的人物全是白皮肤,这反映了一个同质性的日本社会对自身的看法。去看看他们的漫画(manga)和动画(anime)你就明白了。那里面满是长腿高个子金发姑娘,长着一对又大又圆的艾玛·斯通(Emma Stone)式眼睛。

拓展人类谱系只解决了一部分问题,因为整套绘文字依然浸淫着和式感性。里面有"运气君"(unchi-kun),就是一坨笑眯眯的屎。在进入手机之前,这个角色在日本已经存在了几十年,它出演过广告,被做成毛绒玩具摆在孩子的卧室里,甚至还做成糖果。

再来看看智能手机上满屏的建筑物。其中有"情侣酒店",这是一种约会的地方,有装修十分夸张的房间可供情人们租用一两个小时。里面没有破破烂烂的汽车旅馆。日本人对他们卓越的公共交通系统钟爱有加,我一共找出了12个火车符号,三种空中缆车。没有皮卡。

这份日语词汇表实在很少照顾到美国人的需求。比如里面没有竖中指的手势。也没有两指 交叉的好运手势。没有祝愿"生生不息,繁荣昌盛"的瓦肯礼,鉴于《星际迷航》(Star Trek)中饰演瓦肯人的伦纳德·尼莫伊(Leonard Nimoy)近日刚刚去世,要是有的话应该会是件很贴心的事。

想对老板说病重不能去上班?在日本可以用一个戴口罩的绘文字,那里普通人也会在公共场合戴口罩。在美国,你老板可能会以为你要辞职去读医学院,或者抢银行。(另外也找不到趴窝的汽车,那应该也是个好用的借口。)

宠物里没有拉布拉多或金毛,只有秋田犬和贵宾。感恩节这个最具美国特色的节日,里面毫无提及。没有火鸡。连整只的烤鸡都没有。

食物的问题格外严重。没有牛排,没有墨西哥卷饼,没有培根,没有甘蓝菜。(不过龙头倒是挺像甘蓝,也许可以冒充一下。)

有一个国际组织正在尝试加入多达250个绘文字。候选列表很长,各方争执不下。

为了腾出空位,他们可能会去掉一些现有的绘文字——它们体现的是日本人对古董级技术的痴迷,比如里面有三种CD,有软盘和磁带、寻呼机和带兔耳天线的电视机。

但是请不要去掉那些黑色电影片段一般的绘文字:点燃的香烟,炸弹,手枪,刀,药丸,血淋淋的皮下注射器,钱袋。那是我的语言。

达蒙·达兰(Damon Darlin)是《纽约时报》Upshot板块的编辑。该板块提供政治、政策和日常生活的报道。

翻译:经雷

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Wednesday, March 4, 2015

A kingdom in splinters

A kingdom in splinters

by Eric Ormsby

Traditional philology today is a shadow of what it once was. Can it survive?

Papyrus of Callimachus's Aetia. via

What language did Adam and Eve speak in the Garden of Eden? Today the question might seem not only quaint, but daft. Thus, the philologist Andreas Kempe could speculate, in his "Die Sprache des Paradises" ("The Language of Paradise") of 1688, that in the Garden God spoke Swedish to Adam and Adam replied in Danish while the serpent—wouldn't you know it?—seduced Eve in French. Others suggested Flemish, Old Norse, Tuscan dialect, and, of course, Hebrew. But as James Turner makes clear in his magisterial and witty history, which ranges from the ludicrous to the sublime, philologists regarded the question not just as one addressing the origins of language, but rather as seeking out the origins of what makes us human; it was a question at once urgent and essential.1 After all, animals do express themselves: they chitter and squeak, they bay and roar and whinny. But none of them, so far as we know, wields grammar and syntax; none of them is capable of articulate and reasoned discourse. We have long prided ourselves, perhaps excessively, on this distinction. But on the evidence Turner so amply provides, we might also wonder whether the true distinction lies not simply in our ability to utter rational speech, but in the sheer obsessive love of language itself; that is, in philology, the "love of words."

This abiding passion for words, cultivated fervently from antiquity into modern times—or at least until around 1800, in Turner's view—encompassed a huge range of subjects as it developed: not only grammar and syntax, but rhetoric, textual editing and commentary, etymology and lexicography, as well as, eventually, anthropology, archeology, biblical exegesis, linguistics, literary criticism, and even law. It comprised three large areas: textual philology, theories about the origins of language, and, much later, comparative studies of different related languages. Two texts predominated: Homer, considered sacred by the ancient Greeks, and the Bible, a contested area of interpretation for both Jews and Christians. As for theories of language origins, these go back to the pre-Socratics and Plato; the controversy was over whether language was divinely given, with words corresponding to the things they named, or arrived at by convention (the nomos versus physis debate). As for comparative studies, these arose in the eighteenth-century, largely as a result of Sir William Jones's discovery of the common Indo-European matrix of most European languages. Encounters with "exotic," that is, non-European, peoples in the course of the Renaissance voyages of discovery were another important source; here American Indian languages in their variety and complexity offered an especially rich, if perplexing, new field of inquiry.

To follow Turner's account of all this is akin to witnessing the gradual construction of a vast and intricate palace-complex of the mind, carried out over centuries, with all its towers and battlements, crenellations and cupolas, as well as its shadier and sometimes disreputable alleyways and culs-de-sac, only to witness it disintegrate, by almost imperceptible stages, into fragmented ruins, a kingdom in splinters. The remnants of that grand complex, its shards and tottering columns, as it were, are our discrete academic disciplines today with their strict perimeters and narrow confines. To illustrate the difference, take Charles Eliot Norton (1827–1908), one of Turner's heroes (and the subject of his Liberal Education of Charles Eliot Norton of 2002): Norton was the first professor of art history at Harvard and, indeed, one of the founders of the discipline, but he was also, among many other things, an expert on Dante who "taught and wrote art history as a philologist, an interpreter of texts." Nowadays a polymath like Norton would not be hired, let alone get tenure, at any American university; he would be viewed as a dubious interloper on others' turf.

In fact, traditional philology nowadays is less a ruin than the shadow of a ruin; no, even less than that, the vestige of a shadow. Turner acknowledges, and laments, this from the outset; he notes that "many college-educated Americans no longer recognize the word." He adds that, "for most of the twentieth century, philology was put down, kicked around, abused, and snickered at, as the archetype of crabbed, dry-as-dust, barren, and by and large pointless academic knowledge. Did I mention mind-numbingly boring?" Worse, "it totters along with arthritic creakiness." With friends like these, we might ask, can philology sink any further into oblivion than it already has? But the unspoken question here—"shall these bones live?"—is one that Turner poses and resolves triumphantly. He breathes life back into philology. There is not a dull page in this long book (and I include here its sixty-five pages of meticulous and sometimes mischievous endnotes). He accomplishes this by setting his account firmly in a detailed if inevitably brisk historical narrative interspersed with vivid cameos of individual scholars, the renowned as well as the notorious, the plainly deranged alongside the truly radiant.

Here I should disclose a distant interest. I once flirted with the idea of devoting myself to philology. I was soon dissuaded by my encounters with philologists in the flesh. The problem was not that they were dry; in fact, their cool, faintly cadaverous aplomb was a distinct relief amid the relentlessly "relevant" atmosphere of the 1960s. Dry but often outrageously eccentric, they were far from being George Eliot's Casaubon toiling, and making others toil, to leave some small but significant trace in the annals of desiccation. No, it was rather their sheer single-mindedness coupled with a hidden ferocity that gave me pause. When I first met the late Albert Jamme, the renowned epigrapher of Old South Arabian, this Belgian Jesuit startled me by exclaiming at the top of his voice, "I hate my bed!" When I politely suggested that he get a new mattress, he shot back with "No, no! I hate my bed because it keeps me from my texts!" And the undiluted vitriol of Jamme's opinions of his colleagues (all three of them!), both in conversation and in print, was scary; from him and others I learned that nothing distills venom more quickly than disagreement over a textual reading. At times there was something decidedly otherworldly about other philologists I met. In the 1970s, when I studied at the University of Tübingen and had the good fortune to work with Manfred Ullmann, the great lexicographer of Classical Arabic, he startled me one day by excitedly brandishing a file card on which was written the Arabic word for "clitoris" (bazr) and exclaiming, "Kli-tO-ris! What do ordinary folk know about Kli-tO-ris?" (More than you imagine, I thought.) Needless to say, it was the word—its etymology, its cognates, its morphology—that captivated him.

As for philological single-mindedness, when a celebrated German Assyriologist of my acquaintance (who shall remain nameless) got married, he rose abruptly from the wedding banquet to announce "Jetzt zur Arbeit!" ("Now to work!") and headed for the door, a volume of cuneiform texts tucked under one arm; only the outraged intervention of his new mother-in-law kept him from leaving. Such anecdotes about philologists—their pugnacity, their obsessiveness, their downright daffiness—could fill a thick volume. Such anecdotes taught me not only that I wasn't learned enough to become a philologist, I wasn't unhinged enough either.

Happily, there is venom aplenty in Turner's account. As he remarks, "the Republic of Letters could make bare-knuckle boxing look civilized." His adversaries lampooned Erasmus as "Errans-mus" or "roving rat." The seventeenth-century cleric the Reverend William Wotton was described as "a most excellent preacher, but a drunken whoring soul." And A. E. Housman could write of Benjamin Jowett's monumental translation of Plato—a translation that helped to dislodge Aristotle from his pre-eminence in the Oxford curriculum—that it was "the best translation of a Greek philosopher which has ever been executed by a person who understood neither philosophy nor Greek." Turner too bares his knuckles when he describes the celebrated eighteenth-century English classicist Richard Porson as "an alcoholic and a slob on a Herculean scale." While such sallies enliven Turner's account throughout, they don't detract from the genuine magnificence of the philological tradition as he describes it. The venom was the unavoidable by-product of that all-consuming passion for words.

Turner is predictably excellent on such prodigies as the truly amazing Richard Bentley (1662–1742), a kind of Mozart of philology, or Sir William Jones, whose precocious research led to the discovery of what is now known as "proto-Indo-European," as well as on a host of other luminaries, who range from Petrarch, Scaliger, Grotius, and Gibbon to both Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt, and well beyond. But he is also superb on the many obscure or forgotten figures who teem throughout his account. He gives a vivid portrait, for example, of Elizabeth Elstob (1683–1756), the so-called "Saxon Nymph," who had eight languages at her command and whose pioneering studies of Anglo-Saxon established it firmly in the grand philological tradition. And then there is Alexander Bryan Johnson, a banker from Utica, whose Treatise on Language went through three editions, from 1828 to 1854. Even in the nineteenth century, philology was still capacious enough to encourage "amateurs" like Johnson to make substantial contributions.

In several of his most intriguing asides, Turner discusses Thomas Jefferson's abiding fascination with American Indian languages. On one occasion, in June of 1791, Jefferson and James Madison "squatted in a tiny Unquachog village on Long Island" to compile a wordlist of the now-extinct Quiripi language from the three old women who still spoke it. Jefferson sought to discover the origins of American Indians; he wondered whether they were ultimately of Asian origin or, less plausibly, whether they had originated in Wales, his own ancestral homeland. In any case, the image of two future American presidents hunkering down in a freezing wigwam on Long Island, driven purely by intellectual curiosity, seems to come from some alternative universe now forever lost to us.

While Turner excels at pithy profiles, he is also quite superb at illuminating certain recurrent debates in the history of philology, such as the "Transcendentalist Controversy" in 1830s Massachusetts in which Ralph Waldo Emerson disputed Andrews Norton, his former teacher of divinity. The disagreement was over the age-old question of whether language developed by convention, Norton's view, or was inherent in the things it denoted, as Emerson argued. It isn't really so surprising that such a dispute would crop up in nineteenth-century New England: the very nature of discourse, let alone consensus on the interpretation of Scripture, depended upon its resolution. The most compelling such clash, which Turner describes at length, occurred between Friedrich Max Müller, the German-born scholar of Sanskrit who became Oxford's first professor of comparative philology, and William Dwight Whitney, the first Yale professor of Sanskrit—both eminent authorities even if Müller had become a kind of academic superstar through his public lectures. (But Whitney's Sanskrit grammar of 1879 is not only still in use, but still in print.) The dispute, yet again, centered on the origins of language. Müller had made fun of Darwin's idea that language developed when humans first began imitating animal cries, calling it "the bow-wow theory." Müller believed instead that language exhibited "natural significancy" and that its origins could be uncovered by a search of Sanskrit roots. Whitney argued for its basis in convention: "the fact that an American says 'chicken' and a Frenchwoman 'poulet' to refer to the same fowl is purely arbitrary: 'gibbelblatt' and 'cronk' would work just as well." Though this was a trans-Atlantic debate, it might as well have been between Plato and the Sophists; such questions were perennial just because they were unanswerable.

The roll-call of major figures who contributed to philology, or were deeply influenced by its methods and insights, includes Plato and Isocrates, the Alexandrian poeta doctus Callimachus (whom Turner somewhat harshly calls "a heroic grind"), Dionysius Thrax, who composed the first grammar book, and his pupil Tyrannion, who settled in Rome around 67 A.D. and "made a bundle as a chic teacher"—to mention only a few of the Greeks discussed here. There follows a consideration of the Jewish community of Alexandria who translated the Torah into Greek sometime in the third century B.C., the version known as the Septuagint (or "LXX") because its seventy-two translators supposedly completed their work in seventy-two days. This inaugurates a theme that will sound, rather distressingly, throughout the book for Christian exegetes turned to rabbinic authorities for help in elucidating the Biblical text even while contemning them. As Turner nicely puts it with reference to the eighteenth-century English exegete Benjamin Kennicott, "Without Jews, Kennicott was helpless. With them, he was high-handed." Some Christian scholars even went so far as to strip the Masoretic text of the Hebrew Bible of its ingenious vowel-signs (Hebrew, like Arabic, originally used a consonantal script: vowels were later indicated by special diacritics above or below the letters); this "unpointed" text, liberated from rabbinic exactitude, simply offered more scope for free-ranging interpretation.

In successive chapters, Turner moves from the Church Fathers through the Middle Ages, on to the Renaissance and Reformation. But though he handles these periods expertly, his "true subject," as he states it, is "the modern humanities in the English-speaking world." The nine chapters he devotes to this are almost impossible to summarize in a review; they are packed with detail and are simply enthralling. His careful account of the implantation of philology in nineteenth-century America, its steady rise and subsequent decline—or rather, its disintegration from a comprehensive realm of learning to an array of scattered and loosely connected disciplines under the aegis of "the humanities"—is at once sobering and compelling. The grand aspiration, the colossal energy, that propelled philology for almost two millennia passed to the sciences; the scientific model of research and learning ousted the philological.

The erudition of early philologists was staggering. Sir William Jones already had mastered eleven languages, with a good smattering of fifteen others, before he even arrived in Calcutta in 1783 and took up Sanskrit. The formidable German scholar Franz Bopp, whose studies in comparative grammar "revolutionized Indo-European philology" considered not only Greek, Latin, and German in his investigations but Sanskrit, Avestan, Old Slavonic, Lithuanian, and Gothic as well. Another nineteenth-century German scholar, Wilhelm von Humboldt, took on Basque, American Indian languages, and Malayo-Polynesian dialects. In a way, though, their polyglot accomplishments are only part of the picture. The philologists were also passionately interested in the realia of antiquity and the Biblical world. Richard Bentley made expert use of numismatics in his research. Others were antiquarians, a term now associated with the fussy sniffing out of ephemera, a sort of Pickwickian pastime; but it was antiquarianism in its loftiest aspects—the study of inscriptions, of classical architecture, of topography, all the shards of a lost past—that gave rise not only to such fields as scientific archeology, but also to such ancillary disciplines as Assyriology and Egyptology. The point is not simply that philologists were both single-minded and obsessive but that they were virtually omnivorous in their pursuits. No vestige of the past was inconsequential in their eyes.

Turner devotes some of his best pages to Edward Gibbon, to whom his own book owes much. Though he writes not in eighteenth-century cadences but in a lively, elegantly colloquial prose without a smidgeon of barbaric academic jargon, his approach seems modeled on Gibbon's. As Turner points out, Gibbon was both a philosophical historian and a philological historian, one of the first; he drew on documents, on texts meticulously recovered and edited, to support his narrative. This is Turner's approach as well.

Though Turner deplores "the monoglot, narrowly focused scholarship increasingly common in the humanities during the past half-century," he seldom indulges in tirades. He doesn't need to; his subject speaks for itself and tells us unmistakably what we have lost. Earlier I compared the philological tradition to a palace only the fragments of which remain. But I wonder whether it might be better described as a kind of invisible banquet at which we still unknowingly feast. It may be a feast with ghosts, but given the ghosts at the table, it's all the more sumptuous for that.

1 Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities, by James Turner; Princeton University Press, 574 pages, $35.

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英国中产阶级的孩子为何要加入ISIS成为“圣战约翰”?

英国中产阶级的孩子为何要加入ISIS成为"圣战约翰"?



殷之光

       2015年2月26日的《华盛顿邮报》捅出了一则重磅新闻。伊斯兰国的著名上镜刽子手"圣战约翰"的真实身份被曝光。报道称,此人名叫穆罕默德·艾姆瓦兹(Mohammed Emwazi)。从今天西方社会的衡量标准来看,这位出生于科威特的英国公民并不是那种"典型"的失败者。他有一个做出租车司机的父亲,上世纪九十年代初,他们一家五口人从科威特搬来伦敦。就像每一个安分守己的中产阶级那样,"圣战约翰"的父母希望能通过移民,给自己的孩子们带来一个好的生活与教育环境。虽然他们生活并不富裕,但像每一个英国普通中产阶级家庭的孩子一样,"圣战约翰"顺利地进入了公立学校。 据他的邻居们说,10来岁的小"圣战约翰"体格瘦弱,时常有当地小阿飞抢他的午餐钱。即便如此,小"圣战约翰"也没有做出什么出格的事情。2006年高中毕业之后,他申请去威斯敏斯特大学念本科。同样与所有中产阶级的孩子们一样,他选择了一个看上去非常"实际"的专业:信息系统与商务管理。

       正是"圣战约翰"这样一个规规矩矩的成长轨迹,使得所有的西方媒体感到大惑不解。为什么这样一个中产阶级的英国公民,一个工作努力、希望让家庭在英国过上脚踏实地好日子的移民后代,竟然成长为如此坚定的反西方极端分子。在他们看来,这一现象几乎跟上世纪六十年代时在欧洲中产阶级青年中流行的马克思主义思想一样,属于完全不可思议的事件。长久以来,拥有一个庞大的中产阶级被看做是社会稳定基石。然而,今天伊斯兰国的兴起,吸引的却是大量来自西方社会中产阶级的孩子们。他们中间,不仅有移民后裔,也有白人的孩子。

       然而,在这个萦绕西方半个多世纪的困惑背后,实际上是一种对资本主义生产方式及其社会组织形式的原教旨确信。卡尔·波兰尼在其1944年初版的《大转型》中,将西方社会的这种对市场原教旨主义称作为一种"乌托邦的社会体制"。在这种原教旨的理想下,人被假定成为一种超越了社会关系的原子个体。社会则为这种原子个体之间相互作用的总和。

       市场原教旨主义的基本逻辑来自于对原子化个人边界的界定。在这种逻辑下,人的边界一方面被视作是其"自然的"生理需求集合。这类被称作为"基本人权"的诉求,是站在这种原子化个人中心立场上对权利的抽象理解。而也只有在这个基础上,才能理解今天西方社会进行"政治正确"判断的基本前提。另一方面,在涉及到人与人关系的社会交往层面,原子化个人的边界则被抽象理解成为一种建立在财产权基础上的所有权边界。而在这种所有权边界基础上发展起来的契约关系则从制度上将这一个人主义的逻辑扩大到社会群体层面。进而将各种尺度上的社会关系,简化抽象为物权,以及判定物权所属的合同关系。 从这个意义上来看,"文化多元主义"作为一种欧洲社会处理不同族群之间关系的指导思想,实际上也产生于这种古典的自由主义放任思想。这一建立在物权属性基础上的古典自由主义观念,甚至通过康德的《永久和平论》被延伸到理解国与国关系的层面。

       这种基于原子化个人假定所发展出来的对社会关系的理解,本质上是一种发源于欧洲历史背景下的普遍主义。其普遍化,则是伴随着欧洲19世纪殖民历史而产生的。然而,无论是18世纪欧洲,那些倡导绝对自由放任的古典自由主义者们,还是19世纪工业革命后开始倡导通过政府保障个人权利的社会自由主义者们,都没能预见到在21世纪的今天,一个高度多元化了的世界对这种普遍主义的普遍性所造成的深刻冲击。他们更没办法看到,这种原子化个人堆砌起来的契约结构到了今天,却促生了一个几乎完全碎片化了的社会

       很大程度上,"圣战约翰"的故事是这种当代碎片化欧洲社会的缩影。 在今天新自由主义对市场的确信中,城市中产阶级被许诺了一个自由与繁荣的市场。这群对繁荣抱着梦想的人,不单包括像"圣战约翰"父母那样从第三世界涌向伦敦的人们,也有原本便生活在此的白人市民。然而,当对未来生活充满幻想的中产阶级将新自由主义者们送进政府,为他们打破"垄断"的市场化改革而欢声雀跃后不久,他们发现,这个所谓自由与繁荣的市场,很快便成为了少部分冒险家的乐园。

       这种被背叛的感情正像2010年时,当剑桥的中产阶级选民们热情洋溢地将自由民主党(Liberal Democrats)捧进了联合政府之后,剑桥的学生们发现,这个政府的首项举措,竟是取消大学学费限制,将本科学费从2004年的3000英镑猛提至今天的9000英镑。中产阶级的选民们,再次被这种新自由主义的精英政治所出卖。

       涨学费仅仅是这个故事的冰山一角。移民英国后,"圣战约翰"一家人住在伦敦爱奇威尔路(Edgware Road)附近一栋英式公寓楼里。这里距离白金汉宫大约2英里左右,从他们家步行去著名的伦敦摄政公园(Regent's Park)则只需10分钟。虽然一家人住的公寓是政府提供的公租房,邻居也都是与他们家差不多的阿拉伯新移民,但是距他们一街之隔便是伦敦地产的黄金地段之一:拉德布鲁克森林路(Ladbroke Grove Road)。

       拉德布鲁克森林路位于诺丁山(Notting Hill)区北部。根据英国最大的地产交易信息网站rightmove的统计,该地区的住房均价超过百万英镑。这个西伦敦最抢手的黄金地段集中了伦敦大量的政客与名流。这其中就包括了现任英国首相大卫·卡梅伦身边的数位重要顾问及好友。这群扎堆住的年轻保守党政治与经济精英们,被英国媒体称为"大卫·卡梅伦的诺丁山帮"(David Cameron's Notting Hill Set)。

       诺丁山区是伦敦作为一个大都会的骄傲。每年8月这里都会举行一场为期两天的盛大嘉年华。来自世界各民族的人们盛装从诺丁山区的主路上走过,四周的人行道旁也摆满了贩卖各类民族食品物件的小摊。各色人等,摩肩接踵,一派多元文化的祥和景象。然而,直到上个世纪七十年代末期,这一地区还只是塞满了新移民的贫民窟。二战之后,这里一度被此起彼伏的族裔暴动所困扰。

       二十世纪八十年代,英国撒切尔政府推行新自由主义改革,短期内,这一改革效果显著。这一地区大量贫民窟得到改造,随着地产业的发展,这里很快在八十年代末期成为了金融新贵们的宠儿。然而随之地价飙升,诺丁山区成为伦敦炙手可热的黄金地段。到了二十一世纪头十年,来自海外的土豪们更是蜂拥而至,大量购入该地区房产。不过,由于英国政府的规定,地产开发商必须在其开发的区域内留出一定比例的公租房。此举的理念是尽量能够促进贫富阶层之间的交流互动,并通过政府资助地区公立教育等方式,尽量避免阶级固化。"圣战约翰"父母1994年从科威特移民到伦敦时,他们便住进了这种公租房。

       虽然在那种公租房的政策影响下,至少在诺丁山区并未真正出现大面积的贫民窟现象。但是,这并无法填补在公租房住客与私有房产业主之间那道愈来愈深的鸿沟。居住在诺丁山区的移民们仍旧与周围的白人精英们格格不入。"圣战约翰"1994年来到伦敦,与那诸多从英国跑去圣战的年轻人一样,属于他这个时代的英国社会,阶层壁垒高筑,固化现象日趋严重。同时,作为金融中心的伦敦,工作机会几乎完全分散在各类服务性行业中。这其中那些诸如金融、法律、医疗等高收入行业的壁垒被教育、社会资源等搭得越来越高。新移民们作为这个社会的陌生人,实际能够选择的工作机会极少。

       事实上,根据英国第四频道(Channel 4)的统计,近年来在全球圣战中扮演重要角色的人物中,就有7名来自伦敦这一区。并且,他们均是第二代移民。其中就包括去年一度被美国媒体指认为"圣战约翰"的伦敦饶舌歌手、伊斯兰国圣战的参与者、埃及移民的后代阿卜杜-马吉德·阿卜杜·巴里(Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary)。

       随着地产价格日益增高,诺丁山区被进一步撕裂成一个个以街道为单位的碎片化空间。 这种空间上的碎片化起源于财产权的严重不平等,更进一步影响到了社会资源占有的不平等。一方面,类似于"诺丁山帮"那样的富有白人精英们成群结队,住在他们用百万英镑购得的城市别墅中,他们其中绝大多数的子女都将会是同一所精英寄宿高中里的同学,大学也大多会进入剑桥牛津修读法律、医学或是政治经济这类学科。而毕业之后,这群默默拼爹的二代白富美、高帅富们则很有可能轻松拿到大公司或是议员办公室的实习职位。

       另一方面,诸如像"圣战约翰"那样的二代移民们则面对着完全不同的人生轨迹。那些出租车司机、超市收银员们的后代,大多接受的是廉价的政府公立学校教育。作为英国公民,他们也许在卡梅伦政府提高本地大学生学费之前,还有希望负担得起上大学。他们学习的专业则更多为电脑科学、机械工程、工商管理等实用性较强的科目。毕业之后,这群名义上的中产阶级后代们还要过五关斩六将,试图逃脱"毕业便失业"的命运。作为他们中间的一分子,"圣战约翰"2009年在金融危机下的失业潮时毕业,他甚至为了第一份与其专业对口的工作回到了科威特。

       可以说,只要有ISIS的意识形态存在,那么一定还会继续有从"自由世界"奔向他们的年轻人,他们是被新自由主义精英政治出卖的、无声的城市新中产阶级的后代。他们是这个碎片化社会的受害者。然而,这种双重的碎片化现象,前者被新自由主义政治经济策略下的市场机制所合理化;而后者,则被在这种策略下产生的"文化多元主义"观念所掩盖。"圣战约翰"在套上黑色面罩端起AK47之前简直就是一个英国当代社会中的模范移民。

       在壁垒愈发森严的当代英国社会里,虽然"圣战约翰"上的公立小学中学无法打破阶级之间的壁垒,但是总可以从形式上提供打破种族壁垒的条件。体育运动在深受"预约文化"制约的英国社会里,多多少少能够起到促进个体与社群融合的作用。因而在英国,乃至整个西方社会,我们总会不断看到对体育活动的强调。例如在今天的瑞典社会,一些NGO组织甚至通过实践,让新移民,特别是穆斯林移民们参与到滑雪这项瑞典"国技"活动中去,并将这类事例当做成功典型向社会报道。

       的确,体育活动可以成为社会群体融合的润滑剂。但这类活动大多需要一定的资金、时间投入,经过系统训练才能掌握相应技巧。与滑雪相比,足球可能相对更为亲民,但是深受"预约文化"规范的欧洲契约社会里,这类竞技性体育活动必须租用专用场地,在一群已经相互较为熟悉的个体之间能顺利地开展。此外,与深具中国特色集体色彩的广场舞、广播体操、太极拳等这类群众体育活动相比,西方体育活动中浓厚的竞技属性也必然使得缺乏技巧的个体难于被集体接纳。

       据报道,学生时期的"圣战约翰"也积极参加学校足球队的活动。然而,瘦弱的他可能在这个群体中并不出挑。老师们也回忆,他似乎是球队里一个不起眼的小成员。这孩子似乎偶尔会有些小脾气,但经过批评教育之后,倒也没捅过什么篓子。在这种深受个人主义影响的竞争团体里,"圣战约翰"很可能只是一个可有可无的陌生人。

       促使"圣战约翰"父母来到英国的理想是对美好生活的向往。这种美好生活的理想基础是对经济发展可能性的信任。的确,20世纪90年代的科威特刚刚走出伊拉克占领的阴影。与大多数海湾国家一样,科威特社会宗族主义色彩严重。关键行业均被各大家族垄断。不过,应当强调的是,这种垄断实际上符合阿拉伯宗族社会的传统社会组织方式。

       传统海湾阿拉伯宗族是一个高度集体化的社群。生活在阿拉伯半岛沙漠绿洲地区的宗族社会有很强的游牧特性。在这一社会条件下,土地作为一种自然物,是无法被标记所有权属性的。而劳动所需的生产资料,诸如宝贵的水资源等,则归属为宗族集体所有。宗族长老以其一族之长的身份,对这类集体所有的资源肩负着管理与分配的责任。 在土地上通过劳动而产生的财富,具有明确归属。而通常情况下,族长占有着大量劳动创造出的财富。他与族民之间的社会关系以及财产再分配则通过宗族大会(Majlis)的形式调节。这类宗族大会在海湾宗族社会中至今扮演着重要的角色。它是君主与臣民之间沟通并达成利益分配的最直接手段。这类大会通常会在宗族领袖家中举行,其族人无需预约,直接登门拜访。他们中有些人仅仅是通过这种礼节性的拜访向族长表达敬意,而更多的,则会根据自己实际情况,向族长提出一些财产或礼节性要求。诸如向其索取一定金额的财务以补贴家用,或是邀请其出席自己儿女的婚礼庆典等等。这种迥异于现代欧洲社会陌生化的部族熟人生活方式,至今仍旧在阿拉伯社会中扮演重要组织作用。

       然而,在这种脆弱的部落熟人结构维持下的社会稳定极易被打破。除了来自外部的战争、全球化经济压力等因素外,甚至内部的人口增长也容易对这一制度的有效性造成威胁。相应地,伊斯兰(或者确切地说是特定伊斯兰教派)则被转化为可提供国家认同的意识形态。同时,今天伊斯兰国所叙述的伊斯兰,作为政治与道德理想,也为个人努力提供了方向。与今天我们熟悉的一个人为中心的发展主义话语不同,这种伊斯兰国的政治理想将个人视为"穆斯林"这一集合概念的组成部分。因此,那些在个人主义现代社会中不被注意的"圣战约翰"们,一旦戴上了蒙面头罩,便成为了一个无法被忽视的强大集体精神中的一分子。无论在这面罩背后是那个来自科威特移民的后代,还是那个伦敦街头的饶舌歌手,同样都传递了"圣战约翰"作为反西方现代精神的强大符号作用。通过彻底地回归到传统阿拉伯社会结构,放弃个人身份与权利,这些来自西方且无需有名的蒙面人们,实际上在对他们所熟悉的"西方社会"进行着一场"回到过去"式的本质主义抗争。

       虽然,无论是伊斯兰国的意识形态家们,还是今天部分反伊斯兰国的西方学者们,都会强调今天这场血腥反抗与19世纪末殖民地人民反抗殖民主义全球霸权,谋求民族独立的运动相联系。但是,我们也必须认识到这两者之间存在着根本性的政治理想方向差异。在面对针对自由主义意识形态的政治批判时,主流的西方知识界普遍受困于一种拒斥主义态度。他们不肯承认,今天伊斯兰国的疯狂,实际上是对欧洲社会秩序及其政治理想国假想的根本挑战。这种拒斥主义的基础恰恰是对作为普遍主义存在的"个人主义社会结构"及"自由主义政治方向"的原教旨式认同。

       正是在这种拒斥主义影响下,"圣战约翰"才会被看做是无法理解的"疯狂"行为。与上世纪60年代受马克思主义影响的年轻人一样,是一种非理性的心理冲动。这种心理冲动,被"激进"(radical)一词简单概括。这个词的含混性在于它将一系列极为复杂、具有深厚历史背景、政治因素的社会现象用一个标签笼统概括。这个词既可以用来形容20世纪初,代表工人阶级利益的共产主义、社会主义运动,也可以用来形容今天反移民的民粹主义活动。同时,"激进"也被用来描述一切与暴力相关的对抗,以英国社会来说,这类对抗包括19世纪末期殖民地针对宗主国的反抗,包括20世纪中期马克思主义学生的抗议,包括20世纪末期的爱尔兰共和军恐怖活动,当然也包括了今天以伊斯兰国为代表的伊斯兰意识形态与政治运动。

       将这些各自不同的问题概而论之的原因,在于西方社会对自身政治逻辑的原教旨确信。进而使得在政治讨论中,这种"激进"冲动背后可能存在的社会因素被彻底弱化。一切"激进"行为均被视为"无目的的反抗",进而被视为非理性的疯狂,而与这种疯狂相对,欧洲社会的理性主义可能更容易理解作为正义对立面存在的"邪恶"。倘若今天的"圣战约翰"从小生长在一个父亲酗酒,母亲饱受家庭暴力愤而自杀的家庭环境里,是一个有着孤僻怪异的性格,还喜欢残杀小动物的坏孩子,那么对于西方主流社会来说,"圣战约翰"日后在伊斯兰国里做下的累累恶事,便是能够被理性化的"邪恶"。

       正如特瑞·伊格尔顿在他的《论邪恶》一书谈到的,那种从解释学角度出发看到的"邪恶"意义,实际上诞生于基督教神学系中对善恶二元划分的理性传统。这位垂暮的马克思主义知识分子承认"邪恶"是一个道德与神学的问题,并也试图为其提供一个唯物主义的理解方式。在他看来,"邪恶"的行为甚至对其的道德叙述本身是一个制度性的产物。与纯粹的疯狂不同,"邪恶"是理性的。它与正义一起,组成了一个硬币的两面。这一矛盾的关系为伊格尔顿理解"邪恶"及其在今天这个世界里的事实表现提供了最基本的逻辑基础。

       然而,今天呈现在西方媒体面前的"圣战约翰"却完全不合这套逻辑。因此,"圣战约翰"背后的那个伊斯兰意识形态,便也像是一个幽灵,困扰着今天的欧洲。与19世纪欧洲上空的幽灵不同,今天这个幽灵来自过去。虽然今天这个幽灵也在强调自己代表了对西方帝国主义霸权的反抗,并尽力将自己表述为一个与西方世界相对立的阵营。然而我们发现,这种反帝的政治理想并未真正为世界提供平等共存的替代性方案。甚至暴力本身也超出一切,成为这种政治理想的实践手段。

       齐格马·鲍曼曾将911事件称为21世纪的新式政治暗杀。在他看来,这类政治暗杀的对象是符号化的制度本身。世贸大厦代表了(西方的)经济霸权,五角大楼则无疑是(西方的)军事霸权。同样,"圣战约翰"在镜头前对人质的处决,实际上也能被同样看做是对西方政治符号的政治暗杀。这种暗杀式的手段,虽然名义上可以被讲述成针对西方话语霸权的对抗,而实际上,镜头前的两者均成了暴力的施加人。而暴力之后的受害者,则是镜头背后那所有丧失了主权的人民。这也就是为什么,虽然今天伊斯兰国沿用了19世纪末期那种反帝反殖民的自决话语,但其本质仍旧是只为特定一群人服务的分裂性的霸权主义精神。在这个意义上,"圣战约翰"们所代表的对西方霸权与现代政治不平等的反抗,无疑只是一种向后看的"封建反帝"。

       我们今天的中国,其革命建国的历程是一场经过了"反帝反封建"的政治实践。也许重提这一曾经影响了整个第三世界的政治实践及其话语略显得不合时宜。但是,我们看到,恰恰是在这样的理想下,中国以及整个"第三世界"对霸权的反抗才真正有了普遍性的意义。在这种政治"反抗"行动的内部,有着不同寻常的复杂性。在拒绝简单妄信某种外来的"真经"的同时,也需要同时避免这种"反抗"行动沦为新的原教旨主义与霸权。这恰是我们今天的中国人对这个世界的责任。
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Tuesday, March 3, 2015

How Using Emoji Makes Us Less Emotional And what linguists say it means if your

How Using Emoji Makes Us Less Emotional And what linguists say it means if your smiley face has a nose

By @AliceLRobb

A few weeks ago, after I said goodbye to a friend who was moving across the country, I texted her an emoji of a crying face. She replied with an image of chick with its arms outstretched. This exchange might have been heartfelt. It could have been ironic. I'm still not really sure. It's possible that this friend and I are particularly emotionally stunted, but I put at least part of the blame on emoji: They allowed us to communicate without saying anything, saving us from spelling out any actual sentiments. It's no surprise that millenials have embraced emoji and their pixelated cousins, emoticons. Ambiguous, superficial, and cute, they're perfectly suited to a generation that sends Hallmark e-cards ironically, circulates step-by-step guides to "being deep," and dismisses "deep meaningful conversations" as "DMC's."

Writers around the Internet are giddy at the prospect of the 250 new emoji characters coming out later this month. Last Monday, news broke of a soon-to-launch social network, "emojli," on which users will communicate only through emoji; two days later, over 50,000 people had already reserved usernames (consisting, of course, of strings of emoji). Some enthusiasts even believe emoji have literary potential. After raising $3,500 on Kickstarter, data engineer Fred Benenson set out to translate every line of Moby Dick into emoji. Using Amazon's crowd-sourcing project Mechanical Turk, Benenson managed to find thousands of strangers willing to work on the project. Three people translated each line of Melville's text; a second group selected the best translation of the three. Benenson sells the finished product—"Emoji Dick"—online, for $200 in hardcover. (The merely curious can opt for a $5 PDF.) Last year, the Library of Congress requested a copy. Benenson says he pockets between $100 and $300 a month from sales.

Emoticons and emoji are changing the way we communicate faster than linguists can keep up with or lexicographers can regulate. "It's the wild west of the emoji era," said linguist Ben Zimmer over the phone. "People are making up the rules as they go. It's completely organic."

READ: A Peek Inside the Non-Profit Consortium That Makes Emoji Possible

At the forefront of the research into emoji use today is Stanford-trained linguist Tyler Schnoebelen. By analyzing emoticon use on Twitter, Schnoebelen has found that use of emoticons varies by geography, age, gender, and social class—just like dialects or regional accents. Friend groups fall into the habit of using certain emoticons, just as they develop their own slang. "You start using new emoticons, just like you start using different words, when you move outside your usual social circles," said Schnoebelen. He discovered a divide, for instance, between people who include a hyphen to represent a nose in smiley faces— :-) — and people who use the shorter version without the hyphen. "The nose is associated with conventionality," said Schnoebelen. People using a nose also tend to "spell words out completely. They use fewer abbreviations." Twitter notoriously obscures demographic data, but according to Schnoebelen, "People who use no noses tend to be tweeting more about Miley Cyrus, Justin Bieber. They have younger interests, younger concerns, whether or not they're younger."

The gender divide in emoticon use is another topic of debate. "Based on the ideology that women are more emotional, the normal claim is that women use more emoticons," said Schnoebelen. He's quick to point out that analyzing emoticon use—or any linguistic pattern—along a gender binary is simplistic, but studies suggest that women account for a disproportionate amount of emoticon use. In 2012, a team of psychologists at Rice University gave 21 college students—eleven male, ten female—free iPhones they could monitor, without telling their subjects the purpose of the experiment. Over the course of the next six months, the researchers collected and analyzed about 124,000 text messages sent by the group. Everyone involved in the study sent an emoticon at least once, though most people used them infrequently: Just 4 percent of all text messages contained an emoticon—and these were twice as likely to be sent by a woman. 

We can't necessarily generalize from 21 college students to the population at large, but further evidence suggests that both sexes are more comfortable seeing women use emoticons. A study conducted by the online dating site Zoosk in January found that men with a ":)" in their profile receive six percent fewer messages, while women who use the same symbol receive 60 percent more.

READ: How Capital Letters Became Internet Code for Yelling

Colin Rothfels, who runs a Twitterbot that finds and retweets anagrams, has also used a Twitter corpus to explore patterns of emoticon usage. "Can you construct rules for how these symbols are being combined?" he wonders over the phone. Rothfels has made some headway toward developing what he calls a "descriptive grammar" of emoticons by identifying recurring sequences and combinations of emoji. The most common emoji combination on Twitter, for instance, is a laughing face followed by a crying face. The rules are fluid, though: Most emoji "can function as different parts of speech depending on context."

 

Emoji have undoubtedly changed the way we text, Gchat, and tweet—but are they changing language itself? While emoji are more popular than ever, the idea behind them is actually quite old. "There's an old utopian ideal that we could create a kind of a universal pictorial language," says Zimmer. Francis Bacon and John Wilkins dreamed about developing a visual language that could take us back to the pre-Babel era. In the 1950s, a World War II concentration camp survivor named Charles Bliss devised a set of symbols he hoped would preclude war by facilitating communication among speakers of different languages. In 1969, Vladimir Nabokov told The New York Times: "I often think there should exist a special typographical sign for a smile … a supine round bracket." In 1982, computer scientist Scott Fahlman granted his wish. Looking for a solution to the miscommunication that prevailed on early Internet message boards, he proposed that a rotated smiling face, composed of a colon, a hyphen and a parenthesis— :-) –should indicate that the writer was joking.

Emoji could even mark a return to a more pictographic script. Our earliest examples of writing come from the pictographic hieroglyphs and cuneiform inscriptions from Mesopotamia around 5,000 years ago. It was only around 1,200 BC that the Phoenicians developed the first alphabetic writing system. Could the rise of emoji mean we're going backward?

Ben Zimmer doesn't see it that way. He believes emoticons can help us re-incorporate something we've lost. "It's a recurrence of a very old impulse," he said. "I don't see it as a threat to written language, but as an enrichment. The punctuation that we use to express emotion is rather limited. We've got the question mark and the exclamation point, which don't get you very far if you want to express things like sarcasm or irony in written form."

But the ability to convey tone and emotion through text, without resorting to illustration, is one of the key challenges of writing. It's what makes someone a good writer rather than an effective artist or illustrator. And though emoticons may make it easier to convey different moods without much effort, they have limitations of their own. "You couldn't communicate only with emoticons," linguist John McWhorter wrote in an email. "You have to know what you're talking about, what happened, when, and so on. Emoticons don't do that."

Zimmer, too, concedes that there are important limits on what emoji can communicate. He calls Emoji Dick "a fascinating project," but notes: "If you look at those strings of emoji, they can't stand on their own. They don't convey the same message as the text on which they're based." After all,

doesn't quite have the same ring as "Call me Ishmael."

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What the West Got Wrong About Sex Education

What the West Got Wrong About Sex Education

By

In 1976, the British psychologist Rex Stanton Rogers replied to an angry letter from T. J. Proom, who had withdrawn his four daughters from their public school in the south east of England to protest its allegedly "pornographic" sex education lessons. The editor of a recent collection of essays on sex education, Rogers made it clear that he did not share Proom's views on the subject. At the same time, though, Rogers was sympathetic to his plight. "There are arguments both ways about the distribution of power and about parental rights in education," Rogers wrote. "In the specific area of sex education schools vary vastly in policy both over the topic and the role of parents—again I'd hate to say what ought to happen." On other controversial educational questions, Rogers noted, the "conventional answer" was to expose children to a "plurality of opinion" so that they could form their own. But adults were reluctant to do that on matters of sex, Rogers told Proom, because the stakes were so high:

A lot of sex educators have a "health" orientation. They sex educate for the same reasons that others tell us to wear seatbelts, give up smoking or get our children vaccinated/immunized. In the process a few people die in car fires, survive to 90 smoking like chimneys, or get brain damage from vaccines. But many more forms of suffering are avoided—or so the argument goes. You are among the "unlucky" in this argument. Your children may have been "saved" from unwanted pregnancies, sexual "guilt," etc. There isn't much direct evidence that this is true, in the end sex educators are working on hypotheses. If they are wrong they will get hammered like the planners that put people into high-rise, if they are right they will be hailed as new Pasteurs.

Rogers's remarks neatly encapsulated both the broad ambitions and the dashed hopes of sex education in the modern world. From the dawn of the twentieth century, advocates imagined that schools could transform the sexual lives of young people. Some of these visions focused on changing their behavior, to minimize "unwanted pregnancies" and especially sexually transmitted diseases; others emphasized changing their minds, so they could be liberated from "guilt" and other unhealthy ideas. But sex educators were stymied at every turn by dissident parents and communities, who wanted schools to teach their ideas about sex—or nothing at all. "We are not against sex education—quite the reverse—but we do not want modesty, chastity, and fidelity to be undermined in our child," T. J. Proom wrote, in a revealing follow-up letter to Rex Rogers. Nor did he want schools to present a wide array of "opinions" on the subject, as Rogers had suggested. "How do those who believe in reticence counteract the effect of those who impose pornography on children?" Proom asked. "Surely to subject children to a Babel of dissonant voices is to invite cynicism and a myriad of excuses for selfindulgence." As he correctly sensed, even a curriculum oriented toward sexual autonomy and decision making expressed a set of values, about sex and reason and—most of all—about individuality. Whether sex education spawned sexual "self-indulgence" or not, there was no mistaking its focus on the self.

That emphasis echoed the proclaimed values of state-run schools, of course: order, rationality, and individuality. In the twentieth century, for the first time in human history, schools became truly universal institutions; most of the world's people entered their doors, for at least a part of their lives. And wherever they appeared, schools ostensibly taught people to view themselves as rational and purposeful actors who can make their own choices and construct their own lives. More often than not, as many chroniclers have noted, the day-to-day demands and constraints of schools inhibited or squashed this individualist ideal. But as the history of sex education reminds us, the ideal is hardly shared; instead, it is one of the most hotly contested questions of modernity. Examine almost any sex education document—in almost any part of the globe—and you will find statements exalting the conscience and choice of the rational individual, just as you do in the rest of the curriculum. Sex is a highly personal matter, the story goes, so schools should equip each person with the skills and knowledge to navigate its perilous shores. To many people around the world, however, that idea offends their conscience; they want schools to map proper sexual behavior, not to liberate individuals to explore it on their own. "The scheme took what it called 'reason' as the basis for morality," a British conservative wrote in 1972, condemning a new sex education project. "What is called didactic teaching about right and wrong was to be abandoned in favour of the child's 'self-evolved solutions.'" The writer's use of quotation marks punctuated his own skepticism. When it came to sex, many adults believed, there was no good reason to let children come to their own reasoned conclusions.

Nor did they believe that expert authority should trump their own, a central theme of campaigns against sex education—and, more largely, of political conservatism—in the modern West. Since the 1970s, sex educators have linked their opponents to antievolutionists and (more recently) to climate-change deniers; in each case, the argument goes, the right wing mobilized its populist legions to counter established scientific truth. But sex education simply lacks the scientific basis or consensus that marks topics like evolution and human-made climate change. To be clear, no credible research has ever sustained the conservative claim that sex education makes young people more likely to engage in sex. Yet there is also scant evidence to suggest that it affects teen pregnancy or venereal disease rates, either, as pioneering American sex researcher William H. Masters acknowledged in a 1968 interview with Playboy magazine. "We have no scientific knowledge as to whether it's worth a damn," admitted Masters, whose studies (with Virginia Johnson) of "human sexual response" made them both household names. "There are a lot of people who climb on the sex education bandwagon and say it's great. But somebody is going to take the time and effort to find out whether there is any real value in the entire concept of formally disseminating sexual information to youngsters." Since then, scholars around the world have struggled in vain to show any significant influence of sex education upon youth sexual behavior. As a British scholar observed in 2009, the three European countries with the lowest teen pregnancy rates—Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands—all took very different tacks on sex education. Italy's approach was particularly "haphazard," the scholar noted: sex education provision was "sparse," parents retained the right to withdraw their children from it, and one survey showed that half of eleven to fourteen-year-olds believed they could acquire AIDS from a toilet seat. Yet the incidence of teen pregnancy was about the same as in Holland, where youth received much more extensive sexual instruction at school.

Given how sporadically most countries taught sex education, we should not be surprised by the lack of strong data about its behavioral effects. Nor was it clear whether the subject altered individual attitudes, another avowed goal of some—not all—sex educators. This ambition sat uneasily next to educators' repeated claim that they merely sought to disseminate "science" or knowledge, not to change children's minds. But they inevitably taught values, too, whether they admitted it or not. "Most forms of education (like teaching French rather than Cantonese) involve value judgments about what is useful to the child, good for society, and so on," Rex Rogers noted in his letter to T. J. Proom. "Even an apparently neutral subject like mathematics has this characteristic." There was nothing even nominally neutral about sex education, of course, which addressed one of the most intimate dimensions of the human experience. Some educators stressed changed values as a route to improved behavior, insisting that youth would never become sexually continent or responsible until they altered their confused and repressed attitudes about sex. To others, however, fighting repression was an end in itself. "I want these children to learn to experience pleasure without feeling guilty," declared the radical Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, praising a São Paulo pilot project in sex education in the 1980s. "School has to sweep away taboos and sexual prejudices because sex is one of the most important sources of pleasure known to human beings."

But many human beings did not see it that way, in Brazil or around the world. For some, the goal of individual freedom insulted religious or communal prescriptions about sex and sexuality; to others, it violated their own individual rights to raise children as they saw fit. Over the past three decades, as a host of scholars have documented, human rights have become a kind of lingua franca for the modern world. Sex education supporters frequently employed human-rights language, insisting that children's rights—as codified in a growing series of international treaties and conventions—guaranteed the right to receive sexual knowledge and information. But opponents invoked the rights of parents, especially as encoded in what Michael Ignatieff has called the "sacred text" of the twentieth century: the 1945 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children," the declaration states. It also calls the family "the natural and fundamental group of society," entitled to "protection by society and the State." As the 1976 Kjeldsen case in Europe illustrated, conservative efforts to harness human rights principles against sex education sometimes fell short of their mark. But they also spoke to the "globalization of the 'family values' movement," as an Australian observer noted in 2007. The first "family values" campaign came out of the American New Right, of course. But it had become thoroughly internationalized, drawing on worldwide networks—and, increasingly, on worldwide human rights doctrines—to mount a global attack on sex education.

When it came to sex, however, the most influential global force was never the school. Starting with magazines and films and culminating in television and the Internet, mass media had a much more profound effect on children's sexuality in the twentieth century than any set of formal educational institutions. Indeed, sex educators often designed their curricula as an explicit challenge to crass media images and ideologies. To an American educator, writing in 1914, "youth is subjected by our civilization [to] aggressive sex stimuli and suggestiveness oozing from every pore"; a French physician worried in 1959 that "theater, film, pornographic publications and posters ... cause a state of sexual over-excitement," which he compared to "a poisoning gas"; and in 1971, a Japanese educator warned that her country was "flooded" with obscenity and pornography from overseas. "Much of what is produced in the mass media today is 'Sexy' in the extreme," she complained. "How best can it be counteracted?" The question became even more urgent in the era of the Internet, when millions of sexual images could be accessed with a few clicks of a mouse. In China, the popularity of Japanese porn stars—and the weakness of the Chinese "Great Firewall," which technology-savvy adolescents could scale with ease—prompted officials to insert sex education for the first time into the national health curriculum. As a New Zealand journalist surmised, after observing several sex education classes in 2006, "schools are being forced to play catch-up with popular culture."

Could schools ever "catch up"? History suggested the opposite: try as they might, schools would always be a step—or three—behind the sexual curve. "A 12-minute filmstrip is hardly a match for two years of 'R'-rated films every weekend," wrote Scott Thomson, director of an American principals' association, in a bold 1981 article. "A few chapters of a textbook on marriage and family cannot really compete with Hustler, Oui and Playgirl and Masters and Johnson. The school marching band plays 'Stars and Stripes Forever' but the students listen to 'Afternoon Delight' on their cassettes." Indeed, Thomson continued, "schools are a puny David without even a sling-shot against the media Goliath." But they pretended that they could slay the giant, nevertheless, perpetuating a kind of "educational fraud" on the entire nation. "As long as one set of values is taught in the larger society, it is absurd to ask schools to neutralize those values in a few weeks of classroom instruction," Thomson concluded. "Even more absurd, however, is the expectation that any significant outcomes will come from that instruction." He was probably right. Even in Sweden, as a 1969 observer wrote, sex education "tended to follow rather than lead social trends"; two decades later, Sweden's leading sex educator agreed. "Sex education will not be really accepted before a profound change of attitudes in broad groups of the society has occurred," wrote Carl Gustaf Boethius, the longtime head of the Swedish Association for Sexuality Education, summarizing a set of reports about the subject in different European countries. "Things must happen first in society and only then in schools.... The school is not a spear head, it is a mirror."

That is not to say that schools have failed entirely in this realm. Surely, across the twentieth century, many teachers and schools have helped children gain more insight, understanding, and knowledge about their sexual lives and selves. When he taught high school social studies in Colorado in the 1930s, for example, the future bestselling author James A. Michener designed and cotaught a pilot sex education class with a science instructor. Boldly mixing boys and girls in the same classroom, the freewheeling course covered such controversial subjects as birth control and masturbation. Students raved about the class, and—most notably—not a single parent complained. "The bogey-man of parental interference . . . is grossly overexaggerated," Michener wrote. "We believe that most American communities will eventually react in this same way if sane teachers teach those fields." He was wrong, obviously, about America and the rest of the world. Over the past hundred years, there is probably no subject that has posed greater headaches to teachers than sex education. However "sane," to borrow Michener's dated metaphor, some teachers obviously lacked the skills and preparation to teach the subject; others were hampered by community pressures from every side, which accelerated—not abated—after Michener's time. But they were most of all stymied by sex itself, which resisted most efforts to rationalize and systematize it in the modern school. "To the theoretical teacher eager to reform the world on paper the introduction of sexual education into the curriculum of our schools may appear a very simple step," a British author and former headmistress wrote in 1920. "Are we really being honest with ourselves? For in sex we have yet learnt very little, and this is true even of the wisest among us; and indeed, I doubt sometimes if we can ever learn very much except each one of us for ourselves out of our own experience."

"Experience" was a hallmark of twentieth-century educational reform movements around the world, which sought to make schools more "practical" and relevant to students' day-to-day lives. Sex educators seized eagerly on this idiom: like health and vocational classes, the argument went, instruction about sex would prepare young people for real-world activities and decisions. "In this day of progressive education," an American school official wrote in 1939, "when schools teach children ... habits of healthful living; what foods they should eat; how to use carpenters' tools; how to cook, sew, manage a household, dress, and prepare themselves to earn a living, it is hard to believe that our boys and girls are still left to acquire sex instruction in the gutter." He should not have been surprised. For millions of people around the world, the so-called 3 R's—reading, writing, and arithmetic—remained the sine qua non of proper education; "practical" or "experiential" learning was second rate or superfluous, best obtained outside of schools rather than within them. It also seemed especially pernicious in the realm of sex, where it conjured precisely the behaviors that most adults wanted to prevent. "Modern educational experts believe in 'learning by doing,'" an American conservative wrote in 1970, "and we all know what explorations can take place ... stimulated by film strips and class discussions about sex." That same year, but an ocean away, a British critic issued a nearly identical warning. "Children are always eager to put their knowledge into practice," he wrote. "Where would their experimentation end?" Rooted in the modern doctrine of learning via experience, sex education alienated parents and other citizens who did not want students to experience sex.

For the world's children, for the past hundred years, most of this experience has taken place far from the classroom. The rise of near universal education in the late twentieth century made schools into sexual spaces; indeed, sex education was often designed to purify their erotic atmosphere. But children learned much more about sex from their peers—and from mass media—than they did from teachers, parents, or any other authority figures. In a much-told joke from Mexico, a father informs his son that they need to have a "frank, heart-to-heart talk" about sex. "OK, Dad, what is it you want to know?" the son replies. The joke was on adults, of course, who like to pretend that their children are sexual innocents. But so do schools, which have never influenced sexual knowledge or behavior to the extent that they wanted, or believed. In Sweden, another popular joke described an eight-year-old boy whose teacher announces that his class is about to receive its first sex education lesson. "Miss, couldn't we who already know how to fuck be allowed to go out to play football?" the boy asks. For the most part, on matters of sex, schools "taught" the world's students what they already knew. Sex education was neither a modernist monstrosity like high-rise public housing nor a "new Pasteur" of scientific triumph, to quote Rex Rogers. It was instead a mirror, reflecting all the flux and diversity—and the confusion and instability—of sex and youth in our globalized world.

Excepted from Too Hot to Handle: A Global History of Sex Education by Jonathan Zimmerman. Copyright © 2015 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission.

Jonathan Zimmerman is a professor of education and history at New York University.

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The Decline of Book Reviewing

  The Decline of Book Reviewing   Share The fates of authors and publishers — not to mention the reading public — depend on book reviews — b...