Thursday, June 15, 2017

How St. Augustine Invented Sex


How St. Augustine Invented Sex

Illustration by Malika Favre

One day in 370 C.E., a sixteen-year-old boy and his father went to the public baths together in the provincial city of Thagaste, in what is now Algeria. At some point during their visit, the father may have glimpsed that the boy had an involuntary erection, or simply remarked on his recently sprouted pubic hair. Hardly a world-historical event, but the boy was named Augustine, and he went on to shape Christian theology for both Roman Catholics and Protestants, to explore the hidden recesses of the inner life, and to bequeath to all of us the conviction that there is something fundamentally damaged about the entire human species. There has probably been no more important Western thinker in the past fifteen hundred years.

In the "Confessions," written around 397, Augustine described what happened in the bathhouse many years earlier. That day, Patricius, his father, saw in him the signs of inquieta adulescentia, restless young manhood, and was—in Sarah Ruden's new, strikingly colloquial translation—"over the moon" at the thought of someday soon having grandchildren. It is easy, even across a vast distance in time, to conjure up a teen-ager's exquisite embarrassment. But what fixed itself in Augustine's memory, instead, is something that happened when they got home: "In his glee he told my mother—it was the sort of tipsy glee in which this sorry world has forgotten you, its creator, and fallen in love instead with something you've created." (Augustine's "Confessions" are addressed to his God.) His mother, Monica, was a pious Christian and responded very differently. Since God had already started to build his temple in her breast, she "endured a violent spasm of reverent, tremulous trepidation." The unbaptized adolescent's sexual maturity had become the occasion—not the first and certainly not the last—for a serious rift between his parents.

Patricius did not concern himself with his son's spiritual development in the light of Jesus, nor did he regard the evidence of his son's virility with anything but delight. In response, Monica set out to drive a wedge between son and father. "She made a considerable bustle," Augustine writes, admiringly, "to ensure that you, my God, were my father, rather than him."

About one thing the father and mother agreed: their brilliant son should obtain the education his gifts deserved. The young Augustine had been sent to study in the pleasant town of Madauros and had shown remarkable facility in literary interpretation and performance. The university at Carthage seemed within reach—followed, possibly, by a lucrative career in law or public speaking. Patricius, a man of modest means, scrimped and networked for a year to collect the needed funds. When Augustine left Thagaste, he must have seen his father for the last time, for in the "Confessions" he mentions that when he was seventeen Patricius died. The mention is a conspicuously cool one.

If the grieving widow also felt some relief at his death—given that he was a dangerous influence on her beloved son—any hopes she might have had that Augustine would embark at once on the path of chastity were quickly dashed. "I came to Carthage," he writes, "to the center of a skillet where outrageous love affairs hissed all around me." His confession that he polluted "the shared channel of friendship with putrid rutting" sounds like an overheated account of masturbation or homosexuality; other, equally intense and equally cryptic phrases evoke a succession of unhappy affairs with women. The feverish promiscuity, if that is what it was, resolved fairly quickly into something quite stable. Within a year or two, Augustine had settled down with a woman with whom he lived and to whom, in his account, he was faithful for the next fourteen years.

The arrangement was probably the best that Monica could have envisaged at this stage for her son, given his restless sexual energies. What she most feared was a hasty marriage that might hinder his career. Merely living with a woman posed much less of a threat, even when the woman gave birth to a son, Adeodatus. By the standards of the time, the relationship was a respectable one. At least from Augustine's perspective—and that is the only perspective we have—there was no thought of his marrying the woman, whose name he does not even bother to provide. He expects his readers to understand the difference "between the sanctioned scope of marriage, a bond contracted for the purpose of producing children, and a deal arising from lustful infatuation."

Priding himself on his intelligence and his literary sensitivity, he studied law; he honed his rhetorical skills; he entered dramatic competitions; he consulted astrologers; he mastered the complex, sinuous system of thought associated with the Persian cult known as Manichaeanism. Augustine carried his Manichaeanism, along with his mistress and his son, from Carthage to Thagaste, where he taught literature, and then back to Carthage, where he gave courses on public speaking, and then to Milan, where he took up an illustrious professorship of rhetoric.

In Augustine's decade-long ascent, there was one major problem, and her name was Monica. When he arrived at Thagaste for his first teaching position, Augustine's mother was loath to share a house with him, not because of his mistress and child but, rather, because of his Manichaean beliefs. Those beliefs—the conviction that there were two forces, one good and the other evil, at war in the universe—were repugnant to her, and she made a conspicuous show of weeping bitterly, as if her son had died.

Her tears were redoubled when, back at Carthage, he prepared to leave for Rome: "She was hanging onto me coercively, trying to either stop my journey or come along with me on it." Lying, he told her that he was only seeing off a friend, and persuaded her to spend the night at a shrine near the harbor. "I got away, and got away with it."

The son must have felt some guilt. And yet, in remembering this moment, he allowed himself for once to express some anger toward his mother: "Her longing, which was physical, was taking a beating from the justified whip of sorrow." The phrase Augustine uses for this longing—carnale desiderium—might seem more appropriate for a lover than for a mother. Monica had taken whatever was blocked or unsatisfied in her relationship with her husband and transferred it to her son. Augustine, suffocating, had to flee. And the suffering that his escape visited upon her was, he reflects, her due as a woman: "these tortures revealed the vestiges of Eve she had within her, as with groans she searched for what she had given birth to with groans."

In Genesis, the consequence of Eve's disobedience is twofold: women are condemned to bring forth children in pain and to yearn for the husbands who dominate them. As Augustine looks back at his relation to his mother, child and husband are merged in him: she brought him with sorrow into the world and she sought him with sorrow through the world. For his grieving mother's search for her son did not end at the harbor in Carthage. A few years later, when Augustine took up his post in Milan, Monica sailed from North Africa to join him.

This time, he did not flee. Though he was not ready to be baptized a Catholic, he told his mother that he had been deeply impressed by Ambrose, the Catholic bishop of Milan. Ambrose's powerful sermons helped to undermine Augustine's contempt for the apparent crudeness of the Bible's stories. What had originally struck him as absurdities began to seem like profound mysteries. His long-held intellectual and aesthetic certainties were crumbling.

All the while, Augustine's career continued on its course. He met his students in the morning, and spent his afternoons with his close friends, discussing philosophy. His mother, now settled in his household, sought to change her son's life. She busied herself with arranging a favorable marriage, and found a suitable Catholic heiress whose parents agreed to the match. The girl was almost two years shy of marriageable age, though, and so the wedding had to wait.

In the meantime, Monica engineered another change in her son's life. The woman with whom he had been living "was torn from my side, because she was supposed to be an obstacle to my marriage," Augustine writes. "My heart, which had fused with hers, was mutilated by the wound, and I limped along trailing blood." Of his mistress's feelings, he gives us no glimpse, noting simply, "She went back to Africa, vowing to you that she would never know another man." Then she is gone from his account, leaving him with the gnawing sexual appetite that she had served to appease. He quickly took another mistress.

Yet, as he soon came to testify, God's grace works in strange ways. In little more than a year's time, Augustine had converted to the Catholic faith. Shortly thereafter, now baptized, he broke off his engagement to marry, resigned his professorship, vowed himself to perpetual chastity, and determined to return to Africa and found a monastic community. By running away from his mother, he had, without realizing it, embarked on a spiritual journey that would surpass her utmost dreams.

Characteristically, he was able to embrace Lady Continence, as he put it, only in the context of a much larger rethinking of the nature of sexuality. He needed to understand the peculiar intensity of arousal, compulsive urgency, pleasure, and pain that characterizes the human fulfillment of desire. He was not looking back on these feelings from the safe perch of a diminished libido, or deluding himself that they were abnormal. As a young man who had already fathered a child, he knew that, for the entire human species, reproduction entailed precisely the sexual intercourse that he was bent on renouncing. How could the highest Christian religious vocation reject something so obviously natural? In the course of answering this question, Augustine came to articulate a profoundly influential and still controversial vision of sexuality, one that he reached not only by plumbing his deepest experiences but also by projecting himself back into the remotest human past.

In the Roman port of Ostia, a few days before setting sail for Africa, Augustine and his mother were standing by a window that looked out onto an enclosed garden, and talking intimately. Their conversation, serene and joyful, led them to the conclusion that no bodily pleasure, no matter how great, could ever match the happiness of the saints. And then, "stretching upward with a more fiery emotion," Augustine and Monica experienced something remarkable: they felt themselves climbing higher and higher, through all the degrees of matter and through the heavenly spheres and, higher still, to the region of their own souls and up toward the eternity that lies beyond time itself. And "while we were speaking and panting for it, with a thrust that required all the heart's strength, we brushed against it slightly."

It is difficult to convey in translation the power of the account, and of what it meant for the thirty-two-year-old son and the fifty-five-year-old mother to reach this climax together. Then it was over: suspiravimus. "We sighed," Augustine writes, and returned to the sound of their speech.

The moment of ecstasy that Augustine and his mother shared was the most intense experience in his life—perhaps, as Rebecca West remarked, "the most intense experience ever commemorated." A few days later, Monica fell ill, and died soon after. The "Confessions" does not take the story of Augustine's life further. Instead, it turns to a philosophical meditation on memory and an interpretation of the opening of Genesis, as if that were where his whole autobiography had been heading. Why Genesis? And why, in the years that followed, did his attention come to focus particularly on the story of Adam and Eve?

Pagans ridiculed that story as primitive and ethically incoherent. How could a god worthy of respect try to keep humans from the knowledge of good and evil? Jews and Christians of any sophistication preferred not to dwell upon it or distanced themselves by treating it as an allegory. For Philo, a Greek-speaking Jew in first-century Alexandria, the first human—the human of the first chapter of Genesis—was not a creature of flesh and blood but a Platonic idea. For Origen, a third-century Christian, Paradise was not a place but a condition of the soul.

The archaic story of the naked man and woman, the talking snake, and the magical trees was something of an embarrassment. It was Augustine who rescued it from the decorous oblivion to which it seemed to be heading. He bears principal responsibility for its prominence, including the fact that four in ten Americans today profess to believe in its literal truth. During the more than forty years that succeeded his momentous conversion—years of endless controversy and the wielding of power and feverish writing—he persuaded himself that it was no mere fable or myth. It was the key to everything.

He brought to his interpretation not only his philosophical acumen but also memories that reached back decades—to the signs of inquieta adulescentia that made his father babble excitedly to his wife about grandchildren. Through a sustained reflection on Adam and Eve, Augustine came to understand that what was crucial in his experience was not the budding of sexual maturity but, rather, its unquiet, involuntary character. More than fifty years later, he was still brooding on this fact. Other parts of the body are in our power, if we are healthy, to move or not to move as we wish. "But when it must come to man's great function of the procreation of children," he writes, "the members which were expressly created for this purpose will not obey the direction of the will, but lust has to be waited for to set these members in motion, as if it had legal right over them."

How weird it is, Augustine thought, that we cannot simply command this crucial part of the body. We become aroused, and the arousal is within us—it is in this sense fully ours—and yet it is not within the executive power of our will. Obviously, the model here is the male body, but he was certain that women must have some equivalent experience, not visible but essentially identical. That is why, in the wake of their transgression, both the first woman and the first man felt shame and covered themselves.

Augustine returned again and again to the same set of questions: Whose body is this, anyway? Where does desire come from? Why am I not in command of my own penis? "Sometimes it refuses to act when the mind wills, while often it acts against its will!" Even the aged monk in his cell, Augustine acknowledges, in "Against Julian," is tormented by "disquieting memories" crowding in upon "chaste and holy intentions." Nor can the most pious married couple get anywhere "without the ardor of lust."

And this ardor, to which Augustine gives the technical name "concupiscence," was not simply a natural endowment or a divine blessing; it was a touch of evil. What a married man and woman who intend to beget a child do together is not evil, Augustine insisted; it is good. "But the action is not performed without evil." True, sexual intercourse—as Augustine knew from long experience with his mistress and others—is the greatest bodily pleasure. But the surpassing intensity of pleasure is precisely its dangerous allure, its sweet poison: "Surely any friend of wisdom and holy joys . . . would prefer, if possible, to beget children without lust."

Augustine's tortured recognition that involuntary arousal was an inescapable presence—not only in conjugal lovemaking but also in what he calls the "very movements which it causes, to our sorrow, even in sleep, and even in the bodies of chaste men"—shaped his most influential idea, one that transformed the story of Adam and Eve and weighed down the centuries that followed: originale peccatum, original sin.

This idea became one of the cornerstones of Christian orthodoxy—but not before decades of dispute. Chief among those who found it both absurd and repulsive was a British-born monk, Pelagius. Almost exactly Augustine's contemporary, he was in a certain sense his secret sharer: an upstart from the margins of the Roman world who by force of intellect, charisma, and ambition made his way to the great capital and had a significant impact upon the empire's spiritual life.

Pelagius and his followers were moral optimists. They believed that human beings were born innocent. Infants do not enter the world with a special endowment of virtue, but neither do they carry the innate stain of vice. True, we are all descendants of Adam and Eve, and we live in a world rife with the consequences of their primordial act of disobedience. But that act in the distant past does not condemn us inescapably to sinfulness. How could it? What would be the mechanism of infection? Why would a benevolent God permit something so monstrous? We are at liberty to shape our own lives, whether to serve God or to serve Satan.

Augustine countered that we are all marked, in our very origins, with evil. It is not a matter of particular acts of cruelty or violence, specific forms of social pathology, or this or that person who has made a disastrous choice. It is hopelessly shallow and naïve to think, as the Pelagians do, that we begin with a blank slate or that most of us are reasonably decent or that we have it in our power to choose good. There is something deeply, essentially wrong with us. Our whole species is what Augustine called a massa peccati, a mass of sin.

The Pelagians said that Augustine was simply reverting to the old Manichaean belief that the flesh was the creation and the possession of a wicked force. Surely this was a betrayal of Christianity, with its faith in a Messiah who became flesh. Not so, Augustine responded. It is true that God chose to become man, but he did this "of a virgin, whose conception, not flesh but spirit, not lust but faith, preceded." Jesus' existence, in other words, did not depend upon the minutest touch of that ardor through which all other human beings are generated: "Holy virginity became pregnant, not by conjugal intercourse, but by faith—lust being utterly absent—so that that which was born from the root of the first man might derive only the origin of race, not also of guilt."

The crucial word here is "guilt," crimen. That we are not untouched by lust is our fault—not the result of God's will but the consequence of something that we have done. It is here, when Augustine must produce evidence of our individual and collective perfidy, that he called in witness Adam and Eve. For the original sin that stains every one of us is not only a sin that inheres in our individual origins—that is, in the sexual arousal that enabled our parents to conceive us—but also a sin that may be traced back to the couple in whom our whole race originates. And now, in order to protect God from the charge that He was responsible for the innate defects in His creation, everything depended on Augustine somehow showing that in Paradise it could all have been otherwise; that our progenitors Adam and Eve were not originally designed to reproduce as we now reproduce but that they perversely made the wrong choice, a choice in which we all participate. To do this, Augustine would have to burrow into the enigmatic words of Genesis more deeply than anyone had done before. He would have to reconstruct the lost lives of our remote ancestors. He would have to find his way back to the Garden of Eden and watch our first parents making love.

The way forward, he became convinced, was first and foremost to take the words of Genesis as literally true. The Hebrew origin story might seem like a folktale, of the sort he had looked down on when he was a young man. But the task of the true believer was not to treat it as the naïve covering of a sophisticated philosophical mystery. The task was to take it as the unvarnished representation of historical truth—to make it real—and to persuade others to take it that way as well.

Plunging into the project with characteristic confidence, Augustine embarked on a work, "The Literal Meaning of Genesis," that aimed at discussing "the scriptures according to their proper meaning of what actually happened." For some fifteen years, he labored on this work, resisting the urgings of his friends to complete it and make it public. Of all his many books, it was probably the one to which he devoted the most prolonged and sustained attention.

In the end, it defeated him, and he knew it. The problem is that not every word of Genesis can be taken literally, however much one tries, and there is no simple, reliable rule for the appropriate degree of literal-mindedness. The Bible tells us that after Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit "the eyes of both of them were opened." Does this mean that they had been made with eyes sealed shut "and left to wander about blind in the paradise of delights, feeling their way, and so to reach and touch all unawares the forbidden tree too, and on feeling the prohibited fruits to pick some without knowing it"? No, it cannot possibly mean this, for we have already learned that the animals were brought to Adam, who must have seen them before he named them; and we have been told that Eve saw that the fatal tree was good for eating "and pleasing to the eye." Still, Augustine reflects, just because one word or phrase is used metaphorically, "it does not mean that the whole passage is to be taken in a figurative sense."

But how do you know? How did Eve know what the serpent meant when he said, to tempt her, "Your eyes will be opened"? It is not as if the stakes were low. For Augustine, at least, they could not have been higher: it was a matter of life or death, not only for the first parents but also for all their descendants. And yet there is no fixed rule for interpretation: "the writer of the book," Augustine writes, "allowed readers to decide for themselves."

Small wonder that Augustine took so long to write "The Literal Meaning of Genesis," and that, whenever he could put his hands on it, he clung like a drowning man to the literal sense. In the case of "Your eyes will be opened," he was certain that there must have been, after all, something that the couple actually saw for the first time after their transgression, something not merely metaphorical: "They turned their eyes on their own genitals, and lusted after them with that stirring movement they had not previously known."

The key to this understanding had been hidden all along in Augustine's own experience. The inquieta adulescentia that delighted the adolescent's father and horrified his mother could now be traced all the way back to the original moment when Adam and Eve felt both lust and shame. They saw for the first time what they had never seen before, and, if the sight aroused them, it also impelled them to reach for the fig leaves to cover as with a veil "that which was put into motion without the will of those who wished it." Until this moment, they had possessed—for the only time, Augustine thought, in the whole history of the human race—perfect freedom. Now, because they had spontaneously, inexplicably, and proudly chosen to live not for God but for themselves, they had lost their freedom. And they were ashamed.

But what was the alternative that they—and we—lost forever? How, specifically, were they meant to reproduce, if it was not in the way that all humans have done for as long as anyone can remember? In Paradise, Augustine argued, Adam and Eve would have had sex without involuntary arousal: "They would not have had the activity of turbulent lust in their flesh, however, but only the movement of peaceful will by which we command the other members of the body." Without feeling any passion—without sensing that strange goad—"the husband would have relaxed on his wife's bosom in tranquility of mind."

How would this have been possible, the Pelagians asked, if the bodies of Adam and Eve were substantially the same as our bodies? Just consider, Augustine replied, that even now, in our current condition, some people can do things with their bodies that others find impossible. "Some people can even move their ears, either one at a time or both together." Others, as he personally had witnessed, could sweat whenever they chose, and there were even people who could "produce at will such musical sounds from their behind (without any stink) that they seem to be singing from that region." So why should we not imagine that Adam, in his uncorrupted state, could have quietly willed his penis to stiffen, just enough to enter Eve? It all would have been so calm that the seed could have been "dispatched into the womb, with no loss of the wife's integrity, just as the menstrual flux can now be produced from the womb of a virgin without loss of maidenhead." And for the man, too, there would have been "no impairment of his body's integrity."

This was how it was all meant to be for Adam and Eve. But, Augustine concludes, it never happened, not even once. Their sin happened first, "and they incurred the penalty of exile from paradise before they could unite in the task of propagation as a deliberate act undisturbed by passion." So what was the point of this whole exercise of trying to imagine their sex life? It was bound up with Christian polemic and Christian doctrine—with an attempt to refute the Manichaeans and the Pelagians and with a vision of Jesus as the miraculous child of a virgin who became pregnant without the experience of ardor. Along with these doctrinal purposes, Augustine's obsessive engagement with the story of Adam and Eve spoke to something in his life. What he discovered—or, more truthfully, invented—about sex in Paradise proved to him that humans were not originally meant to feel whatever it was that he experienced as an adolescent and afterward. It proved to him that he was not meant to feel the impulses that drew him to the fleshpots of Carthage. Above all, it proved to him that he, at least in the redeemed state for which he longed, was not meant to feel what he had felt again and again with his mistress: the mother of his only child; the woman he sent away at his mother's behest; the one who declared that she would never be with another man, as he would never be with another woman; the one whose separation from him felt, he wrote, like something ripped from his side.

Adam had fallen, Augustine wrote in "The City of God," not because the serpent had deceived him. He chose to sin, and, in doing so, he lost Paradise, because he could not endure being severed from his sole companion. Augustine had, as best he could within the limits of his fallen condition, undone Adam's fatal choice. With the help of his sainted mother, he had severed himself from his companion and had tried to flee from ardor, from arousal. He had fashioned himself, to the best of his extraordinary abilities, on the model of the unfallen Adam, a model he had struggled for many years to understand and to explicate. True, he still had those involuntary dreams, those unwelcome stirrings, but what he knew about Adam and Eve in their state of innocence reassured him that someday, with Jesus' help, he would have total control over his own body. He would be free. ♦


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Monday, June 12, 2017

我的维吾尔“民族主义”是怎样形成的

我的维吾尔"民族主义"是怎样形成的

2014-07-03 张哲 阅想网

张哲为纽约时报中文网撰稿



艾尔肯是我在纽约认识的维吾尔小伙子。他今年27岁,来自新疆,长得高鼻深目,典型的突厥人俊朗面孔。两年前,他留学来到美国。今年以来,从昆明火车站暴恐事件起,维吾尔人和新疆话题屡屡登上新闻,我们也会时不时交换一些看法。



生活中的艾尔肯温和而腼腆,但讨论历史、政治、维吾尔社会等话题时,他又会变得自信而滔滔不绝。虽然在我看来,他的成长经历中,超越民族的普世性远远多过维吾尔民族的特殊性,但他却很注意强调自己的民族身份,时常把"我们这个民族"挂在嘴边,伴以自豪的神情。并且他不喜欢"维族"这个汉语的简称,坚持要我用"维吾尔"的全称,因为这个简称已经"多少带有一点歧视的味道"。我有时会笑他太"民族主义",于是有一次他半开玩笑地说,"给你讲讲我的经历吧,告诉你我的'民族主义'是怎么形成的。"



经过前后八次采访,艾尔肯向我详细讲述了他的成长经历。也许因为身在海外,他在讲述中相当坦诚,几乎毫不回避地涉及了与新疆有关的各种敏感议题:大到双语教育、七五事件、宗教信仰的养成、汉维民族之间的隔阂,小到穆斯林喝酒、"新疆小偷"、被人误会的体味问题,甚至他自己纠结的跨民族情感故事。他严厉抨击体制与中国现行民族政策,同时也对维吾尔人的自身问题和自己本人有诸多反思。



文章用第一人称的口吻叙述,经过艾尔肯本人审核、修改。由于家人仍然在新疆境内从事体制内的工作生活,他要求文章隐去他的部分个人信息。至于名字,他的汉族朋友们喜欢叫他"阿穆",但他给自己选择了这个名字——"艾尔肯",因为在维吾尔语中,它的意思是"自由"。"没有什么比自由更重要",他认真地说。



我出生在世俗化的维吾尔家庭



我家在北疆,父母都是党员干部。甚至我爷爷就是毛主席的忠实粉丝,他生前每次家庭聚会都要跟我们讲感谢共产党,感谢毛主席。他教育我们的时候最爱说的话就是,我们小时候连白面馕都吃不上,你们现在还有啥不满意的?



爷爷是1930年代出生的人,青春年少的时候赶上共和国成立、打地主、土改。他很幸运,本来是穷苦农民出身,又赶上共产党选拔本地干部,他就被选上去乌鲁木齐受教育。识字、上学,回来之后先在教育系统里做老师,很快成了政府干部,一直在地区里做到挺高的位置。因为共产党,他的人生完全改变了。



我父亲兄弟姐妹七人,全是党员。但到了我们这一代,我们就没有再选择走他们这条路。我们大家族兄弟姐妹们十几个人,一个党员都没有。父母还是希望我能去政府工作,找一个铁饭碗,但我们对体制都比较失望了。我们的成长记忆就不一样,我们没挨过饿,可能会更想去追求一点精神上的东西。



我父亲是政府的干部,我母亲是幼师。他们都是"民考民"(指少数民族用本民族语言学习并参加高考,与"民考汉"相对),汉语基础都不是很好,我们在家里还是讲维语,但完全不会谈什么民族问题。他们那一代人经历过文革,生活中几乎没有什么宗教的因素,做礼拜也只有在过节的时候才去清真寺跟大部队意思一下。可以说,在爷爷的影响下,在很长的时间内,我的家庭是一个信仰共产主义的世俗家庭。



足球队,汉族同学才能做队长



我们小时候,还没有实施"双语教育",每个维吾尔家庭在孩子上学的时候都面临两种选择——上汉语学校还是维语学校。



我家两个孩子,哥哥是"民考民"。我跟我哥从小就对着干,他怎么样我就偏不怎么样,所以我要上学时就坚决要上汉语学校。从此,我就成为了一名"民考汉"(少数民族学生用汉语接受教育并参加汉语高考)。



上学第一天,我就被叫家长了。那时候我一点儿汉语也不会,我就记得几个汉族同学笑我,说一些我听不懂的话,我血一热就冲上去跟他们打起来。其实具体怎么回事,我也记不清了,但一直到我高中毕业的时候,我父亲都还会跟他的同事、朋友哈哈大笑着讲这件事。他很自豪,觉得男孩子嘛,想不通了就要站出来,"儿子娃娃"应该有骨气。



整个小学,我的成绩一直非常好,在班上一直是前三名。值得一提的是1997年,我小学四年级,那年发生了伊犁事件(1997年2月5日至8日,在伊犁哈萨克自治州的伊宁市,一系列维吾尔人的抗议示威引发骚乱和严重暴力事件,最终酿成七五前新疆境内最大规模的社会震荡)。我到现在也忘不了这事儿,因为那时候我们就已经开始受反分裂和民族团结的教育了,爆炸的、很可怕的图片都会给我们看。当时我们能想什么呢,老师说什么我们都觉得对。我很震惊、很气愤,觉得这些搞破坏的民族分子确实太坏了,怎么能这样!



学校把我们这些维吾尔学生,也就是"民考汉",叫在一起单独接受民族团结和反分裂教育,汉族同学则完全不用。从那时候开始,我们好像就开始被注入了一种意识,"你们是少数民族,你们跟别人不一样。"我家里从来没有对我做什么民族认同的教导,这样一种民族观念是在学校养成的。



我喜欢踢球,很快就进入了足球队。我们是汉族学校,"民考汉"的学生比例很低,但我们足球队的主力11个人,八个维吾尔,两个回族,一个汉族。我们这个民族还是继承了突厥民族血热的性格,恰好足球就要求你有这种素质,因为它要有碰撞、有激情,这是我们的优势。



问题是,我们踢球不管怎么好,那一个汉族同学就是队长。老师就这么指定的,虽然那个孩子踢得一般般。我们长大后发现,不管这个地区维吾尔人比例有多少,一把手的书记都是汉族,唉,这种情况好像挺熟悉的啊!



我对汉文化开始反感



小学快结束的时候,我的家庭开始出问题。我五年级的时候,父亲开始当官、往上走了。原来他是一个好丈夫、好父亲,特别喜欢跟家人在一起。突然升迁以后,酒席应酬增多,经常喝酒。父亲渐渐开始跟我母亲不说话,以工作为理由经常在外面不回家。初二那年,2001年9月17日,我父母离异了。法院裁决,我哥哥跟母亲生活,我跟我父亲。从那时候开始,我们就分成了两个家庭。



我开始感到自卑,也很孤独,青春期的脆弱心理全部都出来了,学习学不进去,上课睡觉,下课踢球发泄,好像自己被全世界抛弃了。而且因为父母离异,我觉得别人看不起我,开始有一种很深的羞辱感。



又赶上我初三那一年,由于"双语教学"的实施(自本世纪初开始,新疆大力推行中小学双语教学政策,其基本模式为理科课程,如数理化、生物等,以及汉语语文、外语、政治等使用汉语授课,其他课程,如民语语文、体育、艺术等使用民语授课;小学一年级同时开设汉语文和民族语文课,汉语文每周7节,民语文每周5节——编注),维汉学校开始大规模合并。原先维语学校的同学跟汉语学校合并,那些维吾尔同学就成为了所谓的"双语班"。



合并之后,班级调整,我父亲帮忙走关系,把我调进了尖子班。他希望我能好好努力,考进地区重点高中。但那时候我学习成绩已经很差了。而且从进尖子班开始,我对汉文化的反感也开始出现了。我是指这种成绩就是全部、培养书呆子的教育文化。同时我也觉得,相比维吾尔文化的热情活力,汉文化比较缺乏"人情味"。



成绩决定一切,班上甚至用学习成绩排座位,我就一直坐在最后面。大家就在不停地做卷子、做卷子,我只好找个同学抄一下。中考的成绩果然也非常差,只够上普通高中。但我父亲又四处走动,把我送进地区最重点的高中。我们的高中是重点学校,全疆有名,每年上内地名牌大学的学生都有不少。



我们这个年级有四个汉语班,四个双语班,在整个楼层里一边一半。双语班里绝大部分都是维吾尔同学。我从原先基本上是纯汉语文化的环境里,第一次有机会接触大量的民族同学。初中时,我最好的两个哥们儿一个是维吾尔同学,一个是回族同学,但我们在一起都讲汉语。一些民考汉的孩子,要是家里不怎么讲维吾尔语,自己几乎都说不了几句母语。



高中时我最好的三个朋友都是维吾尔人了。其中一个朋友最后去了北京航空航天大学读书。他特别郁闷的一件事情是,在所有条件几乎同等、他甚至略微优于一位汉族同学的情况下,他没能被录取为飞行员学员。



高二有一次年级化学月考,最高成绩是一个双语班的维吾尔同学,他得了100分。那个双语班的化学老师——他是汉族,同时也带我们班,他来上课时说:"连民族同学都能考100分,你们怎么回事?"



结果那句话说完,坐在我身边的汉族同学们就哈哈笑起来,还笑着跟我说:"噢——你们都能考100分啦,那我们确实应该努力啊!"我当时就觉得,你们这不是歧视人家的智商吗?我当时就跟那几个开玩笑的哥们儿飙了脏话,甩脸给他们看——要知道,他们本来是这个班上我仅剩的几个好朋友。



下课我还去老师办公室抗议,我说:"老师,你刚才那句话说得太不负责任了,你知道你说完之后同学们怎么嘲笑我吗?好像是在嘲笑我们民族同学本来就笨!"老师赶紧说,"没有没有,我不是那个意思,你误会我了。"



化学老师下次上课还专门跟同学们解释,"民族同学用自己的非母语听课,都能不犯错误,我是为了鼓励你们,不要曲解我的意思!"那几个当时笑我的哥们儿说,"不会吧,艾尔肯,我们是跟你开玩笑的,你这么认真!"现在想想,我也不知道当时干嘛那么较真,好像从那个时候,我就有了对自己民族的保护意识。



高三时,语文老师,他也是汉族,有一次进来说了一句话,我永远也忘不了。他说:"孩子们,我又看到了你们的英语成绩比语文成绩高,可能因为你们的班主任是英语老师吧。但我真心想告诉你们,不管你们以后走到哪里,别人的语言学得再怎么好,只要你母语学不好,别人也会瞧不起你。"



这句话当时对我刺激太大了,因为我的母语我基本就不会。直到高三,我的维吾尔语只能听说,读写方面我完全不会,等于是文盲水准。那位语文老师是想鼓励大家学好汉语的语文,但他没意识到,班上还坐着我这样的"民族分子"呢。他的这些话成为了我日后自学母语的最大动力。



我的高中就这样过去了。我的高考成绩很一般,但赶上了中国大学扩招,我被南方的一所三本大学录取了,它招收了很多全国各地的民族学生。新疆很多自治区领导的孩子,成绩不好的,或者其他有点钱的家庭,孩子都送那儿去了。



我的宗教观开始形成



父母离婚之后,我母亲面临着巨大的心理问题。加上后来外公去世,母亲像是一下坠入了人生最低谷。她几乎变成了祥林嫂,天天哭,不停跟所有人讲述自己的悲惨人生。很快她身体也不行了,腰椎间盘突出,站都站不起来,被迫手术。手术一下花了十几万,经济上也背负了巨大的压力。2004年冬天,手术后,她回到乡下静养、恢复身体,外婆也方便照顾她。



在那之前,母亲是完全世俗化的维吾尔女性,跟他们那一代的很多人一样,除了饮食方面,几乎跟非穆斯林没什么区别。但看到她糟糕的状态,在她恢复身体的同时,我外婆就把她送到一个阿訇那里去做心理辅导,当时主要是想重新塑造她对生活的信心。



在新疆,对宗教有正确理解、能够很好诠释的真正的宗教人士太少了,这里可能就有政府的政策失误。政府总想把控一切,很多清真寺的阿訇变得政治性很强,南疆有的清真寺里还要升国旗,讲民族团结、计划生育。这样就产生了问题,民众对官方代表的宗教人士,就不信任了。可这样下去,当维吾尔人遇到困难,心灵感到空虚,想要主动寻求宗教帮助的时候怎么办呢?宗教极端分子就有市场了。



我母亲的幸运之处在于碰到一个好的阿訇。这位阿訇家里祖祖辈辈就从事宗教研究,自己受过高等教育,还在国外学习过。母亲的思想慢慢开始转变,比如领悟"惟有忍耐与克己方能能领悟人生的真谛",等等。她学会了读古兰经,学会了做礼拜,但这些我当时并不知道。她从乡下回来以后,我常常去母亲那里住几天,那时候哥哥已经去上大学了。我突然感觉母亲好像变了一个人。她明显对父亲开始有了宽恕和谅解,对生活的态度也乐观起来。父亲还是世俗化的态度,甚至会诋毁母亲,来保护他自己,为他自己的选择做辩护。母亲则从脆弱状态中走出来,变成了一位大方、坚强的女性。



她并没有强迫我、要求我跟她一样去虔诚信教。但高二那年的斋月,盖德尔夜那天对我很重要。根据我们的宗教,虔诚的穆斯林在盖德尔夜要通宵礼拜、祈福。当时我很好奇,就对母亲说,不如我也跟你学习一下怎么做礼拜吧。她非常开心,因为这是我第一次想自愿做礼拜。自愿很重要,强迫、占有一个人就会让人产生反感。



一夜祈福、洗礼、礼拜之后,我突然觉得心里特别舒服,思想特别清晰,早上去上课的时候觉得自己完成了一件特别伟大的事。



我们学校附近有一个清真寺,我和一个朋友一起去。我们高中的时候做礼拜是地下状态的,如果学校知道,肯定德育处会找麻烦,搞不好要处分、开除(尽管中国并无明确法律规定18岁以下的未成年人禁入清真寺,但根据中共党纪规定的精神,1990年起,新疆很多地方设立行政规定,禁制未成年人进入清真寺活动;在学校,进行马克思主义无神论宣传教育被视为是引导学生牢固树立正确世界观、人生观和价值观的重要举措——编注)。



学校的老师们一直教育我们,宗教是封建迷信——这几乎是学校的正式教条,我们要崇尚科学,做共产主义接班人。但阿訇跟我们说什么了呢?"一个撒旦不惧怕一百个无知的人,但一百个撒旦会惧怕一个有识之士。""你们应该去学习、去求知,不论是《古兰经》还是科学。"他还举例说,你不会看到一个教授在街上拿刀砍人,不会看到教师在当街大小便。我内心觉得,唉,阿訇好像在教育我们好好学习、不要做坏事,这也不算什么封建迷信吧?加上母亲的改变,宗教在我内心中的地位大大提升了。



但新疆有些人总是按照自己的价值观去定义宗教,要别人不能这样、不能那样,让人很不舒服。有的阿訇甚至把电视也当做撒旦。有的阿訇把《古兰经》都背下来了,但他们没有去钻研。如果问他们某段经文的原意,他们解答不了。这样容易产生两种后果:要么让人完全远离宗教,要么容易让人变得特别狭隘,容易走极端。



在新疆,谈到宗教,大家下意识都觉得宗教是保守、传统的状态,排斥现代文明。如果问这些阿訇们,为什么有一段这样的讲法?由于自身对伊斯兰认识太肤浅,他们就只会告诉你,《古兰经》就是这么说的,没有为什么。你要稍微多问几句,他马上就会给你扣帽子,批判你。这些阿訇们也有一种独裁的意识。很多独立思考意识比较弱的人也不敢去反抗,只有服从。这时候如果遇到一个有私心、想其他事的阿訇,就很容易带领一批人达到他自己的目的。这也是新疆很多问题的原因之一。在我的认识中,一方面,新疆各地世俗化的进程在加速,另一方面,地方政府对宗教事务的管理刻板而严格,再加上地方官员的腐败、诸多事务上的大汉族主义等因素,确实有一大批非官方的阿訇形成了带有民族情绪的极端伊斯兰思想。但我说的这种极端思想,主要是对伊斯兰教的狭隘理解和误读,而不是简单的恐怖主义思想。



虔诚的信徒为何如此暴力?



目前新疆这样的宗教环境下,很多信徒对宗教的理解能到什么程度呢?我后来遇到过一件很有意思的事。我大四在乌鲁木齐实习时,有一次和朋友去网吧,在二道桥附近一个维吾尔人开的,条件很好。我去用了一会儿电脑之后,想去找厕所,前台的人给我指了一个方向,我就往里走。但当时光线有点暗,我一直往里,路过一个门口时,不小心踩到一个东西。一看,坏了,是一个人做礼拜用的毡毯,原来门里面居然有一个维吾尔小伙子在做礼拜。



破坏人做礼拜仪式是冒犯别人的"罪过"。但我还没来得及说什么道歉的话,小伙子冲过来一拳打到我脸上,我直接就懵了。还没来得及说话,他人高马大,一套动作奇快的组合拳落在我眼睛、鼻子、嘴巴上,直接把我打出门去。一边打他还冲我大吼,你脑子有病吗?我在做礼拜!



我返回去找到厕所一照镜子,发现自己嘴巴肿了,鼻子流血,眼睛变成了熊猫眼。我洗了洗脸才缓过神来,我要去找他理论,但他和网吧的老板都赶我走,根本不给我讲理的机会。我直接走出网吧给我叔叔打电话。叔叔是这个区政府的干部。我说,叔叔,我被人打了,他们还不给我讲道理的机会,你能不能帮我解决一下?



叔叔很快带着这片派出所的所长和两个警察过来了。叔叔把那个打我的小伙子揪过来,冲他一通怒吼,"还敢打人?你们这儿有没有王法了!这是什么地方,网吧、台球厅,这是做礼拜的地方吗?你们这是搞非法地下宗教,知道吗?"那个老板和小伙子都吓坏了,扣这个罪名,整个网吧都可以封掉的。



叔叔悄悄问我说,你想怎么处理?他说,你可以自己先去把那个小伙子揍一顿,然后让警察把他抓回派出所关10天。我说,千万别,叔叔,你误会我的意思了。我就是想给他讲我的道理,他们不给我机会说话而已。



我就把小伙子叫到旁边的房间跟他说,我打断了你的礼拜是我不好,对不起,但你没必要这样冲动吧?我们的宗教是仁慈的宗教,暴力不符合真正的伊斯兰教义。我跟他说了半天,他就是很害怕的样子。这样的人,看起来很虔诚,认真做礼拜,但对古兰经的理解实在太肤浅了。我跟他谈了半天,他似懂非懂地点头。



我就让叔叔把警察一起叫走了,那个所长还跟叔叔开玩笑说,叫我们来,啥事都没干啊,你这个侄子简直是"圣人"嘛!后来,那个网吧老板给叔叔打电话,说自己把那个小伙子打了一顿,算是严肃处理了。我也觉得很无奈。



在新疆,很多人对《古兰经》的领悟还停留在十世纪以前的阶段。如果加上头脑简单,又容易冲动,很容易被人煽动,做一些极端的事。归根结底,他们几乎没有正规的渠道去真正学习宗教,没能适应现代社会。



其实维吾尔民族是突厥世界中最早实现农业文明和城市文化的民族,相比其他突厥民族,我们可能是最温和的。而且只要接触到先进文化和新鲜事物,我们总是乐于接受。就连宗教这样难以变更的东西,我们也先后接受过萨满教、佛教和伊斯兰教。我们不是一个保守的民族。



而且维吾尔族在接受伊斯兰信仰的时候也保留了大量我们自己的文化,比如我们有麦西来甫(Meshrep),这是一种男女都可以参加的大型歌舞聚会,其中还包含诗歌、游戏、教导,等等,这完全是我们维吾尔的文化,与阿拉伯文化差别很大。我们没有被阿拉伯人同化,相反,我们为伊斯兰文化做出了自己的贡献。



总之,学校附近清真寺的主麻礼拜成了我高中时主动学习的一个课堂。后来我们才知道,那位我觉得特好的阿訇,是在德黑兰学习宗教知识回来的。他教给我们尊敬长辈、不要杀生。我从他这里感受到了很多正能量,我学到了要做善事,要给予,等等。两年期间,那个清真寺人来得越来越多,甚至清真寺里面坐满了都会做到街道上。但人多了,政府就紧张了,我高三快毕业的时候,政府找了个借口说这个阿訇有问题,不让他讲了。



这个阿訇有什么错呢?无非是没有按照要求宣讲政府的政策、纲领,他就是要独立地讲解自己对《古兰经》的理解。拿我的人格保证,他绝没有讲过任何反抗政府什么的敏感的话。完全没有政治的话题,他就是在讲道德,讲处世之道。



新换的阿訇我也去听过,但特别没意思,几乎就是随便读读经文,到时间就赶紧散场了。我个人认为,这个系统有一种让人悲哀的思维,就是"非我族类,其心必异"。不管是维吾尔干部、学者还是宗教人士,只要在民间得民心了,政府好像就要找借口把他打下去。这样的例子太多了,我父亲就是政府的官员,一心想做好工作,但怎么也得不到组织信任。信任问题始终是一个雷区。



假如官方还是以打击极端为由,继续打压正常的宗教活动,我认为矛盾会愈演愈烈。这种打压甚至已经触及到了很多世俗化生活状态的穆斯林的底线。比如"黑袍"现象的出现,就是一些本来很世俗化的女孩子,可能因为对社会整体的失落感,开始以"黑袍"行动来表达自己的信仰立场。



现在大家都觉得民族关系有问题,我觉得好像就是一个电脑,它的系统坏了。你不重装系统,永远就是卡机,各种卡,怎么也顺不了。这是最让人郁闷的事。



我们被当成了"新疆小偷"



2006年秋天,我上大学了。这是我第一次来到新疆以外的土地。在这座南方的城市,气候非常湿润,到处郁郁葱葱,跟大西北满眼黄土色的景色呈现出完全不一样的色调。城市也非常繁华,来到这里我当然很兴奋。学校招收了很多少数民族,有40多个民族的学生。



大学第一年的五一假期,我们五六个维吾尔学生一起进城去逛街。学校在郊区,我们去城里一趟并不太容易,本来是很开心的事。逛了一天,我们碰到一个挺大的超市,就进去买水喝。但也就十几分钟的功夫,警察来了。



两男一女,三位警察直接走到我们身边,要求查我们的身份证。我们先是特别惊讶,为什么超市那么多人,要来找我们查?警察说,"有人报警,说你们偷东西。"



我脸一下就红了,特别尴尬。我的一个哥们儿比较冲动,哗啦一下把自己的包扯开喊,"你们来检查呀!我们偷什么东西了!"我们赶紧拉住他,跟警察抗议说,怎么能这样!我们都是XX大学的学生!我们还给警察看了学生证。警察一下也很尴尬,只好说,可能报警的人误会了。但我那个比较冲动的哥们儿不依不饶,在超市里大喊大叫,警察也很下不来台,只好一直说不好意思,最后还用警车帮着把我们送回学校。



真的很气愤,也很无奈。其实我也知道,的确在这个城市里有维吾尔人做不法生意。我去过一些维吾尔餐厅,知道他们同时在做大麻和白粉的生意。我们学校里的美国留学生都知道找维吾尔学生来这里买大麻。



我还记得,2008年5月有一天,我突然接到班主任老师的电话,说学生会有老师希望我去给他们帮一个忙。我赶紧过去后才知道,当地片区的派出所抓到一个维吾尔小孩子偷东西,但他完全不会汉语,需要我去帮忙做翻译。我赶紧去派出所,看到这个小男孩才八九岁,但一点也不害怕,很淡定很老练的样子。我问他,到底是怎么回事?别害怕,我会尽量帮助你。他却只跟我说,哥哥,你让他们放我走吧。



他只知道自己老家是喀什的,但哪个县都不知道。他说自己很小的时候,一个"叔叔"说带他来内地转转,他睡了一觉就到了这个城市,具体是什么时间他也不知道。我只好请警察一定要把他送回新疆去,如果这样放他走,他肯定回去找他的"叔叔",然后接着偷东西。



有一年暑期回新疆的时候,我们在火车上还碰到过一男一女两个孩子。他们两人十五六岁,都是小时候被拐骗来内地偷东西的,然后一起被警察抓住,送他们回新疆。那个女孩子后来给我们讲了她的遭遇,包括她被控制他们的人强暴。我真的特别憎恨这些人,他们做的事彻彻底底违背了我们的宗教信仰和传统文化。



很多开新疆餐厅的人也都从事非法营生。他们利用民族问题比较敏感的情况,钻政策的漏洞,出了事就跟警察"私下解决"。有的干脆是黑道白道都有关系。这些人败坏了我们民族的声誉,也败坏了新疆的声誉。



很多内地人对新疆的印象就是小偷和沙漠,近几年还加上了恐怖分子。我们一开始还会全力解释,认真地讲要区分个别人和整个民族、地区,但时间久了真的有点麻木。碰上一些张口就骂的人,我们也无能为力。



几乎90%以上的聚会都会打架



虽然是在内地,但跟以前"民考汉"的环境相比,我几乎是生活在完全维吾尔的环境里。哥儿们在一起喝酒、踢球、弹吉他,加上有点盲目和狭隘的心理,民族自豪感一下就起来了。



但第一次老乡会,就有人打起来了。后来我才发现,几乎每次维吾尔同学聚会、喝酒,90%的可能都是最后都有人打架。这次是一个库尔勒的学弟和一个和田的学长打起来,然后他们各自的老乡就冲上去。他们打到门外,门外是一条酒吧街,有不少人围过来看热闹,还大声喊,"新疆人打架了!快来看啊!"特尴尬。女孩子们很快就散了,聚会也就这么狼狈地结束了。



我觉得我们这个民族本身就血热,而且民族性之外还有地域性的问题,就很容易在酒后冲动、摩擦。维吾尔同学之间打,维吾尔人和西藏、内蒙的同学也打。我当然也得参与。不去又不行,大家都是抬头不见低头见的,面子上下不来。



有一年我过生日的时候,我们在酒吧里喝酒,从中午一直喝到晚上,结果,大家果然不出所料地又打起来了。几个"民考汉"的同学跟"民考民"的打。我去拉架,也被踹了几脚。我非常失望,好不容易等打完把大家叫在一起说话。我说,你们能不能讲点民族感情?这个样子,让别人怎么看我们这个民族?为了一点点小事就彼此伤害,以后我们会成什么样子?讲到后来,有的哥们儿都哭了。



那段时间很混乱。我每天早上做一次礼拜,但晚上常常又跟朋友们喝酒。喝完了早上再起来忏悔。在学习过程中,我交到了很多新朋友,学了很多新知识。我还记得自己看了《伍尔夫日记》后开始写日记,对社会、人性等等有一些反思。我也开始想做一些对我们这个民族有意义的事。比如,至少能改变一些别人对新疆人粗俗、野蛮的坏印象,也是一种贡献。



被人误解的体味问题



我从大二起就被选作我们班的班长,我对自己要求更高了,好像事事考虑要代表维吾尔人的形象和名声。班上有捣蛋的同学,我把他们叫到宿舍里来,喝酒,谈心,要求至少给我撑面子,他们还真都做到了。



学校把少数民族和汉族分成了不同的班来上专业课,只有选修课大家才有一起上课这样的接触机会。汉族同学常常问一些对新疆特别缺乏常识的问题,比如你们平时上学是不是骑骆驼的,有的是半开玩笑,有的还挺认真。学校可能觉得少数民族同学底子薄,于是给我们施行特殊政策,45分及格。汉族同学是要到60分才及格的。



这种45分政策,很多人,尤其是汉族同学会觉得是一种给我们的照顾、优惠,但后来我学社会学的课程时才意识到,它应该叫做"反向歧视"。当时我没有这种认识,但也去找辅导员抗议过。我说,老师,这种政策不是歧视少数民族同学,暗示他们本来就能力低吗?老师很吃惊,她说,"啊,第一次有人这样想这个问题呢!……嗯,那你说的也很有道理,我会去反应一下!"



后来?后来就跟很多其他的事情一样,没了下文。其实我鼓起勇气去找老师反应这个问题的时候,我同时面临着很多同胞们的压力。我的一个哥们儿就很生气我这样做,他觉得是我成绩好,太自私了,不考虑他们这些成绩比较差的同学。"你这样搞,要是我们不及格了怎么办?"他们是维吾尔人里的"保守派",不想失去这些已有的"优惠政策",但他们不明白,这样的政策只会让少数民族的同学不好好学习,那毕业了怎么办呢?到社会上工作的时候,谁会给我们优待呢?



班主任老师有一次特别小心翼翼地想跟我谈一件事,她反复强调,艾尔肯,你千万不要生气啊,我就是问一问。她是害怕伤害我的民族自尊。她说,你们这个民族是不是有什么特殊的卫生习俗?我这里有几个同学反映,他们宿舍的维吾尔同学体味太大,很影响宿舍里的味道。



我的脸一下就红了。我说,老师您千万不要误会,这个跟我们的民族习俗一点关系都没有;如果严格按照伊斯兰教要求,我们穆斯林是要求每天洗礼的,从生理到心理都要求绝对的纯净。



我问清了老师,是哪几位同学味道特别不好,并且保证自己会去跟他们谈谈。但从老师的办公室走出来,我也很发愁要怎么做。我们这个民族生理上有特殊性,可能汗腺比较发达。尤其是夏天的时候,如果不注意清洁卫生,的确会味道很不好。但我要直接去讲的话,太伤害这几个哥们儿的自尊了。



我找了一位学长,跟他说了这样的情况,然后一起商量要怎么做才能解决问题。后来,我们把这几个同学找在一起喝酒,喝到差不多的时候,我和学长互相使了一个颜色,他就开始讲述自己比较懊恼的事。他说,"我一度不太注意卫生,身上味道让其他同学们很不喜欢,后来特别后悔这样的事……"



然后我趁机就表示,这样的事太可惜了,我们一定自己要多注意,不能因为这种事损害维吾尔族的民族形象。其他几个同学好像想到了什么,纷纷表示赞同。



过了几天,老师特别高兴地找到我。"艾尔肯,太神奇了,你是怎么做到的啊?"她说,"我找那几个反映情况的同学了解了一下,他们居然都有点不好意思了,说维吾尔同学都已经很注意个人卫生了,之前是自己太小气了!"



难产的维吾尔文报纸



大二那年,我之前高涨的自信和热情受到了一次严重打击。我们新闻学院里,汉族同学们风风火火地做起了各种各样的媒体工作,电视台、报纸,尤其他们一份报纸,经常报道学校和我们周边的新闻,让我特别羡慕。我突然想,不如我们办一份维吾尔语、或者维汉双语的报纸怎么样?



办一份维吾尔文报纸,免费发放,也确实能给我们这个群体有很多启发,比如我特别想告诉大家,我们要好好学到东西,才能让自己的民族强大起来。至于经费应该也不是大问题,全市的维吾尔生意人有不少,我觉得可以拉到赞助。我身边的哥们儿们都很支持这个想法,一个个跃跃欲试。



于是,我兴冲冲地去找我们辅导员谈了这个想法,她当场表示很好、很支持,让我去找新闻学院的副院长,也是"中国新闻史"的老师谈谈。我做了很多准备,写了一个提案,信心充足地找到副院长谈。他听完后说,小伙子,很不错嘛!这个想法非常好!但是——总要有个"但是",我觉得我在短短的人生里碰到了太多的"但是",好话一大堆,后面来个"但是",就全完了。



副院长也是怕打击我的热情,"但是"后面只是提了一个问题,我们没有懂维语的指导老师啊,出了政治问题谁来把关呢?



"学校从来没有这种先例嘛,"他补充道。这倒是实话,我当时查过,在新疆以外,似乎全国只有中央民族大学和西安交通大学有学生办过维语报纸。最后副院长让我做两件事,一是去找学校的民族部,问问有哪些相关规定;二是去找文学院的一位汉族老师,他以前在兵团生活过,懂一些维语,看能不能找他做指导老师。



我就马不停蹄地去找民族部,民族部的腔调也很为难,"啊……这个嘛⋯⋯这个不好办啊,我们没有这种先例,要不然,你们再去找找院领导具体谈谈?"兵团生活过的汉族老师也差不多,热情支持我的想法,但又很为难,特别委婉地表示,自己维语的语言程度没到给报纸把关的水准,最后把我很客气地送出了门。



这个时候我就有点儿失落了,原来新闻这个东西,很敏感啊!可是看那些汉族同学们,很容易副院长就给签字同意,拉来赞助,报纸就办起来了,还是每周都出的。为什么我们想办一份自己语言的报纸就这么困难呢?



我又找了院长助理——这位助理人非常好,经常跟我们一起踢球,也特别喜欢我。他表达了支持,并且帮我想办法约到了院长(兼书记)的时间,让我直接去说服领导。我做了最大的努力去准备,想到的理由包括,报纸帮助疏导学生们的民族情绪、理性正确看待民族问题、锻炼民族学生的媒体运作能力,有利于毕业后找工作,等等。



但听我啰嗦了一大堆之后,书记的第一个问题问出口,我的心都凉了。他居然问我:"你们这个民族的语言,在电脑上可以打出来吗?"



我没想到他会说出这样让人心寒的话。我都有点不想回答,但还是只好说,"可以的,书记。新疆维吾尔自治区成立几十年了,一直有维吾尔文报纸。"他也有点不好意思,说,"我不是这个意思……嗯,年轻人,你的这个想法非常好啊!促进民族团结嘛。但是——"得了,"但是"又来了。



就这样,新闻院、民族部、团委,各种领导和老师把我推来推去。几个回合下来,我的热情也没了,放弃吧。虽然从始至终也没有人给我解释明白,为什么我们不能办一张维吾尔文的学生报纸。



那个压抑的夏天



2009年6月26日,广东韶关事件发生了。(2009年6月26日,在广东韶关市旭日玩具厂厂区,维吾尔员工与汉族员工发生冲突并引发大规模集体斗殴。当局出动400名警力平息事态,但据官方统计,事件仍造成120人受伤,其中新疆籍81人,以及2名维吾尔员工死亡。事件起因为约10天前,有网帖谣传该厂两名汉族女工被维吾尔工人强奸。)我记得是法学院的一个哥们儿给我打电话,叫我去他宿舍,说出大事了。我到的时候,发现好多维吾尔同学都围在一起看YouTube视频。



我们看到的视频里,有一群汉族工人拿棍棒什么的打死一个维吾尔人之后在欢呼,旁边有保安样子的人就只是看着。血淋淋的画面太惨了,我法学院的哥们儿立即血往上涌,他当时就喊,我们学校有没有广东韶关的同学,我要去找他打一架!我们赶忙把他劝住。



之后很快,网络上各种激烈的言论碰撞就开始出现了。汉族人骂"新疆小偷","这样的民族就应该从地球上消失!"维吾尔人就骂汉族人猪、"黑大衣"(Hitay,原为俄语中对"契丹"的称呼,后统指"中国人",现维语使用中带贬义),说他们掠夺新疆资源。从组织维吾尔人到外地用工的政策,到自治区政府在事件后的不作为,大家不断争吵,各种肮脏激烈的话都不断出现。



再到后来,所有的语言似乎都失效了——7月5日那天,我们能看到的语言就变成了"今天下午3点,自治区政府门前集合,讨回说法。只要你是维吾尔人,就把这条信息转发20个人。"对,这是我们收到的短信,而且这条短信最后还附上了那首著名的德国牧师的短诗《起初他们》,他是在忏悔,二战前纳粹德国迫害犹太人时自己没有说话,"等他们来对付我时,已经没有人站出来为我说话了。"



收到这条信息时我是在暑假回新疆的火车上,信息来自我一个中学同学、后来在新疆读大学的一个朋友。当然,信息我很快也转发了20条。没有多想,当时就是觉得大家该出来说话的时间到了。



7月5日下午我下了火车,回到家。我还给父亲带了两本《凤凰周刊》杂志,一期是讲热比娅,一期是讲喀什老城改造。他也想不到中国还有杂志用这样的视角来报道新疆问题——不那么官方,比较真实客观。我和父亲、叔叔坐在家里看杂志,还一边聊着相关的问题。



突然,表哥来到我家,气喘吁吁地说,大学生集会了,可能要出事。我们赶紧上网看,发现人人网、QQ空间上很多图片都已经出来了。从下午3点集会开始,三个多小时,自治区没有任何人出来回应。人群却在不断聚集,旁边的警察也在增加。



我有一个维吾尔族的中学同学事后告诉我,他在新疆财大上学,本来也在集会现场的。他说原本人群以学生为主,后来很多无业青年、混混、社会渣滓模样的人都进来了,而且开始喊民族口号,人群也越来越激动。他就开始害怕了,觉得不对,就抽身跑回学校。他真是幸运,离开不久,就出大事了。



后来的事,大家都知道了。杀人、抢劫、砸店,整个世界都疯狂了。彻彻底底的悲剧。那些杀人的人是完完全全违反伊斯兰教义的,《古兰经》清楚地说过,凡枉杀一人者,如杀众人。更别提那些强奸女性,杀害女性的暴徒了。更悲剧的是,这样的事一发生,两个民族直接的对立和仇恨就深到难以想象了。



不过,直到后来我也不相信如政府所说,这是境外势力有组织、有计划的行动。我个人觉得,如果有组织有计划,那些人不是更应该直接冲击政府或者电视台,宣布什么政治主张吗?当时的局势已经完全失控了。我觉得就是积压已久的不满情绪爆发,然后无法无天的状态让那些社会渣滓为所欲为了。



整个夏天,新疆都处在紧张和动荡的气氛中。网络全部断了,短信每天也只能发15条。倒是每天都能收不少政府提示的短信。政府也几乎完全失去了公信力。身边的很多人,都宁可听信谣言也不信政府;甚至政府说了什么,大家就会把消息猜测一番,他们是想掩饰什么呢?新增装了数字电视盒之后,很多维吾尔人都认为电视盒里有监听器,不敢在家里讲什么不好的话。



我有一个哥们儿,维吾尔人,他的女朋友是一个汉族姑娘,这个姑娘的父亲是自治区公安厅的,他在七五之后痛恨维吾尔人,要求家里馕都不许吃。姑娘偷偷告诉我哥们儿之后,哥们儿不但没有安慰她,反而两人大吵一架,分手了。



对于新疆人来说,这个夏天很压抑。



我的这个民族也不是那么完美



大学里,我对自己的民族命运有了新的认识。最早是在2007年5月,我记得那时YouTube和Facebook都还可以使用,我们有一次在网吧上网的时候,突然有人发给我们一个链接,是热比娅女士的演讲。我们当时都被震撼了。一排维吾尔学生坐在网吧里,屏幕上全是一个内容。她在讲话里讲到了"东突厥斯坦"这个词,对当时的我们来说,太震撼了!几乎呼吸都屏住了,非常激动。我们以前从来没听过这个词,当时只觉得这名字好牛逼!当然,事后我们有争论,有人觉得她很了不起,有人觉得她本身没有能力代表我们的民族。



现在回想起来,当时我们根本不了解政治,也没什么更多的知识,只是好奇。还有哥们儿找来了库莱西-苏力坦(Kurash Sultan,1980年代新疆著名歌手,后因政治原因被软禁,最终流亡海外)的一首歌,非常民族主义的歌曲,歌词里大致有这样的意思,"今天,我们迈向为自由而奋斗的道路,要让自由的火炬点亮所有地方。"在我们宿舍里用大音箱播放,那感觉太酷了。每次踢球比赛前都要听这首歌曲,然后就感觉好像是在为整个民族踢球,特别有冲劲儿。



热血之余,我也开始主动搜寻一些"三区革命"(1944年9月,在苏联的支持下,新疆的伊犁、塔城、阿山三个地区爆发对抗国民政府统治的民族革命和武装割据,并成立"东突厥斯坦共和国临时政府"。)那段时间的历史资料来看。那年暑假我回到家里,还特地问我父亲和爷爷,咱们维吾尔人是不是还有这么一段"东突厥斯坦"的历史?父亲拍了我脑袋一下说,唉,小子不错啊,你还知道学习这些!于是父亲就给我找来了祖尔东-萨比尔(Zordun Sabir)的小说《故乡》(Anayurt)的无删节版(祖尔东生于1937年,为维吾尔文学史中地位极其重要的当代作家,他的代表作、三卷历史小说《故乡》描写的正是"三区革命"前后的历史),让我来阅读。这部小说特别棒,像是我们民族的史诗。



但民族主义情绪高涨的时候,我却受了一次打击。有一次,哥们儿们聚会喝酒,大家本来应该平摊费用,但有几个哥们儿当时提出没钱了,让我先垫上,我就掏钱垫了。第二天,谁也没有主动还钱的意思,害得我跑去不同的学院找他们要。有的人就半开玩笑,阴阳怪气地说,唉,艾尔肯-江("江"在维吾尔男性名字中后缀,本来表尊敬之意),就这么几个钱你翻山越岭地跑来要,至于么?还有人就磨磨蹭蹭说,暂时没钱。



我特失望,觉得人真是自私的动物!我当时每个月父亲都会从银行账户给我转账生活费,一下没钱了,我不好意思问他去提前要。我也怕他知道我们喝酒什么的会失望。但这样一来,到月底之前,我的经济一下就困难了,我算了算,每天只能吃一顿饭。



于是我中午下课不吃饭就回到宿舍,喝点水,在床上趟一会儿,节省体力。长期挨饿的感觉真是太让人难忘了,整个人先是身体变得虚弱,然后意志力也渐渐消退。那是非常难过的感觉,我似乎明一下白了爷爷那一辈人为什么对共产党充满感激之情,从战乱动荡、"连白面馕都吃不上"的时代到吃饱肚子,这真是一种巨大的恩情,给你饭吃的人你永远也忘不了。



这时候,给我饭吃的人出现了。这是一个我同班的女孩子,我们关系非常好。她是一个回族的姑娘,她注意到我连续好几天中午不去食堂吃饭,就问我怎么回事。我当然是不好意思说的。她很敏感,可能是猜到了什么,就说她要请我吃饭,我就更不干了。要请也应该是男孩子请,怎么能让女生付钱?



结果第二天中午,她给我打电话,让我从宿舍下楼一趟,说她就在宿舍楼门口。我下来之后,她递给我一个饭盒说,"这是我第一次在宿舍试着做饭,没别的意思,请你尝尝,给我提点意见。你别多想,不好吃可以扔了。"说完她就笑着走了,连反应的时间都没给我。我回到宿舍里,大口大口地吃,那种幸福的感觉真的是用语言无法表达。这个月直到月底,我一直靠爱心午餐过活,我那些平时喝酒聊天的哥们儿们,居然没有一个出来关心一下我、帮助一下我。



我突然意识到,原来,我们这个民族也不是我想象的那么完美,这些人也不是完美的同胞和亲人。加上这期间我看了电影,《我的名字叫可汗》,影片讲述了"九一一"之后穆斯林在美国遭遇的各种歧视,以及主人公如何证明,穆斯林不等于恐怖分子。看完后我懂得一个道理,世界上的人只能分为两种,好人和坏人。我也反思我自己,觉得我自己之前实在是太民族主义了。我常常抱怨汉人歧视,但不知不觉,自己也在以偏概全地去看待汉人,对汉人、甚至所有其他民族都形成了一种"异族"的对立感。



后来我也意识到,其实新疆的很多问题跟内地是类似的,比如民众与政府之间的矛盾。但很多维吾尔同胞把汉人等同为政府、共产党,把内地同样存在的社会矛盾变成了民族矛盾。



不可能的跨民族恋情



那位给我爱心午餐的姑娘是回族人,来自甘肃。我们很快就无话不谈,成了非常好的朋友。我们一起吃饭、逛街、看电影,我们做了所有恋人做的事,留下了那么多美好的回忆,但我们就是没能成为真正的恋人。



原因很简单,民族问题。我是维吾尔族,她是回族,在现在的情况下,维吾尔男孩跟其他民族的姑娘恋爱、结婚是非常困难的。即便是其他突厥民族,比如哈萨克族、乌兹别克族等,还要被别人指指点点、私下议论。我们本来在人性方面是完美的相配,但我必须在她和我的族群之间做出一种选择。



我们彼此离不开对方,但又不能公开恋爱,本来走在一起的时候,一看到远处有其他维吾尔人,她就得赶紧躲在后面,装作跟我不认识的样子。现在看起来,当时的我真是又自私又混蛋。为这段感情,我也曾经失眠、憎恨、饱受折磨,她也骂过我,也跟我抱头痛哭。我们考虑的事情从来都不是什么物质生活,什么买车买房,但我们要面临的障碍好像更难逾越。



大四的第一学期是实习期,我们可以选择留在家乡实习,也可以选择回到学校所在地实习。她为了想见我,决定回学校。而我那时想躲避、想结束这段不可能的恋情,就决定留在家乡实习。



这段时间我在新疆也很不愉快,经常跟朋友们喝酒。有一天在朋友家喝酒,喝多了,第二天早晨,同屋的一位老乡已经早起在床边做礼拜了,但我却翻身开始吐酒,把脏东西吐在了他做礼拜用的毡毯上。当我看到是怎么回事的时候,吓得几乎浑身发抖,喝酒本身就已经是罪了,我居然还把污秽的东西吐在别人的礼拜毯子上。我到洗手间反复洗脸清醒,回来赶紧忏悔。之后我非常生气,把昨晚一起喝酒的哥们儿们都吼了一遍,我说,从今往后,我不喝酒了!你们要觉得不喝酒就没法做朋友的话,咱们这朋友就别做了!说完就气冲冲地回家。从那时起,好几年了,我真的没再喝过酒。



大四下学期,我赶紧回到学校去跟姑娘相见。那天晚上,我们在饭馆一起吃饭,本来我打算当面了结我们这段感情,但说到祝福她今后幸福的时候,她突然大哭起来,身体直发抖。她一哭我也受不了了,非常难受。我们决定先不谈论离别,在一起好好过一学期。



带着一种末日一般的感伤,我彻底把一直戴着的虚伪面具撕下来了。我开始不再躲避其他维吾尔同学,我甚至带她一起去参加我的维吾尔朋友们的聚会。她特别感动,觉得我终于愿意把她带进自己的生活圈子了。她甚至自学了一些维语,就为了能够更好融入我的生活。我的哥们儿们一开始有点不自然,好像有点别扭,但后来他们也接受了。



我一个哥们儿还给她起了个维吾尔名字"迪丽乎玛尔"(Dilhumar),她更是喜出望外。也许到现在,她偶尔也会挂念这个名字吧。后来这哥们儿私下还跟我表示,支持我俩在一起,但他给出的理由却非常"民族主义情绪"。他说:"相对女孩嫁异族,男孩取异族更能同化妻子,可以有助于我们民族的扩张。"我只好一笑而过。



不过,这样幸福的时光太短暂了,怎么都不得不面对的就是毕业分手。火车站告别的时候,我先上火车,火车都开动了,她在站台上开始跟着火车跑,边跑边哭。



毕业后,我们试着不再联络,但又总是忍不住联系。那时,我在内地的一家文化公司工作。他们想跟土耳其进行合拍片,以新疆风土人情为主,就让我出差去新疆,做一些翻译、联系的工作。我跟同事去乌鲁木齐出差,事情不顺利,待了很久。这时候快到十一国庆节了,她突然联系我说,她和父母都想来新疆走一走,问我可不可以陪他们一起看一看?



我怎么能拒绝呢?我怎么忍心拒绝呢?



我鼓起勇气,回家跟我父亲讲。在开始讲这件事之前,我连说了几遍"我知道这是不可能的"。我一边身体发抖,一遍讲述了这段感情。父亲很感慨,但他冷静地给我分析了几点。他说,"如果你要跟她在一起,首先我得花时间来接受这个现实,我跟她也会有一些磨合的时间;接下来,咱们得一起试着让全部大家族的人接受她,这也是一个很大的挑战;但最后你要有心理准备,也许你们最终会无法被我们这个社群接受,过相对独立和隔离的生活,这些是你要为感情付出的代价。当然,最终的选择权在你。"



我们谈了很久,我最终还是决定放弃感情。当时的我无法冒风险去跟整个维吾尔族群隔离。我觉得,相比爱她,我可能爱我的家人和民族多那么一点点。当然,父亲答应我好好接待他们一家人。那时候我刚刚工作,没有积蓄,父亲如果不帮助我,我是没有办法招待客人的。



在父亲和叔叔的帮助下,我尽全力招待他们一家三口,展示家乡的美好一面。不但安排食宿、交通,还请他们来我家里做客。看得出,她父母也特别喜欢我,甚至还故意留出时间给我们单独相处。抱着如果我们最终决定在一起的希望,她母亲还问到当地的房价,但我几乎不敢看她们的眼睛。



告别时,我开叔叔的车送她们去火车站。告别之后,在回来的路上,她给我发短信说,她妈妈给我留了一个信封在车后座。我赶紧去看,天,原来她妈妈装了几千块钱,还有一封信给我。钱算是这些天他们的花销,他们知道我好面子,不肯让他们花钱,所以当面没有跟我争着付账。信里妈妈说,特别感谢我这几年照顾她的女儿。还说不管以后我们会怎么样,都祝福我。



我心里百感交集。我一度埋怨、憎恨邪恶的政治,觉得是它把我们这个民族变得自我保护意识过强——与其他民族共处的困难也是因为过度自我保护,怕被同化、怕受伤害。但现在看,不管怎样,我还是不能原谅自己的冷酷和自私。



我来到了美国:"维吾尔,那是什么?"



大学的后半段,我渐渐开始对电影着迷,同时对美国文化也产生了越来越浓厚的兴趣。我也越来越热爱英语,甚至把奥巴马选举获胜的演讲背得滚瓜烂熟。



我迷恋看的美剧有一大堆,《越狱》什么的都看,最喜欢的电影则是《教父》。我选修了电影课,自己拍摄了一部作业短片,得了96分的高分。自那时起,我就想毕业后投身电影事业。我最大的梦想是做电影导演,拍摄一部以维吾尔人为主题的电影。



我喜欢美国文化,美剧里那种人道主义、英雄主义的东西我很喜欢。维吾尔人不是不接受外来事物。相反,我认为维吾尔社会很容易对外来文化产生认同感,只要这种外来文化有足够的软实力来征服我们。比如,俄罗斯文化一度被广泛认同。但汉族文化的软实力一直没能征服我们,我们常常会想到文革、饥荒、现在官场的腐败横行等等,这些事都是汉人带来的。这常常让我们有一些排斥心理。



相比汉文化,现在维吾尔人显然更接受西方文化。在新疆,维吾尔人之间聊天,要是维语里夹杂几个英文单词,别人会觉得你挺棒、挺有格调的,但你要是夹几个中文词,肯定会招来一通嘲笑:是不是维吾尔人啊,连维吾尔话都不会说了吗?



大学毕业后,我的工作也很不顺心。在新疆出差的过程中,要跟文化口、宣传口的各种机关部门打交道,结果让人非常失望。非常简单的事情,他们拖来拖去,互相推诿。不说行,也不说不行,就满口讲一些虚伪无用的话。公司请各种官员吃喝了很多次,也没有结果。耗了几个月也没有批下来合拍片的许可,公司只好决定让我们回去。文化领域的非常明显的"大汉族主义"太让人失望了。



我决定重新考托福,申请去美国读书。很幸运,我居然被美国一所大学新闻专业的硕士项目录取了!而且更加幸运的是,由于我在大学里表现很好,又是优秀毕业生,老师和学校给我开具了证明,让我比较顺利地拿到了护照。



于是就从公司辞职,回家准备。我把消息告诉了迪丽乎玛尔。她吃惊过后,既替我高兴——她知道我一直梦想去美国学电影,又很难过、不舍。



在我回到新疆家里不久,真正让我震撼的消息来了。她突然短信告诉我,她要结婚了。自从他们一家从新疆回来,确定我们无法在一起之后,她的父母给她安排了相亲。她告诉我,那个男生比她大几岁,人很好,他们很快就要结婚了。她结婚之前那天,QQ状态变成:"真主保佑我吧,希望这次我能得到真正的幸福。"我的心都要碎了。



于是,两年前,我终于来到美国。一切都是全新的,我的情感也结束了。 



在海外的感触很多,但首先一条是,这个世界对维吾尔人的了解太少了。我们在新疆的时候,大家都非常为我们民族的文化和历史骄傲,也总觉得全世界应该都了解我们。但在美国发现,完全不是这样。跟藏族人比,我们太默默无闻了。



我跟很多美国朋友聊天,他们问我哪儿来的,我说我来自中国,很多人都以为我是开玩笑——毕竟我长得太不像他们印象里的中国人了。我只好说我是少数民族,我是维吾尔人。但"Uyghur(维吾尔)"这个词说出口之后,美国人最常见的反应是:"Uyghur?What is that?(维吾尔?那是什么?)"



这时候我简直尴尬极了。我只好问美国朋友,你知道西藏吗?他们会说,Yes!然后,我就不情愿地说,"好吧,我们在西藏旁边,我们的问题都是类似的。"



为了让美国人能多了解一点我们,我甚至和维吾尔朋友们做过一些傻事,比如,我们跑到第五大道的苹果旗舰店去,把所有的几十台电脑桌面上的Wikipedia(维基百科)都打开,在里面输入Uyghur(维吾尔),然后悄悄走开。说不准就有一两个顾客用电脑的时候,会停下来看一眼呢。这样,不就多一两个人对维吾尔人和我的家乡多一点点了解吗?



这段时间里,我对美国文化,对我们的宗教,对自己的"民族主义"情绪,都有了全新的认识。比如,我学会了分析问题,而不是简单地选边站。我不会带着那么狭隘的民族情绪去看这个世界和社会上的很多问题。我也慢慢体会到了天赋人权的含义。我相信我现在的民族观更加健康、更加完善。我也越来越相信,每一个人、每一件事出现在你的生命里都是有原因的。当然,我做电影的梦想没有改变,希望有一天,我能为我的民族,做好这件事。



张哲是前《南方周末》记者,现为自由撰稿人,居住在纽约。

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Thursday, June 8, 2017

No Magic, No Metaphor

No Magic, No Metaphor

Fredric Jameson on 'One Hundred Years of Solitude'

The first centennial of the Soviet revolution, indeed the fifth centennial of Luther's, risk distracting us from a literary earthquake which happened just fifty years ago and marked the cultural emergence of Latin America onto that new and larger stage we call globalisation – itself a space that ultimately proves to be well beyond the separate categories of the cultural or the political, the economic or the national. I mean the publication of Gabriel García Márquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude in 1967, which not only unleashed a Latin American 'boom' on an unsuspecting outside world but also introduced a host of distinct national literary publics to a new kind of novelising. Influence is not a kind of copying, it is permission unexpectedly received to do things in new ways, to broach new content, to tell stories by way of forms you never knew you were allowed to use. What is it, then, that García Márquez did to the readers and writers of a still relatively conventional postwar world?

He began his productive life as a movie reviewer and a writer of movie scenarios nobody wanted to film. Is it so outrageous to consider One Hundred Years of Solitude as a mingling, an intertwining and shuffling together of failed movie scripts, so many fantastic episodes that could never be filmed and so must be consigned to Melquíades's Sanskrit manuscript (from which the novel has been 'translated')? Or perhaps it may be permitted to note the astonishing simultaneity of the beginning of his literary career with the so-called Bogotazo, the assassination in 1948 of the great populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (and the beginning of the seventy-year long Violencia in Colombia), just as García Márquez was having lunch down the street and, not much further away, the 21-year-old Fidel Castro was waiting in his hotel room for an afternoon meeting with Gaitán about the youth conference he had been sent to organise in Bogota that summer.

The solitude of the title should not at first be taken to mean the affective pathos it becomes at the end of the book: first and foremost, in the novel's founding or refounding of the world itself, it signifies autonomy. Macondo is a place away from the world, a new world with no relation to an old one we never see. Its inhabitants are a family and a dynasty, albeit accompanied by their fellows on a failed expedition which just happened to come to rest at this point. The initial solitude of Macondo is a purity and an innocence, a freedom from whatever worldly miseries have been forgotten at this opening moment, this moment of a new creation. If we insist on seeing this as a Latin American work, then we can say that Macondo is unsullied by the Spanish conquest as also by indigenous cultures: neither bureaucratic not archaic, neither colonial nor Indian. But if you insist on an allegorical dimension, then it also signifies the uniqueness of Latin America itself in the global system, and at another level the distinctness of Colombia from the rest of Latin America, and even of García Márquez's native (coastal, Caribbean) region from the rest of Colombia and the Andes. All these perspectives mark the freshness of the novel's starting point, its utopian laboratory experiment.

But as we know, the form-problem of utopia is that of narrative itself: what stories remain to be told if life is perfect and society is perfected? Or, to turn the question inside out and rephrase the problem of content in terms of novelistic form, what narrative paradigms survive to provide the raw material for that destruction or deconstruction which is the work of the novel itself as a kind of meta-genre or anti-genre? This was the deeper truth of Lukács's pathbreaking Theory of the Novel. The genres, the narrative stereotypes or paradigms, belong to older, traditional societies: the novel is then the anti-form proper to modernity itself (which is to say, of capitalism and its cultural and epistemological categories, its daily life). This means, as Schumpeter put it in an immortal phrase, that the novel is also a vehicle of creative destruction. Its function, in some properly capitalist 'cultural revolution', is the perpetual undoing of traditional narrative paradigms and their replacement, not by new paradigms, but by something radically different. To use Deleuzian language for a moment, modernity, capitalist modernity, is the moment of passage from codes to axioms, from meaningful sequences, or indeed, if you prefer, from meaning itself, to operational categories, to functions and rules; or, in yet another language, this time more historical and philosophical, it is the transition from metaphysics to epistemologies and pragmatisms, we might even say from content to form, if the use of this second term did not risk confusion.

The form-problem of the novel is that it isn't easy to find sequences to replace those traditional narrative paradigms; the replacements inevitably tend to reform into new narrative paradigms and genres in their own right (as witness the emergence of the Bildungsroman as a meaningful narrative genre, based as it is on conceptions of life, career, pedagogy and spiritual or material development which are all essentially ideological and thereby historical). These newly created yet soon familiar and old-fashioned paradigms must be destroyed in turn, in a perpetual innovation of the form. Even then, it is rare enough for a novelist to invent wholly original replacement paradigms (paradigm change is as momentous an event in the history of narrative as elsewhere), let alone to replace narrative itself, something modernism can be seen everywhere to strive for, unsuccessfully I might add: for what is here demanded is a new kind of novelistic narrative which replaces narrative altogether, something obviously a contradiction in terms.

The perpetual resurrection of newer narrative paradigms and sub-genres out of the still warm ashes of their destruction is a process I would attribute to commodification, as the primary law of our kind of society: it isn't only objects that are subject to commodification, it is anything capable of being named. Many are the philosophical examples of this seemingly fatal process, and the philosophers who – like Wittgenstein or Derrida in their very different ways – set out to free us from stable, reified, conventional categories and concepts have ended up as brand names in their own right. So it is with the creative destruction of narrative paradigms: your 'knight's move', your deviation or defamiliarisation, ends up becoming just another 'new paradigm' (unless, as in postmodernity, it chooses the path of what used to be called irony, namely the use of pastiche, the play with a repetition of dead forms at a slight remove).

Such are, in my opinion, the consequences of Lukács's insights in the Theory of the Novel – insights which did not have the benefit, as we do, of generations of accumulated modernist experiments in this direction. Returning to One Hundred Years of Solitude with a view to demonstrating and validating what I have proposed, let's begin with its principal narrative paradigm, the family novel. It has been debated a good deal lately, the upshot being that it is no longer possible, if it ever was (and perhaps, indeed, in the West it never was). The Bildungsroman is not a family novel but a flight from the family; the picaresque novel turns on a hero who never had a family; and as for the novel of adultery, its relation to the family speaks for itself.

Someone, I think it was Jeffrey Eugenides, has claimed that the family novel today is only possible in the non-West, and I think there is a profound insight here. We may think of Mahfouz, for example, but I would argue that it is one of the greatest of all novels, the Chinese classic Dream of the Red Chamber, one should have in mind. After all, it is from China that we have the slogan that epitomises the ideal of the family as the fundamental structure of life itself: five generations under one roof! The great manor or compound thereby includes everyone from the eighty-year-old patriarch to the newborn baby, including the intermediate generations of parents, grandparents and even great-grandparents, at the appropriate twenty-year generational intervals: patriarchy in its ideal or even Platonic form, you might say (overlooking the often malign role of the various matriarchs and uncles in the process). Folk wisdom through the ages has – along with many philosophers, beginning with Aristotle – assimilated the state itself to this patriarchal or dynastic family, and it is this deep ideological archetype that One Hundred Years of Solitude brings to the surface and makes visible. The extended family founded by José Arcadio Buendía is the 'mythic' state, which will only later, in its days of prosperity, be infiltrated by personnel of the professional or official state, in the person of a 'magistrate' and his police, who are at once assigned a minor and inconspicuous position, along with the other hangers-on of any city-state, such as merchants and booksellers. And just as an extended family has its own service personnel – gardeners, electricians, pool maintenance specialists, carpenters and shamans – so also these appear and disappear punctually in the entourage of the Buendía family, of which they may be considered honorary members.

The family considered as its own city-state has, as the anthropologists teach us, one fundamental problem: it is endogamy, the centripetal tendency to absorb everything external into itself, risking the danger of inbreeding (the intermarriage of cousins and even incest), and all the consequences of triumphant identity, including repetition, boredom and that fateful genetic mutation, the family pigtail. What is not the family, to be sure, is the other and the enemy. Still, the law of endogamy does have its own way of thinking inoffensive otherness; it has its own thought categories for acknowledging difference and relegating it to a subordinate and intermittent, indeed cyclical and harmlessly festive category. It calls such incursions from the outside gypsies. These bring, as the opening pages of One Hundred Years of Solitude so memorably show us, radical difference, in the form of trinkets and inventions: magnets, telescopes, compasses and, finally, the only true miracle achieved by these swindlers and con-artists, the wonder that testifies to their authentically magical power: 'Many years later,' the immortal first sentence of the novel reads, 'as he faced the firing squad, Colonel Aureliano Buendía was to remember that distant afternoon when his father took him to discover ice.' Ice! An element with inconceivable properties, a new addition to the atomic chart. The existence of ice in the tropics is 'memorable' because it is remembered, as Benjamin might have put it. It marks, in that opening sentence, the dialectical nature of reality itself: ice burns and freezes simultaneously.

So it is the raw material of the 'family novel' which will in this opening section be worked over for all its resources and all its possibilities of musical variation, structural permutation, metamorphosis, anecdotal invention, the production of endless episodes which are all in fact the same, structural equivalents in the myth of 'magic realism', whose production and reproduction is itself what is then tautologically described as 'mythic'. Yet the identity of this seemingly irrepressible and irreversible proliferation of familial anecdotes is betrayed by the repetition of names down through the generations – so many Aurelianos (17 of them at one point), so many José Arcadios, even with some Remedios and Amarantas thrown in on the distaff side. Harold Bloom is right to complain of 'a kind of aesthetic battle fatigue, since every page is crammed full of life beyond the capacity of any single reader to absorb'.

I would add to this an embarrassment the literary commentator is loath to confess, namely the difficulty of keeping the characters' names separate from one another. This problem is rather different from students' complaints about impossible Russian patronymics and matronymics (and now Chinese or non-Western ones), and worthier of attention in its own right as a symptom of something historically more important: namely, the renewed significance of generations and the generational, in an overpopulated world henceforth doomed to synchrony rather than diachrony. I can remember when, in the development of that now respectable literary genre the detective story, a writer of some originality (Ross Macdonald) began to experiment with multi-generational crimes: you could never remember whether the murderer was the son, the father or the grandfather. So it is with García Márquez, but deliberately, in a spatial world beyond time itself ('No one has died here yet'; 'the first person born in Macondo' and so on). Everything changes in Macondo, the state arrives, and then religion, and finally capitalism itself; the civil war pursues its course like a serpent biting its own tail; the town grows old and desolate, the rain of history begins and ends, the original protagonists begin to die off; and yet the narrative itself, in its rhizomatic strings, never grows extinct, its force remaining equal to itself until the fateful turn of its final pages. The dynasty is a family of names, and those names belong to the inexhaustible narrative impulse, and not to time or history.

So, as Vargas Llosa has observed, there lies behind the repetitive synchronicity of García Márquez's family structure a whole diachronous progression of the history of society itself, against whose shadowy, inexorable temporality we follow the structural permutations of an ever changing yet static family structure, whose generations ring the changes on its permanency, and whose variations reflect History only as symptoms, not as allegorical markers. It is this dual structure which permits a unique and unrepeatable solution to the form-problem of the historical novel and the family novel alike.

But the family narrative has one last trick up its sleeve, a final desperate move at its moment of saturation and exhaustion: the absolute structural inversion or negation of itself. For what defined the autonomy of Macondo and allowed its luxurious exfoliation of endogamies was its monadic isolation. Yet as in the ancient cosmologies of atomism, the very concept of the atom produces a multiplicity of other atoms, identical to itself; the notion of the One generates many Ones; the force of attraction that pulls everything external into the internal, that absorbs all difference into identity, now subverts and negates itself, and the repulsion into which attraction suddenly turns acquires a new name: war.

With war, One Hundred Years of Solitude acquires its second narrative paradigm, only apparently a mirror-image of the first, whose secondary, eccentric filial protagonist now suddenly becomes the hero. The war novel, to be sure, is itself a peculiar and problematic kind of narrative: if you like, it is one manifestation of a deeper structural necessity of all narrative, namely what the screenwriters' handbooks recommend as conflict, and what narrative theorists such as Lukács (and Hegel) see as the essence of the pre-eminence of tragedy as a form.

The Latin American version of the war novel, however, is a little more complicated than it looks. Colombia's institutionalised civil war, the Austrian-style alternation of its two parties, is at first memorialised in Aureliano's identification with the Liberals, but is then transformed by his repudiation of both parties in the adoption of guerrilla warfare and generalised social 'banditry'. Meanwhile, in the country of Bolívar, this atomisation is modified by a truly Bolívarian pan-Americanism (of the type aspired to by both recent Latin American revolutions, the Cuban and the Venezuelan), which is itself but a figure of that 'world revolution' onto which the original Soviet revolution had hoped to open. The ambiguity is not only that of South America as a distinct geographical and ethnic 'autonomous zone' in a world history of which it nonetheless wishes to be a central part; but also of the imbrication of these various autonomies – from village to nation-state to region – between which the representation freely moves. We remember that the mythic founder, José Arcadio, set out from the Old World 'in search of an outlet to the sea' (discouraged by his discovery of a primal swamp, he settled on the halfway position of Macondo). The space of independence (and solitude) is thus something like the attempt to become an island. The sea here figures that ultimate boundary and end of the world otherwise socially and economically embodied for Latin America by the US. (It is true that the other great regional autonomous zone in which García Márquez's Cartagena participates is the Caribbean, but it scarcely has the importance in One Hundred Years of Solitude that the regional centrality of the Cuban revolution had in García Márquez's own life.)

This would be the moment to speak about politics, and of One Hundred Years of Solitude as a political novel, for despite Colombia's eternal civil war, the enemy is always the US, as Porfirio Díaz's inexhaustible sigh reminds us: 'Alas, poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States!' But these gringos, a strange and alien race, whose very approach tenses the muscles and always arouses suspicion, are here personally reduced to the self-effacing Mr Brown then replaced by the faceless banana company, which brings with it capitalism, modernity, union-busting, bloody repression and an inevitable relocation (an uncanny anticipation of the US's own plague of factory expatriation decades later). It also brings the desolation of eight years of rain: a world of mud, the worst possible dialectical synthesis of flood and drought. But what is truly and artfully political about this sequence isn't just its mythic symbolism, or even the way in which the combined form-problems of the representation of villains, foreigners and collective actors is skilfully circumnavigated, but rather the redeployment of García Márquez's supreme theme, which is not memory but forgetting. The plague of insomnia (and its resultant amnesia) has long since been surmounted; but a specific – one wants to say, a surgical – amnesia is here revived: no one but José Arcadio Segundo can remember the massacre of the workers. It has successfully, magically and yet naturally been eradicated from the collective memory in that archetypal repression which allows all of us to survive history's immemorial nightmares, to live on happily despite 'the slaughterhouse of history' (Hegel). This is the realism – yes, even the political realism – of magic realism.

There is, however, something peculiarly sterile and skeletal in this context about the war paradigm as such: warfare cannot provide the anecdotal richness of the family paradigm, particularly when it is reduced, as in this novel, to the stark reciprocity of enemy sides. What emerges isn't so much a war novel as a play of executions, beginning with that famous first sentence ('as he faced the firing squad'), and a set of surprise reversals (Aureliano will not be executed – twice over – but his brother José Arcadio will be, along with various alter egos). Here, at this temporal rather than geographical 'end of the world', what the execution promises is a momentary halt in that breathless continuity of filled time and perpetual narrativity which Bloom deplored, thereby making room for a new kind of event altogether: namely, memory ('Colonel Aureliano Buendía was to remember'). The representation of memory as an event transforms this temporality altogether: utterly unlike the familiar Proustian version, it comes as a thunderbolt in its own right. Nostalgia is anecdotal; memory here is no resurrection of the past, in this filled space of unremitting sentences, of something like a Churrigueresque narrativity. There can be no past in that traditional sense, nor any real present either (what there is, as readers of the novel already know, is a manuscript, to which we will come in a moment).

But the structural reversals that make up the eventfulness of the novel do draw their most intense off/on energies from the war material, and this very precisely in the characterology of Aureliano (who for this reason most often seems to be the novel's protagonist, even though it has no protagonist except for the family itself and the space of the named collectivity). García Márquez is behaviourist in the sense that the characters have no psychologies, depth or otherwise; without being allegorical, exactly, they are all obsessives, possessed and defined by their own specific, all-encompassing passions. Secondary characters are marked by mere functions (plot or professional); but when the protagonists withdraw from their obsessions, it is into the néant of closed rooms and shuttered houses, as with Rebeca, who persists forgotten into her old age in a kind of narrative sequestration, where the distraction of the novelist (or better still the impersonal chronicler) is rigorously the same as the forgetfulness of society (and of the family) as such; without their anecdotal captivations, they do not simply become normal, they disappear.

Or else their passions suddenly mutate into new missions, new demonic possessions: this is what is paradigmatic about Aureliano, who moves from the fascination of ice in childhood, through the alchemy of his year-long handicraft (in his father's laboratory) of little golden fish-trinkets, to the political vocation of war and rebellion, which seizes him as soon as Macondo threatens to be absorbed into the institutional reification of a state, and falls away again like a deconversion and a fit of dejection at the end of the age of revolutions, at which moment he reverts to his handicraft and his closed quarters: in Macondo only ceaseless activity sustains life.

In Macondo only the specific and the singular exist: the great abstract schemas of dynasty and war can only preside over minute and empirically identified activities. lt is clearly in some unique, not to say impossible co-ordination of these narrative levels that the specificity of García Márquez's narrative solution lies: not in the unification of episodic poetic inventions within the continuity of a single bizarre character's life (as in the parallel generic line of the mega-novels of Grass and Rushdie), but rather in a unique structural constellation, perhaps the last thing to call which is 'magical realism'. Indeed, let's stop using this generic term for everything unconventional and consign it to the bin in which we keep such worn-out epithets as 'surrealistic' and 'Kafkaesque'. Alejo Carpentier's original version is that the real itself is a marvel (the 'real maravilloso'), and that Latin America is in its paradigmatic unevenness – in which computers co-exist with the most archaic forms of peasant culture and on up, through all the stages of the historical modes of production – itself a wonder to behold. But this can only be observed and told absolutely deadpan, and with the unsurprising undeniability of a simple empirical fact. García Márquez's 'method', he tells us, must be 'to tell the story … in an imperturbable tone, with infallible serenity, even if the whole world resists, without for one instant calling into doubt what you are saying and avoiding the frivolous and the truculent alike … [this is] what the old ones knew, that in literature there is nothing more convincing than your own conviction.' So nothing remarkable, nothing miraculous, about the fact that Mauricio Babilonia, a man who is all love, pure love, should constantly be surrounded by a swarm of yellow butterflies ('accompanied by a stupendous odour of grease'); nothing tragic about the fact that he should be shot like a dog by someone whose plans he hampers; nothing magical about the fact that a priest disturbed by the utter absence of God or religion in Macondo should seek to call its citizens to decency and piety by levitating a foot above the ground (after fortifying himself with a cup of hot chocolate); or that Remedios the Beauty should rise into heaven like a windy tangle of backyard sheets. No magic, no metaphor: just a bit of grit caught in transcendence, a materialist sublime, drying the wash or changing the oil caught in an angelic perspective, celestial grime, the Platonic Idea of Socrates' dirty toenails. The storyteller must relate these things with all the ontological coolness of Hegel confronting the Alps: 'Es ist so' (and even then, without the philosopher's ontological emphasis).

Not 'magic', then, but something else must be evoked to account for the undeniable singularity of García Márquez's narrative invention and the form that allows it to come into being. I think it is his uncanny, rapt concentration on his immediate narrative object, which isn't without resemblance to Aureliano's awakening to the world 'with his eyes open':

As they were cutting the umbilical cord, he moved his head from side to side, taking in the things in the room and examining the faces of the people with a fearless curiosity. Then, indifferent to those who came close to look at him, he kept his attention concentrated on the palm roof, which looked as if it were about to collapse under the tremendous pressure of the rain.

Later on, 'adolescence … had restored the intense expression that he had had in his eyes when he was born. He concentrated so much on his experiments in silverwork that he scarcely left the laboratory to eat.' It is interesting, but not particularly relevant for our purposes, that like his own sequestered characters García Márquez himself never once left his house during the writing of One Hundred Years of Solitude; what is essential for grasping the peculiarities of the novel is this notion of concentration itself which, far more than vague ideas of the magical or the 'maravilloso', give us the key to its episodic narrative.

We might draw back and sketch a long development between Aristotelian logic and Freudian free association, passing through the 18th-century psychology of associationism and culminating in Surrealism, on the one hand, and Jakobsonian structuralism (metaphor/metonymy), on the other. In all these frameworks, what matters is temporal succession and the movement from one topic to another, as when Aureliano's nascent vision moves from object to object, or as the emplacement of the objects of this or that 'memory theatre' remind the speaker of the order of his remarks. I want to suggest that far from the baroque disorder and excess of that 'magic realism' with which he is so often taxed, the movement of García Márquez's paragraphs and the unfolding contents of his chapters are to be ascribed to a rigorous narrative logic, characterised precisely in terms of a peculiar 'concentration', which begins with the positing of a specific topic or object.

From a relatively arbitrary starting point – the gypsies and their peculiar mechanical toys or playthings, the wife's family, the construction of a new house (to mention just the openings of the first three chapters) – an association of events, characters, objects, is followed with all the rigour of Freudian free association, which isn't free at all but in practice demands the utmost discipline. That discipline demands exclusion rather than the epic inclusion so often ascribed to García Márquez's narrative. What does not arise in the specific line of associated topics must rigorously be omitted; and the narrative line must lead us wherever it goes (from the curse of the pigtail to the slander of Prudencio Aguilar, his killing, the haunting by his ghost, and as a consequence the attempted abandonment of the haunted house, the exploration of the region, the founding of Macondo, its peopling by their children, the organ which is far from being a pigtail etc). Each of these follows rigorously on its predecessor, whatever shape the series takes under its own momentum, but it is not the form of the narrative sequence but rather the quality of its transitions as they emerge from García Márquez's rapt concentration on the logic of his material, as well as the sequence of topics that emerge from that undistracted stare, from which neither abstraction nor convention can move him. This is a narrative logic which is somehow beyond subject and object alike: it does not emerge from the unconscious of some 'omniscient narrator'; nor does it follow the habitual logic of daily life. It would be tempting to say that it is embedded in the raw material of that Latin America Carpentier characterised as 'maravilloso' (owing, I believe, to the co-existence of so many layers of history, so many discontinuous modes of production). Anyway it isn't really appropriate to credit some exceptional storytelling genius to a fictive entity called García Márquez's 'imagination'. Rather, it is an equally indescribable or unformulatable intensity of concentration which produces the successive materials of each chapter, which then, in their accumulation, result in the appearance of unforeseeable loops and repetitions, 'themes' (to name another literary-critical fiction), finally exhausting their momentum and beginning to reproduce themselves in static numerical patterns.

This concentration, however, is the quality we consume in our unique reading, and which has no real equivalent in The Tin Drum, say, or Gravity's Rainbow, or Midnight's Children, even though their momentum is analogous, as are the associations from which their episodes are constructed. We have no ready-made literary-technical terms with which to approach the strange mode of active contemplation that lies at the heart of this compositional process (and of reading too). It would be philosophical and pedantic to hearken back to the notorious Fichtean formula – 'the identical subject-object' – which has had its day in fields beyond the aesthetic; but there is a sense in which it remains the most satisfactory characterisation, and incites us to an essentially negative approach to these narrative strings. No, there is no point-of-view here, no implied narrator (or reader either). There is no stream of consciousness, or style indirect libre. There is no initial order, challenged and ultimately restored. No digressions either; the string pursues its own internal logic without distraction and without realism or fantasy. The great images – ghosts who grow old and die, the lover emanating yellow butterflies – are neither symbols nor metaphors, but simply designate the string itself, in its inexorable temporal progression and its stubborn repudiation of any distinction between the subjective and the objective, the inner feeling and the external world. The starting points alone are arbitrary, but they are given in the family itself, less a genre or a subject matter than a network of points, any of which can serve until the associations begin to peter out and are broken off. The dialectic of quantity into quality leaves its mark as the episodes pile up and begin to burden what used to be new references with layers of memory. And indeed, this is what, for want of a better word or concept, García Márquez calls the narrative logic of his strings: 'memory', but memory of a strange and unsubjective kind, a memory within the things themselves of their future possibilities, threatened only by that contagious epidemic of insomnia that threatens to wipe out not only the events but the very meaning of the words themselves.

It would be philistinism of the most unreceptive and boring kind to pronounce the word 'imagination' here, as though García Márquez were a real person and not (as Kant thought of 'genius' itself) simply the vehicle of a physiological anomaly, like his own characters, the bearer of that weird and inexplicable gift we have called concentration, the inability to be distracted by what is not implicit in the narrative sequence in question. Our happy accident as well as readers, if we are able in much the same way to lose ourselves in that precisely situated oblivion in which everything follows logically and nothing is strange or 'magical', a hyperconscious yet unreflexive attention in which we are unable to distinguish ourselves from the writer, in which we share in that strange moment of absolute emergence which is neither creation nor imagination: participation rather than contemplation, at least for a time. It is a defining characteristic of the spell of the marvellous that we are unaware of our own bewitchment.

*

Still, certain features of the work of art in general offer privileged access to what the Frankfurt School used to call their truth-content; among these, temporality has always played a significant role in the more productive analyses of the novel as a form. Just as Le Corbusier described the dwelling as a 'machine for living', so the novel has always been a machine for living a certain kind of temporality; and in the multiple differentiations of global or postmodern capitalism, we may expect a far greater variety of these temporal machines than there were in the transitional period we call literary modernism (whose experimental temporalities, paradoxically, seemed initially on the face of it far more varied and incomparable).

The novel is a kind of animal, and just as we speculate about the way in which a dog experiences time, or a tortoise, or a hawk (both in its limits and its possibilities, and granted that we assess these in terms of our own human temporal experiences), so also each distinctive novel lives and breathes a kind of phenomenological time behind which non-temporal structures can sometimes be glimpsed. This is why, for example, I have insisted on grasping what is here called the act of memory as a punctual experience, an event that interrupts the anecdotal yet irreversible flow of narrative sentences and is at once reabsorbed into them as yet another narrative event. Thus, what seems as if it might be the pause and distance of a moment of self-consciousness turns out to be another instance of unreflexive consciousness, that unremitting attention to the world which is itself shaped and tensed by a contradictory ontology in which everything has happened already at the same time that it is happening afresh in a present in which death scarcely exists, although time and ageing do. Repetition has become a popular topic in contemporary theory, but it is important to insist on the varieties of repetition of which this temporal one – past and present all at once – is a unique type.

This particular temporal structure then intersects with another, in which fundamental historical breaks are registered: the founding of Macondo is one such 'break', but it is reabsorbed owing to the tendency of mythic events to loop back into themselves. The arrival of the banana company, which registers the traumatic event of US economic colonisation, is assimilated into the continuity of everyday life in Macondo as its agents and actors become part of the secondary personnel of Macondo; and then wiped away altogether by the misery of the years of rain which renders its presence invisible. Here too then, temporality as a form-problem reflects that more general dilemma I have characterised as endogamy, in which the autonomy of the collective and its internal events must somehow find a way of defusing external shocks and assimilating them into its fabric, whether by marriage, warfare or, in this case, by a naturalisation that turns the socio-economic into acts of god or forces of nature. Historical temporality becomes natural history, albeit of a miraculous kind; while its recipients retain the option of withdrawing into the real interior space of crumbling buildings.

Such withdrawals, the long-awaited deaths of the principal protagonists, indeed the very indices of capitalist modernity itself in the imperialist penetration by the banana company of Macondo's ever more threatened autonomy, and with all this the gradual exhaustion of the dual plots or narrative paradigms (the cyclical repetition of names; the gradual enlargement and effacement of military rivalries into ideological conflict and the dialectic of guerrilla resistance and 'total war'): all of this betokens increasing impatience with the paradigms whose structural originalities have been exhausted and which, after their two-part development, give way to the interminable repetition of tale-spinning and the piling up of anecdote on fresh anecdote. (Where does the break take place? This is the historian's unnamed vice, the hidden jouissance of periodisation: a deduction of the beginning of the end times, of 'when it happened', or in other words when it all stopped – the opposite of the Freudian primal scene. I would personally select the moment in which 'Colonel Gerineldo Márquez was the first to perceive the emptiness of the war', but I leave it to others to identify their own secret 'break'.)

This kind of memory-event is utterly different from what happens in the great predecessor, Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom!

Once there was – Do you mark how the wisteria, sun-impacted on this wall here, distills and penetrates this room as though (light-unimpeded) by secret and attritive progress from mote to mote of obscurity's myriad components? That is the substance of remembering – sense, sight, smell: the muscles with which we see and hear and feel – not mind, not thought: there is no such thing as memory: the brain recalls just what the muscles grope for: no more, no less: and its resultant sum is usually incorrect and false and worthy only of the name of dream.

Faulknerian memory is profoundly sensory, in the tradition of Baudelaire – the odour that brings a whole moment of the past back with it. Despite its assignment to a poetic avant-garde, this is the mainstream Western ideological conception of time and the body, where that of García Márquez is on the contrary a reversion to chronicle time, the time of miracles and curiosity, of heightened attention, of the memorable, the exceptional event (Benjamin's storyteller) – what generally goes down in collective or folk memory, even though here it is the 'folk memory' of an individual character. And the other way round: for is not all of Faulkner somehow transmitted via memory as such, so that events, soaked in it, are no longer to be distinguished as present or past, but only conveyed by the interminable murmur of the remembering voice? No such voice in García Márquez: the chronicle records but does not evoke, does not fascinate and immobilise us, rapt, in the web of a personal style; and the absence of style is also in general the mark of the postmodern.

'The history of the family was a machine with unavoidable repetitions,' Pilar Ternera says towards the end of the novel, 'a turning wheel that would have gone on spilling into eternity were it not for the progressive and irremediable wearing of the axle.' We can recognise the onset of this final section by the emergence of sheer quantity as its organising principle, and above all the apotheosis of those dualisms dear to structuralism in general, in which content gives way to pattern and empty formal proliferation; but also, as I have already hinted, by the signs of modernity that begin to show up in the village like so many unwanted strangers who must somehow be accommodated.

The denunciation of imperialism would scarcely be a novelty for Latin American literature: the genre of the 'great dictator novel' would be another version (García Márquez himself took it up in his next book, The Autumn of the Patriarch) – the portrait of the political monster who is alone powerful enough to resist the Americans. Here, however, the analysis is more subtle: only the rain can force the banana company out of the country, but the cure leaves its own insuperable desolation behind it – the very epitome of 'dependency theory'.

The ways in which this penetration of 'Western modernity' is registered in temporality itself are more problematic, for it brings with it what we now call 'daily life' but what the novel's title has already identified as 'miserable solitude', the absence of the miraculous event, whose boredom must now be filled by mindless rote work: in the case of Amaranta, sewing, whose 'very concentration gave her the calmness that she needed to accept the idea of frustration. It was then that she understood the vicious circle of Colonel Aureliano Buendía's little gold fishes.' But this introduction of 'understanding' into the sheer activity of the chronicle is already a contamination, and points towards other kinds of narrative discourse the novel means to avoid. So also the notion of 'truth', which appears at the very moment when José Arcadio Segundo finds that the memory of the workers' massacre has been, in Orwellian manner, effaced from collective memory. Truth then becomes the negative in a quasi-Hegelian sense, not the interminable listing of events of the chronicle, but rather the re-establishment of old events in the place of their distortion or omission. But this is also another kind of discourse, another kind of narrative, from the one we have been reading.

This is the twin face of the exhaustion and onset of readerly boredom to which Harold Bloom gave voice: for here the chronicle mode has fallen into deterioration, and the novel itself has begun to lose its reason for being, threatened by psychology on the one hand and depth analysis on the other. The chronicle mode was itself a kind of archaic utopia, but of a more subtle and effective kind than in those outright indigenista novels of which Vargas Llosa so bitterly complained. The chronicle took us back to an older kind of time and place, an older mode of origin. Now suddenly for the first time we begin to grasp the novel as itself a duality, the existence, alongside García Márquez's impersonal yet contemporary narrative, of the old parchments in Sanskrit in which Melquíades composed the same history in another, more authentic form. And at this point, One Hundred Years of Solitude paradoxically becomes a trendy text espousing all the ideological furor of 1960s 'écriture'; for in an unexpected final flourish, a concluding originality arises to match that of the novel's beginning, and when 'real life' finally coincides with the confabulation of the parchments everything ends up in a book, just as Mallarmé had predicted, and the novel swirls away in a gust of dead leaves, just as Macondo is wiped out by the wind.

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