Wednesday, May 19, 2021

Jonas Staal: Collectivizations


Rangea, Karl Marx with Swartpuntia, and Ernietta. Jonas Staal, 94 Million Years of Collectivism (detail of storyboard study), 2020–21. Gouache on paper. Courtesy of the artist. 

Decades of capitalist propaganda have reduced the notion of collectivization to Stalinist terror. This flattening of the term dismisses the breadth of forms that collectivization can take: from nationalizing communal resources and production, to other-than-human redistribution efforts to establish comradely ecologies. We need a more serious analysis of the different forms and outcomes of collectivization efforts in egalitarian movements around the world, from the deep past to recent history. The success of anti-collectivist propaganda also keeps us from revalidating collectivization’s present-day importance for regaining control over common resources in the face of massive extraction by trillion-dollar companies. It is therefore essential to explore the collectivized imaginaries and practices—collectivizations, in the plural—that make egalitarian forms of life imaginable and actionable.

1. Other Collectivizations

In capitalist propaganda, the notion of collectivization, its multiple meanings and forms of implementation, are trapped in a time capsule labelled “totalitarianism.” It is ridiculed and demonized by historians such as Oleg Khlevniuk, who decries Stalin’s 1929 proclamation for the construction of large-scale collective farms (kolkhozes) as the “brainchild of socialist fanatics.”1 Other historians, less driven by anti-communism, such as Moshe Lewin, argue that while the brutal costs in lives and the use of state terror in the era of Stalinist collectivization are undeniable, “The whole set of repressive and terrorist measures has too often monopolized the attention of researchers, at the expense of the broader panorama of social changes and state building.”2 In this light, Lewin emphasizes that the very use of the term “collective” was inappropriate. He argues instead that the kolkhoz was “a hybrid structure containing incompatible principles … without ever becoming either a cooperative, a factory, or a private farm.”3 Such an approach turns the usual critique of Soviet collectivization on its head: rather than being all-encompassing, it might not have even been collective enough to be called collectivization.

Early reports by writer Maurice Hindus on the creation of the kolkhozes are an important record for engaging with Lewin’s call for a “broader panorama” on collectivization. A Russian-American émigré, Hindus returned to his home village to describe the collectivization process, published in his 1931 book Red Bread. He observes the protests by the peasant population against the relentless liquidation of the kulaks (property-owning peasants), whose families, if lucky, faced the choice between exile or joining the kolkhoz. But he simultaneously witnesses the creation of free nurseries and cultural centers across the countryside, guaranteed maternity leave for kolkhoz members, the success of cooperative stores, emancipation from the firm grip of the Orthodox Church, and the liberation of women from marriage entrapment and subservience. Hindus is unscrupulous in speaking of “dictatorial Soviet standards,”4 but this does not keep him from seeing the Soviet Revolution as a “double-armed power” of both repression and mass emancipation.5 One does not redeem the other, nor does one legitimize the other, but they are equally real parts of its history.

Maurice Hindus, Red Bread, 1931 (opening page).

It is a great historical loss that we have come to identify collectivization’s inherent relentlessness with state-imposed mass violence, due to Stalinist terror and enduring anti-communist propaganda. In recent decades, other terms such as “commoning” and the “commons” have been employed to recuperate the spirit of historical, emancipatory struggles against the primacy of private property. But as Silvia Federici writes, “Since at least the early 1990s, the language of the commons has been appropriated by the World Bank and the United Nations and put at the service of privatization.”6 In contrast to this neoliberal use of commoning language, a feminist theory of the commons, argues Federici, builds on “the collective experiences, the knowledge, and the struggles that women have accumulated concerning reproductive work, a history that has been an essential part of our resistance to capitalism.”7 Contrary to how those international organizations co-opt the term, Federici concludes that such a feminist theory of the commons entails the “collectivization of our everyday work of reproduction.”8

Federici’s use of the term “collectivization” distinguishes it from the capitalist capture of the commons, where commoning takes the form of World Bank microcredit policing and a demand for some form of preexisting property or physical ableness on the part of the commoner. Collectivization, however, is fundamentally indiscriminate: it completely rejects debt, and does not care whether people are “productive” bodies or not. Collectivization is relentless not because it is a priori violent, but because it includes and applies to everyone and everything.9

Just as Federici theorizes collectivization from a feminist perspective, there are many other historical and contemporary examples that resist the reduction of the term to Stalinist repression. The terrible famine of 1959–61 is adduced to discredit Chinese communes, but this entirely ignores—as Joshua Eisenman writes—the successes of the subsequent “green revolution” in China. Due to reforms of the nationwide agricultural research and extension system undertaken during the Cultural Revolution, experts rotating across communes pushed innovations and farming techniques. By the time of decollectivization in the early eighties, the communes had reached “historically high levels of agricultural productivity per unit land and per unit labor, life expectancy, basic literacy, and the promulgation of bookkeeping and vocational skills.”10 The communes were dismantled not because they were a failure, but because the reformist faction of Deng Xiaoping regarded them as too successful an inheritance of the Maoist era to keep in place.

Film still from Robin Shuffield’s Thomas Sankara: The Upright Man (2006) depicting Sankara’s 1985 tree planting campaign known as One Village, One Grove. 

Thomas Sankara’s leadership of Burkina Faso (1983–87) embodies yet another take on the practice of collectivization, this time through an eco-socialist, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist paradigm—another kind of “green revolution.” This manifested most famously in Sankara’s 1985 campaign to plant ten million trees, which aimed to turn reforestation and mass planting into a new “national and cultural tradition.”11 Here, collectivization cannot be reduced to the totalitarian cliché of state-imposed industrial farming, but manifests instead as an interdependent ecology of human and nonhuman workers: trees and humans struggle together for socialist self-determination. For Sankara, the campaign was a struggle against desertification, but also a struggle for resources that would sustain the country’s sovereignty from World Bank feudalism. In his words:

Our struggle for the trees and forests is first and foremost a democratic and popular struggle. Because a handful of forestry engineers and experts getting themselves all worked up in a sterile and costly manner will never accomplish anything! Nor can the worked-up consciences of a multitude of forums and institutions—sincere and praiseworthy though they may be—make the Sahel green again, when we lack the funds to drill wells for drinking water a hundred meters deep, while money abounds to drill oil wells three thousand meters deep!12

It is exactly this notion of self-determination that resonates with Coni Ledesma, representative of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), when she speaks of the Bungkalan as a contemporary collectivization practice. In Filipino, Bungkalan means “to cultivate,” and relates to peasants and farmworkers who have been promised land reform, to no avail, and instead take collective repossession of idle lands on the islands of Negros, Mindanao, and Luzon, among others—despite continuing disappearances and murders perpetrated by the military. Rather than depending on massive state intervention, Ledesma describes how “farmers and sugar workers take their destiny and their lives in their own hands,” as a practice of collectivization in the here and now.13

With such examples in mind—from Federici to the Chinese communes and from Sankara’s eco-socialism to the Bungkalan—it would be better to speak of a history of collectivizations in the plural. As Vijay Prashad remarks, there needs to be a history of “polycentric communism” in thought that is not “centered around Moscow and Soviet foreign policy.”14 This helps to not only reconsider the pluralist histories of collectivizations in the past, but to also redefine collectivization struggles against the theft of common resources in the present and future.

Film still from Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982).

2. Trillion-Dollar Dispossessions

Faced with the rise of trillion-dollar companies such as Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, and Bayer (Monsanto), with their massive extraction operations, there is an evident urgency to redefine the role of collectivization for egalitarian politics today, in order to reclaim control over political, economic, and social commons. When trying to grasp the vastness of the monopolization of resources by these companies, researchers draw parallels to the histories and presents of colonial empires. Siva Vaidhyanathan writes that “between Google and Facebook we have witnessed a global concentration of wealth and power not seen since the British and Dutch East India Companies ruled vast territories, millions of people, and the most valuable trade routes.”15 Yanis Varoufakis claims that “the East India Company was no aberration” but should rather be considered the historical template that result in “mega-corporations like Amazon, Facebook, Google and ExxonMobil, which are effectively beyond the control of any nation-state.”16 Shoshana Zuboff argues that trillion-dollar companies are part of an era of “surveillance capitalism” and engage in neocolonial “digital dispossession,” with the result that “claims to self-determination have vanished from the maps of our own experience.”17

Zuboff’s reference to self-determination is relevant here if we want to understand the multiple forms of dispossession carried out by these trillion-dollar companies. As Karl Marx phrased it, the means of production are “the means of absorption of the labor of others,” meaning that “it is no longer the worker who employs the means of production, but the means of production which employs the worker.”18 This analysis seems fully applicable to Zuboff’s conception of surveillance capitalism, for in digital dispossession, data consumers also function as data workers.

Jodi Dean questions whether this form of surveillance capitalism is not better understood as a form of neofeudalism: “Cities and states relate to Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, and Google/Alphabet as if these corporations were themselves sovereign states—negotiating with, trying to attract, and cooperating with them on their terms.”19 In Dean’s words, trillion-dollar companies are “doubly extractive,” because “platforms not only position themselves so that their use is basically necessary (like banks, credit cards, phones, and roads) but that their use generates data for their owners.”20 Facebook and Alphabet are less concerned with selling products to their users than with extracting behavioral data to sell to commercial and political advertisers, with the goal of eventually predicting future behavior in order to ensure guaranteed outcomes. While consuming, users are providing labor, just as that labor simultaneously becomes a form of consumption. In Blade Runner (1982), the bioengineered “replicant” Rachael perfectly summarizes the conditions for users of these platforms: “I’m not in the business. I am the business.”

When taking—consuming—a smart car for a spin, the driver is also operating as a data worker whose behavioral information is extracted to benefit restaurants and stores en route. The expanding internet of things uses our health monitoring apps to anticipate when we will become hungry, or our Google searches to predict when we will desire a new item of clothing. In the smart-city phantasmagoria, the world becomes a vast data mine that is excavated to predict our behavior, both as workers and consumers.21 This is what leads Vaidhyanathan to argue that if corporations such as Facebook merely recognized users as clients instead of resources, this alone could be considered revolutionary.22

Of course, it is important to emphasize that extraction through digital means remains a fundamentally material operation. This is exemplified by a recent lawsuit against Apple, Google, Dell, Microsoft, and Tesla based on field research conducted by antislavery economist Siddharth Kara, filed on behalf of families of children who were killed or injured at cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The primary phase of dispossession does not involve neofeudal data workers using their smartphones, laptops, and electric cars, but rather those who are forced to mine the materials to create these infrastructures and interfaces in the first place.23

This doesn’t mean, however, that people in the Global South are not also mined for data by trillion-dollar companies. Facebook piloted its “internet.org” project, later renamed “Free Basics,” under the guise of providing free internet to regions of the world that have limited access. The project was advertised as part of the company’s mission to “connect the world.” But the services were only free for limited apps, such as Facebook, and everything was hosted on Facebook’s servers. The goal, then, was to essentially replace the internet with Facebook.

This did not go without resistance: Indian net activists successfully fought Facebook for infringing on net-neutrality principles, leading to internet.org’s withdrawal from the country in 2016.24 But in many other countries, Facebook successfully contracted with governments to implement Free Basics, which in turn gave the company undue influence on national affairs. In the Philippines, where Free Basics went into effect in 2015, Facebook employees advised various candidates on their digital campaigns during the presidential elections of 2016. The winner, authoritarian Rodrigo Duterte, turned Facebook into his main media service, banning independent press from covering his inauguration.25 A year later, Facebook and the Duterte regime entered into a partnership to lay new underwater data cables, forging a profitable relation that ties Facebook indefinitely to Duterte’s murderous “war on drugs” campaign and his current push for an “anti-terror” bill to rid himself of any form of leftist opposition.26 Facebook might have been praised for its all-too-late suspension of Donald Trump’s account after his neofascist followers stormed the United States Capitol, but Trump’s incompetent authoritarianism is child’s play compared to Duterte’s Facebook-sponsored regime.

The emergence of neofeudalism—or “techno-feudalism” in the words of Varoufakis27—thus threatens self-determination in various ways: through multiple forms of dispossession, these companies extract our labor, equally as workers and as consumers; they dismantle any remaining notion of privacy; they structurally undermine democratic oversight and shared ownership; and they enable new forms of authoritarian (corporate) government. What twenty-first century collectivized imaginaries and collectivization practices might help us reclaim ownership over our common resources?

Left: Public protests on Black Friday in Bangladesh. Right: Projection on the wall of Amazon’s headquarters on Black Friday in London; both part of the Make Amazon Pay campaign coordinated by UNI Global Union and Progressive International. Courtesy of Progressive International.

3. Collectivized Imaginaries

As we consider contemporary strategies for collectivizing resources and forms of technology, it is important to remember that users are the ones who initially funded these trillion-dollar companies—not just through unpaid data work as described above, but also through public investment, without which these companies could not have come into existence in the first place. Apple’s so-called “innovations” are inconceivable without US government–financed technological research.28 Amazon could not have kickstarted its operations without the publicly funded postal system of the US and other countries, through which it continues to be subsidized;29 and as Andreas Petrossiants remarks, “Many of Amazon’s workers are so underpaid that they receive what little welfare benefits still exist in the US—meaning taxpayer money is essentially funding the social reproduction of Amazon workers.”30 Alphabet would not exist without the knowledge production of others, who provide its search engine’s content.31 Bayer would be of no value if it did not steal decades and centuries of seed knowledges and practices from farmers and Indigenous peoples.32 That users have collectively worked for these companies, paid for them, and been expropriated by them, without renumeration of any kind, frames the core argument for transferring them to collective ownership.

Such an endeavor is not without precedent. At certain critical moments in history, even liberal-democratic societies have recognized that private enterprise can disproportionately impact public well-being; in these moments, some companies and sectors have been placed under public control. During the 2008 financial crisis, a number of banks were (temporarily or partially) nationalized—Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, Bankia in Spain, ABN Amro in the Netherlands—when their criminal dealings in financial derivatives ruined the lives of precarious people all over the world. Spain temporarily nationalized private health care during the coronavirus pandemic.33 While these actions were taken primarily to rescue a disastrous economic system, they nonetheless display a recognition that banks and privatized health care threaten collective self-determination. The same recognition should be extended to trillion-dollar companies.

It is in this light that Wendy Liu argues for “more democratic control over the online platforms we spend so much time on, through user ownership, state ownership, stronger regulation, or decentralization.” Liu further emphasizes the need to “increas[e] worker mobility” through portable personal data, which could be moved from one platform to another in order to block further monopolization, and to deprive trillion-dollar companies of their “control over intellectual property.”34

Regaining democratic control over trillion-dollar companies also means repurposing them to serve the public good. Nationalization campaigner Paris Marx argues that the logistical urgencies of the coronavirus pandemic provide further rationale for placing Amazon under public ownership, by integrating it into the United States Postal Service (USPS):

The key task of a publicly owned Amazon in this moment of crisis would be to maintain the supply chain so it can continue delivering the necessities that people rely on, with priority given to those items. However, it should also begin preparing for the large-scale delivery of packages containing food staples and essential items to every home in the country, making use of the combined labor power of USPS and Amazon delivery workers, but also the infrastructure that only the USPS has: post offices all across the country, even in small rural communities that aren’t economical for private-package delivery companies to service.35

This is not the end of the nationalization effort Marx proposes. He also argues that Amazon’s web services, its infrastructure, and its data centers could become a “strong backbone” for a publicly owned internet. Whole Foods, an Amazon subsidiary, could be “reoriented to make a food hall that provides food to the community” and could also serve as a foundation for an expanded Meals on Wheels program. Amazon Studios could be reorganized to produce smaller, mid-budget indie and alternative films, which are currently marginalized to nonexistence due to the increased consolidation of large production studios that prioritize blockbuster output.36

Liu’s and Marx’s demands for democratic oversight and public ownership resonate with current workplace mobilization. The global campaign Make Amazon Pay, coordinated by Global UNI and Progressive International, was launched on “Black Friday” in 2020, demanding workplace improvements and job security for Amazon employees, a reversal of the company’s ban on unionization, a commitment from Amazon to achieve carbon neutrality, and full taxation of the retail giant.37 When the campaign was launched, tens of thousands of Amazon workers gathered in front of warehouses across the world, from Bangladesh to India, Australia to Brazil, the United States to the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland.

The visual morphology of the campaign, which I developed together with Remco van Bladel in close dialogue with the organizers, aimed at two things. Firstly, the famous Amazon logo, which can be read as both a smile and a forward arrow, was doubled and placed on a red canvas to emphasize the demand to return: return rights to Amazon workers, return their hard work by providing benefits and financial security, return the environmental costs of excess carbon emissions, return the profits earned through tax avoidance. Secondly, hijacking and socializing Amazon’s visual identity was also intended as a first step toward the company’s replacement: our campaign symbols gestured towards a future Amazon owned and governed by its workers and users.

Jonas Staal and Jan Fermon, Collectivize Facebook, 2020-ongoing. HAU Hebbel am Ufer, Berlin. 

Creating a “visual portal” that points towards a future of workers’ ownership and self-governance is also central to the collective action lawsuit against Facebook that I initiated with human rights lawyer Jan Fermon, which we will file at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. In line with Zuboff, we argue that the ownership model of Facebook and other trillion-dollar companies fundamentally infringes on the self-determination of peoples and individuals. As a consequence, we demand that the Council recognize Facebook as a public entity, and transfer ownership to its 2.8 billion users.

We are asking neither to reform nor nationalize Facebook: our approach to collectivization aims to turn the Facebook platform into a transnational cooperative, owned and governed by its users.

To replace the economy of extractivism and private ownership with a common, collectivized economy, cultural work is crucial. In Varoufakis’s political sci-fi book Another Now (2020), we encounter a parallel reality in which the 2008 financial crisis did not result in a consolidation of techno-feudalism; instead, it marked a fundamental turning point towards a “corpo-syndicalist” alternative. In this “another now,” a movement called Ossify Wall Street brings a new group into being: the Ossify Capitalism Rebels. Their actions target both physical spaces and the digital realms of techno-feudalism. Employing a “double strike” strategy, the OC Rebels help organize a strike among Facebook workers; at the same time, they convince masses of Facebook users not to log on, starving the company of valuable data.38 Other major “tech strikes” follow, forcing a halt to the extraction economy of Facebook and other trillion-dollar companies. Feeling the pressure, the political class passes a new Digital Rights Act that guarantees every person on earth full property rights over their own data:

Starved of their targeted advertising revenues and access to stock exchanges, the new shareholders of Google, Facebook and their ilk—employees owning one share each—were forced to seek the financial support of their community of users. In a surprisingly short time, what used to be the world’s greatest and greediest private monopolies had mutated into vast digital communes.39

Varoufakis shows the power of the cultural imaginary to recognize our current present as criminal, compared to the feasible pathways towards the digital communes of another now. It is in this light that we should see the work of the TESA Collective, which creates cooperative board games. It is hard to name a popular game, book, or film that does not involve a storyline based on a predatory win-or-lose dichotomy—and this shows how culturally embedded the extractive imaginary truly is. From Monopoly to Risk and Settlers of Catan, many board-game players are trained from an early age to understand narrative excitement through the theft of the commons: my gain is based on everyone else’s loss. The TESA Collective’s games, such as Co-Opoly, Rise-Up, and Strike, are instead based on collectively identifying shared oppressors—private capital and authoritarian governments. These games task players with creating large coalitions among workers, faith communities, students, alternative media outlets, and other groups, helping to train future social-movement organizers and cooperative members.40 We find real-life applications of such cooperative efforts in Clara Balaguer’s project Troll Palayan, which organizes meme-creation workshops, or what she calls “organic troll farms” (“palayan” means “rice paddy” in Filipino). The projects aims to reclaim the joys of collective memology to “dismantle toxicity in cyberspace.”41

In these examples—from Paris Marx’s mappings of nationalized trillion-dollar companies, to Varoufakis’s description of another now, to the training of cooperative mentalities by TESA Collective and Balaguer—collectivized imaginaries serve as the foundation for constructing collectivized realities.

TESA Collective, Rise Up: The Game of People & Power, 2017Courtesy of TESA Collective. 

4. Ninety-Four Million Years of Collectivism

Capitalism—along with its neo- and techno-feudal mutations—is maintained in part by a certain origin myth. Unjust systems of predation are portrayed as an inherent part of the “circle of life” or “human nature.” Through this narrative, collectivization is framed as a rarity in history, as a utopian glitch that may be desirable but is in fact incompatible with human reality. Collectivization might look good on paper, but not in practice. In this line of thought, capitalism is naturalized: it is not what we want, it’s simply what we are.

Nick Estes challenges this origin story by arguing that “Indigenous ways of relating to human and other-than-human life exist in opposition to capitalism, which transforms both humans and nonhumans into labor and commodities to be bought and sold.”42 Furthering this argument, the Red Nation coalition—of which Estes is a member—demands “dignified lives as Native peoples who are free to perform our purpose as stewards of life if we are to protect and respect our nonhuman relatives—the land, the water, the air, the plants, and the animals.”43 Through this emphasis on comradely relationality within ecosystems, the notion of private property—of legalized theft—is rejected. The struggle for collectivization today, then, is no novelty, because collectivized practices preceded capitalism all over the planet. In their proposition for a “Red Natural History,” Not An Alternative refers to this as a “world in common,” existing as a horizon within our world of capitalist capture.44

Capitalism’s origin myth even reaches further back than humans have existed on earth. For a long time, geologists claimed that the carnivorous “Cambrian Explosion” that occurred 541 million years ago was the evolutionary leap that resulted in complex life on earth. But for decades geologists ignored facts that contradicted this view—which might have something to do with their inability to imagine that complex life could result from anything other than capitalist predation.

However, in the geological era immediately preceding the predatory Cambrian Period—known as the “Ediacaran Period”—complex life-forms coexisted in a cooperative, nonpredatory oceanic world. The Ediacaran Period lasted from 635 to 541 million years ago—ninety-four million years of collectivism. In is in this light that geologist Mark McMenamin asks, “Do socialism and capitalism have, fundamentally, an ecological basis?”—implying that the Ediacaran could be considered a period of pre-socialist socialism, and the Cambrian as a period of pre-capitalist capitalism.45 Ediacaran biota resemble disks, worm-like shapes, and elegant plant-like forms characterized by a quilted body architecture. They are regarded as neither plants nor animals, their existence defying biological and gendered classification. Their collectivized ecology operated through photosymbiosis, chemosymbiosis, and osmotrophy, recirculating nutrients amongst one another, making predation unnecessary.46

Rangea, Swartpuntia, Kimberella, and Alexandra Kollontai with Charnia. Jonas Staal, 94 Million Years of Collectivism (detail of storyboard study), 2020–21. Gouache on paper. Courtesy of the artist. 

The Ediacaran is named after the Ediacaran Hills in South Australia, home of the Adnyamathanha people. We might thus evoke here the Aboriginal concept and practice of The Dreaming, where ancestors and descendants coexist.47 Do Ediacaran biota, such as Charnia, Rangea, Kimberella, Swartpuntia, Spriggina, and Ernietta, coexist in a dream space with Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Alexandra Kollontai, Rosa Luxemburg, Hồ Chí Minh, Célia Sanchez, and Thomas Sankara? Do they share the same dream, or dream of one another, beyond time and across space? A dream of socialized ecologies of coexistence, a dream of perpetual redistribution and collectivization of life? These questions belong to the field of “Proletgeology”: earth-memory studies of other-than-human proletarian and collectivist life-forms.48

While we should not naturalize the ninety-four-million-year Ediacaran Period as a pre-socialist socialism the way the ruling classes naturalize capitalism, it is essential to recognize that human and other-than-human work towards collectivization is as much a part of our deep history as of our struggles in the present. Our challenge today is to solidarize these dreams and imaginaries to collectivize worlds for all.

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I want to thank Adwait Singh, iLiana Fokianaki, and Andreas Petrossiants for their editorial support in writing this essay. I further want to thank Singh and Mihnea Mircan for our ongoing conversations about Ediacaran collectivism, and Proletgeologist Vincent W. J. van Gerven Oei for his counsel. Part of the research for this essay emerged from the “Collectivizations” interview series that I co-programmed with Marina Otero Verzier and Flora van Gaalen for Het Nieuwe Instituut, Rotterdam.

Jonas Staal is a visual artist whose work deals with the relation between art, propaganda, and democracy. His most recent book is Propaganda Art in the 21st Century (MIT Press, 2019).

© 2021 e-flux and the author

Wednesday, April 21, 2021

纳塔尼尔·阿玛:《在中国乐坛摸清和规避(自我)审查制度》(2020

 


纳塔尼尔·阿玛:《在中国乐坛摸清和规避(自我)审查制度》(2020)

原创 纳塔尼尔·阿玛 译窟 前天


摘要:虽然2018年1月中国嘻哈音乐的“审查”事件引发关注,但这并不表明中国存在多种形式的音乐审查制度。本文从朋克摇滚群体内部的观察入手,概述审查制度在实践中如何运作,并探讨哪些机构在负责监督专辑、演唱会到音乐节中的音乐作品。本文讨论中国乐坛审查机制,包括自我审查,并强调如何规避审查制度,以及艺人与当局斡旋的可能性。


在中国乐坛摸清和规避(自我)审查制度

Navigating and Circumventing (Self)censorship in the Chinese Music Scene


作者:纳塔尼尔·阿玛(Nathanel Amar,法国现代中国研究中心/CEFC)

译者:陈荣钢


引用:Amar, N.. “Navigating and circumventing (self)censorship in the Chinese music scene.” China perspectives 2020 (2020): 25-33. 译自原文前两节的部分内容


最近由中国官方和私人进行的审查与自我审查案例备受关注。争议歌曲不见。音乐审查可以有很多种,可以让歌曲、歌词不见,让签证失效,演唱会取消。私人公司或个人的自我审查则在保护自己获得更大的市场份额。

图片

综艺节目修改歌词(来源:yinyidushe)


音乐内容审查研究中,Sabine Trebinjac研究了“地区民间音乐集成办公室”,该机构负责收集和分类民间音乐。Jeroen de Kloet研究中国音乐社群,尤其是对“语言伪装”(linguistic camouflage)的研究,这个术语用来描述艺人不得不对争议歌词做伪装。


本文旨在确定负责音乐审查的官方机构,以及音乐界如何驾驭这些障碍、生产和传播音乐。哪些机构参与了这个过程?如何与当局斡旋?是否存在规避这些成文或不成文规则的空间?本文根据2011年以来在北京、武汉、深圳、长沙、天津等地对中国朋克摇滚乐坛进行的观察和采访,试图分析音乐审查制度如何执行和演变。这些观察有助于更好理解审查制度和自我审查制度在今天的中国是如何运作的,也将拓展过往对摇滚、90年代地下音乐及其他音乐流派的既有研究。


除了艺人为了发行唱片而不得不与官方机构打交道之外,他们在公开演出时还必须与一系列行为者打交道——警察、文化部门的公务员等等。首先,我将概述自1949年以来对音乐作品的审查是如何组织的,然后描述艺术家在发行唱片或组织音乐会时必须遵守的机制。然后我会说明一些近期案例如何揭示“自由裁量”的做法,并引起这种审查制度如何影响海外华语地区。


文化审查机构


高层很早就提出对文化形式的管控。毛泽东在1942年《在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话》中提出过,但这个主题早在1929年的古田会议上就讨论过了。文化政策促成中国大众文化元素和共产主义艺术宣传形式的结合和推广,比如秧歌,与每年农活周期相关联,伴以歌曲和各种乐器。这些艺术作品被用于宣传目的,并在“冷战”时期被其他华语左翼群体挪用。

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赵树理“泽州秧歌”《开渠》插图,1962年


1949年起,与电影、广播和电视有关的文化生产被国有化。“中国音乐家协会”成立于1949年7月,旨在宣传符合党的要求的音乐,并培养新一代的社会主义音乐家。此前的“左翼音乐组织”成立于1932年,1936年解散。1949年5月,“中国唱片集团有限公司”成立,开始垄断音乐发行。


中国的民歌——包含少数民族和港澳台地区的民歌由国务院收集和编纂。机构“由至少一万名官员组成,负责收集民族音乐,并在审查和自我审查后,按照社会主义价值观制定汇编”。20世纪30年代在上海制作的浪漫歌曲成为“黄色歌曲”而被禁止。


1976年毛泽东逝世后,邓小平推行经济改革,相对放松了大众文化审查。音乐领域出现发展高峰。尽管邓丽君的情歌还很“妖艳”,但盗版磁带让邓丽君在大陆非常受欢迎,以至于70年代有句俗话:“白天听老邓,晚上看小邓。”


独立艺术家开始组织起来,出现了新的风格,比如“囚歌”,然后是80年代的“摇滚”。80年代末之后,摇滚乐受到控制。崔健、何勇的作品被“扫黄打非”。


90年代中期,在官方音乐之外,出现了港台艺人的盗版磁带(如Beyond)和许多城市黑市上卖的打口碟。这些在西方音乐产业中“剩下”的产品被送到中国回收,但从1993年开始,它们在中国城市街头被非法低价售卖。


20世纪90年代中期,新的音乐流派出现在中国各大城市——另类摇滚、朋克、嘻哈到金属。通过这种方式,他们规避了官方的审查制度,也避开了无法满足他们的音乐产业:

印刷出版物的出版权和复制权被少数国营出版社独占,而这些出版社的生产能力(无论从种类还是质量来看)都与公民对文化产品的巨大需求极不相称。


20世纪90年代的开放和未经批准的新风格的流行并未真正改善音乐内容审查政策。各部门职能交织在一起。根据播放方式的不同,音乐本身受到不同机构的管理。


审查程序和宣传监督最初由“电影事业管理局”负责,直到 1986 年才被“广播电影电视部”取代,1998 年成为“国家广播电影电视总局”,由国务院直接领导。另一个机构“国家新闻出版署”成立于1954年,也由国务院领导,负责出版和版权,在1998年并入“国家广播电影电视总局”之前曾与之竞争。


2013年,“国家广播电影电视总局”成为“国家新闻出版广电总局”。2018年3月,该局被”国家广播电视总局“取代,新机构由“中宣部”直接领导。“中宣部”成立于1924年,主要负责新闻管制工作,这次主要目的是规范媒体,发放出版授权,监督文化作品的发行。另一方面,“文化和旅游部”和各地文化局负责监督音乐现场,因此艺人和经纪人需要和他们打交道。


与当局斡旋:发专辑,开演唱会


虽然各级行政部门都有负责管理文化领域的机构,但许多厂牌、媒体或文化内容的生产者并不是由国家直接控制的。


国有企业和事业单位通过国务院授予的官方出版授权出版包括报纸、图书、音像制品、电子出版物在内的“出版物”,并将适应市场的作品出版任务委托给特定的民营公司,这些作品也需要“促进社会主义精神文明建设”。


80年代至90年代,中国早期摇滚乐手崔健、何勇、窦唯以及唐朝等通过港台的“滚石唱片”、“魔岩唱片”发型作品。90年代末开始,首批独立厂牌为宣传新兴独立摇滚而成立。它们也需要与国有音乐机构斡旋以获得出版权。

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“魔岩三杰”张楚、何勇、窦唯


“清醒”乐队主唱沈黎晖是关键人物。他之前是“中国唱片”的平面设计师,后来决定自己制作摇滚专辑,1997年创立独立厂牌“摩登天空”,同年发行了乐队第一张专辑,销量达到15万份,而非法拷贝卖出了30万份。


“摩登天空”还成立了另一个厂牌“Badhead Records”,并由“北京新声”运动中的团体制作了大部分唱片。有人指责“摩登天空”的商业化,说把中国摇滚乐过度程式化了,但另一些人将这种现象归结为“典型的后现代中国悖论”,因为代表中国音乐产业的“摩登天空”必须审慎地去做专辑。


1999年,从朋克酒吧“嚎叫俱乐部”的余烬中诞生了“嚎叫唱片”,并制作了首都朋克、金属和嘻哈圈的第一张专辑。艺人吕波和摇滚乐手王迪与“京文唱片”合作,制作了首张专辑《无聊军队》。其他厂牌也在21世纪的第一个十年陆续成立,包括由美国人Michael Pettis创建的唱片“兵马司”,其在2005年左右出了很多独立乐队,这也要归功于北京D-22酒吧。




D-22于2012年关门,其继任者XP在邀请了被北京市政府列入黑名单的日本艺术家河端一(Makoto Kawabata)后也于2015年7月关门。“兵马司”在2018年被卖给大厂“太合音乐”,现在旗下的摇滚艺人参加电视选秀节目,将其商业化并要求乐队修改歌词。




虽然这些唱片公司不受国家直接控制,但它们仍然需要官方唱片公司的支持才能合法地发布音乐内容。一位“兵马司”的员工表示,一个常见的做法是购买国际标准音像制品编码(ISRC)号码:


我们不能自己发行专辑,而需要向官方厂牌购买ISRC号码。因为他们的数量太多,并且需要钱,所以他们可以把一部分卖给独立的唱片公司,这样就不会失去政府给予的ISRC号配额。在能够发行专辑之前,我们必须提交歌曲的歌词以便他们验证。所以有的时候,我们要自己修改歌词后再提交。如果我们发行的CD不符合政府的要求,政府就会和卖给我们ISRC号码的唱片公司交恶,他们收到的号码就会减少,就会停止卖给我们。



这和出书一样。正如Sebastian Veg指出,出书也要书号,一些官方出版社将书号卖给愿意承担出版后被禁风险的小型的、相对独立的出版社。换句话说,在音乐专辑和书籍的情况下,国家出版商将审查的风险外包给独立公司。


在这种情况下,审查制度在不同层面上发挥作用。如果一个乐队想正式发行一张专辑,也就是说想通过授权的商业渠道或在互联网上销售,那么必须将其歌曲提交给唱片公司的管理部门,在那里进行初选。乐队和唱片公司经常会修改歌曲的歌词,以适应官方的规定。正如Jeroen de Kloet所言,除了与当局建立和保持良好的关系外,一个好的出版商还知道在谈判规则时应该采什么样的正确策略。


因此,为了避免“宣扬色情”的指控,乐队和出版商都会更改一些不恰当的词语,甚至是英文词汇,比如《无聊军队》里“fuck”改成“funk”,《苍蝇》里“性”改成“心”。类似的自我审查做法也出现在其他语境,如民族题材。

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《无聊军队》


不仅是、歌词,声音也要符合国家机构的要求,但声音也可以用来掩盖有问题的文字。北京朋克乐队“地下婴儿”的《觉醒》MV中,“我要把我的热血和大便都通通抛在这旗帜上面”这句话对唱片公司来说是个大挑战,因此在制作短片时决定加入卡车的声音,以巧妙地掩盖掉这句话。


以官方的方式销售专辑意味着与当局的谈判,一些乐队根据其专辑的政治内容在官方和地下出版物之间游走。比如武汉朋克乐队“生命之饼”。2001年它们和“嚎叫唱片”合作出了第一张专辑,但2014年的《中国来信》就没有申请ISRC号。




现场演出需要文化部门审批,通过行政程序来实现。早在80年代,新兴的中国摇滚乐队就需要寻找特定演出场所。尽管他们开始在首都的几所大学里演出,但在不受当局控制的国际酒店和餐馆里北京的“摇滚圈”才真正蓬勃发展起来。




从上世纪80年代末开始,在“不倒翁乐队”李季的推动下,摇滚现场表演以“派队”形式出现,也就是在京城的酒吧里即兴表演而没有任何市政当局的授权。1992年,李季为这些演出开辟了一个叫“幸福俱乐部”的空间,但在政府压力下很快关闭了。


1995年,刘元开了家CD Café,接待京城摇滚和地下音乐圈的人,崔健也演过,尽管他在80年代末到2007年都被禁止在北京做官方演出。1990年崔健被允许组织一次短暂的巡演来宣传亚运会,但他也不得不面对一些省级部门干预,如1995年在太原的一次授权过的演出被突然取消,并且没有解释。这些也是90年代中期许多音乐团体常遇到的问题。

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刘元在CD Café 表演


由于这个许可证很难获得,许多演出都没有这个许可证。北京的一位演唱会组织者介绍了如何最好地避免干预:

你有官方、半官方和地下的方式来组织音乐会。官方的演唱会(……),有一些国有公司或者全国性的舞台,他们有牌照和授权,通过艺人的歌词来提交申请,这需要大量的时间和金钱。一般来说,我们主要选择第二种方式,我们通过一些半官方的方式把艺人介绍给文化局,通知警方艺人的到来,虽然不在官方网络上,但我们可以卖票。第三种选择是在被禁止的地方举行音乐会,比如聚会,或者在地下室里,但你可能会遇到大问题。


结语


中国的音乐审查机制远非单一,而是采取了不同的形式:制度性的、实践性的和随意性的。在实践中,无论是音乐专辑的发行、网络曲目的上传,还是演唱会的组织,都有不同的应对方式。朋克摇滚圈的例子揭示了某些团体如何通过修改某些歌词来应付审查制度。私人利益相关者出版专辑也是被允许的,公司必须想办法自筹资金,即使这意味着将专辑发行权卖给独立厂牌,同时检查这些专辑的意识形态内容。


演唱会的组织也属于灰色地带,涉及到与地方政府的谈判和好处。但这并不妨碍当局直接干预音乐会和音乐节,对其进行静音或药检。近年对文化音乐领域的管控更加严格。在体制方面,原来由国务院控制的机构已由宣传部门直接监管。从实际情况看,由于新的税收政策,举办音乐会的难度加大了。此外还有可能会忽视但更令人担忧的自由裁量决定,比如网络平台的审查和移除。

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