Saturday, June 24, 2023

What Is an Image 什么是图像

 What Is an Image

什么是图像


作者:WJT Mitchel

翻译:袁朝飞

原文载于 New Literary History, vol.15, no.3

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译者按

芝加哥大学教授W.J.T.米切尔是当前美国最重要的文化学者之一。1992年,他提出了“图像转向”这一概念,对文化人类学的研究产生了重要影响。今天的社会实际上是一个“图像”社会,我们被密密麻麻的图像所包围。从电影到电视剧,从图片到视频,从各种APP对我们生活的挤占到无处不在的广告界面,可以说,我们正处在图像洪流之中。然而,图像的种类五花八门,最直接的是各种可见的图片,然而诸如梦、诗中的画等等非可见的景象也能呈现视觉性效果。因此,“什么是图像?”仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。米切尔早期的这篇文章,以“picture”和“imagery”的冲突性关系为主线,从不同侧面论述了图像研究的基本问题,清晰地呈现了图像理论的核心讨论域。




曾经一些时候,“什么是图像(image)?”是一个非常要紧的问题。例如,在八九世纪的拜占庭,你的回答会立刻让人认为你是皇帝和宗主教斗争中的一员,是一个激进的圣像破坏者,试图净化偶像崇拜的教会,或是一个保守的圣像崇拜者,试图保存传统的礼拜仪式。关于圣像(icons)的性质和使用的冲突,表面上是关于宗教仪式和符号意义的争论,实际上,正如雅罗斯拉夫·帕利坎(Jaroslav Pelikan)指出的那样,是“一场伪装的社会运动”,“使用教义词汇来使本质上的政治冲突合理化”。相比之下,在17世纪中期的英国,社会运动、政治动因和描象(imagery)性质之间的联系是毫不掩饰的。可以稍微夸张地说,英国内战是围绕图像问题展开的,不仅仅是雕像和宗教仪式中的其他物质符号的问题,还有一些非物质的问题,比如君主的“偶像”(idol)。除此之外,还有宗教改革思想家试图在自己和他人身上清除的“心灵偶像”。

如果问今天的图像是什么,风险似乎降低了一点,那并不是因为它们对我们失去了影响力,当然也不是因为它们的本性现在已经被清楚地理解了。在现代文化批评中,图像具有古代偶像崇拜者所无法想象的力量,这是老生常谈。同样明显的是,在现代批评的发展过程中,描象的本质问题仅次于语言问题。如果说语言学有索绪尔(Sausure)和乔姆斯基(Chomsky),那么图像学就有帕诺夫斯基(Panofsky)和贡布里希(Gombrich)。但这些集大成者的出现,不应被视为语言或描象之谜最终将解开的标志。恰恰相反,语言和描象不再像启蒙运动的批评家和哲学家所承诺的那样——完美的、透明的媒介,通过它现实得以被理解。对于现代批评来说,语言和描象成了谜,成了有待解释的问题,成了禁锢理解与世界的牢笼。现代图像研究的惯例是,实际上它们必须被理解为一种语言。图像不再是世界的一扇透明的窗口,而是现在被视为一种符号,它呈现出一种自然和透明的欺骗性外表,隐藏着一种不透明、扭曲、任意的表征机制,一种意识形态的神秘化过程

下面这篇文章的目的既不是为了推进对图像的理论式理解,也不是为了在日益增多的反偶像论战中增加对现代偶像崇拜的另一种批评。我的目的是考查一些维特根斯坦所说的“语言游戏”,即我们与图像概念的游戏,并提出一些关于维持这些游戏的历史生命形式的问题。因此,我并不打算对图像的本质作出一个新的或更好的定义,甚至也不打算研究任何具体的图画或艺术作品。相反,我的工作将是考查我们在一些制度化的话语中使用描象这个词的一些方式——特别是文学批评、艺术史、神学和哲学——并批评这些学科中单个学科使用从邻近学科借来的描象概念的方式。我的目的是开启探究我们对图像的“理论式”理解是如何立足于社会和文化实践的以及我们理解的历史基础,不仅是关于图像是什么,还包括人性是什么或可能成为什么。图像不仅仅是一种特殊的符号,而是历史舞台上的演员,一种被赋予传奇地位的存在或角色,一段历史,它与我们告诉自己的故事相似,并参与其中,讲述我们自己从“按照造物主的图像制造”的生物到按照自己的图像创造自己和世界的生物的进化过程。

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1. 图像家族

任何试图对被称为描象的现象有一个总体看法的人,有两件事一定会立即引起注意。第一个简单来说就是这个名字所包含的各种各样的东西。我们把图画、雕像、错觉、地图、图解、梦、幻觉、眼镜、投影、诗歌、图案、记忆甚至想法,都称为图像,而这张列表的绝对多样性似乎使任何系统的、统一的理解都不可能。第二件让我们震惊的事情是,所有这些事物都被称为“图像”,并不一定意味着它们都有共同之处。也许更好的做法是,把把图像看作成一个悠久的家族,它在时间和空间上变迁,在这个过程中经历了深刻的突变。然而,如果图像是一个家族,那么就有可能构建一些它们的谱系。如果我们开始寻找,不是寻找这个术语的普遍定义,而是在那些图像在不同制度话语之间的界限的基础上彼此区分开来的地方,我们会得到一个谱系树,正如下图所示:
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这个谱系树的每一个分支都指定了一种类型的描象,它是某些知识学科话语的中心:心理描象属于心理学和认识论;光学影像属于物理学;图形,雕塑和建筑描象属于艺术史;语言描象属于文学批评;知觉图像则属于一种生理学家、神经学家、心理学家、艺术史学家和光学学生与哲学家、文学评论家合作的领域。这是一些奇怪的生物所占据的区域,它们出没在物理和心理描象的边界上:“物种”或“感觉形式”(根据亚里士多德的说法),它们从物体中产生,并像图章戒指一样印在我们感官的蜡状容器上。幻想是在最初刺激它们的物体缺失的情况下,由想象力唤起的那些印象的复活版本。“感觉数据”或“感知”,它们在现代心理学中扮演着大致类似的角色;最后,那些(用通俗的说法)闯入我们和现实之间的“表象”(appearances),我们经常称之为“图像”,从熟练的演员所投射的图像到广告和宣传的专业人士为产品和人物所创造的图像。在所有这些关于描象的特殊案例之前,我找到了一个母体概念,即“像……”的描象概念,与这种现象相对应的制度话语是哲学和神学。

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现在,这些每一个学科中都在自己的领域中产生了大量关于图像功能的文献,这种情况往往会吓到任何试图对这个问题进行概述的人。在将与描象有关的不同学科结合在一起的工作中,有一些令人鼓舞的先例,比如贡布里希在感知和光学方面对图画描象的研究,或者让·哈格斯·楚姆(Jean Hagstrum)对诗歌和绘画姐妹艺术的研究。然而,一般来说,对任何一种图像的描述都倾向于将其他图像降级为未经审查的“背景”,而不是主体。如果有一种统一的描象研究,一种连贯的图像学,它的行为就像帕诺夫斯基警告的那样,“不像民族学与民族志的对立,而是像占星术与天体摄影术的对立。”关于诗歌描象的讨论通常依赖于一种心理描象理论,这种理论是根据17世纪的思想观念的碎片临时拼凑而成的;关于心理描象的讨论反过来又依赖于对图形描象的相当有限的了解,通常是基于一种可疑的假设,即某些类型的描象(照片、镜像)提供了一种直接的、没有中介的拷贝。对镜像的光学剖析果断地忽略了什么样的生物能够使用镜子这个问题;而对图形图像的讨论往往被艺术史的狭隘性所隔绝,与更广泛的理论或思想史问题没有过多的关联。因此,尝试对图像进行概述,仔细检查我们在不同类型的图像之间绘制的边界线,并批评这些学科中每个学科对相邻图像的性质所做的假设,似乎是有用的。

我们显然不能一次讨论所有这些话题,所以下一个问题是从哪里开始。一般的规则是从基本的、显著的事实开始,然后从那里开始研究存疑的或成问题的事实。然后,我们可能会开始问,在严格的、适当的或字面意义上,图像家族的那些成员何以称其名,哪些类型涉及一些扩展的、比喻的或不恰当的术语使用。我们很难抗拒这样的结论:“恰当”图像(the image "proper")是我们在树形图的左侧找到的那种东西,我们在一个客观的、公开共享的空间中看到的图形或光学显示。我们可能想要争论某些特殊情况的地位,并质疑抽象的、不具有代表性的绘画,装饰的或建筑的设计,图表和图形能否被理解为图像。但是,无论我们希望考虑何种特殊情形,公正地说,我们对图像的字面意义有一个大致的想法。并且因为有了这个大致的想法,这个词的其他用法就有了比喻性的和不恰当的感觉。

例如,我们图表右侧的心理和语言图像似乎只是某种可疑的、元记忆意义上的图像。人们可能会讲述在阅读或做梦时在他们的脑海中体验到图像,但我们只有他们的说法,没有办法(因此产生争论)客观地验证这一点。即使我们相信心理描象的报告,但很明显,它们肯定不同于真实的物质图像。心理图像似乎不像真实图像那样稳定和永久,并且因人而异:例如,如果我说“绿色”,你们中的一些人可能会在脑海中看到绿色,但有些人会想到一个词,或者根本也没有想到。同时,心理图像似乎不像真实图像那样完全是视觉的,它涉及到所有的感官。此外,语言描象不仅涉及所有感官,也可能根本没有任何感官成分,有时只是暗示一个反复出现的抽象概念,如正义、优雅或邪恶。难怪当人们开始把语言描象的概念过度字面化时,文学家们会感到非常交流。也难怪如此,现代心理学和哲学的主要目标之一就是质疑精神描象和语言描象的概念合理性。

最后,我想说的是,所有这三种常见的“恰当”图像和它们的非法后代之间的对比都是可疑的。也就是说,我希望表明,与普遍的看法相反,“恰当”图像在任何元物理意义上都不是稳定的、静态的或永久的。观看者对它们的感知方式与梦中的图像不同。它们在任何重要方面都不完全是视觉的,而是涉及多感官的理解和解释。真实的、正恰当的图像与它们的不愿意承认的私生子们有更多的共同点。然而,现在让我们从表面上看这些规则,并考查这些非法概念的谱系,思想中的图像和语言中的图像。

  • 二、心理图像:一个维特根斯坦式的批判


“对于思维的灵魂来说,图像代替了直接的知觉;当它断言或否认它们是好是坏时,它会避免或追求它们。因此,灵魂的思考离不开精神图像。”
——亚里士多德《论灵魂》

一个拥有三百年制度化研究和推断的具有根深蒂固权威的概念是不会轻易放弃的。至少从亚里士多德的《论灵魂》(De Anima)开始,心理描象就一直是心理理论的一个核心特征,它仍然是精神分析、认知实验研究和民间关于心理的一般信念的基石。公正地说,一般而言,心理表征的地位,特别是心理描象的地位,一直是现代心理理论的主要战场之一。这个问题的两股力量之间斗争的一个标识是,我们这个时代最著名的心理描象批评家发展了一种关于意义的“图画理论”,作为他早期工作的基石,然后用他的余生与该理论的影响作斗争,试图驱逐心理描象的概念及其形而上学包袱。

然而,维特根斯坦攻击心理描象的方式并不是直接否认其存在的策略。他坦率地承认,我们可能有与思想或语言相关的心理图像,只是坚持认为这些图像不应该被认为是私人的、形而上学的、非物质的实体,就像真实的图像一样。维特根斯坦的策略是通过将心理描象直接呈现在我们可以看到的地方来揭开它的神秘面纱:“颜色、形状、声音等等的心理描象,在通过语言进行交流中发挥着作用,我们把它们与实际看到的颜色、听到的声音归为一类。”然而,很难看出我们如何能把精神图像和物质图像“放在同一范畴中”。我们当然不能把别人的头切开来和墙上的照片进行比较。一个更好的策略,更符合维特根斯坦的精神,是首先通过尝试描绘出这种行为创造的意义世界,来检验我们把这些图像“置于头脑”的方式。我将利用下面的图表作为这样一个图画:

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这张图应该被解读为一个重写本,它显示了三个重叠的关系:(1)一个真实的物体(左边的蜡烛)和该物体的反射、投影或绘图之间的关系;(2)一个真实的物体和一个被设想为镜子、暗箱或用于绘画或印刷的表面的精神图像(如亚里士多德、霍布斯、洛克或休谟)之间;(3)介于物质描象和精神描象之间。这个图表作为一个整体显示的是类比矩阵(尤其是视觉隐喻),它支配着思维的表征理论。特别是,它展示了西方形而上学的经典划分(心灵-物质,主体-客体)如何转化为表征模型,即视觉图像与它们所代表的对象之间的关系。意识本身被理解为一种图像生产、复制和再现的活动,由透镜、接收表面和用于印刷、留下印象或在这些表面上留下痕迹的中介等机制控制。

现在这个模型显然受到了各种各样的反对:它把所有的感知和意识都吸收到视觉和图像范式中;它假定心灵和世界之间有绝对的对称;它肯定了物体和图像,世俗现象和心灵或图形符号中的表征之间一对一的同一的可能性。我将这个模型以图形的形式呈现出来,不是为了论证它的正确性,而是为了让人们看到我们用通常的说法来划分宇宙的方式,尤其是用那种把感官经验作为所有知识的基础的说法。这张图还为我们提供了一种理解维特根斯坦将精神图像和物质图像“放在同一范畴”的建议的方法,并帮助我们看到这两个概念之间的互惠和相互依赖。

我换个稍微不同的说法。如果这张图的一半被表示为“意识”——也就是说,我的意识,你的意识,所有的人类意识——都被消灭了,我们倾向于认为,没有我们,物质世界将会继续很好地存在。但反过来就不是这样了:如果世界被毁灭了,意识就不会继续存在(顺便说一下,这就是对图表对称性的误导)。然而,当我们用图表来解释我们谈论描象的方式时,这种对称就不那么容易让人误解了。如果没有更多的思想,就不会有更多的图像,无论是精神的还是物质的。世界可能不依赖于意识,但世界的图像显然依赖于意识。这不仅仅是因为需要人手来制作一幅画、一面镜子或任何其他类型的拟像(动物在某种意义上能够在伪装自己或相互模仿时呈现图像)。这是因为图像不能被看作是没有意识的矛盾把戏,一种同时看到“在”和“不在”的能力。当一只鸭子对诱饵做出反应,或者当鸟儿啄食传说中的雪西斯画中的葡萄时,他们看到的不是图像:他们看到的是其他鸭子,或者真正的葡萄——事物本身,而不是事物的图像。

但是,如果识别世界上真实的物质图像的关键是我们同时说“在”和“不在”的奇特能力,那么我们必须问,为什么心理图像应该被视为比“真实”图像或多或少神秘。哲学家和普通人对于心理描象的概念一直存在的问题是,它们似乎在真实的、共同的经验中有一个普遍的基础(我们都在做梦、想象,并且在不同程度上有能力向我们自己表达具体的感觉),但我们不能指着它们说:“那里——那是一个心理描象。”然而,如果我试图指向一个“真实”的图像,并向一个不知道图像是什么的人解释它是什么,就会出现完全相同的问题。我指着薛西斯(Xeuxis)的画说“看,这是一幅画”。回答是:“你是说那张彩色的表面吗?”或者“你是指那些葡萄嘛吗?”

因此,当我们说心灵就像一面镜子或在画面时,我们不可避免地假定另一个心灵在描画或破译其中的图画。但我们必须明白,这个比喻同时也从另一个角度切入:教室墙上的“白板”、前厅的镜子、我面前的书页,之所以是它们,是因为大脑用它们来代表世界,以及它自己。如果我们开始把思想当作一张白板或一个暗箱来谈论,不久之后,空页和相机就会开始有它自身的想法,并成为它们自己的意识场所。

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这并不是说心灵真的是一张白纸或一面镜子——只是说这些是心灵能够描绘自身的方式。它可能以其他方式描绘自己:作为一栋建筑,一座雕像,作为一种看不见的气体或流体,作为一段文字,一段叙事,一节旋律,或者什么都没有。它可能会拒绝拥有自己的图像,拒绝所有的自我表征,就像我们可以看着一幅画,一座雕像,或一面镜子,而不把它看作一个表征的对象。我们可能会把镜子看作是闪亮的垂直物体,把绘画看作是平面上的大量色彩。没有规则要求心灵必须描绘自己,或者在自己身上看到画面,就像没有规则要求我们必须进入画廊,或者一旦进入画廊就看到这些图画。如果我们摒弃了心理描象和物质描象的形成并非必然的、自然的或自动的这一观念,那么我们就可以像维特根斯坦建议的那样,把它们和功能符号“放在同一范畴中”,或者像我们的图表那样,放在同一个逻辑空间里。这并不能消除心理和物理图像之间的所有差异,但它可能有助于消除这种差异的形而上学的或神秘的性质,并减少我们对心理图像在某种程度上不恰当或非法地模仿“真实事物”的怀疑。从原始模型到非法类比的推导路径也可以很容易地沿着相反的方向追溯。维特根斯坦可能会说“我们完全可以……用观看一个物体或任何绘画、素描或建模的过程来代替每一个想象的过程;每一个对自己说话的过程都是通过大声说话或写出来的,但这种“替代”也可以向另一个方向发展。我们也可以很容易地用诸如“在纸上、大声地、图像地思考”之类的语言来取代我们所谓的“对符号的物理操作”(绘画、写作、说话)。

澄清心理描象和物理描象的关系的一个好方法是反思我们刚才用图表来说明类比矩阵的方式,类比矩阵将表征理论与心理理论联系起来。我们可能会说,在我们把这张图画在纸上之前,我们的脑海中就一直存在着这张图的心理版本,它支配着我们讨论精神图像和物质图像之间界限的方式。好吧,也许是这样;也可能是在讨论的某个时刻,当我们开始使用“界线”和“领域”这样的词时,我们才想到这一点。或者,也许我们在思考这些事情或把它们写下来的时候,根本就没有想到它,只是后来,经过多次修改,才想到它。这是否意味着心理图作为一种无意识的深层结构一直存在,决定了我们对“图像”这个词的使用?或者它是一种后验结构,是我们关于描象的命题中隐含的逻辑空间的图形投影?在这两种情况下,我们当然不能把图表看作是“私人的”或“主观的”意义上的精神的东西;它更像是语言中展现的东西,不仅仅是我的语言,而是我们从谈论心灵和图像的悠久传统中继承下来的一种说话方式。我们的图表可以被称为“语言图像”,也可以称为心理图像,这将我们带到了图像谱系树中另一个臭名昭著的非法分支,即语言中的图像概念

  • 三、语言图像简史

  • “思想是事物的图像,正如语言是思想的图像一样;我们都知道,图像和图画只有在它们是人和事物的真实表现时才是真实的....因为诗人和画家都认为从事物的表象中取其相似之处是他们的职责。”

  • ——约瑟夫·特拉普,《诗歌讲座》(1711)

  • “要理解一个命题,设想与之相关的事物并不比据此画出草图更为重要。”

  • ——维特根斯坦《哲学研究》


  • 与心理描象相比,语言描象似乎不受不可知的形而上学实体的指控,这些实体被锁在一个私人的、主观的空间里。毕竟,文本和语言行为不仅仅是“意识”的事情,而是与我们创造的所有其他类型的物质表征(图画、雕像、图表、地图等等)一样,是长期存在的公共表达。虽然不能说一个描述性的段落完全像一幅画,但它们确实有类似的功能,作为公共符号,反映出事件的状态。对此,我们可以达成粗略的、临时的协议。


  • 具有讽刺意味的是,早期维特根斯坦声称“命题是现实的一幅图画……这并不是隐喻,而是一种“常识性”的问题:“乍一看,一个命题——比如印在纸上的命题——似乎并不是它所涉及的现实的图景。但是,乍一看,书面音符似乎也不是一首乐曲的写照,我们的音标(字母表)也不是我们说话的写照。然而,即便是在常识意义上,这些手语所代表的东西也被证明是图画。”这种“常识”原来就是这样:维特根斯坦继续声称命题是“与所指之物的相似”,并建议“为了理解命题的本质,我们应该考虑象形文字,它描绘了它所描述的事实”。重要的是要意识到存在于语言中的“图画”,这些图画用它们的虚假模型来威逼利诱(用维特根斯坦的话)我们,它们与肖像以及象形文字并不完全是一回事。《逻辑哲学论》中的图画不是某种心理过程的神秘力量或机制。它们是转译、同构、结构同源,遵从转译规则的符号结构。维特根斯坦有时称它们为“逻辑空间”,他认为它们适用于乐谱、音标,甚至留声机唱片上的凹槽,这表明它们不应与狭义上的图形图像相混淆。正如我们所看到的,维特根斯坦的语言描象概念可以通过我们构建的图表来说明,该图显示了知觉的经验模型中精神描象和物质描象之间的关系。当我们思考这个话题时,这张图并不一定对应于我们脑海中的某些图像。图解只是在图形空间中表现了由一组典型的经验主义命题所决定的逻辑空间。


  • 然而,整个问题抛给了我们,即语言图像被称为图像是否合适,用维特根斯坦的话说就是“精神痉挛”,因为它所假定的字面表达和比喻表达之间的区别,在文学话语中是与我们想要解释的概念——语言图像——纠缠在一起的。字面语言通常被(文学评论家们)理解为直接的、不加修饰的、不生动的表达,没有语言图像和修辞。另一方面,比喻语言就是我们通常所说的语言描象。换句话说,短语“verbal imager”似乎是隐喻本身的隐喻。难怪许多文学评论家建议将这个词从文学批评中剔除。


  • 然而,在我们抛弃这个术语之前,我们应该对它进行批判性和历史性的反思。首先,我们应该注意到,我们一直在将语言描象的概念应用于两种截然不同的,也许是对立的语言实践。我们所说的语言描象,一方面是隐喻的、比喻的或修饰的语言,是一种将注意力从话语的字面主体转移到其他事物上的技巧。但我们也以维特根斯坦的方式来谈论它,就像一个命题“像活生生的画面——呈现事物的状态”。语言描象的概念只能被看作只具有命题的字面意义,如果将其看作具有现实意义的话,它将使命题成真。在现代诗歌理论中,休·肯纳(Hugh Kenner)对这种语言描象作了最清晰的阐述。他说语言描象就是“文字实际描述的东西”,这一定义将诗歌语言视为字面的、非隐喻的表达。


  • 肯纳的现代主义理念,即语言图像是简单、具体的名词,它至少可以追溯到17世纪,在语言的共同假设中有充足的先例。这是一种假设,即语言所代表的不是别人,正是我们的老朋友,即经验给我们留下的“心理图像”。因此,我们要把一个词(比如人)看作是一个从它所代表的原物中远离两次而形成的“语言图像”。一个词是一个观念的图像,一个观念是一个事物的图像。这是一条表征链。我们只要在经验模型下的认知图上再加一个环节,就可以将其描绘出来:


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  • 我在这里描绘的“真实的人”(或他的“最初印象”)比简笔画更有画面感,因为简笔画代表的是心理图像或“理念”。这种对比可以用来说明休谟在“力量和活力”方面对印象和想法的区分,这些术语在绘画表现的词汇中被用来区分现实主义或栩栩如生的绘画与做作的、抽象的或示意图式的绘画。休谟沿袭了霍布斯和洛克的手法,用图画隐喻来描述认知和意义的链条:观念是“模糊的图像”或“腐烂的感觉”,它通过惯例与词语联系在一起。休谟认为,澄清词语,尤其是抽象术语的含义的正确方法,是追溯思想链的起源:“当我们有兴致时……如果怀疑一个哲学术语的使用没有任何意义或理念(这种情况太常见了),我们只需问一问,这个所谓的理念是从什么印象中得来的?”当然,这种语言理论的诗意结果是一种彻底的绘画主义,一种对语言艺术作为恢复原始感觉印象的艺术的理解。艾迪生可能最雄辩地表达了对这门艺术的信心:


  • 如果用词得当,它们具有巨大的力量,以至于描述往往比看到事物本身更能给我们生动的印象。读者通过文字的帮助,而不是对文字所描述的场景进行实际的考察,会发现在他的想象中,一个场景被描绘得色彩更浓,更贴近生活。在这种情况下,诗人似乎战胜了自然;的确,诗人在自然之上制造景观,但他赋予了景观更有力的触感,提升了它的美感,使整幅作品充满活力,以至于从物体本身流出的图像与来自表达的图像相比显得虚弱而微小


  • 对于艾迪生和其他18世纪的评论家来说,语言图像既不是隐喻的概念,也不是(字面上)标明隐喻、形象或日常语言的其他“修饰”的术语。语言图像(通常被称为“描述”)是所有语言的基石。准确、精确的描述产生的“来自语言表达”的形象比“来自物体的形象”本身更生动。亚里斯多德假设的“物种”从物体流向我们的感官,在爱迪生的写作和阅读理论中,这些“物种”形成了单词本身的属性。


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在17世纪和18世纪的文学理论中,这种把诗歌和语言看作是一种图像生产和复制的过程的观点伴随着修辞手法和比喻的声望下降。“图像”的概念取代了“图形”的概念,“图形”开始被认为是过时的“修饰”语言的特征。语言描象的文学风格是“朴素”和“清晰”的,这种风格直接触及物体,比物体直接表现自己更生动地表现它们(正如艾迪生所说)。这与修辞的“欺骗性修饰”形成对比,修辞现在被视为符号之间关系的问题。当修辞手法被提及时,它们要么被视为前理性、前科学时代的人为过度行为而被驳斥,要么被重新定义,以适应语言图像的霸权。隐喻被重新定义为“简短的描述”。“典故和明喻是从相反的角度来描述……夸张往往不过是一种超出概率范围的描述。”即使是抽象的东西也被看作是形象化的、可视的物体,投射在人格化的语言描象中。

在浪漫主义和现代诗学中,语言描象仍然控制着对文学语言的理解,对字面和比喻表达的混淆应用继续鼓励诸如描述、具体名词、比喻、“感觉”术语,甚至是反复出现的语义、句法或是在“描象”标题下的音位母词。然而,为了完成所有这些工作,描象的概念必须被升华和神秘化。浪漫主义作家一般会将心理的、语言的,甚至是图画的描象融入神秘的“想象”过程。它通常被定义为与“简单”的心理回忆画面、简单的外部场景的描绘,以及(在绘画中)简单的外部可见物的描绘,以此和精神的、感觉的或“诗”中的场景形成鲜明对比。

图片


换句话说,在“想象”的庇护下,描象的概念被分成了两部分,并在图像或图形图像之间做出了区分,这是一种较低的形式——外部的、机械的、死的,以及通常与经验主义的感知模型相关联的——和“更高”的图像,这是内部的,有机的,有生命的。描象和图画的词汇仍然主导着语言艺术的讨论,但在浪漫主义诗学中,它被诸如康德的图式、柯勒律治(Coleridge)的符号和“纯粹形式”或先验结构的非表征形象等概念提炼和抽象。这种升华的、抽象的形象取代并包含了经验主义的概念,即语言图像作为物质的清晰表征。就像那个图片预先包含了修辞的形象一样。

当整首诗或整篇文章都被视为一个图像或“语言符号”时,这种图像的逐步升华达到了逻辑上的高潮,而这个图像被定义为,不是图像上的相似或印象,而是在某些隐喻空间中的共时结构——“那个”(用庞德的话来说)。“在一瞬间表现出一种智力和情感上的复杂。”意象派在诗歌中强调具体的、特殊的描述,这本身就是我们在艾迪生的作品中看到的18世纪观念的残余,即诗歌力求在生动和直接性上超越“从物体本身产生的图像”(威廉姆斯的“没有思想,只有事物”似乎是这种观念的另一个版本)。但现代主义的独特之处在于,它强调图像是一种水晶结构,一种由诗歌所体现的智力和情感能量的动态模式。形式主义批评既是一种诗学,也是一种对这种语言描象的解释学,它向我们展示了诗歌是如何将它们的能量包含在结构张力的矩阵中,并展示了这些矩阵与诗歌的命题内容的一致性。

现代主义图像作为纯粹的形式或结构,我们回到语言图像之旅的起点,回到维特根斯坦的主张,真正重要的语言图像是由命题投射在“逻辑空间”中的“画面”。然而,逻辑实证主义者却把这幅图景误认为是一种不经中介的现实之窗,是17世纪梦想的实现,即一种完全透明的语言,可以让人们直接接触物体和思想。维特根斯坦在其职业生涯的大部分时间里都在试图纠正这种误读,他坚持认为语言中的图画不是任何现实的未经中介的拷贝。那些似乎存在于我们语言中的图画,无论它们是投射在心灵的眼中还是纸上,都是人为的、传统的符号,就像与它们相关联的命题一样。这些图像的地位就像几何图对代数方程的地位一样。这就是为什么维特根斯坦建议我们通过用它的物质等效物取代它来消除心理描象概念的神秘性(“用观看一个物体的过程或通过绘画、素描或建模来取代每一个想象过程”)。这就是为什么对维特根斯坦来说,“思维”不是一个私人的、神秘的过程,而是“与符号打交道的活动”,无论是语言的还是图像的。

我们可以通过展示一种新的方式来解读我们在经验认识论中关于文字、思想和图像之间联系的图表,来说明维特根斯坦对心理和语言图像的批判力量:



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现在试着阅读这幅画面,不是把它看作是从世界到思想再到语言的运动,而是把它看作是从一种符号到另一种符号的运动,看作是书写系统发展的图解历史。现在的进展是从图画到相对简略的“象形文字”再到语音符号的表达,这个序列可以通过插入一个新的中间符号来充实,象形文字或“表意文字”(回想一下维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》中的观点,命题就像“描绘现实本来样貌”的“象形文字”):

图片

象形文字所显示的是用一种修辞手法取代了原来的图像,从技术上来说,是一种提喻或转喻。如果我们把圆圈和箭头解读为身体和阳具的图像,那么这个符号是提喻的,意味着部分代表整体;如果我们把它理解为盾牌和长矛,那么它就是转喻,用相关的物体代替了事物本身。当然,这种替代也可以通过语言-视觉双关语进行。这样,所描绘的事物的名称与另一个具有相似发音的事物联系在一起,就像下面类似的图:



图片
这些插图应该暗示了语言描象的另一种“字面”意义——显然,最字面的意义在于,它记录了书面语言,将语音翻译成可见的代码。就文字而言,它与材料、图形和图画联系在一起,这些材料、图形和图画以各种各样的方式被删节或浓缩,形成字母文字。但书写和绘画的符号从一开始就与修辞,说话的方式密不可分。西北印第安人的象形文字中的鹰的图案可能是战士的标志、部落的象征、勇气的象征,或者——仅仅是一只鹰的图案。这幅画的意义不是通过简单而直接地参照它所描绘的对象来表达的。它可以描绘一个想法,一个人,一个“声音图像”(在谜语的情况下),或一个东西。要知道如何理解它,我们必须知道它是如何说话的、它应该说什么以及它的立场。“会说话的画面”的概念,一方面经常被用来描述某些诗意的存在或生动的事物,另一方面又被用来描述绘声绘色的才华,这不仅仅是艺术中某些特殊效果的图像,而且是写作和语言的共同起源。

如果图画文字或象形文字的形象要求观众知道该说什么,它也有一种方式来塑造可以说的东西。让我们进一步思考模棱两可的标志/签名/表意文字的岩石雕刻鹰。如果这个战士是一只鹰,或者“像”一只鹰,或者(更有可能的是)如果“鹰自己”参加了战争,并回来讲述它,我们就可以想象这幅图的延伸。鹰无疑会从远处看到他的敌人,毫无预兆地扑向他们。“鹰”的“语言图像”是一种语言、描绘和文字的综合体,他不仅描述了他所做的事情,还预测和塑造了他能做和将要做的事情。这是他的“特质”,是一种语言和图像兼具的特征,既是对他行为的叙述,也是对他本身的总结。

象形文字的图像有一段历史,与语言和精神描象的故事平行。精致的修辞和寓言被17世纪的批评家视为“迷信”或哥特式的过度行为而抛弃,经常被比作象形文字。沙夫茨伯里(Shaftesbury)称它们为“虚假的模仿”,“神奇的、神秘的、僧侣式的和哥特式的象征”,并将它们与真实的、清晰的“镜像写作”进行了对比,后者会让人们注意到作者的主题,而不是他机智的技巧。但是,有一种方法可以将象形文字保留到现代的启蒙时代,那就是将它们与魔法和神秘的联系分离开来,并将它们视为一种新的科学语言的模型,这种语言将保证完美的交流和对客观现实的清晰接触。维柯(Vico)和莱布尼茨(Leibniz)发明了一种新的基于数学的象形文字系统,这与对一种通用的、科学的语言的期望联系在一起。与此同时,图画图像在经验主义认识论和基于镜子模型的文学理论中被心理化并被赋予了介于词与物之间的特殊中介作用。埃及的象形文字本身也受到了一种修正主义的、反封闭的解释(最著名的是18世纪的沃伯顿(Warburton)主教),他认为古代的符号是透明的、普遍可读的、被时间的流逝所掩盖的符号。

作为象形文字的语言图像在浪漫主义诗学中恢复了它的崇高和神秘,正如我们所料,它在现代主义中也发挥了核心作用。维特根斯坦使用象形文字作为语言图像理论的模型,埃兹拉·庞德(Ezra Pound)迷恋于将中国的题图诗作为诗歌图像的典范,这可以被视为标志着这一角色的分界线。最近,我们看到象形文字的图像在雅克·德里达(Jacques Derrida)的后现代批评中重新出现,他提出了“语法学”的概念,这是一种“写作的科学”,它把口语从语言和交流研究中的主导地位上移开,代之以“文字”或“语法”的一般概念、图形标记、痕迹、字符或其他符号,这些符号使“语言……一种以写作的一般可能性为基础的可能性”。德里达以文本的形式恢复了古代世界的图像(在文艺复兴时期的诗学中,这个图像使自然本身成为一种象形文字体系),但又有了新的转折。既然这个文本的作者已经不在我们身边,或者已经失去了他的权威,那么这个符号就没有了基础,也没有办法阻止无尽的意义链。

这种认识可以引导我们感知到“不确定性”,一种令人作呕的能指空虚,在这种空虚中,对自由游戏和任意意志的虚无主义放弃似乎是唯一合适的策略。或者它会导致一种感觉,即我们的符号,也是我们的世界,是人类活动和理解的产物。尽管我们的知识和表征的模式可能是“武断的”和“传统的”,但它们是生活形式的组成部分,是我们必须在其中做出认识论的、伦理的和政治的选择的实践和惯例。德里达对“什么是图像?”这个问题的回答无疑是:“只不过是另一种书写,一种图形符号,它把自己伪装成它所代表的东西的直接抄本,或者是事物的样子,或者是它们的本质。”这种对图像的怀疑似乎只适用于一个人从窗口看到的景色,更不用说日常生活和各种表现媒介中出现的场景,似乎需要持续的解释警惕。一切事物——自然、政治、性、其他人——现在都以一种图像出现在我们面前,预先刻上一种似是而非的东西,只不过是笼罩在疑云下的亚里士多德式的“物种”。现在我们面临的问题似乎不仅仅是“什么是图像?”,而且是,我们如何将图像和产生图像的想象力转化为值得信任和尊重的力量?


图片

回答这个问题的一种方法是将想象力和心理表征的整个概念视为笛卡尔式的谬误。心理和语言描象的概念,以及所有用于书写、印刷及绘画的镜子和界面的舞台机器——所有这一切(正如理查德·罗蒂(Richard Porty)所主张的)都应该被抛弃,因为这是一种过时的范式机器,是过去三百年来以“认识论”的名义主导西方思想的哲学与心理学的混淆。这是行为主义的主要观点之一,在某种程度上,我同意它,因为它反对知识是印在头脑中的现实的拷贝或图像的观念。很明显,知识最好被理解为社会实践、争议和协议的问题,而不是某种特定模式的自然或无中介表征的属性。然而,当现代“物质”图像研究的主要目标是剥夺这些特权时,现代对精神图像作为“特权表征”概念的攻击就显得有些不合时宜了。当我们不再有图像理论的时候,很难揭穿语言的图像理论。

那么,解决我们的困难的办法,似乎就不是抛弃心理或语言的表征理论了。这将是徒劳的,因为打破传统的尝试,清除世界上的图像一直是徒劳的。然而,我们可能要做的是追溯图像作为透明图像或“特权表征”的概念接管我们的思想和语言概念的步骤。如果我们能理解图像是如何拥有它们现在之于我们的力量,我们可能会重新拥有产生它们的想象力。


四、作为相像的图像:上帝肖像

到目前为止,我们一直在假设“图像”这个词的字面意义是一种图形的、图画的表现,是一种具体的、物质的对象,而诸如心理的、语言的或感知的图像等概念是这种字面意义的不恰当衍生,是“图像”在图像没有实际业务的地方的图像延伸。现在是时候承认整个故事可以用另一种方式来讲述了,从传统的角度来看,图像这个词的字面意义是一个坚决的非图像,甚至是反图像的概念。当然,这是一种传统,始于“按照上帝的图像和样式”创造人类。我们现在翻译为图像的词语(希伯来语是tselem,希腊语是eikona,拉丁语是imaginem)是正确的理解,正如解说员孜孜不倦地告诉我们的那样,不是作为任何物质的图像,而是作为抽象的、一般的、精神的“相像”。在“图像”(希伯来语demuth,希腊语homoioosin,拉丁语similudinm)后面经常添加的短语“and likeness”不应被理解为添加新的信息,而应被理解为防止可能的混淆:“图像”不应被理解为“图画”,而应被理解为“相像”,一种精神上的相似。

一个痴迷于对雕刻图像和偶像崇拜的禁忌的宗教传统,想要强调图像概念的精神的、非物质的意义,这应该不足为奇。像迈蒙尼德(Maimonides)这样的塔木德学者的评论帮助我们看到了理解这种精神意义的确切术语:“图像一词适用于自然形式,我的意思是指一个概念,通过这个概念,一个事物被构成为一个实体,并成为它是什么。它是事物的真正实在性,就事物是那特殊的存在而言。”必须强调的是,对于迈蒙尼德来说,图像(tselem)是一件事物的本质现实,只有通过一种腐败,它才与像偶像这样的有形事物联系在一起:“偶像被称为图像的原因在于,人们认为在他们身上寻求的东西存在于他们身上,而不是在他们的形状或配置中。”真实的、字面上的图像是心理或精神上的图像。不恰当的、衍生的、具象的图像是我们的感官感知到的物质形状,尤其是眼睛感知的。

无论如何,这是一种激进的观点,即图像是一种相像,而不是一幅画。在实际用法中,甚至迈蒙尼德也承认描象是一个“模棱两可”或“词义模糊”的术语,它可能涉及到“特定形式”(即事物的身份或“种类”)或“人工形式”(其有形形状)。但他很清楚这两种意思的区别,也很确定哪一种是原始的、真实的,哪一种是由于不恰当的应用而派生出来的。他倾向于赋予抽象的、理想的图像以特权,我认为,这是犹太人和基督徒对这个问题思考的缩影。我们很难理解一个词最初的“精神”意义和后来派生出来的“物质”应用,这主要是因为我们对词的历史的理解一直围绕着我之前描述的经验认识论:我们倾向于认为一个词最具体、最物质的应用是它最初的、最原始的意义,因为我们有一个通过图像从事物中派生出来的词的模型。这个模型不比我们对“image”这个词本身的理解更强大。

但是,这种不与任何物质图像相混淆的“精神”图像究竟是什么?我们首先应该注意到,它似乎包含了对差异的假设。说一棵树或一种树的一个成员与另一棵树相似,并不是说它们是相同的,而是说它们在某些方面相似,而在其他方面不同。然而,通常我们不会说每一种相像都是一种图像。一棵树和另一棵树很像,但我们不会说一棵树是另一棵树的图像。只有当我们试图构建一种理论来解释我们如何感知树与树之间的相似性时,图像这个词才会与这种相似性相关。这种解释通常会求助于一些中间的或先验的对象——一种观念、形式或心理图像——它们提供了一种机制来解释我们的范畴是如何产生的。因此,“物种起源”不仅仅是生物进化的问题,而且是意识机制的问题,因为它们被描述为心智的表征模型。

图片

但是我们应该注意到,这些理想的对象——形式、种类或图像——不需要被理解为图画或印象。这些类型的“图像”也可以被理解为列举一类对象的特征的谓词列表,例如:树:(1)高的、垂直的物体;(2)铺绿顶;(3)扎根于土壤的。我们不可能把这组命题误认为一棵树的图画,但我认为,当我们谈论一幅不(仅仅)是一幅图画的图像时,它就是我们所指的那种东西。我们可能会用“模型”、“图式”甚至“定义”这些词来解释我们所说的不(仅仅)是一张图画的图像。因此,作为相像的图像,可以理解为一系列标出相同点和不同点的谓词。但是,如果这就是这种“精神”图像所包含的全部内容,我们一定想知道为什么它会有一个“图像”的名字,这使它与图画表征混淆了。偶像崇拜的敌人当然不愿意鼓励这种用法。我们只能猜测,这个图像的术语是一种隐喻性的“漂移”的结果,一种对具体类比的寻找,在周围民族和以色列人自己的偶像崇拜的压力下,这种类比被字面化了。肖像和图画之间的混淆也可能是有利于神职人员操心一个不识字的俗人的教育。牧师会知道“真实的图像”不存在于任何物质图像中,而是存在于精神上的——也就是语言和文本的理解中,而人们可以得到一个外在的图像来满足他们的感官并鼓励奉献。精神与物质的、内在与外在的图像的区别从来不是一个简单的神学教义问题,而始终是一个政治问题,从祭司种姓的权力,到保守与改革运动(偶像崇拜者与偶像破坏者)之间的斗争,再到民族身份的维护(以色列人净化自己偶像崇拜的斗争)。

精神图像和物质图像之间的张力,从来没有比弥尔顿(Milton)在《天堂篇》第四卷中,把亚当和夏娃当作上帝的肖像,表达得更尖锐了:


“两个高贵的身姿高大挺拔,
    像上帝一样挺拔,身披与生俱来的荣耀
    在赤裸的荣耀下,似乎是一切的主宰,
似乎是值得尊敬的,在他们的面容中
闪耀着他们光荣的造物主的图像,
  真理,智慧,圣洁的肃穆以及纯粹,
严肃,但却没有真正孝顺的自由。”
(Bk. IV, 11. 288)

弥尔顿故意混淆了视觉上的、图像上的感觉与对它的无形的、精神上的、语言上的理解。每件事都取决于关键字“外表”的模棱两可的功能,这可能指的是亚当和夏娃的外表,他们“高贵的外形”,赤裸、直立或者是不太有形的“外表”,即他们目光的品质,他们“表情”的特征。这种品质不是看起来像别的东西的视觉图像,它更像是可以看到图像的光,是一种辐射而不是反射。为了解释这个图像是如何“闪耀”在“他们的外表神圣”中,弥尔顿必须诉诸一系列谓词,一系列亚当和夏娃与上帝共同拥有的抽象精神属性——“真理、智慧、圣洁、严肃、纯洁”——以及一个限制性的区别来强调人与上帝的不同:“严肃,但在真正孝顺的自由中却没有。”上帝在他完美的孤独中,不需要孝顺的关系,但对他图像要在人类中完善来说,男女的社会关系和性关系必须建立在“真正的孝顺自由”中。

那么,人是按照上帝的图像被造的吗?因为他看起来像上帝,还是因为我们可以说人与上帝相似?弥尔顿想要两者兼得,我们可以追溯到他的非正统唯物主义,或者更根本的是,描象概念的历史性转变,这种转变倾向于将精神相似性的概念——尤其是“理性灵魂”,使人成为上帝的图像——与某种物质图像联系起来。弥尔顿的诗歌是一场斗争的场景,在对外在图像的反偶像的不信任和对其力量的迷恋之间,这种斗争体现在他增加视觉图像的实践中,以防止读者关注任何特定的画面或场景。为了了解这场斗争的舞台是如何搭建起来的,我们需要更仔细地观察这场将图像视为“相像”的革命。它将图像识别为图画或“人工形式”的“肖像”(迈蒙尼德的“特定形式”)。

  • 五、 图画的霸权

我在这里想到的革命,当然是人工透视的发明,最早是由阿尔贝蒂(Alberti)在1435年体系化的。这项发明的效果不亚于让整个文明相信,它拥有一种绝对可靠的表现方法,一种自动和机械地生产关于物质世界和精神世界的真理的系统。人工视角的瑰宝的最佳标志是它否认自己的人为性,并声称自己是“事物看起来的方式”,“我们看到的方式”的“自然”表现,或者(用一个让他反感的短语来说)“事物本来的样子。”在西欧政治和经济优势的帮助下,人工视角在理性、科学和客观性的旗帜下征服了表象世界。无论艺术家们如何反驳,说还有其他方式可以描绘“我们真正看到的”,都无法动摇这些图画与自然的人类视觉和客观的外部空间具有某种同一性的信念。具有讽刺意味的是,制造这种图像的机器(照相机)的发明,只是强化了这是自然表现模式的信念。很明显,自然的东西就是我们可以制造一台机器来为我们做的事情。

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即使是贡布里希,尽管他为揭示这一体系的历史和传统特征做了大量工作,似乎也无法打破围绕着它的科学主义的魔咒,而经常退回到一种观点,即认为绘画幻觉主义提供了“打开我们感官锁的钥匙”。这句话忽略了他自己的警告,即“我们的”感官是一扇窗户,有目的的、适应了文化的想象力通过窗户向外看,而不是一扇门,打开就有一把万能钥匙。当贡布里希对人工视角的科学理解以这种非历史的和社会生物学的主张来表达时,即“我们的感官”决定了某些特权的表征模式,这种理解尤其脆弱。然而,当用信息理论的复杂术语和科学发现的波普尔式描述来表达时,这听起来更有道理。贡布里希似乎拯救了有目的的想象,他不把透视作为固定的表现标准,而是作为一种灵活的尝试和错误的方法,在这种方法中,图像图式被比作科学假设,测试了视觉事实。对贡布里希来说,“制作”图解性的假设总是先于它们与可见世界的“匹配”。这种表述的唯一问题是,没有一个中立的、单一的“可见世界”来与事物相匹配,也没有关于我们看到什么或如何看到的未经中介的“事实”。贡布里希本人是最雄辩的倡导者,他认为没有目的就没有视觉,天真的眼睛是盲目的。但是,如果视觉本身是经验和文化的产物——包括制作图画的经验——那么我们与图像表征相匹配的不是任何形式的赤裸裸的现实,而是一个已经被我们的表征系统包裹起来的世界。

在这里防止误解是很重要的。我不是在为抛弃“真理标准”或有效知识的可能性的任何轻率的相对主义而争论。我主张的是一种严谨的相对主义,它将知识视为一种社会产物,是世界不同版本之间的对话,包括不同的语言、意识形态和表现方式。这种观点认为存在“一种”科学方法是如此灵活和广阔,可以容纳所有这些差异,并在其中作出裁决的。这对科学家来说是一种便捷的意识形态,也是一种致力于科学权威的社会制度,但它在理论和实践中似乎都是错误的。正如保罗·费耶阿本德(Paul Feyerabend)所主张的那样,科学不是一个有序的过程,即建立假设,并根据独立、中立的事实“证伪”这些假设。这些“事实”只是作为某种似乎很自然的理论的一部分而存在的。科学进步既是一种修辞、直觉和反归纳(即采用与事实明显相矛盾的假设)的问题,也是一种有系统的观察和信息收集的问题。最伟大的科学发现往往是在人们决定忽视最明显的“事实”,而去寻找能够解释一种永远无法被观测到的情况的解答而产生的(伽利略(Galileo)的万有引力概念是经典的例子)。

我认为,反归纳原则,即忽略明显可见的“事实”,在图像制作的世界中有一个直接对应的原则,那就是:绘画艺术家,即使是在传统上被称为“现实主义”或“幻觉主义”的艺术家,对不可见世界的关注与对可见世界的关注一样多。我们永远无法理解一幅画,除非我们掌握了它如何表现我们看不见的东西。在一幅虚幻的画面中,有一件事是看不见的,或者是倾向于隐藏自己的,那就是它自己的人工性。关于心灵的内在合理性和空间的数学特征的整个假设系统就像允许我们提出或认识命题的语法。正如维特根斯坦所说:“一幅画不能……描绘它的图像形式:它显示它”,就像一个句子不能描述它自己的逻辑形式,而只能用它来描述别的东西。如果我们提醒自己,画家总是声称要呈现给我们的是“肉眼所见之外的东西”,通常是在“表达”这样的术语的标题下,这种“描绘看不见的东西”的概念似乎就不那么矛盾了。在我们对古代图像概念的简短回顾中我们已经看到,图像是一种精神上的“相像”,一直有一种感觉,实际上是一种基本的感觉,即图像被理解为内在的、看不见的东西。透视幻术的部分力量在于,它似乎不仅揭示了外在的、可见的世界,而且揭示了理性灵魂的本质,而理性灵魂的视觉就是表象。

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毫无疑问,现实主义、幻觉主义或自然主义的图像类型已经成为与西方科学和理性主义意识形态联系在一起的现代世俗偶像崇拜的焦点,这些图像的霸权在艺术、心理学、哲学和诗学中产生了反偶像的效应。真正的奇迹是绘画艺术家成功地抵制了这种偶像崇拜,他们坚持不懈地继续用他们所能拥有的资源向我们展示比我们所看到的更多的东西。

  • 六、描绘不可见之物
有时候,要想揭开奇迹的神秘面纱,尤其是当它已经变成了一个谜的时候,最好的办法就是通过一个不信它的人的眼睛来重新审视它。绘画能够表达某种看不见的本质的观念,在马克·吐温(Mark Twain)多疑的眼睛里几乎没什么印象。站在圭多·雷尼(Guido Reni)著名的阿特丽斯·岑西(Beatrice Cenci)的画作前,他这样说:“就信息而言,一个好的易读标签通常相当于一幅历史画中大量重要的态度和表达。在罗马,富有同情心的人们站在著名的‘比阿特丽斯·赞西被处决前一天’雕像前哭泣。它展示了一个标签能做什么。如果他们不认识这幅画,他们会无动于衷地看着它,说:‘患花粉热的少女;头装在袋子里的少女。’”

吐温对艺术中美好事物的质疑,是对绘画表达局限性的更复杂批评的呼应。在莱辛(Lessing)的《拉奥孔》中,他认为“表达”,无论是个人、想法还是叙事进程,都是不合适的,或者在绘画中充其量是次要的。拉奥孔派的雕刻家以一种平静的姿态展示这些面孔,这并不是因为斯多葛学派要求压抑痛苦,而是因为雕塑(以及所有视觉艺术)的真正目的是描绘身体之美。希腊诗歌中拉奥孔所表达的任何强烈情感,都需要破坏雕像的和谐平衡,使其偏离其主要目的。莱辛也提出了类似的观点,他认为绘画无法讲述故事,因为它的模仿是静态的,而不是动态的;绘画不应该试图表达思想,因为这些思想完全是用语言表达的,而不是用图像表达的。莱辛警告,试图用图像形式“表达普遍的想法”,只产生怪诞形式的寓言;最终,它会导致绘画“放弃其应有的领域,堕落为一种任意的书写方式”——图画文字或象形文字。

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如果我们忽略马克·吐温和莱辛对绘画表达贫乏的评论中明显的敌意,我们就会发现对绘画可见之物的概念的含义有一个相当明显的解释。表达就是在画面中巧妙地植入某些线索,使我们能够表演一种腹语,这种表演赋予画面以文才,尤其是一种非视觉和语言的文才。一幅画可以通过寓言意象来表达抽象的思想——正如莱辛所指出的,这种做法接近于书写系统的符号程序。鹰的图像可能描绘了一个有羽毛的捕食者,但它表达了智慧的想法,因此作为象形文字。或者我们可以用戏剧性的,雄辩的术语来理解表达,就像文艺复兴时期的人文主义者所做的那样,他们制定了一种历史绘画的修辞,用面部表情和手势的语言来完成,这种语言精确到足以让我们用语言来表达所描绘的人物的想法、感觉或者说话。而表达也不必局限于我们所描绘的对象所附加的谓词:环境、构图安排和配色方案都可以带有表达的色彩,因此我们可以谈论适当的情绪和情感气氛

当然,描象的表现性方面可能会成为一个主要的存在,以至于图像变得完全抽象和修饰性,既不代表人物也不代表空间,而只是展示它自己的材料和形式元素。乍一看,抽象的图像似乎已经逃离了表现和语言口才的领域,留下了形象模仿和文学特征,如叙事或寓言。但抽象表现主义绘画,用汤姆·沃尔夫(Tom Wolfe)的话说(但不是他的揭露态度),是一种“画出来的词”,是一种图形代码,需要像任何传统绘画模式一样精心设计的口头辩护,是“艺术理论”的伪形而上学。画布上的彩色涂抹和条纹,在适当的语境下,也就是说,在适当的腹语者的存在下,成为关于空间、感知和表现的本质的陈述。

如果我似乎对绘画表达的主张采取了吐温的讽刺态度,那并不是因为我认为这种表达是不可能的或虚幻的,而是因为我们对它的理解经常被“自然表现”的神秘感所笼罩,这种神秘感阻碍了我们对模仿表现的理解。马克·吐温说,就信息而言,这个标签比“大量有意义的表达”更有价值。但是,我们可能会问吐温,如果没有圭多·雷尼的这幅画,或者没有用图画、戏剧或文学图像来表现岑西的故事的整个传统,这个标签在信息或其他方面会值多少钱。这幅画是绘画传统和语言传统的融合,这两种传统对吐温天真的眼睛都不陌生,所以他几乎看不出这是什么,更不用说对它做出反应了。

马克·吐温和莱辛对图像表达的怀疑是有用的,因为它揭示了想象无形事物的必然的语言特征。这是一种误导,因为它谴责这种对图像的语言补充是不恰当的或不自然的。让“善良、有同情心的天性”的人对雷尼的比阿特丽斯·琴西的画做出反应的表征手段,可能是武断的、传统的信号,依赖于我们对这个故事的先验知识。但是,让吐温看到《患花粉热的年轻女孩》的表现手法;“把头装在袋子里的少女”,虽然更容易学,但与语言的联系并没有减少。

  • 七、图像和文字

认识到图画图像不可避免地是传统的和被语言污染的,并不需要把我们扔进一个无限倒退的能指的深渊。它对艺术研究的意义很简单,文艺复兴时期的绘画诗歌和艺术的姐妹情谊一直与我们同在。字和图像的辩证法似乎是一种文化围绕自身编织的符号结构中的常量。不同的是织法的精确性质,经线和纬线的关系。在某种程度上,文化史就是图像符号和语言符号之间争夺主导地位的长期斗争的故事,每一种符号都声称一种特定的所有权,只有自己才能抵达“自然”。在某些时刻,这种斗争似乎成为一种沿着开放边界的自由交换关系;在其他时候(如莱辛的《拉奥孔》),边界被关闭,并宣布单独的和平。在这一斗争中,最有趣和最复杂的版本可以被称为颠覆的关系,在这种关系中,语言或描象审视自己的内心,发现潜伏在那里的反面。自经验主义兴起以来,这种关系的一个版本一直困扰着语言哲学:怀疑在文字和观念之下,心灵的最终参照是图像,是印刷的、绘画的或反映在意识的表面的外在经验的印象。维特根斯坦试图从语言中驱逐这种颠覆性的图像,行为主义者试图从心理学中清除这种图像,当代艺术理论家试图从绘画表现本身中剔除这种图像。现代的图画图像,就像古代的“相像”概念一样,最终在其内部运作中被揭示为语言的。

为什么我们会有这种冲动把文字和图像之间的关系想象成政治上的,一种领土的争夺,一种对立意识形态的竞争?因为文字和图像之间的关系,在表征、意义和交流的领域内,反映了我们所假定的符号和世界、符号和它们的意义之间的关系。我们想象文字和图像之间的鸿沟就像文字和事物之间的鸿沟一样宽,就像(在最大意义上)文化和自然之间的鸿沟一样宽。图像是假装不是一个标志的标志,伪装成(或者对信徒来说,实际上完成)自然的直接和存在。这个词是它的“他者”,是人为的、武断的人类意志的产物,它通过将非自然的元素引入世界——时间、意识、历史以及象征性调解的异化干预,破坏了自然的存在。这个缺口的版本重新出现在区别中,我们依次应用于每种类型的符号。一种是自然的、模仿的图像,它看起来像或“捕捉”了它所代表的东西;另一种是它的绘画对手,人工的、富有表现力的图像,它不可能“看起来像”它所代表的东西,因为那种东西只能用文字来表达。一个词是它的意思的自然图像(如在拟声词中),另一个词是任意的能指。在书面语言中,有一种分裂,一种是由物体图画构成的“自然”文字,另一种是由象形文字和音标构成的任意符号。

我们该如何理解这种语言表现和图像表现之间的竞争呢?我建议我们将其历史化,并将其视为一种斗争,而不是在某种包罗万象的符号理论的条件下和平解决的问题,而是将我们文化中有趣的基本矛盾带入理论话语本身的核心。因此,关键不在于弥合文字和图像之间的鸿沟,而在于看清它为哪些利益和权力服务。当然,这种观点只能从一种观点出发,即怀疑任何关于文字和图像关系的特定理论的充分性,但这种观点也保留了一种直觉信念,即存在某种根本的差异。在我看来,例如莱辛,就他认为诗歌和绘画是完全不同的表现方式而言,他是绝对正确的,但他的“错误”(理论仍然参与)是将这种差异物化在类似的对立方面,如自然和文化、空间和时间。

什么样的类比不那么具体化,不那么神秘,更适合作为对文字-图像差异进行历史批判的基础?一种模式可能是两种不同语言之间的关系,这两种语言有着悠久的互动和相互翻译的历史。当然,这个类比远非完美。它会立即将案例加载到语言中,并将在文字和图像之间建立联系的困难降到最低。比起英国文学和英国绘画,我们更清楚如何将英法文学联系起来。另一种类比是代数和几何之间的关系,一种是通过任意的语音符号逐步读出,另一种是在空间中显示同样任意的数字。这种类比的吸引力在于,它看起来很像插图文本中的文字与图像的关系,而这两种模式之间的关系是一种复杂的相互翻译、解释、说明和修饰的关系。这个类比的问题在于它太完美了:它似乎提出了一个在文字和图像之间不可能实现的系统化的、规则化翻译的理想。然而,有时一个不可能的理想是有用的,只要我们认识到它的不可能。数学模型的优势在于,它表明了文字和图像的解释性和代表性的互补性,对其中一种的理解似乎不可避免地会吸引另一种。

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在现代,这种诉求的主要方向似乎是从图像(被认为是一个明显的、表面的内容或“材料”),到文字(被认为是隐藏的,隐藏在图像表面背后的意义)。在《梦的解释》中,弗洛伊德(Freud)通过将“构成梦的心理材料”与视觉艺术的材料进行比较,评论了“梦的无能”,无法表达逻辑、语言联系和潜在的梦的思想:

绘画和雕塑的造型艺术与诗歌相比,确实处于类似的限制之下,后者可以利用语言;在这里,它们无能为力的原因再次在于这两种艺术形式在努力表达某些东西时所操纵的材料的性质。在绘画了解支配它的表现法则之前,它曾试图克服这一障碍。在古代绘画中,画中的人物嘴上挂着小标签,上面写着艺术家无法用图画表现出来的话语。对弗洛伊德来说,精神分析是一门研究'表达法则'的科学,它支配着对沉默图像的解释。无论是在梦中还是在日常生活场景中,分析提供了一种方法,可以从误导和不清晰的图像表面提取隐藏的语言信息。

但我们必须提醒自己,有一种反传统,它认为解释是朝着相反的方向发展的,从语言表面到背后的“视觉”,从命题到赋予其意义的“逻辑空间中的画面”,从文本的线性顺序到控制其顺序的“结构”或“形式”。认识到维特根斯坦发现存在于语言中的这些“图像”并不比我们产生的任何其他类型的图像更自然、自主或必要,这可能使我们能够以一种不那么神秘的方式使用它们。在这些用途中,最主要的是,一方面,重新尊重图像的文才,另一方面,重新相信语言的现实主义,一种话语确实能描绘出世界和事务状态的感觉,这些世界和事务状态可以被具体描绘出来,并通过其他表征进行测试。也许想象力的救赎在于接受这个事实,即我们创造了我们的世界语言和图像之间的对话,我们的任务不是为了直接攻击自然而放弃这种对话,而是要看到自然已经是我们的一部分。

Wednesday, June 21, 2023

My Adventures in Deconstruction

 

My Adventures in Deconstruction

The New Yorker · by Lucinda Rosenfeld · June 9, 2023

Not long after I became my professor’s research assistant, I told him that I sometimes threw up what I ate. A junior at Cornell, I had just turned twenty. X, as I’ll call him, had hired me in conjunction with the “work-study” program, which was available to students who received financial aid. He was almost a decade and a half my senior. He was also married, but his wife was teaching and living elsewhere. X himself was on leave from another élite university. It was 1990. George H. W. Bush was in the White House. And you could still smoke cigarettes anywhere you wanted to.

Sometimes, when I visited X in his office on the top floor of a Victorian building near the Arts Quad, as I began to do after class, he’d ask if he could have one of my Marlboro Lights. I had started smoking a year before as a way of dealing with the nagging questions of what to do with my hands, how to suppress my appetite, and, above all, how to give myself the appearance of someone who stood aloof from the petty squabbles of everyday life—though nothing could have been further from the truth.

I remember following up my confession with a question: “Do you think I’m pathetic?”

“Do you want me to think you’re pathetic?” In the manner of a therapist (or Socrates), X often replied to my questions with other questions.

“No.” I recall laughing to break the suddenly sombre mood—also with relief that he didn’t seem to have judged me.

After a smoke-filled pause, he told me that someone he knew was making a film about the topic.

I never found out who the filmmaker was, but the idea that an associate of his regarded the topic as worthy of further inquiry made me feel a little less ashamed.

Why, after lengthy deliberation, I’d decided to disclose such a closely held secret to someone who was neither a trusted friend nor a mental-health professional was a more complicated question. On account of his age and perceived authority, I suppose I saw X as a substitute parental figure, especially since confiding in my own parents had proved to be a fraught activity. I think I had the idea that, if I could get X to worry about me, he’d want to take care of me. Which was the fantasy that underpinned all my other fantasies, even as I lived in fear of appearing needy.

But that was only part of it. X had a slow and measured manner of speaking that put me at ease, along with a calm confidence that I lacked and found magnetic. He was also tall, with tenebrous good looks, and he laughed easily, as if the very business of life were an elaborate joke. Really, I thought I’d never met such a clever and glamorous man and I made no effort to hide the crush I had on him. I attached flirtatious notes to the piles of books he asked me to retrieve for him at the library, and sat down right next to him at the polished-wood table where he conducted his seminar.

I was also angry at my family and the pressure I felt all of them put on me to be “perfect” and impressive—or, at least, I was as angry at my family as I was at myself for not being those things—and therefore all the more drawn to X’s radical politics and irreverent attitude, which seemed to repudiate everything that my high-culture-loving parents had raised me to revere. My father was a cellist, and my mother a writer of art-related books.

Although X taught English, he seemed to dislike literature. He was equally disdainful of classical music and art. (An invitation to attend a concert performed by the university orchestra, in which I played the violin, was declined.) After a childhood of being dragged to classical-music concerts and art museums, I welcomed his perspective. Just as important, he seemed to want to know all about me, peppering me with probing questions and patiently listening to my responses with what seemed like amused attention, which I could only find flattering, even as he revealed little about himself.

If it’s possible to be two things at once, I was both pathologically insecure and intoxicated by the power that my newly discovered desirability to men seemed to have conferred on me. In high school, shy and a “late bloomer,” I’d been mostly invisible to boys. Now, just a couple of years later, I’d noticed with fascination how, when I entered a room, all eyes seemed to turn to me. In public, in one of my provocative outfits, I likely appeared self-assured. In private, I was frequently engaged in a spiral of self-recrimination in which I ate until I was overfull, vomited, then forced myself to go running the next morning to atone for my “crimes” of the previous night. “I’m a cool cat at noon, and a sick, lost soul at midnight,” I wrote in my diary. Occasionally, I’d try to integrate the two sides of myself, as I did that day in X’s office, in an attempt to get closer to others. But, for the most part, I kept them separate. Honesty was too risky a proposition.

Only a couple of months earlier, I’d been in Spain on a semester-abroad program. Still nineteen, I’d been above all keen to prove my self-sufficiency. But things hadn’t worked out the way I’d envisioned them. Not only had I detested my host family in Seville, embittered Francoists who criticized me for using too much of their toilet paper and eating too much of their marmalade; I’d been terribly homesick. I especially missed my best friend at college, J, from whom I’d been inseparable the previous six months.

In the back of my mind, I’d been hoping to have the kind of amorous adventures that I imagined both my close-in-age, older sisters had had on their foreign travels; a year earlier, one had delayed her return from Paris in order to spend more time with her French boyfriend. What’s more, a classmate at Cornell had pointed out that my first name was a near-anagram of Dulcinea, the elusive love object in “Don Quixote,” which we’d read in my Literatura del Siglo de Oro class. It had almost seemed like fate that, once in Spain, I should find my own worshipful knight-errant.

But when the opportunity finally presented itself—at the rastro Charco de la Pava one afternoon, a handsome young artisan in Chinese cloth slippers handed me a piece of paper with his address on it and asked me to come and see him (he had no phone, he said)—I hesitated. After a week spent trying and failing to garner the courage to pay him a visit, I tossed the address in the trash. Instead, I found myself in an unwanted psychodrama involving my roommate, a Mormon girl from Michigan who mistakenly believed I had sexual designs on her.

With even more incentive to stay away from the moldering villa in which we’d been housed, I took to wandering the winding streets of Seville’s Jewish quarter, past trickling fountains and beggars missing teeth or limbs, the 1985 Smiths album “Meat Is Murder” playing on my Sony Walkman—in particular, the rain-enhanced dirge “Well I Wonder,” which I rewound again and again. “I half die / Please, keep me in mind / Please, keep me in mind,” Morrissey sang.

With the widespread use of e-mail and cell phones still a few years off, keeping in touch from overseas was not the easy feat it is today. And I’d grown increasingly convinced that my friends and family back home had all forgotten about me. Seeking comfort, I’d taken to buying bags of “pasas sin pepitas de California”—seedless raisins—at the local market and found that I couldn’t stop eating them. It was in Seville that I developed bulimia.

My hunger for human connection felt equally ungovernable. One afternoon, unable to reach J or to otherwise relieve the all-consuming loneliness that had taken hold of me, I found myself in a phone booth crying so hard that I fell to my knees. A couple of days later, I packed my bags and took a train to Madrid, where I spent a week by myself in a pensión, waiting for my flight back to the U.S.

It was on a visit to the Prado one afternoon that week that I became obsessed with Francisco Goya’s black paintings, my secret new habit having found its monstrous reflection—or so it seemed to me—in his “Saturn Devouring His Son.”

Back in New Jersey, I presented my mother with the gilded hand mirror I’d purchased from my Spanish lover-who-wasn’t. She, in turn, gave me an appointment with a shrink in a neighboring town. But the whole idea of a child of hers requiring psychiatric care seemed to distress her so much that she immediately rewrote the story of my semester abroad. The real reason I had quit the program and come home early, according to her, was that I’d “gotten sick,” just as she herself so often was, with an upset stomach.

I spent most of the next two months lying in and on my trundle bed, across from my tennis trophies and Teddy bears, waiting to return to college and feeling like an unmitigated failure. “Moods sit on me like lead X-ray bibs,” I wrote, my diary having become the one place where I felt free to express my humiliation.

In Ithaca a few weeks later, snow drifts flanking the streets, J and I noticed a photograph of X in a campus newspaper and decided that he was cute. J, in jest, suggested that I do something about it. We giggled at the very idea. Intrigued, I looked up his class in the course catalogue. Although the subject didn’t particularly interest me, I registered for it the next day.

It is odd to think how easily we might never have met the people who leave an indelible mark on us.

One evening, halfway into the semester, X invited me over for a “nightcap” at his rental house, a mile from campus, and then, in the most casual of tones, asked me if I’d like to spend the actual night. My naïveté matched only by my recklessness, I agreed. Given X’s position and résumé, I don’t think it even occurred to me that he might have anything other than my best interests at heart. He’d already mentioned that his marriage was in its death throes. I assumed that he and his wife had some kind of understanding. But, really, what did I know about such things? To the extent that I was apprehensive, it was because I wasn’t sure whether I’d measure up.

But, before long, any concern on my part was lost to the surreal amazement of finding myself in X’s embrace. That someone of what I perceived as his exalted stature wanted me as his lover—and, what’s more, was prepared to risk so much for the pleasure of such—both astonished me and seemed to validate my mother’s insistence on my exceptionality. For the first time ever, I felt on par with my hyper-accomplished sisters, with whom I was always trying and—it seemed to me—failing to keep up. Plus, to have won the affections of someone who had published books and articles, who was invited to give lectures all over the country, and had travelled all over the world (and had a foreign accent, as if to prove the point) made me feel brilliant and worldly by association—all while promising to erase the last traces of my sheltered suburban upbringing. Or maybe the truth was that I was so busy worrying about whether I looked O.K. that I was hardly thinking at all.

All I know for sure is that, afterward, it seemed as if nothing so exciting had ever happened to me. There is a month-long lacuna in my diary that matches up with the first month of my affair. The next entry after that begins, simply, “WOW.”

In the nineteen-seventies, Cornell—along with Yale and Johns Hopkins—became a locus of the literary and philosophical movement, imported from Paris, known as post-structuralism. Positing reality as less a fixed thing than a product of the language that described or “constructed” it—“Il n’y a pas de hors-texte,” Jacques Derrida famously wrote, sometimes translated as “there is nothing outside the text”—the teachings it encompassed were sometimes known simply as “theory.” On my return from Spain, I’d switched majors from Spanish to comparative literature and discovered that I could take various “theory-oriented” classes that would count toward my degree, including some in what was then known as women’s studies.

In one, I was introduced to the work of the feminist deconstructionist Judith Butler. From Butler’s just-published book, “Gender Trouble,” I absorbed the compelling idea that women were always playing a part. Butler wrote—and I dutifully underlined—“As the effects of a subtle and politically enforced performativity, gender is an ‘act,’ as it were, that is open to splittings, self-parody, self-criticism, and those hyperbolic exhibitions of ‘the natural’ that, in their very exaggeration, reveal its fundamentally phantasmatic status.” Butler’s theory of gender confirmed the feeling, long embedded in my psyche, that I had to perform in order for others to like me—and, especially, to perform my femininity.

It was in my women’s-studies classes, too, that I was first exposed to a corresponding movement that came to be known as sex-positive feminism. Mirroring the Reagan era’s “me-first” ethos, it eschewed economic issues and those related to male violence in favor of a politics of personal fulfillment centered on the concept of female pleasure. (In my “French Feminisms” class, the preferred term for such was jouissance.) The rough idea was that women should be celebrated not just as desirable objects but as desiring subjects, and that, in liberating their libido and seizing the terms of their objectification, they might liberate themselves, too. It followed that even entanglements that appeared to present asymmetries of power could be justified on the ground that the participants were acting out a fantasy or engaging in role-play. Conversely, the inherently emotional aspect of sex, along with its ability to make one human feel bound to another, went unmentioned. So did the fact that, in heterosexual relations, biology rendered the female party the more physically vulnerable one.

It was thanks to this line of thinking—a line I later came to regard as casuistry—that I was able both to justify my affair and to identify myself as a feminist while conducting my personal life in a way that might suggest otherwise. That X considered himself a “male feminist” and appeared to harbor few ethical qualms about what we were doing seemed to be further evidence that nothing about our situation could possibly be wrong. And, besides, wasn’t morality “socially constructed,” too?

But, if my involvement with X began as a lark, an act of one-upmanship, even a feminist statement, it soon became something else entirely—at least to me. After a long winter, Ithaca’s gray skies and cold rains finally gave way to scintillating sun, and my own mood followed suit. By the second month, I was in a quasi-fugue state.

At first, my friends reacted to the news more with amusement and curiosity than with censure. Age-gap relationships were common in that era; women of eighteen and older were seen as full-fledged adults, and universities had few prohibitions against student-faculty dating. Though I perceived that X’s being married did raise eyebrows.

The only person I recall expressing any hesitation was P, a kind, hippie-ish friend from my semester-abroad program, in whom I’d confided. “Is this really what you want?” she wrote to me. “Or are you being dragged along by this powerful drowning wave? Your initiative or his? [And] how do you always get into these relationships with such a dominating figure? . . . Remember, you are in total control of yourself!”

But, while I appreciated P’s concern, I had no answer to allay it, if only because being subsumed by a “powerful drowning wave” was, in truth, precisely what I was hoping for. Where once I’d lived in fear of losing control—as a child, I’d been particularly frightened of carnival rides and deep water—now all I secretly wanted was to close my eyes and let someone else take charge. Also, to the extent that X seemed as besotted with me as I was with him—within forty-eight hours, he’d said that he missed me when we were apart—I could believe that the “initiative” belonged to us both. But, really, I wasn’t thinking about such things. I’d never before felt so desired and admired. For the moment, at least, and to my enormous relief, my eating disorder had vanished—and my appetite along with it. I’d regained my confidence, as well. Waking at X’s place, I felt as if, after having spent years at the “kids’ table,” I’d finally been invited to join the adult one, where wine and witty conversation flowed freely.

I soon concluded that I’d fallen in love—but also that we’d fallen in love.

Simultaneously, I rejoiced that X seemed to misread me, if self-servingly, as a happy-go-lucky, young sophisticate. Although I was never wholly comfortable in his presence, I did my best to embody his misreading. “Everyone returns us to a different sense of ourselves, for we become a little of who they think we are,” Alain de Botton writes in “On Love.”

Most of the untruths that passed between X and me were lies of omission. When my inauthenticity seemed at risk of exposure, however, I’d actively fib. I recall him asking me once if I’d ever been in “one of those sororities” and me quickly denying that I would ever have belonged to something so juvenile or politically regressive, when, in fact, I’d lived at my sorority house, albeit unhappily, for part of sophomore year.

But, to the extent that my life had become a Russian nesting doll of secrets and evasions, one encompassing the other, the entire contraption seemed at perpetual risk of coming apart, which only added to my anxiety. X kept me hidden from his friends and colleagues, and he expected me to be quiet about our involvement, too, both to preserve his own privacy and to protect his wife’s feelings. (In response to my urging him to come clean, he would say that she was not the one who had done anything wrong.) Although I’d accepted his refusal to conduct our relationship openly, I defied him by telling every friend I had, as proud of our connection as X was concerned about it becoming public knowledge, even as I feared X would find out and be furious at me.

Outside the classroom, we were two people of disparate ages delighting in each other’s company—laughing, gossiping, and bantering. When not watching trashy TV or “feminist porn,” we’d go on drives up the lake. But the power imbalance between us was never not present. When I least expected it, he’d turn stern and reprimand me—one time, for being insufficiently deferential to the waitress at the diner where we sat eating our breakfast and, by association, to the “working classes.” On occasions such as these, I’d fall silent, rather than defend myself, inclined to believe that he knew better than I did.

There was rarely any intellectual exchange between us, beyond X imparting his dark and paranoid view of the world, and me listening and offering the occasional question or quip. Sometimes, a little voice inside me would ask, Really?, with regard to some tendentious assertion he’d presented as the indubitable truth. But I mostly kept my doubts to myself.

I also remember sitting alongside X in his living room, as he read my classwork. “This was a great paper,” he wrote on the last page, before handing it back to me. “Too short, of course, to fully explore what you mean by the ‘mentality of suburban life.’ ” If I found this setup problematic in any way, I have no memory of it.

Even thornier was how the same dynamic played out in intimate spaces.

As the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of the nineteen-eighties, some left-wing intellectuals began to extoll individual acts of cultural subversion as substitutes for revolution. In my classes at Cornell, the word “subversive” was bandied about so often that I came to think of it as a synonym for “good.” The AIDS crisis and the heartless response to it from the Christian right, then America’s chief proponent of “family values,” further buttressed the belief, seemingly shared by X, that libertinism was not just compatible with feminism but an ideal worth championing. In one of my women’s-studies classes, we were even reading a novel—“Justine”—by the Marquis de Sade.

But if X believed that, in transgressing with his student slash research assistant, he was sticking it to the man, he did so without seeming to realize that he was The Man—or, at least, he was for me. As reluctant to disappoint him as I was determined to prove my mettle, I’d effectively surrendered all agency. I don’t know if I was even able to differentiate between his pleasure and mine, or mine and its opposite; they were all jumbled together in my head. Whatever X wanted, I reflexively wanted, too. At any point, of course, I could have said no. I was not under threat of punishment.

But I never said no. I longed for any and all manifestations of X’s affection. I was also scared of losing him.

More generally, the sexual revolution had made asserting boundaries the business of prudes. Wary of being saddled with such a damning label, young women like me were therefore disinclined to have any boundaries whatsoever.

Which was all to the benefit of those who felt entitled to violate them.

I was scared of losing X, but I could not see that I was already in the process of doing so. One day, as we climbed the shaded banks of one of Ithaca’s scenic falls, he told me that our relationship was “ill-fated.” I looked up the meaning of the word when I got back to my room.

Yet even when I was faced with an official definition—“destined for misfortune; doomed”—I did not absorb its implication for my own life. Instead, I recall noting that one of the synonyms given was “star-crossed,” a word I associated positively with “Romeo and Juliet” and, by extension, great passion.

Or, maybe, there was a part of me that liked the idea of being involved in something impossible and fraught. (At least it wasn’t boring, like New Jersey.) And wasn’t true love almost by definition tragic?

Or am I lying to myself? Like X, maybe I’d organized my personal life, however unconsciously, in such a way as to avoid any chance of actual intimacy. From a certain angle, conducting a “fantasy relationship” was far safer than conducting a real one.

But, of course, it wasn’t safe at all.

At the end of the spring semester, X invited me to spend the weekend at his wife’s house, in the city where she taught, while she was out of town. Once again, it did not occur to me to object. Nor, in my immaturity, could I conceive of X’s wife as another fully sentient human who, in all likelihood, would not want me in her home. My only objection was that I couldn’t afford to go; he sent me a plane ticket. (X told The New Yorker that he remembers several incidents described in this piece differently.)

I no longer recall the interiors of the different houses and apartments where X and I met up that year. What I do remember are the shampoos in the bathrooms: Aussie at his place, some kind of henna rinse at hers. In their perceived exoticness, as much as in their implied intimacy, the sight and smell of one or another plastic bottle would leave me briefly startled by my own misbegotten proximity, if not startled enough to dislodge the delusions that had taken up residence in my head.

Halfway through that summer, which I spent mostly in Ithaca, where our visits continued, I told X, for the first time, that I loved him. I had never said those words to a non-family member before. Having concluded my teens without understanding that desire, especially as it’s experienced by some men, only sometimes overlaps with deeper emotions, I assumed he’d reciprocate.

That he did not actually love me was not an idea I had entertained—until he failed to echo my declaration, claiming that, although he was flattered by my pronouncement, were he to do so, it would imply a commitment that he couldn’t make. Nevertheless, he did not express any misgivings about continuing our affair.

At first, I tried to rationalize X’s response. I appreciated that he’d been honest. It was true that he was in no position to commit to a romantic partner right now. And, in the end, weren’t they just words—which, as I’d learned in my theory classes, had no intrinsic meaning and referred only to other words?

But, over time, X’s withholding of the words I’d wanted to hear began to eat away at me like a parasite, summoning back the feelings of inadequacy and alienation for which our affair, at least initially, had been the ultimate balm. It was no longer enough for me simply to be desired. I wanted to be loved, too—and could come up with no answer as to why I was not by X, except that I wasn’t good enough to be so.

I conjectured that he kept me a secret for similar reasons. “How can I not help but think that I am unacceptable, embarrassing . . . when he won’t tell any of his friends about me—needless to say, his wife” I wrote in my diary. In growing frustration, one day I dashed off a letter to X, calling him a “piece of shit” and telling him that our affair was over. But, soon after, I must have told him that I hadn’t meant what I’d said. The next time I saw him, I recall him telling me that my letter had been “extremely hurtful” to him. Then I felt guilty and embarrassed and found myself apologizing for mistreating him.

It wasn’t just that I had placed X on an impossibly high pedestal in my mind; I’d made his feelings for me the measure of my self-worth. Rather than walking away, therefore, I was inclined to dig in. “I want him to take responsibility for the double life he’s been leading,” I wrote.

Of course, he did no such thing. Nor did I actually insist on it.

At the beginning of the fall semester, I developed a kidney infection, the result of an untreated U.T.I. and, more generally, of my failure to notice or take care of my health. I was in the hospital for six days. My parents drove four hours each way to come and see me, but, to my recollection, stayed only twenty minutes; my mother found hospitals too upsetting.

X, who had by then left Ithaca and reassumed his regular post, didn’t visit at all. But a bouquet soon arrived from him, accompanied by a card that alluded to “our song” and was signed, “Love [X].” I was surprised, touched, and even hopeful. Never mind that “our song,” a cover version of the 1983 R. & B. hit “Just Be Good to Me”—which X had, of course, picked out himself, then recorded for me on a cassette tape—was about a young woman who was so enamored of the man in her life that she didn’t mind sharing him with unnamed others. I remember endlessly rewinding the tape on my mini boombox, parsing the lyrics in search of evidence that, one day, just as the song went, We could be together, be together.

Once recovered, I began spending weekends with X in New York City, where he now lived—always, of course, at his convenience and in accordance with the dictates of his schedule. Even if he wouldn’t publicly acknowledge me or say that he loved me, I still felt special and excited to be in his company. Flea-market shopping in Chelsea with my secret, inappropriate, older “boyfriend,” or sitting across from him in a dimly lit SoHo bistro, or browsing the aisles of the St. Mark’s Bookshop in the East Village—I could almost imagine myself into one of the contemporary novels and short-story collections I read on school breaks, like Tama Janowitz’s “Slaves of New York,” Jay McInerney’s “Bright Lights, Big City,” or Mary Gaitskill’s “Bad Behavior,” at least insofar as those books were about underemployed hipsters in downtown Manhattan, making chic messes out of their dysfunctional lives. To do so made me feel finally grown-up. Yet the feeling was constantly being thwarted by my fear that I couldn’t actually keep up with X—that I hadn’t read the “right” books or heard of the “right” people or had the “right” life experiences. It was another old anxiety, no doubt tracing back to my sisters.

When I think of that year, I see myself frantically lighting one cigarette after another, as if it were possible to disguise my shortcomings behind the smoke they generated. I didn’t understand then that a large part of my appeal for X was that I was beneath him, looking up. Or, rather, gazing worshipfully upward. Why else would a professor even pursue a relationship with an undergraduate? Maybe I wasn’t the only one who was afraid of being truly seen or known.

“Woman [is the] pivot point of consumerism, [both] as ‘consumer’ and ‘consumed,’ ” I wrote on the second page of my notebook for my favorite class, Fetishism 409, a graduate-level seminar I’d lucked into that fall. The class was taught by the feminist film theorist and filmmaker Laura Mulvey, who is famous today for having coined the phrase “the male gaze.” Thanks to Mulvey, I began to challenge the more facile assumptions of sex-positive feminism.

Yet, even as I became expert at seeing how Hollywood objectified and fetishized its female stars, reducing them to nothing but their appearance—and even as I was disgusted that this was the case—I found that I still on some level wanted to be the object of the gaze I was deriding.

A similarly contradictory set of impulses had begun to inform my thinking about my affair. What did I even see in X at this point? I suspect it was less that I saw something than that I’d grown attached and therefore determined to make him care as much as I did, even as my ever-increasing complaints, demands, and dramatic departures failed to elicit in him what I felt would be an appropriately emotional response, further wounding and frustrating me.

“We’re just giving in to our desire,” he replied fatuously when I objected to his latest plan for us to go to his wife’s house.

I had also begun to notice that, even when X was at the center of the drama, he kept himself at a distance. He sometimes referred to our relationship as a “narrative”—as if all the action were happening to a set of fictional characters, as opposed to ones made of flesh and blood. (And as if he weren’t the narrative’s chief protagonist.) And, the more he assumed the role of passive spectator, the more I found myself cast as the desperate pursuer—and the more our affair began to resemble another self-harming addiction in my life that seemed beyond my capabilities to regulate.

When X asked if I wanted any of the old clothes that his wife was getting rid of, was he simply trying to be nice because I was a student with no spending money, or did he relish the deception implicit in the image of me walking around campus dressed like her? As usual, by the time I thought to wonder, it seemed too late to ask.

I was similarly uncertain how to interpret X’s announcement that it would be “erotic” if I met him at a hotel in Massachusetts, one weekend when he was slated to attend an academic conference at Harvard. Should I feel flattered? Degraded? Increasingly, I felt out of my depth, without any clear route back to shore.

In any event, I saw the invitation as an opportunity to finally introduce X to one of my sisters, who was in Cambridge finishing her degree and whom I regarded as similarly glamorous. I suppose I hoped to impress each of them with my connection to the other.

But, over an awkward coffee at a café in Harvard Square, X seemed as uncomfortable as my sister seemed wary. And that night, when he and I met up again after dinner and drove to a Marriott on the outskirts of the city, he was cold and uncommunicative and walked two steps ahead of me on our way into the bar. Maybe he was trying to punish me for conscripting him to play a part he’d never agreed to play. Or maybe it was simply that his infatuation with me had come to an abrupt end; whatever tenderness he’d once harbored for me appeared to have evaporated.

I assume that, during the night that followed, X did not intend to hurt me physically. But nor did he show an iota of concern for my safety and well-being. Yet again, given my passivity and inexperience, and the skewed power dynamic that fed upon them, it did not occur to me that I ought to protest. (I had also drunk enough that the room spun when I closed my eyes.)

But, waking before dawn, I was as frightened as I was bewildered to find my legs trembling and both of my kneecaps grotesquely bloodied by carpet burns. Sitting on the edge of the bathtub, examining my damaged flesh, I wondered how I’d got to this point—and what any of it had to do with liberation (or love). When X woke a few hours later, he asked how “that” had happened, as if he’d had nothing to do with it, then complained that he was running late. Upon our arrival at the conference a short time later—I planned to hitch a ride back to Ithaca with a Cornell graduate student—X pretended not to know me and allowed someone to introduce us when I approached. As if it were all some kind of parlor game.

I remember standing in a crowd of strangers, dressed in my favorite vintage trenchcoat, my wounds hidden beneath my white jeans, feeling as if I were hovering outside myself. If I’d once felt beautiful around X, now I felt erased—unsure if the thing I understood to be my life was even real anymore.

He didn’t phone that night—not to see if I’d made it back to college safely, and not to make sure that I was all right. Nor did he phone the day after that. And, when I finally phoned him to report on and ask tentative questions about my injuries, which had prompted the nurse at the campus health center to express concern, he said that I’d been acting like a “slut.”

I have a dim memory of him laughing afterward. Though it seems just as possible that I made that part up, if only to convince myself that he’d been merely kidding around. In any case, I do recall trying to find the accusation flattering. Reclaiming old slurs had become a popular semantic practice.

But shock, shame, and alarm flickered in the background of my consciousness, like the changing colors of a stoplight caught in the rearview mirror. Was X revealing a latent misogyny that had infected our affair all along?

Or was he right, and was that all I amounted to?

One afternoon, my motives opaque even to myself, I waited for my favorite women’s-studies professor after class and attempted to tell her about my affair. Was I trying to impress her with my “adult credentials” so that she would want to be my friend? Did I hope to get X into trouble? Or was I seeking yet another quasi-parental figure to guide and console me? Maybe it was all three.

But she cut me off mid-sentence, a stricken look on her face, and announced, “Oh, dear, I don’t think you should be telling me this”—before apologetically sending me on my way. Afterward, I was mortified and furious at myself for the misjudgment.

Today, it is easy to imagine the same professor feeling compelled not just to listen but to report what she’d heard to the campus Title IX office, whereupon an investigation might be opened.

A couple of weeks—and another breakup attempt, this one in person—later, I discovered that X was returning to Ithaca, not to see me but to have Thanksgiving dinner with his wife and their friends. That he would soon be close by but with others devastated me. I cried as hard as I had in that phone booth in Seville.

Except this time I couldn’t stop. Still shocked by the disregard for my personal welfare that X had demonstrated during the conference, I had finally begun to understand not only that he would never take care of me but that our affair was, at best, a distant cousin of love.

Yet, without X, I no longer felt I belonged or mattered to the world. “Alone. I am alone,” I wrote in my diary. “I could call some friends maybe. But I am still alone. . . . [X] is not there for me—doesn’t love me. Why would he?”

It’s still unclear to me whether it was the demise of my affair that caused me to temporarily lose my ability to live in my body—or whether that loss was already in the works and X was merely a vehicle to which I’d hitched myself in order to advance the journey.

“Dr. G___ thinks [X] is fucking me up—making me crazy—making me puke. I don’t know anymore,” I’d noted earlier in the fall, referring to the psychiatrist I’d begun to see.

My eating disorder had come blazing back to life. I considered a day when I threw up only once to have been a success. There were fewer and fewer of those days.

If my bulimia had begun in part as a dieting strategy, it had evolved into something that had more to do with compulsion than with vanity. I didn’t fully understand it myself, though I’d located an explanation in one of the “theory” books I was reading—Julia Kristeva’s “Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection.” “I am throwing up as a masochistic ritual designed to reaffirm my being (the interior) (the ‘I’ w/ boundaries) . . . even though I realize my non-space,” I wrote.

Looking back, I suspect the real explanation was that I’d internalized the anger that I didn’t know how to express to X. As I cycled between comfort and horror, shame and relief, I was maybe also trying to regain a sense of control over my life. As if my negative feelings might literally be cast out of my body.

“I throw up to feel blank—to feel dead—[to] fall asleep like a rock, too tired to feel anything, or to worry about the outside world,” I noted.

But, of course, no such thing was actually possible.

The evening I couldn’t stop crying, I had called X to tell him how hurt I felt. He expressed feelings of regret and loss, just as he had done the first time I tried to leave him. But, this time, he seemed largely resigned to it and possibly even relieved.

A few weeks later, during another phone call, he sounded even more indifferent. “Life is about survival,” he intoned.

It did not seem that way to me.

“I want to die sometimes,” I wrote a week before my twenty-first birthday, having returned home early for winter break. “Nothing looms ahead in my future that I can look forward to. I find everything too difficult, too painful; I don’t have the energy for it.”

It occurs to me in retrospect that, having spent the previous year trying to understand the literary concept of deconstruction, I’d begun to mimic a deconstructed text myself. I was reduced to a collection of “empty signifiers,” devoid of an author, and utterly destabilized.

Or maybe I was the deconstructionist, ruminating over X’s words with an eye toward identifying the “différance,” to use one of Derrida’s winking neologisms, between what he’d said and what he’d meant, yet still failing to comprehend why he wasn’t fighting to win me back.

But, while X had stopped calling, he encouraged me to keep calling him—and was still happy to spend the night with me if I showed up at his door. Perhaps that was why I kept revisiting the affair even after I’d officially ended it: somehow, I couldn’t bring myself to accept that, like words, I meant nothing in particular.

By the time I graduated from Cornell, X had separated from his wife. But he’d made it clear that he hadn’t left her for me. In one particularly cruel outburst, as I was making plans to move to New York myself, he’d announced that he would no longer be available to see me unless I promised to be “fun.” (It turned out that X did not want to hear about my problems, after all.)

Unable to entirely sever our connection, even as I found new romantic partners who genuinely cared about me, I’d occasionally reach out to X.

Maybe I was still hoping that he’d come to his senses and realize that he loved me, after all.

Our last phone call took place when I was around twenty-five.

On picking up, he sounded so uninterested in speaking to me that it broke something inside me all over again. For several minutes, I went through the motions of catching up. The strain of doing so was so acute that my teeth began to chatter.

After I hung up, I felt like a paper napkin that had been used, crumpled, and discarded. Now, it seemed, it was my job to decompose and disappear from view. As if in preparation for doing so, I curled up in a ball on the floor.

X didn’t contact me again after that—not to compliment me on something I’d written, not to see how I was. Every few years, however, we’d run into each other at parties or cultural events. X would always smile broadly, kiss me hello on both cheeks, and engage me in a few minutes of lighthearted chitchat. For reasons of pride and self-protection, I’d eagerly participate in these charades, making a great show of my sang-froid.

But, after he disappeared back into the crowd, I always felt disturbed and upset.

In late 2017, X attended a public book talk that I did in connection with my novel “Class.” We’d got back in limited touch when I was in my early forties, after I’d e-mailed him to address a dismissive comment I’d heard he made about me to an acquaintance, and X had written a surprisingly conciliatory response. In an impulsive moment, I’d added his name to my group mailing list. He was wearing a T-shirt that read “Dismantle the Patriarchy.” “[Y]et he hath ever but slenderly known himself,” Regan says of her father in “King Lear.”

But X was respectful, even complimentary, and he lingered after the event. Which I found, at first, gratifying—how many years had I waited to win his approval!—and then painful. By coincidence, or not, the media was awash in tales of male predation. For many women I knew, there was a sense of vindication and of finally being heard. Not for me. I found myself rattled by the new framing that I felt the culture superimposing on my long-ago affair. In some ways, it had been easier to blame myself for having been judged unlovable than to believe that I had been exploited.

In other ways, it had made things more difficult. Although my eating disorder belonged to the distant past—and I’d gone on to find lasting love, marry, and have children—the hurt and the confusion about what had happened to me lingered. Even so, I would sometimes play the story for laughs, brandishing it as evidence of my “wild” college years.

On other occasions, talking about it with friends, I’d become short of breath and find my hands and legs shaking.

Why do some scars fade away while others never fully heal, their sticky matters perpetually leaking out? I suspect that the unhealed wounds are those inflicted by events that not only leave our hearts feeling trampled upon but that seem to confirm our worst fears about ourselves.

In fact, it was nearly three decades later, prodded by the #MeToo movement, the eerie spectacle of Trump’s untrammelled narcissism, and the clarifying rage of perimenopause, that I finally saw that Goya’s Saturn had not been me at all. It was X. ♦

The New Yorker · by Lucinda Rosenfeld · June 9, 2023

Sunday, June 18, 2023

“I Love You” (in Theory)

 

“I Love You” (in Theory)


On Thursday, January 23, 1975, Roland Barthes lectured in Paris at the École pratique des hautes études on the theme of love, focusing on the phrase “I love you.” Barthes was then at the summit of his career. From his beginnings as a literary and cultural critic of the “mythologies” of mass media in the years after World War II, he had become both a famous writer and (despite never finishing any of his three attempts at graduate study) one of the more influential figures in French academia. Known best for his pioneering application of structural linguistics to the analysis of texts ranging from the classics of literature to detergent packaging, Barthes seemed in the 1960s and early ’70s to have laid the basis for a new science, or semiotics, of culture.

Barthes’s analysis of love, however, came at a critical moment in his thinking, just after he had announced, in his experimental autobiography Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (finished in the autumn of 1974) that he was tired not only of semiotics but of the pretenses to epistemic “heroism” and “arrogance” that characterize all forms of theory.1Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, in Roland Barthes, Œuvres complètes IV, livres, textes, entretiens, 1972–1976, ed. Eric Marty (Paris, France: Seuil, 2002): 575–774. He condemned what he called “the blackmail of theory,” by which we seem to hear ideas saying that we must “love, maintain, [and] defend” them because they align with our intellectual commitments. But isn’t thinking a kind of pleasure, Barthes asked, and isn’t it in the nature of pleasure, whether intellectual or erotic, to make us question such certainties?

Stepping back from the discipline of semiotics, and apparently from the pursuit of generalizable knowledge of any kind, Barthes also announced a shift in his political views that, by the time of his death in 1980, would take him to the limits of an idiosyncratic liberalism. As he was completing his autobiography, in the spring of 1974, he had joined a group of fellow travelers on the French left for a three-week trip to Maoist China. The group, which included the young Bulgarian theorist of language Julia Kristeva (whose career in France owed much to Barthes’s effusive public praise) and was originally meant to include the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, was composed mostly of thinkers looking for an alternative model after their disillusionment with the Soviet Union and the French Communist Party. Barthes, as he wrote in a book-length unpublished diary, was looking to distract himself from a painful, one-sided romantic obsession (for which he would soon seek treatment from Lacan, unsuccessfully). What he found in communist China bored and disgusted him: political clichés from every interlocutor, drab uniformity of dress and comportment, a country, it seemed, in which the personal and the pleasurable had been abolished. Once back in France, Barthes published a short, dismissive essay, “Alors, la Chine?” “We return,” he wrote, “with: nothing.”2Roland Barthes, “Alors la Chine?,” in Roland Barthes, Œuvres complètes IV, 516.

As he began his seminar on what he had recently started calling the “lover’s discourse,” the things that someone in love says to himself, the beloved, and others, Barthes seems to have prepared himself for a decisive break with “theory” in both science and politics. The experience of love, both as he himself was undergoing it and as it could be considered in “discourse,” might have seemed an ideal topic through which to pursue a new, post-theoretical approach that moved from the abstract to the personal. Yet Barthes’s lecture on “I love you” was a display of theoretical bravura, in sometimes bracingly opaque language. It drew, ironically, on linguistic and psychoanalytic jargon he had been exposed to by Kristeva and Lacan. Their difficult, rebarbative styles worked their way into his own, with characteristic neologisms, erudite digressions, and inversions of the obvious. Drawing from their work, and the broader, voguish, conceptual vocabularies of linguistics and psychoanalysis, Barthes’s lecture offered a dense theory, at times impenetrable and self-contradictory, about declarations of love.

The crux was that “I love you” is a statement “without context,” resisting explanation in terms of what precedes or underlies it. This phrase, unlike any other, cannot be historicized, with attention to circumstance revealing its meaning in this instance to differ from its meaning in that one. “I love you” can be analyzed only in terms of its self-same, unchanging essence, which is a doomed “demand” for love from an arbitrarily selected, and ultimately irrelevant, beloved. But even as Barthes insisted that “I love you” has no context, and no hope, he was not only analyzing these words but saying them, in a covert address to one of his students, Roland Havas, with whom he was, unrequitedly and despondently, in love.

An Unchaste Socrates


Romantic and sexual relationships between students and professors were in that era neither forbidden nor necessarily frowned upon in the French, or American, academy. (In our own case, one has only to think of Allan Bloom’s relationships with students, semicovertly celebrated in what conservatives misread as a celebration of traditional morality, The Closing of the American Mind.) Barthes had enjoyed several such intimacies during the previous decade, making himself the center of a circle of admiring young men who had been or might become his lovers. Many of them became, in later years, something like successors, significant figures in French intellectual life who wrote monographs and organized conferences on Barthes, even seeing to the posthumous publication of his lectures. Like Michel Foucault, who had been his friend in the mid-’60s (before Foucault’s increasingly strenuous political radicalism drove them apart), Barthes seems to have relished being at the center of a group of male student-lovers, as an unchaste Socrates—more so than he enjoyed any of the particular partners on whom he temporarily focused his attention. Until he met Havas.

More than thirty years younger than Barthes—who had been born in 1915—Havas spent many days and evenings in his teacher’s company in 1974 and ’75, playing piano, discussing psychoanalysis, and occasionally sharing a bed. But he was already living with his fiancée, whom he would eventually marry. He may have been flattered by the interest of one of France’s most famous thinkers, who remained dashing, if a bit pudgy, at the threshold of sixty. But Barthes’s desire neither altered the course of Havas’s life nor aroused in him any reciprocal intensity.

This unaccustomed rebuff seems to have inflamed his teacher. After falling for Havas in the spring of 1974 and enjoying what he called in his diary (perhaps retrospectively) a “brilliant summer” of delusion, Barthes spent the second half of that year in despair.3Roland Barthes, “Chronologie et premier index,” Fonds Roland Barthes, NAF 28630 (9), Bibliothèque nationale de France, Roland Barthes archive. He wrote Havas hundreds of love letters, sometimes several a week, to which his student often didn’t respond. By the beginning of 1975, Barthes was lurching between listless misery and lacerating agony, sometimes waking up in the middle of the night wracked by thoughts of suicide.

Barthes’s seminar on love was, ostensibly, about a fictional version of just this situation. The course, he announced at the beginning of the year, would examine the “lover’s discourse” in Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther. Written two centuries earlier, as Goethe grappled with an unrequited love of his own, the novel recounted the title character’s romantic obsession with a young woman, Charlotte, which eventually drives him to kill himself. The novel inspired a wave of Wertherian suicides across Europe, but Goethe himself, Barthes noted, had escaped Werther’s fate by writing a novel about him. Barthes did not say aloud, but may have hoped, that he could do the same for himself by lecturing about the novel, in a strategy, self-therapeutic no less than pedagogy, of talking about Goethe’s escape from love through art as an escape of his own from love through commentary.

If Goethe had sublimated his feelings in a coherent, masterful work of art, however, Barthes took a different approach, eschewing any sort of conventional unity for his lectures. On the first day of the course, he introduced it by arguing that although we often talk about love, including our own, as a story with a beginning, middle, and end, we experience it as a disorienting series of isolated moments.

When we look at love from the outside—for example, as readers of a romantic novel—we can imagine it progressing, through a series of difficulties and pleasures, to its tragic or joyous conclusion. But when we are in love, we don’t see a path. We don’t understand how our confused and contradictory feelings, our alternatingly joyous and dim visions of the beloved, can be reconciled into a whole. These discordant states of feeling, each coming into language in its own fragment of discourse, form in Barthes’s account not the raw material of a narrative but so many distinct voices.

Aiming to make his students experience for themselves love’s dizzying multiplicity, Barthes moved in each lecture through a variety of apparently unrelated themes. Over the weeks of his seminar, he tracked the changing emotional states, as expressed in Werther and other texts, through which someone in love drifts. To capture the way such a person is pulled unpredictably from one emotional state to another, and from one way of talking to another, he isolated and labeled several such fragments, then arranged them alphabetically. Each of his lectures would be composed of several of these units, related to one another solely on the basis of alphabetical order.

The plan immediately broke down. He gave the first proper lecture, in the second week of the course, on the ravissement of falling in love—as the word connotes in both French and English, the experience of being seized and drawn upward by a deity, in the manner of both the Christian Rapture and the love affairs of Zeus. This lecture was out of alphabetical sequence, Barthes admitted, but he rationalized that love is like that, disorganizing even our attempts to represent its disorganization. We are always surprised to find ourselves in love, and in love with this specific person. Once in love, we are, in a sense, out of place, “atopic.” Obsessed with our image of the beloved, we become ill at ease in company and by ourselves, unable to fit into our usual groups or routines. We are amazed that everyone else is still so wholeheartedly involved in what, from the perspective of lovers, seems like futile business and idle chatter. Coming without warning, love takes lovers out of the world. Returning to the world (and alphabetical order), Barthes devoted the following week’s lecture to the word aime—as in je t’aime, “I love you.”

Barthes used strange linguistic arguments to justify his decision to focus on this conjugated form of the infinitive aimer (“to love”). The verb love, he said ought to have no infinitive. In other verbs, the infinitive exercises a “metalinguistic role,” placing our attention in a “neutral position” from which we focus only on the act abstracted from any actor. But in our actual experience, we never take such a neutral position toward love. Loving always “implies a subject-position” and has to be conjugated (I love, you love, etc.). A “true grammar” (italics his) would reveal that loving is unlike any other activity, cannot be considered apart from a subject—and, why not, an object—to form the phrase “I love you.”

“I love you,” Barthes went on, comes “without context.” It is a “cry” that constantly echoes in the heart of the lover and can erupt at any moment into discourse. “I love you” appears suddenly out of our vast, unknown inner life, like a “fallen meteor.” (The metaphor is revealingly bad; astronomers can see meteors coming.) Neither does “I love you” have “isotopy.” This was a concept from linguistics that had only recently been developed by Algirdas Greimas to refer to the expectations that a word or phrase creates about what is to follow. But in the case of love, Barthes argued, if we wonder about the “the preceding message” that was said just before “I love you,” we are bound to be misled. Love comes out of the blue, just like that, with no explanation.

Certainly, that was how his argument seemed to be proceeding. With purple language about cries of the heart and fallen meteors, as well as recently invented jargon that must have been obscure to many in the audience, Barthes was insisting that “‘I love you’” can appear anywhere, anytime, and thus should not be analyzed in terms of its “context.”

Such a claim should make us suspicious. If taken seriously, it would convey that “I love you” as a unit of meaning always means the same thing. Context, after all, is that which we use to distinguish among what we would ordinarily take to be the various senses of “I love you” (or any other phrase). One may find oneself, for example, saying “I love you” as an apology, a plea, a reproach—and perhaps infinitely many other things—depending on the specific conversation and relationship in which one says it. Barthes denied that these contextual considerations had any relevance to the analysis of “I love you,” which always comes into language in the same, contextless way.

The timing and content of Barthes’s lecture on “I love you” raise questions—in defiance of his injunctions, or in a secret fidelity to his real intentions—about its context. What moved him, as a thinker and as a lover, to take “I love you” for his theme at just this moment? One way to answer the question would be to consider, as Barthes enjoined us not to, a “preceding message.” He had written in his diary the night before, “The idea occurs to me, scathingly, that R[oland] never answers my letters and usually doesn’t even acknowledge having received them.”4Roland Barthes, “Chronologie et premier index,” Fonds Roland Barthes, NAF 28630 (9), Bibliothèque Nationale de France [unpaginated], entry for Jan. 22, 1975.

Barthes had first confessed to Havas that he loved him five months earlier. This was the only instance of telling Havas “I love you” that Barthes recorded in his diary, which does, however, reveal his almost constant anxiety, pain, and grief over his student’s “muteness,” his inability to reciprocate Barthes’s feelings and unwillingness to respond to what Barthes said and wrote to him. The section of the lecture that followed Barthes’s pseudolinguistic remarks on love addressed, precisely, the problem of silence. He argued, in a reversal of his actual, personal situation, that the silence torturing the lover is not the silence of the beloved, but his own.

Seeming to suddenly remember that the course was supposed to be about Goethe’s novel, Barthes declared that Werther had been driven to suicide because he had been unable to say “I love you” to Charlotte. The unspoken avowal “putrefied” in him, leading to fatal despair. Werther thus appeared as the tragic story of a “mute lover” who could have been cured if he had revealed his feelings. The lover who speaks, in contrast, can begin “refashioning” and releasing his passion. Breaking his own silence is the first and most important step the lover must take to rescue himself from the pain of love.

Alone at night, Barthes suffered from Havas’s silence, but in the light of day, before an audience, he could turn his suffering inside out. Despite the unhappiness that had followed his declaration of love to Havas, Barthes was now telling students that Werther proved that the lover “should always say ‘I-love-you!’” (as one hurried word) regardless of the consequences. Otherwise, thoughts of love would form a deadly “blockage” inside him—as if such thoughts were not still a blockage inside Barthes, months after he had said “I love you” to Havas, and as if his lecture, in which he said, under the cover of citation, “I love you” again and again, was not only another sort of continued, unanswered address to his beloved student.

If Havas and the other students were two distinct audiences, to whom Barthes’s lecture spoke in different registers, Barthes was also talking, in a third register, to himself. In this passage he seems to have been reassuring himself that, all the evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, he was better off than Werther. Having made his declaration to Havas, he had escaped the greatest danger, suicide—however narrow or unsecured an escape that might be.

Agonized by the “muteness” of his beloved, Barthes justified having admitted his feelings. The lover must say “I love you,” or die! But as he transitioned to the next section of his lecture, shifting from linguistics to psychoanalysis, Barthes recognized that “I love you” is not just a statement, but a “demand” that expects a response. It is, he further asserted, inevitably disappointed.

Absolute Lack


Here, Barthes turned to the work of Jacques Lacan. Psychoanalysis was then one of the most important discourses in French intellectual life, and Lacan was its most (self-)important spokesman. Not without reason, Barthes justified his resort to psychoanalysis by explaining that it offered the only conceptual vocabulary for discussing love that would be taken seriously by his contemporaries. But psychoanalysis was not just one of the epistemological bases of the age. It was a frequent subject of discussion between Barthes and Havas, who was in training to become an analyst. In his lecture, Barthes sharpened Lacanian theory into a weapon against his beloved, using it to argue that beloveds, in general, are insignificant objects of misguided fantasies.

Barthes gave a summary of Lacanian theory based more on conversations with Havas than the still scant quantity of Lacan’s published writings and seminars. As Barthes explained it, Lacan teaches us that we remain, throughout our lives, in the position of children longing for our mother’s love, seeking more or less tolerable symbolic substitutes. As infants, we call out for our mother when she is physically separated from us. In the first years of life, we begin to develop language, learning not only to make these calls with words rather than screams and sobs but to be satisfied with a linguistic rather than physical response. “Mommy’s here,” said in a warm and tender voice, becomes as pleasurable as being held or suckling at the breast, or even more so. From then on, our longing for intimacy—the caring presence of another person—is expressed and answered more and more in symbolic terms, through language, rather than in the direct meeting of bodies.

“I love you,” Barthes added, is the paradigm of this substitution of word for flesh. We say it to reveal our experience of “absence,” of being separate from others and uncared for by them. We hope that, by saying it, we will be met, as we were as infants, with “the message of presence,” a reciprocal “I love you.” This phrase is a plea “to be recognized,” begging the beloved: “Be there. Speak to me. Love me.” It is an echo of the child’s first cries when its mother is absent, the cries that are the origin of language itself—as though, just as all our desires derive from our fundamental, infantile longing for our mother, all our discourse, as a substitute for her absence, shouts out “I love you!” yet means “Love me!”

Imagine, Barthes told his audience, “the case, improbable but hoped for,” in which, “in one flash, simultaneously,” two lovers tell each other “I love you.” It would be the “joyous mirror, the fulfillment” of desire—for an instant. “From absolute satisfaction” in such a mutual embrace would only surge an unmediated awareness of “absolute lack,” the “bitterness” of knowing that even when we get what we think we want, we cannot be lastingly happy. The cycle of illusion would begin again, with some new object of desire deluding us with the promise that it could give us the sense of plenitude that only God and our mothers—with whom, as living adults, we can hope for no blissful union—offer us in our prayers or memories.

Werther needed to tell Charlotte “I love you,” then, regardless of the consequences, because whether he were to feel the disappointment of rejection or the inevitable disillusionment of an actual romantic relationship, he would in either case realize that she, like any beloved, was not what he really wanted. Werther was in love only with a “fetishized” ideal, investing in his image of this dull young woman all the wonderful qualities and promise of joy that mothers have in the eyes of their infants, who, once grown, can never again experience such ecstasy and contentment. Charlotte herself, Barthes noted, is “boring.”

From the Lacanian point of view as adopted by Barthes, the task of the lover—the person demanding love—is to speak his “truth” (“I love you”) in order to grasp the greater truth of his, and humankind’s, condition: that every love is a passing substitute for the love we have lost forever. The lover needs to confess his love not because the answer, whatever it might be, will satisfy his “lack,” but because he should rid himself as quickly as possible of this specific desire and its corollary delusion that the beloved is somehow different from his or her equally unsatisfying predecessors.

As if to prove that language is the play of substitutions, Barthes had now provided (in the space of only a few pages of notes, equivalent to perhaps fifteen minutes of lecturing) no less than three different accounts of “I love you.” He did not signal how different they were from each other, or clearly mark the transitions from one to another.

The first account presented “I love you” as a contextless burst directly from the lover’s anguish. Its precedents and consequences are not of interest, and it does not appear as something said deliberately to achieve some desired end. “I love you” is a meteor that falls to earth, dangerous and strange, but not something prompting questions about intent or significance.

In his second version of things, Barthes analyzed “I love you” as a phrase said by a lover who surmounts an inner resistance that has been keeping his feelings silenced. Here “I love you” is deliberate and consequential. If the lover can say it, he rescues himself from the worst of his suffering; if he cannot say it, he dies. While the first account analyzed “I love you” as something that unpredictably forces its way into speech despite the intentions of the speaker, the second account treated it as a therapy that lovers should perform on themselves. “I love you” was no longer a meteor crashing over the lover’s head but a courageous, salutary choice to speak what he felt.

Now Barthes had given yet a third account of “I love you.” Although he had begun the lecture by arguing, through rather bizarre employments of linguistic concepts, that the word love is unlike other words, here he claimed, with the help of Lacan, that “I love you” is in fact the hidden template of all speech. Saying “I love you,” from this psychoanalytic perspective, is neither a contextless eruption nor a courageous decision, but a revelation of the unconscious and its relationship to language. Everything we say is a lover’s discourse addressed to an absent mother.

What Barthes’s students—and Havas in particular—made of the lecture is impossible to say. We should keep in mind, as we consider it, that it was delivered with a voice, a look, a body, shaken, inwardly and perhaps outwardly, by desire, to an audience that was likely uncomfortable and perplexed. Sitting in the crowded classroom, alongside colleagues and friends (and perhaps his fiancée), Havas would have heard Barthes say “I love you” dozens of times over the course of the lecture.

Where, and how, did Barthes direct his gaze as he said it? Steadily at Havas? Stealthily? Or, knowing that his student would know to whom this phrase was addressed, did he glance indifferently at one member of the audience, then another, or into some blank middle distance, as if the I and you were only grammatical units, not two real people in the room? As Barthes spoke, again and again, the words that expressed his feelings, did Havas blush or shudder? Was he already past being embarrassed or flattered by such scenes? Perhaps sensing that something was amiss, did the other students awkwardly avert their eyes, titter meaningfully to one another, slump in resigned confusion?

From Desire to Theory


Whatever the audience made of Barthes’s lectures, generations of readers of the book that resulted from them, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, have been, since its publication in 1977, almost unanimous in their praise of its masterful analysis of love.5Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978). First published 1977 as Fragments d’un discours amoureux. Moving, like the lectures, from one fragment to another, the book has appeared as a kind of theoretical kaleidoscope whose shifts in perspective reveal, as Barthes biographer Tiphaine Samoyault puts it, “an experience that belong[s] to all,” the universal structure of love.6Tiphaine Samoyault, Barthes: A Biography, trans. Andrew Brown (Cambridge, England: Polity, 2017), 398. First published 2015 as Roland Barthes, Biographie.

In connection with their analysis of the lectures that led to A Lover’s Discourse, present-day Barthes scholars and biographers do mention, with varying degrees of hagiographic discretion, his infatuation with Havas. In his introduction to the published edition of the lectures, Eric Marty, one of Barthes’s former students, traces how Barthes transformed personal suffering, first into a diary recording his romantic longing, then into the lectures, and finally into the book. Samoyault follows the same course, moving, apparently with Barthes, from the private pain of unreciprocated love through the work of thinking, arriving at a theory of love applicable to any lover. She argues that while Barthes “does bring his personal experience into play, this is only while placing it at a distance and insofar as it can help the structures to be displayed.”7Ibid., 396.

The theorist ascends, it seems, from the crushingly private experience of a contingent love affair to the impersonal essence of love as such. Presenting such an account of Barthes’s thinking about love, such scholars give readers new iterations of a common vision of the relationship between living and thinking that has been handed down to us since Plato’s Symposium. We start, so it goes, with our own singular desires before, in a movement that could be described either as propelled by or in flight from them, coming to recognize truths about what love, or human nature, is like. This knowledge is theoretical insofar as it moves us from the specific and concrete to the universal and abstract.

With concepts from linguistics and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Barthes traced his own version of this passage from desire to theory, the personal to the general, and love to disillusionment, in his lecture on “I love you.” Few readers appear to have been struck by the stark incoherence of his claims—or the madness of having delivered them to the man with whom he was so unhappily in love!

Barthes’s analysis of “I love you” as a contextless “cry” and unsatisfiable “demand” was only apparently an egress from his painful enthrallment to desire into the soothing generality of theory. It reassured him that, through the power of thought, he could make Havas appear to be an arbitrary, fungible object—like the other student-lovers he had so easily moved among before—not a precious, singular, irreplaceable person who would never love him in return. It reassured him, too, that it didn’t matter that Havas refused him.

After years of successfully pursuing students, Barthes had finally become fixated on one who wouldn’t return his interest. He had, as it were, chosen someone to break his heart. But no, Barthes insisted, this is the way love always is, for everyone.

Scientific and Unsubtle


Theory, by telling us what a thing “is like,” essentially, in general, relieves us of having to ask what it is like for us—and who it reveals us to be. Ironically, this was just what Barthes had claimed to despise about theory in Roland Barthes, the experimental autobiography he finished just before his lectures on love—and as he was falling in love with Havas. Theory, whether as political ideology, psychoanalysis, the science of language and culture, or in any other form, seems unable to account for the singularity of one’s own life. Or, putting it the other way around, Barthes argued that he could not take the same approach as his leftist fellow travelers in China, “because I don’t have the same body that they do; my body can’t get the hang of generality.” He asked himself—and did not answer—whether this was “an individualist perspective? Don’t we find this in a Christian…like Kierkegaard?”8Barthes, Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes, 747. This was the only reference to Søren Kierkegaard in Roland Barthes. Indeed, Barthes hardly ever mentioned the Danish philosopher. But the book is deeply and explicitly engaged with the thought of another—though notoriously anti-Christian—individualist, Friedrich Nietzsche.

“Always think about Nietzsche,” Barthes instructed himself toward the conclusion of Roland Barthes: “We are scientific because we lack subtlety.”9Ibid., 735. Those who purport to know the essence of something—those who would even wish for such a knowledge—are “scientific” and “unsubtle” in that they cannot attend to “difference,” all the innumerable variations that make each instance “of something” an incomparably unique singularity. They lack, or rather are frightened of, such a sensitivity to difference because they do not want to have to understand themselves as personally, passionately involved in what they are trying to know. They want to abstract themselves from their own analysis, to exempt their own motives from investigation, to relieve themselves of having to ask what the topic of their research means to them, in the specific context of their own lives. They ask “What (is X like)?” to avoid asking “Who (does my interest in X reveal me to be)?” To acquire the spirit of subtlety necessary to perceive “difference” where the timid, supposedly objective seekers after knowledge see only sameness, one must risk becoming aware of one’s own investment, the “confusion, shaking, obsession” that calls one’s search for knowledge onward.

Roland Barthes can be read as an attack on the very idea of theory—and a prescient critique both of Barthes’s academic inheritors and of his own apparently fatuous theorizing on love the following year. Barthes scholars and biographers of today celebrate his prowess at processing the raw material of the personal into a final product: theory. They thus misunderstand how Barthes’s theorization of love in his course appears both as an inability to live up to the mission he had set for himself in his autobiography and as a former theorist’s desperate lapse back into its generalizations, abstractions, and self-unknowingness. His analysis of love thus appears not as a triumph but as a failure.

Thinking about Nietzsche, and trying to escape theory, Barthes knew, were not without such risks. A decade earlier, during the period of their close friendship, Foucault, in dialogue with philosopher Gilles Deleuze, made a similar argument in his 1964 paper “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx.” Foucault claimed that after Nietzsche, “interpretation will always henceforth be interpretation of the ‘who?’…who is interpreting.” Thinking would no longer be an effort to achieve an objective science or universally applicable theory, but an ever more subtle “psychology” that asked why such-and-such a thinker thought such-and-such a thought, even at the risk that this “circular” self-questioning might end in “insanity.”10Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” in Nietzsche: colloque de Royaumont (Paris, France: Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 193–201.

Such a declaration was actually no less imperious and impersonal than the sort of theory it meant to overthrow. In its sweeping imperatives, Foucault’s appropriation of Nietzsche had what Barthes would refer to in Roland Barthes as the “arrogance” of the “militant,” who tells us how things are and what we should do. It is only superficially different from the other two forms of arrogance—which it seems to oppose—that of objective “knowledge” and common sense, or “Doxa.” Even when exponents of a radical break with all previous forms of thinking declare their intention to smash hierarchies, democratize knowledge, or let uninhibited enjoyment circulate, even when they threaten to expose the mystifications by which oppressors legitimate domination, they sound hierarchical, elitist, inhibited, mystifying, oppressive, and domineering. They are on the side of theory.

Barthes wished in Roland Barthes for a gentler Nietzscheanism, one without “arrogance,” aggression, or displays of pseudotransgression—one that could not become another instance of the performative contradictions that belie Foucault’s apparent radicalism. Where Foucault, following Nietzsche, had called for a new “psychology” that would expose the personal stakes of thinking for a specific thinker, Barthes adumbrated the possibility of a “carnivalesque” style of thinking that would “dramatize” them—revealing them in the play of different voices rather than in the authoritative monologue of the self-knowing subject.

Instead of universal truths about structures and essences, the knowledge that came from such a teaching would grant “the power of difference” to attend ever more closely to the uniqueness of each situation, and each person trying to understand it. Instead of aiming, as Foucault did, to answer the question of “Who?” in a straightforward telling—a procedure that, as Foucault himself recognized, presupposed an impossible and insanity-inducing pursuit of self-transparency—the carnivalesque teacher would raise the question in a circuitous showing.

Barthes’s lecture on “I love you,” delivered four months after he finished writing Roland Barthes, may have been a ridiculous failure, in which the archcritic of theory hid behind a series of sweeping and self-contradictory claims about what love, always and everywhere, is like—even as he hoped, desperately, that these assertions might wound, provoke, or otherwise act on his beloved in such a way as to exempt Barthes’s own case from his claim that love is always disappointing. It might, however, have been the first trial of the carnivalesque mode, in which, by their very absurdity, his claims’ obvious discordance with each other and with his actual situation would incite students, and readers, to think.

We do not have to choose between these two possibilities to decide whether Barthes was the conscious director or unconscious dupe of the drama of his lecture. Let us take “the lover’s discourse” to include what Barthes, as a theorist, said that “the lover” says, but also what Barthes himself, as a lover, said—taking for granted that for Barthes, or for any one of us, to speak is to be the site of encounter between conscious and unconscious meanings, addressed to multiple audiences. From this perspective, love and theory, desire and thinking, do not appear as two distinct stages in an ascent from the singular to the universal, and the private to the objective—nor, in Foucault’s Nietzschean maneuver, are claims to general knowledge reduced to the peculiar psychological characteristics of their claimants. Rather, we find a single constitutive human longing, epistemic and erotic, reaching out toward what eludes and exceeds saying—and find that if the nature of this longing cannot be rightly explained in theory (whether as science, psychoanalysis, philosophy, or anything else), it can be intimated in performance.

The Truth Is in the Detail

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