Wednesday, January 28, 2015

Barry Schwabsky

Barry Schwabsky

GOETHE'S NIGHTMARE

In the early years of the twenty-first century, reports began to emerge in the Western press of a 'painting village' in China filled with workers, rather than artists, assiduously painting copies of the masterpieces of Western art as if on an assembly line. In her recent book, Winnie Won Ying Wong recalls some of the headlines: 'Van Gogh from the Sweatshop', 'Chinese Village Paints by Incredible Numbers', 'Van Gogh, Gauguin: Cheaper by the Dozen'. [1] The 'urban village' of Dafen—in reality, a high-rise suburb—lies on the outskirts of Shenzhen, the booming Special Economic Zone across the straits from Hong Kong. Here, in 1989, Huang Jiang, a painter and businessman, set up a workshop employing twenty-six apprentices, mainly teenagers recruited from Fujian or Guangdong. The enterprise was successful and expanded fast, selling its products to American retailers like K-Mart and publishing, as Wong explains, annual catalogues containing over two hundred works: 'French beaux-arts genre scenes, American minimalism, Bouguereau, Thomas Kinkade, and more.' Huang's workshop attracted others, and was soon staffed by thousands of painters. As Wong notes, the annual entrance examination for the Guangdong Academy of Fine Arts attracts 120,000 applicants, of whom only 1,225 are accepted; Dafen offered an alternative for those who had already undergone the rigorous preparation for the Academy's exam as well as artistically inclined young people who never had access to such training. By the time Western visitors began to arrive, Dafen had become to commercial art what Helmand is to heroin, reportedly cranking out more than half the world's supply. By 2007, as Philip Tinari put it in Artforum, the 'village' was 'a dense warren of alleyways and six- and seven-storey concrete buildings, containing nothing but apartments and workshops dedicated to oil painting'.

Western curiosity about Dafen—in which, Wong suggests, anxiety is leavened with condescension—seems to encapsulate myriad concerns about increasing political and economic competition from China, while wrapping them up in issues specific to the aesthetic field: questions about the dialectic between 'original' and 'reproduction' that have been unavoidable since Marcel Duchamp and Walter Benjamin, and others that have been manifest since the birth of modernism: what is painting? Who is an artist? Wong, an assistant professor of rhetoric at Berkeley—this is her first book, based on research for her doctoral dissertation at mit—is well placed to untangle the knot that ties aesthetic and political concerns together at 'the world's largest production centre for hand-painted art products'. She comes armed with a sophisticated understanding of the complexities and contradictions of the discourse of aesthetics, but hers is also a sturdily empirical study, grounded in five years of field work (2006–2010) encompassing not just Dafen but 'production and retail sites throughout China, the United States, and Europe'.

Wong's interest is squarely on the production side. She emphasizes that her methodology encompasses both art-historical and ethnographic aspects. As she explains:

I began my participant observation in 2007 through a typical succession of roles, first approaching the site as an individual consumer, then serving as an interpreter and guide to tourists and buyers (including art historians, curators, and artists). I soon learned to order and sell paintings at a small scale. I then spent several months learning to paint in the workshop of a Van Gogh painter, a typical entry-level training for an aspiring trade painter.

One might wish that she had also investigated the end-consumers of these 'art products'. What do the people who hang copies of Van Gogh in their homes think of them? How do they choose? Likewise, a deeper sense of the social background of the men and women who make up the workforce of Dafen would have been helpful. Wong characterizes these 'provincials who faithfully desire the meritorious centre' as rural migrants, excluded from legal residence in China's cities; but beyond this, she gives little sense of either the individual trajectories that brought them to Dafen or the larger social and economic shifts that conditioned their life choices.

More than most art historians or ethnographers, however, Wong is able to follow the implications of her research into the more rarefied realms of cultural theory and philosophical aesthetics. As one who has come to know the art and the business of 'trade painting' from the inside, as well as through research and theory, Wong evinces a noticeable disdain for earlier commentators whose observations she finds superficial. At times this can be self-defeating, as when she airily dismisses the idea that contemporary art copying might be related to an age-old tradition in Chinese painting—she even encloses the word 'tradition' in scare quotes—but in doing so merely draws attention to the fact that the aesthetic concepts she uses are overwhelmingly of European origin. At the same time, Wong's empathy for the working painters of Dafen, as she takes their side against 'two sets of privileged authors—contemporary artists and the Chinese party-state', only sharpens her book's keen polemical edge.

Van Gogh on Demand begins with a description of an official Copying Competition held at Dafen in 2004, in which over a hundred painters were given three and a half hours to copy an 1883 portrait by Ilya Repin, forerunner of socialist realism, depicter of the Volga boatmen and—for Clement Greenberg in 'Avant-Garde and Kitsch'—the personification of everything that modernism meant to bury: 'Repin predigests art for the spectator and spares him effort, provides him with a short cut to the pleasure of art that detours what is necessarily difficult in genuine art. Repin, or kitsch, is synthetic art.' The Copying Competition, as Wong says, 'appears at first blush to be surreal, absurd, and almost tragi-comic'. Her aim, however, is to reframe the event—and first-blush responses to Dafen in general—by showing that, just as the Chinese seem to misuse Repin, so too do Westerners appear 'primed to misunderstand the complexity of such use'. She does so in order to pose a provocative question:

Do China's highly productive uses of Western history and culture lay claim to an alternative modernist legacy—Western art history (or socialism, or capitalism) with 'Chinese characteristics'? Or does it in fact represent a broader, and even universal fulfilment of modernism's most avant-garde ideals?

In other words: should China's late-twentieth-century development be seen as a new local inflection of universal ideals, articulated in the West since the eighteenth century—'West as precedent and East as follower', as Wong phrases it elsewhere—or rather as portending the genesis of a new universality, to which its Western sources (Kant, Marx, or what you will) should be seen as mere tributaries?

As Wong points out, the modern notion of art emerged in the late eighteenth century, alongside Adam Smith's analysis of the division of labour and the shifting relations of production embodied in the industrial revolution. In his 1797 essay 'Art and Handicraft', Goethe warned that industrialization would affect even the fine arts, conjuring the incubus of a 'great painting factory' whose immense productivity would merely reflect the anonymous mass of 'the common herd' who would consume its products. Wong suggests that in Goethe's lifetime something like this 'painting factory' might already have existed in Guangzhou, where by that time paintings were already being produced in quantity for foreign export.

Goethe's nightmare returned to haunt Western accounts of Dafen, which told of paintings being produced on Fordist assembly lines. According to Wong, such practices are rare; where they occur, they are often loosely organized by friends who find that, faced with a large commission, 'it might be tongkuai (fast and fun) to get the order done together'. Though bosses, brokers and wholesalers like to accumulate prestige by boasting to visitors of their massive factories and minutely ordered production systems, in general painters 'control their own work processes, time, and space'; either they paint the works themselves or they subcontract them to a network of independent studios, which may be staffed by a small group or just a single painter. The 'great painting factory' of Dafen turns out to be no more like a manufacturing plant than was Warhol's Factory in Manhattan—though both undoubtedly house complications for accepted understandings of the circumstances under which art might be produced. Rather than deskilling, Wong contends that the division of labour has led the painters to broader concerns about skill, craft, authenticity and individuality.

While they also produce 'free paintings' on spec, the replicas of existing imagery for which the Dafen painters are best known are made with reference to a gao, an 'image source' supplied without any contextualizing information (even the size of the original). Producing as many as a dozen copies a day, the painters soon eschew the gao, working entirely from memory. In replicating the image, they are not concerned with a detailed reproduction of it. Skill is valued, but measured in other ways. 'Stop looking at the gao', painters exhort their apprentices, echoing the anti-academic directives of late-nineteenth-century Paris; speed and spontaneity rather than exactitude are what make for good painting, not to mention a good income. An experienced painter tells Wong he's stopped doing Impressionists and returned to making Van Goghs—generally considered an easy task for beginners—'because it does not require the extra step of mixing paint'. Warhol, who was always looking for ways to decrease the labour involved in painting, would have nodded in appreciation.

While Warhol did not live long enough to think of outsourcing his production to Dafen, his artistic descendants have taken the hint. Just as journalists were becoming intrigued, Chinese as well as European and American artists began visiting Dafen and contracting with its painters in order to produce works that would be exhibited under their own names at the Venice Biennale, the Guangzhou Triennial and Art Basel, to name just a few. At times Wong can barely contain her contempt for the condescension of visiting artists, who imagine themselves to be 'elevating' the factory artists of Dafen through their conceptual projects. To some extent she gives herself an easy target by taking these endeavours as her exemplars of the international art world; while she rightly treats the conceptualism that derives from the Duchampian readymade as the main current of contemporary art, most of the projects that have involved Dafen trade painting sound like naïvely academic spin-offs. The most engaging of those she describes is precisely the one that dissembles its conceptual underpinnings: a series of purportedly documentary images taken at Dafen by Michael Wolf, an 'American-born, German-trained, and Hong Kong-based photographer'. These are portraits showing Dafen painters with their replicas of contemporary artworks by the likes of Gerhard Richter, On Kawara or William Eggleston, each titled with a number, the name of the copied artist and the price of the copy: #11, Ed Ruscha, $7; or #7, Francis Bacon, $102. The Chinese painters remain unnamed.

Researching another Dafen-based conceptual project, Christian Jankowski's China Painters, Wong meets Yin Xunshi, whom she recognizes as one of the painters depicted by Wolf. Yin tells her that he alone painted most of the art works in Wolf's photographs, and that the people portrayed in them are friends of his who had nothing to do with making them. He is surprised to learn that the photographs were made for exhibition; apparently it had not occurred to him that they were anything but souvenirs. But he is hardly miffed. 'Seeing in me a potential copy of one of his best customers', writes Wong, 'Yin remarked more than once that I could also order paintings from him and make some new photographs à la Wolf.' In her view, Wolf's project is conceptual art masquerading as documentary—she cites Walid Raad's work as The Atlas Group as a parallel. Yet the process relies on dissimulating Yin's authorship—apparently no problem for Yin—and reproducing Western assumptions about the Chinese as copyists indifferent to what they copy. At the same time, the whole chain of coincidence on which the story is built seems suspiciously novelistic; after first wondering to what extent Yin's account could be taken as veracious, I began to suspect that the whole tale could be Wong's invention: is there really a photographer named Michael Wolf who worked at Dafen? A Google search reassured me. Wong's virtuosity in tracking multiple levels of misprision lies precisely in the extent to which she succeeds in arousing scepticism, even toward her own words, rather than lulling the reader into an easy confidence. She points out that the Chinese word for 'translator'—a role she sometimes played in Dafen—means 'someone who literally makes the business doable', and that this can entail strategically encouraging sufficient misunderstanding to keep two parties with conflicting needs satisfied: finding a way 'for each party to see in the project what each required'.

All scepticism stops somewhere, however. At times Wong—as she 'translates' Dafen for her readers—seems to believe she has found an Archimedean point from which to account for all the complementary misunderstandings, without remainder. If there is a blind spot here, it has to do with what she habitually designates as Romanticism, imagined as a realm of (possibly necessary) illusion and self-deception, 'an untenable idea' which enables the painter 'to labour away with the conception that he is an independent artist or artisan, while allowing the consumer to trust that the painting he has bought may well be the work of an independent artist or artisan'. Wong notes in her conclusion that, lurking among the Dafen painters, the conceptual artists and the Chinese Communist Party functionaries who hope to use their 'creativity' for propaganda purposes, is 'the Romantic paradigm of "true art", with its attendant apparatus of auto-genesis, individuality, and romantic love'—this latter emerging as a topos in Chinese television films set in Dafen, which Wong analyses in her least engaging chapter. And yet, as in a theatrical farce in which the happy ending is brought about precisely by all the protagonists working at cross-purposes to each other, it is through their departure from this paradigm that something is accomplished by their interaction. 'When a hidden amanuensis is revealed under the aegis of Romanticism, it would seem an outrage—as if signing one's name on something someone else has painted was fraudulent', she suggests. Yet 'in the "contemporary" context (the context in which the romance of the studio was dismantled along with the cult of individuality, the fetish of aura, and the myth of originality), it appears somehow canny and ironic, as if it has overturned a narrative or set up a paradox.'

What Wong overlooks is that irony and paradox, theatrical dissembling and collaborative ebullience are just as much a part of the Romantic constellation as sincerity and individuality, if not more so—think of Wilhelm Meister's apprenticeship in the theatre, or the paeans to irony in Schlegel's fragments. Around Dafen, fictions and ironies multiply. And in a globalized economy, the precious creative self begins to lose its aura of uniqueness: 'Everywhere we find our own doppelgangers', Wong writes, 'for everywhere we can find replacements for our labour'. What is more a creature of the Romantic era than a doppelganger? It is a tribute to the way that Wong enters into this spirit of irony that in places, as in the account of Wolf, I began to suspect her of crossing the line between scholarship and fable. At one point a Dafen painter offers to write Wong's dissertation for her—after all, he knows more about the subject than she does and, as it turns out, he is also an experienced ghost writer of internal policy documents for local Party officials. The encounter leads her to reflect that the ethic proper to her academic calling means she must internalize the very 'Romance' she is deconstructing, for 'the contemporary writer, like the contemporary artist, is deeply embedded in a market of the self', a self that should not be supplemented by another's labour. It is undoubtedly true that, as Wong points out, 'the delegation, substitution and replacement of one person's hand with another's is all the more disarming when it's unvexed', as it is in Dafen. But once it comes within the purview of an investigator or a theorist, some vexation is bound to arise.

Wong never registers an aesthetic judgment of taste; she never says that Dafen painting in general is art, or that a particular Dafen painting is a work of art. She merely claims that everything Dafen painters do is done in conditions 'exactly like' (her italics) 'the flexible, specialized and bespoke mode of global production in which contemporary artists function'. And that's all it takes for her to tax with prejudice all those 'who are sure in their knowledge that Dafen painting is "not art".' In her telling, Dafen painting might be said to be conducting a kind of unwitting psychoanalysis of Western aesthetics. For every assertion made about creativity, reproduction, authorship, collaboration, authenticity, spontaneity or method, it seems to simply repeat the same idea in the form of a question. After Paul Gauguin, it asks, 'In art, there are only two types of people: revolutionaries and plagiarists?' After Sol LeWitt, it asks, 'The fewer decisions made in the course of completing the work, the better?' After Joseph Beuys, it asks, 'Everyone is an artist?' The practices of the painters of Dafen may serve to deconstruct established notions of authorship, originality, art and their opposites, as Wong suggests; but if what makes art conceptual is—as she believes—that it involves the production, not just of paintings or any other sort of art object, but more importantly of a properly 'artistic self' or 'authorial persona', then we are still well and truly in the grip of a Romantic Bildungsroman. A rural Chinese migrant who has never had any chance of entering an art academy or even of obtaining a permit for legal urban residency in a city like Shenzhen is unlikely to be able to forge such a self or persona, but perhaps equally unlikely to resent this. That's what it means to have an 'unvexed' relation to the act or art of copying. Wong, in resenting it on his behalf, is a true daughter of the Romantics.




[1] Winnie Won Yin Wong, Van Gogh on Demand: China and the Readymade, University of Chicago Press: Chicago 2014, $35 320 pp, 978 0226 02489 9

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Monday, January 26, 2015

Can art still shock?

Can art still shock?

Is Grayson Perry right – can we no longer be outraged by art and literature? From Manet's Olympia to Pussy Riot and Houellebecq, Adam Thirlwell presents a short history of shock

Olympia by Édouard Manet. Photograph: Corbis

Friday 23 January 2015 17.15 GMT

For a long time, I've been nostalgic for the era of shock. It's with a certain fondness that I reflect on the crazed year of 1857, which began with Gustave Flaubert in court for his first novel, Madame Bovary (in the presence of a stenographer, hired by Flaubert, for the benefit of an incredulous posterity), followed, six months later, by Charles Baudelaire, on trial for his first book of poems, Les Fleurs du Mal. On both occasions, the unlucky prosecutor was Ernest Pinard, who lamented "this unhealthy fever which induces writers to portray everything, to describe everything, to say everything". The era of grand trials! Or if not trials, then scandales: like the first night of Stravinsky's Rite of Spring in 1913, with its catcalling audience; or Duchamp's impish Fountain – his notorious urinal, signed by R Mutt, submitted to the exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists in New York in 1917, but rejected by its committee.

I was nostalgic because it seemed to me that shock was no longer possible. Or, perhaps more precisely, shock was no longer admissible. We are all, pronounced Grayson Perry, bohemians now – and therefore unshockable by art. And if this is true, it signals a grand and maybe melancholy shift in the nature of art, and in the relation of art to society. It also appears to me – considering, let's say, Pussy Riot and Ai Weiwei – a slightly provincial argument. And then came the attack on Charlie Hebdo.

Naturally, the discussion that followed was about the right to offend, and the potential geopolitical imbalances of such offence. But even more urgent it seems is to define what offence might be at all. To be shocking, to be offensive: the meaning of these noble terms might not be obvious. There are so many variants of shock. What might be necessary, for more precise orientation, is some kind of shock genealogy.

Marcel Duchamp's Fountain (1917). Photograph: Alfred Stieglitz/AP

And the place to start, both symbolically and historically, is Paris.

Imagine that you are in 1865, at the Salon in Paris, looking at the paintings. You are, in this experiment with time travel, a critic. But you are not looking at the classical allegories with their cherubs and porpoises, or the sodden northern landscapes. Instead, you are laughing at a painting of a nude. The title of this painting is Olympia, and the artist is Édouard Manet. Yes, here you are among the connoisseurs of shock – in the crammed atmosphere of Room M, listening to the way the critics talk among themselves. Olympia looks like a gorilla or monkey, they are saying, and the hand draped over her crotch looks like a spider or a claw. She is made of india rubber. Definitely she is unwashed, and the sooty marks of her cat's paws can be seen all over her sheets. If, that is, anything can be made out at all: because really she is formless, inconceivable, a blur where there should be a body.

We are so used to the idea that the history of modernism represents a heroic succession of shock artists that it's rather touching to observe how downcast Manet was by this reaction. He wrote a bedraggled letter to his friend Baudelaire: "I really would like you here, my dear Baudelaire; they are raining insults on me, I've never been led such a dance." (To which Baudelaire admittedly replied in the full regalia of modernist panache: "What you ask from me is truly stupid. People are making fun of you; jokes annoy you; no one does you justice … Do you think you're the first person to be placed in this position?") But then, Manet wasn't exaggerating. This painting, wrote critic and philosopher Georges Bataille, was "the first masterpiece before which the crowd fairly lost all control of itself".

Now of course, to the innocent tourist in 2015 standing in front of this painting – which depicts a woman naked on a bed, her two companions a black woman bringing flowers, and a cat – such loss of control might just seem another episode from the history of 19th-century hysteria. But it is at least worth considering whether the contemporary critics were correct – not, perhaps, in how they theorised their reaction, but in having such a reaction. Not to be shocked at all might represent the greater obtuseness.

Sure, the scandal was to some degree purely to do with subject matter: that Manet had apparently so frankly depicted a prostitute. And some of it was to do with form: that Manet had apparently so frankly made his painting an exercise in sketched flatness. Those shocks were perhaps specific to the 19th-century atmosphere. But they were also just surface shocks. The deeper shock, as Bataille observed, was how no sign-system was useful in understanding Olympia. The painting could neither be defined according to "the drab world of naturalistic prose", nor its opposite, the universe of "absurd academic fictions". Manet's genius and the true source of the bourgeois outrage was his ability to "disappoint expectation": "instead of the theatrical forms expected of him, Manet offered up the starkness of 'what we see'. And each time it so happened that the public's frustrated expectation only redoubled the effect of shocked surprise produced by the picture." The greatness of the art was that it changed the nature of the form. The shock was just a side effect.

Let Olympia, therefore, stand as a mini maquette of shock: the immediate improprieties of subject matter – prostitutes! The working classes! – followed by the more hidden improprieties of form. And yet none of this might be visible in the present moment. There's a wonderful chapter in TJ Clark's 1985 book The Painting of Modern Life, where he analyses the shock of Olympia, at the beginning of which he assembles the manic archive of contemporary criticism: all the chatter of the Salon virtuosi. The shock, he observes, simply created a failure of criticism. For in the present moment of outrage, there might be only absence, and frustration.

This creates one final, hidden complication: the more blankly frustrated a critic feels, the more she might also suspect that the entire operation was a deliberate joke. In a minor article on Olympia by a minor hack, A Bonnin, a rumour is reported that Manet's painting was just "a parti pris on his part, a sort of ironic defiance hurled at the jury and the public". (It's true, Bonnin adds, that other people also tried to argue for Manet's sincerity, but in the end no one could really know: "His canvases are too unfinished for us possibly to tell.")

Pussy Riot perform in front of Saint Basil's Cathedral in Moscow, 2012. Photograph: Anna Artemeva/Getty

There's something dubious about shock, something dirty and vulnerable to our purer disdain. Is shock anything other than a stunt tactic – an episode not from the history of art but of publicity? It's that worry that lay behind the Salon chatter, and also the celebrated preface the Goncourt Brothers wrote, in the same year as Olympia, to their realist novel Germinie Lacerteux, where they posed the basic question: "Why have we written it? Is it just to shock the public and scandalise its tastes?" (Absolutely not, was the Goncourts' noble answer. Their motives were entirely moral.)

Shock, it has to be admitted, is not chic. It is so often seen as juvenile, meretricious, boring. Even in 1865, shock was passé.

***

The heroic era of shock begins about a century earlier, with the Enlightenment writings of Voltaire, Diderot and co. The Enlightenment was a criminal publishing operation – their manuscripts so shocking that they had to be sent to Amsterdam to be printed and then smuggled back into France, hidden under straw in fish barrels or in the baggage of sympathetic diplomats. When the network failed, the consequences were gothic. Of one seizure, when three people were arrested, Diderot wrote to Sophie Volland: "They have been pilloried, flogged, and branded, and the apprentice has been condemned to nine years on the galleys, the colporteur to five years, and the woman to the hospital for her entire life." By hospital he meant madhouse, in the future Soviet punishment style. In their novels and essays, Diderot and his accomplices were intent on dismantling the ruling ideology, and in particular the religio-political complex of the church and the state.

The Enlightenment was a renegade movement. In works such as Candide, or crazier excesses such as De Sade's 120 Days of Sodom, all the ruling codes – political, sexual, semantic – are destabilised or rejected. (Edward Gibbon recorded one dinner he attended with the philosophes in 1763, where everyone "preached the tenets of Atheism with the bigotry of dogmatists, and damned all believers with ridicule and contempt".) It's the Enlightenment where the conjunction of art and shock began, and which is why 100 years later, by 1865, that conjunction was already suspect.

But one way of considering if our weariness is appropriate is to take a geographical sidestep. Yes, we might feel so over shock, in the liberal democracies, but it's worth remembering the fate of shock in countries where the decor is less halcyon. One major heir of Diderot, for instance, is the feminist punk group Pussy Riot – put on trial for offending Russian Orthodox sensibilities after their brief performance, Mother of God, Chase Putin Out, in 2012 in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, in Moscow – of which the definitive study in English is Masha Gessen's acidic book, Words Will Break Cement. Gessen offers the prehistory of Pussy Riot and their trial, including the art collective Voina – to which some Pussy Riot members belonged: "they wanted to confront a language of lies that had once been effectively confronted but had since been reconstructed and reinforced, discrediting the language of confrontation itself. There were no words left." This was the problem Voina faced in the new era of Putin, which led to their happenings in supermarkets and subways – and it finds its retrospective analysis in the precise, restrained closing statements of the three members of Pussy Riot who were put on trial. As Nadya Tolokonnikova outlined it, these punk songs had a philosophical rationale: "We were seeking true sincerity and simplicity and we found them in the holy-fool aesthetic of punk performance." just as the absurdist writers Daniil Kharms and Alexander Vvedensky confronted Soviet terror with nonsense poetry: "They paid with their lives to show that they had been right to believe that senselessness and lack of logic expressed their era best. They made art into history."

Charles Baudelaire c1860. Photograph: Corbis

If a work of art dismantles the ruling ideology, it will be intrinsically offensive to those who continue to believe that ideology. The legacy of the Enlightenment is this savage right to artistic offence, whose credo was summed up in Voltaire's slogan: "I disagree with what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it." (Even if Voltaire was defending another Enlightenment hero, Helvétius, and never said those precise words.) And the "appeal of the Voltairean credo", observed Tom Stoppard, soberly and correctly, "was precisely that it was voluntary, his choice. He was not conceding his antagonist's possession of an overriding right, he was choosing to accord that right. He was putting down a marker for the kind of society he favoured, for an ideal."

It is both the fragility and necessity of that ideal that was so brutally proved by the killings at Charlie Hebdo. While the cartoons for which they died prove a more complicated truth: that offence is a mobile category. Charlie Hebdo is a mini-Enlightenment publication, its hyperactive cartoons an expression of an absolute refusal politically of the ruling powers, and socially of religious belief. Just as in the notorious novel Thérèse Philosophe the Marquis d'Argens mocked the church's pretensions to spiritual guidance, with his pornographic scenes where a priest inspires in a student ecstasies she maintains are purely metaphysical, so the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo mock the Pope, or orthodox rabbis, or the madnesses of Islamism. But the Marquis d'Argens was only speaking to a local audience. Now, the audience is potentially global. The meaning of every work is therefore dependent on a much wider network of oppressions and ideologies. (One new problem of shock and new media is that so often it exists only as a rumour: a work can be freely condemned without being either seen or read.) And so the theorist Mahmood Mamdani can observe, defending the prosecution of cartoonists by the international tribunal into war crimes in Rwanda, that "we need to distinguish between bigotry and blasphemy. Blasphemy is the practice of questioning a tradition from within. In contrast, bigotry is an assault on that tradition from the outside." But making that distinction in Rwanda is simpler than elsewhere. What is inside, and what is outside? If you see the Charlie Hebdo cartoons within a context of recent French internal politics, they may seem expressions of casual contempt. If you see them within a context of global militant Islam, they are expressions of courageous defiance.

***

On 11 May 1929, the writer Michel Leiris went to see Pablo Picasso. In Leiris's journal, their conversation is summed up by the depressed sentence: "At present, there's no means of making something pass as ugly or repulsive. Even shit is pretty." To be nostalgic for the era of shock is a recurring malaise. But Picasso's depression is the symptom of resistance. To make work that passes as ugly is one noble aim for art. Of course, outrage can be fleeting, and manufactured: there can be nothing more superficial than offence. But the usefulness of a small history of shock is to persuade one not to relinquish the concept of shock, but instead to examine it with more agility. And one possible future ideal may be not the fragile pleasures of ideological shock, however noble that may be, but to be shocking anthropologically.

In his book of open letters with Bernard-Henri Lévy, the French novelist Michel Houellebecq distinguished the art of the provocateur – someone who "calculates the phrase or attitude which will provoke in his interlocutor the maximum displeasure or discomfort; and then, rationally, applies the result of his calculation" – from his own novelist's "form of perverse sincerity: I search obstinately, relentlessly, for the worst that might be inside me in order to lay it … at the feet of the public." Like the Goncourts, he wanted to claim that there was nothing tactical in the possibility that his fiction might offend. Whether this is true, of course, is a problem of literary criticism. Houellebecq is a minor star of outrage – with each new work, there is a new accusation: racism, misogyny, and now, with his new novel, Soumission, Islamophobia. (In the week of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, it was Houellebecq who was their cover star.)

And Soumission obeys so many of the usual shock tropes. Its background plot is already notorious – a rumour to be praised or excoriated. In 2022, thanks to a cynical sequence of political deals and machinations, France becomes an Islamic state. When a moderate Muslim Brotherhood party becomes increasingly popular in the polls, the two centrist parties become increasingly marginalised. To maintain a small amount of power, and to counter the far greater threat of a rising National Front, they both offer the Muslim party their support. And so its leader is elected president – and constructs a sketched version of Islamic government. To be a woman in this new world is a dismal prospect. But the economy stabilises, unemployment crashes, the family is a new utopia, and a new religious future seems to be offered to Europe.

But this fantasy is just a contraption for Houellebecq to pursue his true subject. The novel is narrated by a middle-aged male university professor, a specialist in the work of Joris-Karl Huysmans, the 19th-century novelist who converted from aestheticism to Catholicism. His thesis on Huysmans was subtitled "The Exit from the Tunnel", and it is a similar exit from a tunnel that Houellebecq's novel describes. For as always in his novels, modern life is described – with wilful comic terror – as a dead landscape of circumscription and ennui: a desolation of microwave meals, bored sex and smoking bans. In this desolation, there are fleeting moments of hope – such as the love shown him by his Jewish girlfriend Myriam, who decides to emigrate. But the only lasting future hope is conversion. And so the novel ends with the narrator contemplating his future conversion to Islam, superficially for the material benefits (the university salary from Qatari funds; the multiple wives), but really because submission to God is the only way of recovering meaning given the shallowness of a liberal, western democracy. Only religion offers the prospect of "a second life" – even if that future, in the novel, remains hypothetical. Just as the epigraph to the novel, from Huysman's En Route, describes the basic dilemma, as Huysmans' narrator sits in the church of Saint-Sulpice, wondering if he can pray: "I am very much disgusted with my life, very much tired of myself, but there's a long way from there to leading another existence!"

For Houellebecq is the novelist of the impasse. In a pre-publication interview, he stated his basic position: "The Enlightenment is dead, may it rest in peace." This has been his philosophy throughout his career, and it is the source of his deeper affront against the entire project of secular, liberal progress, which is rejected in the melancholy of his prose. The apparent outrages to thesensibilities of others are masks for a greater outrage: an absolute philosophical pessimism, an intellectual ugliness …

***

And yet: I'm not sure that the example of Houellebecq is enough. The forms of his novels are always drably conventional – alternations of conversations and descriptions. Whereas, I keep thinking about Manet's Olympia, and TJ Clark's lovely observation that one source of the public's confusion was a miniature shift: the way Olympia holds the viewer's gaze, unlike the dreamy narcotised eyes of one of his models, Titian's Venus of Urbino. That small shift represented a giant formal refusal – a formal shock that represented a rejection of social norms, too.

The truly shocking work, such as Pussy Riot's punk prayer, will investigate the ideology of its own making. The future works of shock I imagine are as formally adventurous as they are intellectually destructive. I'm not in fact sure that true resistance to ideology is possible without resisting aesthetic conventions. The new shock moves might well be quieter, more low‑rent – in the invention of new forms that are troublesome, and mischievous. A quick list for consultation might include the monologues of Wallace Shawn, such as his great piece The Fever, with its direct address to the complicit audience; or the giant length of Roberto Bolaño's novel 2066, with its meticulously comprehensive descriptions of the murders of hundreds of women in Santa Teresa; or the experiments in curatorial choreography of the artist Philippe Parreno. In other words, one path for investigation might be to disturb the usual compact of distance between the writer and the reader, or the performance and the audience.

The future art work can be as quiet as it likes in the way it shocks. I would just like to make sure that it survives.

• Adam Thirlwell's latest book Lurid & Cute is published by Jonathan Cape.

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简奥斯汀笔下拒绝接受“不”的男人

简奥斯汀笔下拒绝接受"不"的男人

译者: 素夜未央
发表时间:2015-01-24浏览量:347评论数:1挑错数:0

两个世纪以前,简·奥斯汀在她的著作《傲慢与偏见》中写 了一个章节,非常吻合一场持续进行的辩论。这辩论有关性别文化、认同,说"不"的女人和认为她们本意并非如此的男人——即便语境是"礼节文化"而非"勾引 文化"。这个场景的开头是一个被称为柯林斯先生的绅士请求与伊丽莎白·贝纳特单独谈话——这个请求很快就得到了这位年轻女士母亲的允许。

"亲爱的夫人,不要走,"伊丽莎白恳求道,"我求您不要走。柯林斯先生一定会原谅我的。他不会有什么只能说给我听的不可告人的话。"

母亲还是离开了,接着柯林斯先生马上挑明来意,提出了这样的奇念:伊丽莎白对于独处的谨慎态度只会增加他对她的敬意。

"相 信我,亲爱的……至今,您的内敛不但无损于您,反而让您更完美,"他说,"如果没有这些小别扭,您在我眼中不会这么可亲;但是请允许我向你保证——这番话 我己获令慈允可。对于我这番话的目的,您可能并无疑义,尽管您敏感的天性可能会让您有所掩饰;我的关注如此明显,您不可能错会。我几乎在刚踏进房间时就选 定您作为我未来的人生伴侣了。"

接着他对此进行了一番论证:

"我结婚的原因,首先是我认为每一个生活安逸的牧师(比如我自 己)都应该为他教区树立一个婚姻典范;其次,我坚信这会大大增强我的幸福感;关于第三点,也许我应该早点提及,这是我有幸称之为女恩主的非常高贵的夫人特 意向我提出的建议和意见……她说,'柯林斯先生,你必须结婚。一个像你这样的牧师必须结婚。要正确选择,为了我,你要选择一位淑女;为了你,她应该是那类 活跃的、有用的人,她出生不必高贵,但是能懂得量入为出……我想,她一定能接受你的风趣和活力,特别是当你用这些特质去缓解她那个阶层必然激发的沉默与敬 意时。'

"以上就是我为什么想要结婚的总体原因;但是我仍需要说明为什么我宁愿选择从朗伯恩而不是我的邻居中找伴侣——您要知道,我周围是不乏谦和温柔的年轻女性的。不过现实情况是,在令尊过世后我将要继承他的家产(当然,他应该还会活很久)。有鉴于此,如果不娶他的一个女儿为妻,我 将无法心安理得。只有这样,才能在那桩不幸降临时——当然,正如我所说,这可能还会有很多年——尽可能地减少她们的损失。这就是我的动机,我可爱的表妹, 我窃以为这将无损我在您心中的尊严。现在我唯一要做的是用最生动的语言让您相信我奔涌的情意。对于财产我毫不关心,并且我也无意就此向您的父亲提出要求, 因为我很清楚,提也白提;你所有的财产,可能就是年息四厘的一千英镑,而那也要在令慈过世后您才能继承。对此我将同样保持沉默;您大可放心,婚后您也不决 会从我这儿听到任何小器责备。"

这番话激起了伊丽莎白的抗议:"您太轻率了,先生,"她告诉他。"您忘了我还没有答复您。让我现在就答复您以免浪费更多的时间。对于您的赞美,请接受我的谢意。对于您的求婚,我深感荣幸,却不得不拒绝。"一场不快的交流由此开始,这让她困惑地发现,在这个男人的设想中,女人有时说"不"其实意味着"是"——无论是将之归结为神秘、虚荣,或是伊丽莎白不熟悉的某类女性的行为,或是男性主导机构的社会化。结果无论她如何拒绝他的求婚,都无法被严肃的对待。

作者风趣地写道:

"我不是现在才知道,'柯林斯先生煞有介事地挥手答道,'年轻女士拒绝一个内心暗允的男子的首次求婚是很寻常的,有时甚至会拒绝第二次、第三次。因此我决不会因您所言而泄气,还希望不久就能带您走向圣坛。"

"照 我说,先生,"伊丽莎白叫道,"在我做出声明后,您还能抱这样的希望,真是非常奇怪。我可以向您保证我不是那类女性(如果真有这样的年轻女士),我可不敢 冒险将自己的幸福押在第二次求婚的可能性上。我的拒绝是十分认真的。您不能使我幸福,我相信我也绝不可能使您幸福。而且,如果您的朋友凯瑟琳夫人认识我, 我相信她也会发现无论从哪个方面看我都不配做您的妻子。"

"即使凯瑟琳夫人真的这样认为,"柯林斯先生严肃地说,"我也无法想象夫人她会彻底反对您。当我有幸再次见到她时,您也许就能定心了,我会大力赞扬您的谦卑、节俭,以及其它可亲的品质。"

"实 际上,柯林斯先生,对我所有的赞美都毫无必要。您必须容许我自我评判,同时恳请您相信我的话。我祝您幸福富有,同时通过拒绝您来尽力防止这一切落空。您的 求婚必然已经满足了您对于我家的微妙感情,您可以随时接受朗伯恩的财产而无需自责了。事情就当已经解决了吧。"说着她站起来,准备离开屋子——如果柯林斯 先生没有对她说出以下言辞:

"当我有幸再次向您提及此事时,我希望得到比这次更可喜的答复;尽管我完全不想指责您此刻的冷酷,因为我知道拒绝一个男子的首次求婚是你们女人的惯例,也许刚才您已经在保持微妙的女性特质同时,说了够多话来鼓励我了。"

"真的,柯林斯先生,"伊丽莎白有些激动地叫起来,"您太让我不解了。如果我的话说到这份上,您还认为是在鼓励您,那么我实在不知要如何拒绝才能让您相信我心口如一。"

"请 容我腆颜说一句,我的亲爱的表妹,您的拒绝当然只会是有口无心。我如此确信的原因很简单:我并不认为我的求婚不值得您接受,或是我的条件不够诱人。我的社 会地位,我跟德包尔一家的关系,以及我与您的关系,都是我的有利之处,您还应该考虑到,虽然您具有多方面的吸引力,但无论如何都不会再有人向您求婚了。您 将要继承的财产不幸太少,而这会将您的可亲可爱的品质完全抵销掉。我可以认定您并不是真心拒绝我,因此只能将您的拒绝归结为欲擒故纵,正如优雅女性们一贯 所为。"

"我可以向您担保,先生,我不会假装具有这种优雅,会去折磨一位可敬绅士。我宁愿您赏脸相信我的由衷之言。对于您求婚的荣幸,我再 三感谢,但是绝不可能接受。无论在哪个方面,我的情感都不容许。我还能说得更直白些吗?现在请不要把我看作是一位有意折磨您的优雅女性,请把我看成是一个 言出其心的理性生物。"

"您还是那么迷人!"他以一种极其殷勤的语气叫道,"我相信在得到您出色双亲的明确授意之后,我的求婚将会被接受。"

这种决意自欺的执着让伊丽莎白无言以对,她随即默然离开,并决定,如果他执意将她反复的拒绝当作献媚的鼓励,她将向父亲救助,他应该会坚决地表示反对,他的举动至少不会被误解为一位优雅女性的爱慕和卖俏。

根 据这幕场景,不难想像,没有父亲的帮助,伊丽莎白将不得不冒险以非常强势和尖刻的态度来让他明白自己的意思;这些能够穿透他那个呆脑瓜的言辞会极其刺耳, 他骄傲受挫,可能会大怒回应,甚至暴力相向。她没必要在逃避求婚这么一个时刻冒险让事态升级。但是如果为这场对话构想一个不同的语境,其中,一个女人面对 一个无法接受其性提议被拒的男人,局面显得非常紧张。

那种情形看起来到底是怎样的?这可能有不计其数的表现方式。这是其中一个例子。无论一个人认为明确的赞同有如何通行的法定标准,但一声清晰明了的"不"仍然不能够确保这一点,这看来是强奸案认定罪行的绝佳理由。

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失約的末日—保羅的普世主義 (Part 7-10)

失約的末日—保羅的普世主義 (Part 7-10)


Part VII 保羅的兩個世界觀與我們的時代

 

Daniel:

剛才內容上很多解經的部分,到最後引到我們現實的處境,是我們定這個主題時比較關心的。或者我們可以先從論述那邊入手討論,因為在那個時候我們開始回答一個問題:為甚麼聖保羅是我們的同代人呢?

 

我們和保羅,很有趣地,生活在比較共同的處境。為甚麼在這個處境下,保羅要說出一種普世主義?巴迪烏曾經提及到羅馬法,或者希臘的世界觀,其實也是 一種普世主義。如果希羅傳統是一種普世主義的話,那保羅所提及的普世主義又是甚麼呢?普世主義的基礎(the foundation of universalism)是甚麼呢?又和我們今時今日提的普世主義又有甚麼關係呢?

 

輝:

我想這就是說保羅是所謂同代人有趣的地方。今天我們身處的世界,「全球化」時常和「文化多元主義」並行不悖,為甚麼兩個邏輯可以共存?根據巴迪烏所 講,在羅馬法和希臘的哲學世界裡面,甚麼為之一個普世(universal)或真理呢? 就是一個宇宙的總體(cosmological totality)。所以所有東西都已經存在,所謂的真理就是與這個宇宙完美的對應(perfect correspondence)。如果我能夠言說這個宇宙的秩序,就是所謂的普世。而羅馬作為一個政治實體,的而且確是一個很完善的政制。如果你去讀羅馬 從共和到帝國的歷史,你就會發現那時用的法律,政治管制手段,對今日的政治管治還是很有參考作用。這個管治機器與希臘哲學有個地方相似,就是都傾向總體(totality)。例如Michael Hardt 及 Antonio Negri那本《Empire》[1]也提到羅馬的律法及其政治軍事的機器兩者結合,是一個帝國的原型。

 

巴廸烏指出,保羅說的那種普世主義與希羅的普世主義的分別就是:真正的普世,在保羅的世界裡面,只能是一種內在的例外(immanent exception)。這讓我們想起剛才說的,猶太人的論述就是一種例外的論述。如果說羅馬希臘的整體正好對應著全球市場,那例外的論述就對應我們今天對他者的沉溺(obsession)。這 種沉溺,在文化多元主義中最典型的表達就是:「因為他是黑人我是白人,所以我無法言說黑人的經驗。」、「因為你是同性戀者我是異性戀者,我無法代他去言說 甚麼,要不就是霸權呀怎麼怎麼了。」開始時提到齊澤克那本《Paul's New Moment》,裡面就論及新紀元(New Age) 的心態(mentality)就是有個神祕的他者我們接觸不了。

 

保羅時代的兩個世界觀很有趣地對應著我們今天的處境。剛才說過的「內在的例外」,就正好切割在兩個論述中間。此話何解?儘管保羅肯定那些基督教傳統 中提到的超越性,但細心讀保羅,會發現他對末世沒太多幻想。相反他非常關心現在這刻。剛才我們讀哥林多後書,So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new! 他關心的是,現在這一刻、這個內在的世界裡面,是否有東西超越固有的整體(totality),同時又非來自一個神秘地超越這個世界、在世界外部的絕對他 者?

 

剛才腓立比書所提到的神格,從超越的神變成一個內在的神;而這個內在的神又同時是一個超越宇宙整體(cosmological totality)的例外。所以巴迪烏那種普世主義很古怪,它不是我們一直以來所想像的那種傳統的普世主義。他那種普世是種在現有政治、或法的系統內無法 言說的一個例外,但這個例外又不是神秘意義下的那種超越,而是以事件(event)[2]的方式出現。所以這本書不斷討論普世主義,其實也是想說普世真理的主體,那是一個回應普世真理事件的主體。

 

Part VIII 資本主義與文化相對主義共同製造的末日

 

Daniel:

巴迪烏的理解下,耶穌事件對於保羅就是那個普世事件,由此創造一個主體去面向一個普世的世界。因此保羅著意建立基督宗教的普世性。然後書裡面就會說他和那些猶太基督徒,例如彼得,討論如何超越猶太人的例外法則,成就遍及全地的普世宗教。

 

如果放在當代,我們可以如何理解這個普世呢?因為保羅很特定地說基督教的基督事件,但很明顯巴迪烏不是傳教,也不是叫人重返保羅的基督事件。對巴迪 烏來說,保羅重要的地方在於他用基督事件去為獨特的主體提供基礎(ground),然後開展普世的世界。這個架構到今天仍然有意義。我們面對一個相似的處 境,就是當年的羅馬帝國以羅馬法和宇宙學為體系的一個全包(all-encompassing)的東西,這個普世主義裡面是不用講真理或公義的。而這也像 是今天的資本主義世界,不是要你信甚麼或信資本主義。

 

這是左翼常被問的一個問題:你們不要資本主義,那你信甚麼,難道你信共產主義?很奇怪,我很想反問:其實你是不是信資本主義?資本主義裡面不需要信 念。它就是一個運作而已,只需要把所有東西都流動化(liquidified),普世就正正在他的流動當中。甚麼都可以變錢,甚麼都是流動的,然後錢又可 以變成其他東西。錢只是一個中介,卻永遠不是追求的終結,永遠是個中介。這就是資本主義的普世主義,將所有事物同質化為銀碼。其實是很普世的,你甚麼都可 以用錢買到,尊嚴都可以。

 

雖然尊嚴都可以買賣,但今時今日也很講對他者的尊重。現代人常常說要尊重他人,但甚麼叫尊重?他們會覺得尊重就是不理會啊!尊重他人的生活方式,就 是不干涉、不理會他人的生活。所以齊澤克有個很有趣的說法:你講甚麼尊重?你聞到別人的味道就掉頭走啦!印度人有咖哩味,中國人有魚味,白人直男 (white straight guy)就有古龍水味,各種人只跟自己人聚在一起。齊澤克說這些就是要講那種特殊性(particularily)和文化多元主義的虛偽。這放在保羅的時 代就是所謂猶太式的特殊性,強調自己是例外。

 

這個例外很有趣,很像我們今時今日。如果用齊澤克的講法就會罵很多人,罵女性主義,罵後殖民主義。推到一個極端就是:你不是女人,你不要幫女人說話;你不是黑人就不能說話。變了你不能說話了。為甚麼你不能說話?因為你們極端地不同。到了最後就建構了一種不可溝通的差異。

 

昨晚我們看了一齣電影,說現代社會,美國、歐洲、甚至香港都有一個問題,就是移民的問題。移民問題就是那些人是「其他人」,非我族類,所以我們要建 立香港城邦也好,歐洲的文化傳統也好,我們就是要趕走「其他人」。或者一種新納粹主義就是,他們也可以進來,但他們要信我們所信的東西,說我們所說的語 言,你要拋棄你原有的語言的根,你要拋棄你的一切,然後成為我們的一份子。

 

這種移民問題或排外主義,正正就是文化多元主義的衍生物。從一開始文化多元主義似乎是指向開放,其實是指向封閉。表面上現代社會有許多不同身份的人 共處,但事實是老死不相往來,還美其名曰「尊重」。今日這種封閉終於開花結果,變成了排外。要建立自己就要排他,根本是普世主義的對立。

 

資本主義故然不講價值。你可以在資本主義裡面搞你的城邦,可以跟全世界繼續做金融資本主義的交易。但我總想問,如果是一個大陸人拿著大批資金來投 資,他不是要搶你的日用品,也不是要用簡體字,他只是要去買你上市的那些股票,如俄鋁而已,那你允許嗎?如果根據香港城邦的原則,你應該趕走他。但這是不 合理的,因為香港會倒閉。坦白說為甚麼香港那麼多人,只是因為香港賺錢。如果香港不賺錢,你又不讓人來買賣,人就自然會走。但似乎城邦論者不是這樣說,說 我們要建立我們自由的價值,我們要海納百川,這事實上就是一個悖論:我們一方面接受資本的普世流動以圖利,另一方面我們又要堅持自己的獨特性,排拒其他文 化。

 

說了那麼大的篇幅,因為這就是末日一個很重要的部分。末日的處境不是說有隕石撞下來撞死了我們,而是我們的世界越收越窄。這兩樣都是把世界割裂的辦 法。其中資本主義的特點就是︰他是完全的液態化的,所有東西都是流動的,並且會將所有已有的價值都沖走。譬如說你要街道文化嗎?他買起那街道,變成了商 場。你想要昔日的美食?沒問題,他會把它重新包裝,然後一塊很漂亮的蛋撻出現,機械化生產之後還可以賣給很多人。但二十年前你下樓就買到蛋撻的那種經驗就 完全消失了。資本主義不停洗走一些東西。這就是所謂的末日處境,它要把我們的生活經驗拿走,原有的東西慢慢的剝離。

 

其實文化多元主義也是要把這些東西拿走,我們原本面對的是普世的世界。譬如環境,女性主義,本來這些都不是指向封閉,但現在我們會有環保分子,甚麼 意思呢?環保是屬於環保份子的,你不是環保分子然後環保與你無關,然後環保份子就是那批吵著要環保的人。然後又有一些女權主義者,某一些人才搞女權。但很 奇怪這些東西剛出現的時候並不是這樣的。難道環保只是環保份子的專利?環保有關全人類,從一開始就是普世的。但看看現實的社會處境:某某就是某綠色團體的 代言人,記者只訪問他,好像只有他才可以說環保。本來這個世界是屬於全部人的,本來環境是大家共有的,但只有一批人可以為我們的環境發言,告訴我們應該怎 麼做。

 

跟著我們就開始罵自由主義式民主(liberal democracy)。這是比較踩界的,在香港你可以罵資本主義,還是有少數人聽。你罵自由主義式民主,就再進一步。但巴迪烏和齊澤克就真的會在這些地方 用力。其實文化多元主義就是衍生自自由主義式民主的東西,它就是要把所有人變成不同的利益團體,然後各自代表自己的利益。這是很多香港人對民主的想像,你 就是來議價(bargain)而已:你要環保一些嗎?好吧,我少起兩層屏風樓,我讓你環保吧,然後你給我起兩層,這樣就可以了吧?這就是一種議價。但這種 議價代表著的就是分離,因為他代表環保,他代表起樓,這個時候我們的身分就割裂了。我們越來越困在更專門的身分中,其餘的你就要尊重,即不要理那麼多。如 果有衝突,我們就來議價,美其名曰民主。

 

說回頭,甚麼是末日?末日就是把人的很多東西都拿走,人就喪失(deprived)得越來越多,然後到了喪失得最多的程度,就到了阿甘本所說的「神聖之人」(homo sacer),裸命(bare life)[3]的 處境就會出現。我們今天在香港還未感受到。但在第三世界,戰亂頻生的地方,例如巴勒斯坦人,他們被以色列侵佔後就活在難民營裡面。他們有甚麼呢?每日飛彈 亂射,或隨時結束的停火協議。這就是末日的處境,當日常生活裡你見到的就是第三世界的處境,你就會發現人類的生活已經完全的失散。

 

但在這個處境下,也創造了一種怪異的主體(subject)。這主體就正正與保羅所說的那種對立。因為我們的主體,這種被困的、生活在資本主義底下 的主體,是甚麼呢?就是伏儒地接受現存的體系。我們責罵梁振英,說他真是壞透了。罵一下以色列,為巴勒斯坦的兒童哀悼。然後就完結,回家去。就是這種主 體:就算責怪,都不會使之變成普世,走出來去向這個世界做一種整體或普世性的宣稱。與之對立的主體,是保羅那種主體,就是根據事件去建立的。於是我們會 問,在現代社會可以如何建立這種主體呢?如果我們不相信上帝(巴迪烏也不是叫人信上帝),我們又不是要叫人做基督徒,面對剛才所說的好多好多的處境,我們 如何建立一個普世主體呢?

 

輝:

Daniel勾勒了我們生活中很實際的處境。我覺得末日對我來說是甚麼呢?他說是喪失得越來越多,我就覺得是所有東西都變成自動化 (automatism)的時候。當所有東西都可以自己運作下去的時候,每天你如何知道自己生活得好呢?你就把自己放在那個制度裡面,你看你有多少層樓, 你就用這個制度衡量、照顧自己。回到巴迪烏或聖保羅,他們會覺得末日是甚麼呢?他們會說末日就是那個主體或那個自我死亡的時候,你不需要自我。所謂的自我,都只是一個商品化的自我,或一個完全推入資本化過程的東西、自動運動的世界的一樣東西,可以把自己完全嵌進去。我想末日不單是剝奪你到一個地步你越來越少東西,而是完全沒有,那就是終末。譬如你讀班雅明(Walter Benjamin)[4],他會告訴你,當你看見越來越多高樓,譬如中環,你看到越多的摩天大廈,就是一個越盛大的廢墟。這一樣意思,當你看到資本運作得越強勁,你就會見到自己的廢墟越大。

 

如果你問普世是甚麼,我不能夠說得很實際,要好像Fight Club那樣,我們出去炸毀幾棟摩天大廈洩憤。我不是要說這些,我要說的,是我們能否在這種自動運作的資本體系裡面打開一道缺口。這是一個怎樣的缺口呢? 我覺得可以再一起討論,但一定不是Daniel剛才說的文化多元主義。巴迪烏講的那種主體不能委縮(collapse)變成一種會員制 (membership),一種身份認同的主體。所以文化多元主義就正正是一個一個不在場證據、一個藉口(alibi):正正因為今天如此強調文化多元, 我們覺得我們已經反抗,我們已經在改變那個資本體系。文化多元主義正正是失敗本身,整個反抗扭曲成特定的會員制,然後就活在個別的會員制度裡。齊澤克說甚 至戲謔地說:我們快要成立一個組織了,一個姦屍的社群——你不是姦屍者,你怎麼可以為他們說話呢?我們要保護姦屍者的權利,你如何知道他們在姦屍的時候得 到甚麼體驗呢?為甚麼要阻礙他們姦屍呢?——文化多元主義到最後就只能如此。文化多元主義正於此失敗了,與資本主義一體兩面。

 

Part IX 超越個人主義,打開既有秩序的缺口

 

Daniel:

你剛才提到的一點我覺得可以討論下去。你說末日就是那些人一無所有到一個地步甚麼都沒有於是可以順從一種自動化。那就很容易跌入一種齊澤克和巴迪烏都會很反對的狀態,就是個人主義。

 

這就是後來講新紀元裡面一種比較明顯的說法:是啊,我們現在面對世界那麼殘酷混亂了,那我們可以怎樣呢?我們就做好自己吧!然後我們改變自己的生 活,世界就會變得更美好喇。但我認為我們需要提出超越個人主義,重建普世主義的原因。個人主義會說,我今天做好自己啦,今天吃少一點肉啊,練氣功啊,感受 大自然啊,良心消費啊。這種「做好一點」往往成為犬儒的個人主義。我們面對這個世界那麼惡劣,從明天開始我們就多一點搭巴士吧,或者用多一點公共交通工 具,然後就完了。然後很多人就會反指責說,你說你想怎麼樣,我們想做好一點有甚麼不可以啊?你是不是要革命啊?我會說,是的,哈哈。

 

但我多舉一個例子吧。一個醫生對一個平常又煙又酒又晚休息的人說,你有癌症,可能很快就要死了。然後那個人說,好吧,那我以後每天吃一個橙吧。這就 是現代的處境。我們面對的危機,好像末日片每一齣那樣告訴你的大禍臨頭,但看完以後我們都只是做一些很小的東西,說:好吧,明天不要吃那麼多肉吧。這很奇 怪,很不平衡。

 

由此,我們看到兩個問題:一)剛才所說的一個很不對等的反應;二)就是我們面對一個全球的問題,一個普世的問題──資本主義是一個普世的現象,環境 受破壞是一個普世的現象──但最後你的回答卻是個人的。「那我如何如何吧」。這美其名就是由個人做起,但不好意思,最後見到的卻還只是個人。我們看不到公 共的面向。普世主義為甚麼重要?這個時候我們可以看到普世主義的力量──就是我們不是要這種個人的東西,而是要揭示另外一種普世的可能性,不是說我做好一 點就算。譬如對巴迪烏來說,愛是不是一個切入點?其實我們行動的意志是甚麼呢?這好像是一些很個人的問題和經驗。但我們真正面對的是世界、整體。

 

用基督教來做例子。基督教不是說你自己得救了,知道死後就會上天堂,然後從今天起留在家就完結的吧。他會認為傳福音,建立一個基督教的世界是重要 的。那個差異到底是甚麼?我們要問保羅,為甚麼「因信稱義」是向世界走出去呢?在這裡就看到普世的力量。為甚麼不是說你信了耶穌你進了一個地下教會然後你 說這裡超級好,你就藏起來等待基督的來臨。現在就是一模一樣:啊,我好高興現在知道吃肉很不好,我們吃素吧!但我們不會走出去叫別人吃素。又其實都會有人 說出去,然後他得到的回應是「你是素食者啊!」。那就變成文化多元主義的一部分,這是另一種文化──你出去就是這樣子。

 

Chan:

我認為那真是非常可惜!我們今天生活在一個充滿教派的世界。有些好像你說那樣,相信現在就要留在地下世界,等耶穌再臨啦,等被提啦。今日不是要釋經,但我覺得被提絕對是對帖撒羅尼迦前書(First Thessalonians)的錯誤解讀釋。這裡我不說「被提」和相關的那堆垃圾暢銷小說啦。我有三樣東西想說。

 

首先,剛才說到打開缺口的問題。我也同意這不是個人少吃一點肉的問題。當然如果你問我這是不是一個道德行為,我會說可以是的,外出帶自己的水瓶;環 保一點;或者關心多點動物權益。(我家裡養了兩隻貓,我也關心動物權益。)(笑)我想說那個缺口:如果回到保羅的終末論,其實基督教傳統裡,終末這個字的 重要性,也許不在於處理終結,雖然它叫終末論,但真正重要的是要建立一個新的開始。譬如為甚麼耶穌被釘死以後會在猶太人的曆法裡面七天的第一天復活?

 

很多人說終末論就是一個新的開始多於一個終結。那個終結只不過是懸擱既有的秩序或律法。新的普世的出現不是說你想做甚麼就做甚麼。我們廢除一些律法,到最後會回歸到另一種「法」。根據保羅的系統,他覺得就算懸擱了羅馬法和希臘法,到最後都是會回歸到一個「法」裡面,是一個trans-literal Law。保羅在哥林多後書裡面有一個很出名的說法,就是「字」(letter)只會讓你死亡,因為是刻在石板上的。他追求的是一種transliteral的「法」。這就是為甚麼大家討論保羅的時候那麼喜歡討論「法」的課題。他懸擱了既有的律法系統(legal system),在缺口裡面產生了新的法,一個transliteral law。

 

其二,我想說的東西是,那個「法」是甚麼?在保羅的世界,如Daniel所說,就是一種普世的愛(universal love)。那個愛就不是我們現在的那些愛情啦,現在的愛情好廉價,大家明白啦,我就不多說了。但保羅的愛是指你對耶穌復活的相信,並將它普世地推演出去的實踐與力量。耶穌將摩西律法提煉到最後,得出「愛人如己」的法,他就是提出一個transliteral law。所以脫離資本主義世界,不是指活在一個逾越(transgress)所有律法的世界,或說脫離法(lawless)不是生活在一種很犬儒的我有我的生活你不要搞我的狀態。

 

最後一點,就是真正會出現的新的東西是甚麼?這就是聖保羅終末論裡面很重要的一部分,already not yet,相信某事件會啟動缺口。但是what will have been,將會出現甚麼呢?用愛推展出去的普世,最後會出現甚麼?那不會離開你的工(work)。不是說我們不用做事了,因為因信稱義,信就可以了,我們 甚麼都不用搞。對保羅而言,譬如你看帖撒羅尼迦前書,有個很重要的概念就是「等待」。但記住,他叫你等,不是叫你留在地下,然後等上面搞好了你才爬出去地 面,或等「被提」讓你上天堂。他的等是一種主動的等待(active waiting)。就是說當你等的時候,怎麼可以看得出你是在等,就是你要做好多東西,你才算是等。如果你甚麼都不做的話,你那個不叫等。所以他那個主動 的等待和最後那個not yet的關係很微妙,兩者之間或許不是因果關係,但可能是前者condition後者的關係。

 

巴迪烏有個學生,叫Quentin Meillassoux ,說到一樣東西:他不信神,卻相信復活,這看似古怪,不過今天不是說這個。Meillassoux設想:要是未來必然有個身體復活的世界,我為甚麼還要幹 活,我就等那個世界來臨就可以了;因為那個世界是完全偶然的(completely contingent),就是你沒有辦法導致它出現,不是你能力可以控制。Meillassoux有個很有趣的講法,但我們不要單從字面讀他,而要明白他 的思考模式。今天如果你不是日日爭取公義,不是天天為了平等而抗爭,不是去斷絕資本對我們的異化;就算突然有一天,不知道為甚麼,死人都復活了,這件事情 都不能被看成是普世事件(universal)。因為這件事的普世意義,取決於此事發生之前我們不停努力做過很多事。這種「主動的等待」,讓死人復活變成 普世的願景,而不是一件無端端出現的事情。譬如我們今天甚麼都不做,到最後世界變成甚麼樣──粉身碎骨的末日又好,死人會復活又好──你活在A還是B之 中,其實是沒分別的。既然你甚麼都不做,你無法讓A或B變成一個具有普世意義的抉擇。甚麼會成為普世,是牽扯到你今天所做的事情。所以這涉及到聖保羅說的 三個觀念:信、愛和望。保羅說的盼望是一種堅忍和耐性。要不停、繼續做下去,你不要管你做的事情會不會讓資本運作倒下,你不要管你做的事情是不是會有一個 即時可以計算到的結果,你只要不停的去不停的去做。然後到最後哪天資本運作真的瓦解了,新的秩序就是通過你這種主動等待——對公義對社會平等的爭取——令 這東西到最後成為普世。

 

Part X 觀眾發言

 

陳寧:

I think there's one thing that Chan Kam Fai (陳錦輝) said which is interesting in the end. You say that  if you act upon this world, you cannot always think about whether what you do is effective or useful. Standards of what's effective or useful is always external to yourself. And I think that this is something very interesting in Paul. Kierkegaard(齊克果) said that the first law of Christianity is "love thy neighbour as thyself". He also said that in Christianity what your neighbor does does not really concern you. It's not a matter of reciprocity like an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, or these kinds of things. For Kierkegaard, the relationship between a Christian and his neighbours is unequal.

 

In Paul, there's one thing that we didn't talk about: the ontological(本體論的) implications of Paul. Paul's ontology is really interesting and totally relates to what Badiou is talking about. Paul said "But God chose the foolish things of the world to shame the wise; God chose the weak things of the world to shame the strong." When Badiou talks about Truth and the event, it is not transcendentally objective(超驗地客觀). The Truth is something subjective, and only the subject can see the Truth.The Truth cannot be verified by some external agency. It's not of the "order of knowledge"(知識體系).

 

I am thinking of how this can relate to Christian subjectivity. Because we can think of Paul and other great Christian philosophers like Pascal, Kierkegaard or whoever. When Kierkegaard deplored the Danish church of the time, he was saying it has made it easy to be Christian. People think that when you become a Christian it's like a second childhood, it's like everything in life is solved for you. There will be no more problems, you can rest in the hand of God and all these kind of stuff. But Kierkegaard said that Christianity is something that you live in anguish and anxiety. You have to reaffirm your faith every single moment in your life. I think for Badiou it's the same thing. For him Truth is not something that "is" because all these identities like female, black, transexual, whatever, all these identities are already mapped onto the world, the world recognizes that these identities exist and you accept these identities; but what Paul and Badiou are interested in is what does not exist in the eyes this world. The subject has to affirm this "does not exist", to say "this exists" has to affirm "this exist" in face of everything that tells him that this is stupid, ridiculous, absurd, does not exist, whatever.

 

This sets the bar really high for political action. Many people already criticized Badiou and Zizek. Chris Harman says that Zizek's idea of revolution is sitting at home watching TV and writing psycho-analyses, and criticism or something like that. People always ask Badiou what's an event for him. And Badiou famously only has three events: Paris Commune, May 68, Shanghai Commune during the Cultural Revolution.

 

So the question is what constitutes political action today? The problem today is a lot of people say, "Oh, we need to do something about this society, it's so messed up", "We have to act", "We have to fight for justice, equality, ecological improvement…" But then again it comes back to the question of what is acting now, what does it mean to be a subject, what is Truth in this world.

 

From my personal experience in Occupy Central, it's a thing most people think is just rubbish. We are not doing anything effective on the level of society at large; or we haven't reached a large amount of people; or we are not really changing society day by day and stuff like that. But now the question is capitalism is now in a crisis after the huge financial meltdown in 2008. And all of these old solutions are coming back into play. In France and Latin America, many socialist or leftist parties have won their election. They become very active again, saying they are making the real difference. But I think all of these things have exalted themselves. They are all of "the order of knowledge" again, to use Badiou's terms. These people feel there is a formula for us to get out of this crisis. We just need to follow someone and choose the right idea in the supermarket of ideas, and then we'll get to a better world.

 

If we take the kind of Paulinian subjectivity(保羅學的主體),it's very very fragile. You cannot take this and tell people this is how we make a revolution. Because the formula is something that you invent on a daily basis, by experiment, as you go along. What makes me very uncomfortable these days is that it's very easy for people to say "we need to do something for the society", "we need to stop talking and act" and all these kinds of stuff. We should be actually acting upon this world and trying to invent a different kind of world, trying to create a revolution that doesn't repeat the same variations of capitalism that we've known like socialism, national socialism, socialist democracy. To try to invent something is incredibly difficult, especially since the rest of the world tells you that this is useless, we don't recognize this as being a form of action.

 

女士:

保羅應該是根據他的靈性經驗去討論基督。我認識有一些朋友有靈性的經驗,指那種體驗是完全不同的。那麼如果巴迪烏因為是非教徒,而後完全不理會靈性的部份去詮釋保羅,那我覺得有點脫軌。

 

男士:

我不是基督徒,所以我難以認同這種進路。我沒有神秘經驗,至少我認為我沒有,而有神秘經驗的人也認為我沒有。面對這種極端的差異,我們怎樣去找一個 思考的起點,去想政治行動?在這個意義下我不能接受巴迪烏詮釋下的保羅,這個計劃。因為我與教徒的差異大得我完全不能理解,這種擬似目的論框架 (quasi-teleological framwork)。

 

輝:

這個問題要再多討論。或者和剛才男士問的有點相似,就是這個模態(model)、整個巴迪烏對聖保羅的詮釋的確是很依主體的,但陳寧提出一樣很值得思考的。我常常說今日的抗爭是很廉價的,因為你不用付出代價。基督主體是很脆弱的,而這種脆弱是真的——保羅曾經在哥林多後書說過耶穌復活這個真理是放在一個泥造的器具入面——就是說你要一直繼續be faithful to 一個真理事件(truth event)其實是很困難的。所以在那個基督的主體性裡面是有一種不停磨練、不停去做、不停抉擇、不停去被試煉、不停受苦——當然那些受苦不是終極的意義,不是被虐狂,那些受苦不是終點——而是當你預備了不去屈從於資本主義秩序的時候,你就要預備付出很多代價。

 

對於剛才那位女士的回應,我也覺得很陌生。講到靈性的時候,我覺得所謂的靈性、spirituality、charisma這些字,都是需要詮釋 的。很多時在教會,spirituality這個字會指一種很私有化、很私密的那種信仰經驗——神秘又好,不神祕又好——是一種很個人的、脫離世界的、和 政治現實很大距離的。我不知道你的朋友或你的教會背景如何,也許不同宗派也會對他們的信仰經驗有很大影響,我不是要否定那種經驗,只是我覺得距離這種經驗 很遠。

 

Daniel:

或許我作少少回應。其實很冒犯的說,聖保羅是甚麼樣子不是最重要的;而是巴迪烏詮釋的聖保羅,其中某些東西對於現代社會和現代人有甚麼意義?這也是 重新詮釋保羅的根本原因。他並不關注基督信念,而是保羅的一個講法,而此講法的結構對現代世界有整體的意義:就是被稱為universal的東西。當然, 回去到剛才男士的問題:到底當巴迪烏說保羅這個結構好精彩的時候,能否應用在非基督徒的處境呢?也即是問:到底事件和信念是如何開展出來的,是不是要根據 某一種經驗,或者是神秘經驗,或者對於某一種特定東西的信念,才能生產出來呢?

 

所以我的第一個回應是,可能真的沒有關係的,可能保羅真的不是這樣;第二個回應是,根據巴迪烏的分析,保羅是排拒第四種論述的。他這樣分別三種論 述:第一是希羅的論述,一個法的論述;第二是猶太徵兆、先知的論述;第三他就講自己,他覺得基督教會有一種不同的論述。但還有第四種論述,是保羅排拒的, 而那就是一種逼近神秘主義(mysticism)、純粹私有化的論述。為甚麼要排拒這種被私有化、不能夠言說的神祕經驗?

 

如果你講得盡一點,第四種論述連個人主義連個人也不是,但又不是完全普世。因為當你進入這種神秘經驗,它應該是拒絕主體和客體的對立。它有一種不可 溝通的特性。如何才能言說呢?你一定要一起進入這種神秘經驗的實踐。保羅覺得這不行。保羅可不是反對神秘經驗,應該有的。但當我們去傳教,去講這種普世主 義的時候,不是根據神秘經驗;或者是,不根據這東西都可以講到。這就回應剛才男士的問題。

 

現在還有兩個問題:第一,保羅說不需要訴諸不可溝通的經驗都可以進入的論述(巴迪烏覺得很重要的「普世主義」),是否能在非基督教的處境下做到呢? 如果回答這個問題,或者就可以回答剛才的問題。到底是不是一定要指標(indicator)呢?我聽來,你是有點擔心:到底是不是這樣啊?沒有任何證據卻 可以肯定這種論述?這就回到保羅所說的找證據的問題。

 

現在很多基督徒都喜歡去些偏遠的地方找些甚麼古木回來,說:「嘩,有料到啊!」,似乎是福音的證據。

 

但如果根據巴迪烏的說法,保羅是不理會那些東西的。保羅認為我們不是根據證據所以相信。這也回到耶穌復活後說「凡未見過的都信的,就有福了」。如果說指標就是證據的話,那保羅的說法就是不需要證據。

 

輝:

保羅最不喜歡就是那些要靠肉眼看見才有效的秩序。

 

Daniel:

其實這就是一個主體和客體同時出現的當下。真理事件的確立,是因為主體肯定這個客觀的事件,其之所以是客觀、真實正是因為主體的肯定。但這又不是單 純的唯心論,因為主體之所以能確立也是因為事件的真實不虛。在事件之前並沒有主體。就如只有在基督裡才有新的創造,然後我接受這個基督復活的真理──那甚 至不是事實,而是真理。它不是世界中的一件事,而是使世界之能確立的真理。

輝:

保羅覺得宣告那個真理比神秘經驗重要。當然他覺得兩者都可以有,甚至同時經歷兩者。不過,他指出是宣告真理的當下令他成為真理主體,而不是他內裡藏 有甚麼神秘經驗而令他成為一個真理主體。對一個基督徒而言,是那些行動、是信仰的宣告 (declaration of faith),令他成為真理主體。

 

延伸閱讀:

– Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford University Press, 2003)

– John Milbank, Slavoj Žižek & Creston Davis, Paul's New Moment (Brazos Press, 2010)

– John D. Caputo & Linda Martín Alcoff (Editors), St. Paul Among the Philosophers (Indiana University Press, 2009)

註︰

[1] Hardt及 Negri為意大利左翼社會、政治思想家。他們合著的《Empire》為當代討論社會改變、革命的經典,與《Multitude》、《Common Wealth》合為二人的三部曲。書中分析後現代的體制已脫離資本主義早期的民族國家帝國主義,進入「帝國」,並闡論在新處境中如何想像新的反抗模式。

[2] 事件(event)是一個特定的哲學概念,並不能直接以字面理解。請參考巴迪烏《存在與事件》(Being and Event)。

[3] 「神聖之人」、「裸命」皆是阿甘本思想的重要概念。其意義可參考以下網址:(點樣整個簡單的link?) http://blogqua.wordpress.com/2012/06/18/%E3%80%90%E9%A3%84%E6%B5%81%E9%96%B1%E8%AE%80%E9%A4%A8%E3%80%91%E8%A7%A3%E9%96%8Bhomo-sacer%E4%B9%8B%E8%AC%8E%E9%A1%8C/

[4] 班雅明(Walter Benjamin, 1892-1940) ,德國籍猶太人,在二戰期間自殺身亡。在生時因為各種原因只能以評論家的身份發表文章,亦沒有得到太多重視。直至戰後由法蘭克福學派的友好重新出版其作 品,終於受到熱烈回應。其思想受德國哲學、馬克思主義、猶太神秘主義影響,寫出許多重要的文學評論,反省現代文明的諸多問題,成為很多近代思潮的理論源 頭。重要作品有、〈翻譯者的任務〉、《德國悲劇的起源》、〈機械複製時代的藝術作品〉、〈說故事的人〉、《瞭解布萊希特》、〈論波特萊爾的幾個主題〉、 〈歷史哲學命題〉等。

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失約的末日—保羅的普世主義(Part4-6)

失約的末日—保羅的普世主義(Part4-6)


Part IV 保羅對「無神/不敬神」的大逆轉?

 

然後我想跳去看另外一個文本,就是以弗所書的第二章。今天很多人,包括一些聖經學者都辯論保羅留下的這十三封書信,有部分不是保羅寫的。而以弗所書 是一封巴迪烏也覺得不是保羅寫的信,所以他在整本書都沒有處理這封信。但為了方便我先不在這裡討論,就當這封是保羅寫的,或有部分是保羅寫的,或是依據保 羅的傳統留下來的一封書信。我們一起讀二章11節:

 

So then, remember that at one time you Gentiles by birth, called "the uncircumcision" by those who are called "the circumcision"—a physical circumcision made in the flesh by human hands…(NRSV譯本)

 

留意這封信是對著以弗所的信徒講的。他說他口中的「你們」(you)並不是指猶太人的基督徒,而是希臘或羅馬人基督徒。Gentiles就是指非猶 太人,不是選民的人。割禮(circumcision)就是出生第八日時把陰莖前方包皮一部分切下來,作為上帝選民的記號。當然這裡保羅是下了一個註腳去 嘲諷那些猶太人:這些肉體上的割禮都是用人手去為自己做的,並不是上帝的手做的。我們再看第12節:

 

remember that you were at that time without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world. (NRSV譯本)

 

如果這個從希臘文字面翻譯"being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel"應該是"alienated from the body politics of Israel"。你不是以色列這個「政治體」的成員,你被異化(alienated)、隔離(separated)。這裡我們找到今日第二個主題,就是 「無神/不敬神」(ungodliness)。

 

保羅指著以弗所教會的基督徒說,你們以前是「沒有神」的。這裡你可能覺得保羅很自大,很排外,但這句話有個很重要的扭轉(twist)。因為沒有神 或無神這個字在希臘文是atheos,就是今天無神論(atheism)這個字的來源。這個字起初是希臘人用來指控他人的字眼。譬如他們責怪別人不敬虔, 目中無神,不知道這個世界由神靈(deities)掌管。如果讀哲學就會知道一個很著名的哲人就是背負這個罪名死去,就是蘇格拉底。他遭指控不相信城邦 (當時的政治體)的神祇,目中無神。指控中的罪名正正是保羅現在說的那個字。

 

以前希臘人最喜歡說哪些人目中無神呢?猶太人。為甚麼?因為如果你熟悉舊約聖經,就知道猶太人不可以鑄造神像。不可以像羅馬人那樣鑄造一個凱撒或奥 古斯都的像,所以對希臘人來說他們和無神沒有分別。後來這個就用來指控第一世紀出現的基督徒,說他們是無神的,因為他們覺得基督教是在猶太教裡面衍生出來 的。

 

初世紀有個猶太裔的羅馬史學家叫Josephus,寫了一本書叫《猶太戰爭》(Jewish War),有關公元六十九年,羅馬人火燒耶路撒冷,剷平耶路撒冷的一場戰爭。這個歷史學家雖然是猶太人,但卻站在羅馬帝國那邊。他提到羅馬人如何指責猶太 人,就是說他們「沒有神」和「憎恨人性」(hater of humanity)。

 

保羅這處說的「無神」是一個逆轉,就是反過來說希臘羅馬的信徒從前是無神的,把別人指控猶太人和基督徒的反過來指控對方。我想說甚麼呢?第一,首先 被指為「無神」的不是希臘或羅馬人,是保羅和他教會的信徒。第二,保羅正在重新定義甚麼是敬神的(godly),甚麼叫神性。所以我們一起看最後一篇書 信。

 

Part V 從「無神/不敬神」到「神性」

 

最後一篇書信是腓立比書第二章第6-11節。如果你上教會讀過保羅的書信的話,就不會陌生。這段是以詩體寫出來的。有人說這詩未必是保羅寫的,因為 整個詩體正是源於初代教會的信經、詩歌,或經常要讀的禮儀詩的一部份。但這是不是保羅寫的並非最重要。這首詩正是要在基督教的世界觀或論述中,重新定義 「神格/神性」(divinity)。這封書信是這樣寫的,提到我們該如何理解耶穌基督,或彌賽亞:

 

"who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death— even death on a cross.Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."(NRSV譯本)

 

巴迪烏論及這詩,在書的最後篇章討論到「名字」這課題。我在此說說這篇詩如何重新定義神或神性。很多時候,基督徒會說這篇是要從新認識耶穌是誰。但 讀深入點,會發現他要我們重新認識神/神格,而不只是認識耶穌。在當時許多猶太人眼中,很難理解神成為一個人的形態。變成一個奴僕,變成一個死在十字架上 的人,這超越了當時許多猶太人的世界觀。這個同時也是超越了羅馬人的世界觀。在羅馬帝國的世界裡面,凱撒就是神或神的後裔。如果你不注意這些東西你就要重 新認識羅馬的歷史背景。

 

耶穌出生時,正是如日方中的凱撒奧古斯都(Octavius)。如果你讀羅馬史,他是第一個凱撒,你也可以說他是第二個,因為他的養父就是尤利烏 斯‧凱撒(Julius Caesar)。看過莎士比亞的《凱撒大帝》就知道,尤利烏斯‧凱撒帶兵入城,就在登基前給布魯圖(Brutus)刺殺死了。之後羅馬爆發內戰,由他的養 子奧古斯都勝出。奧古斯都登基後,追封尤利烏斯‧凱撒做神。於是「凱撒」,原本是人的名字,變成一個神聖的頭銜(godly title)。而奧古斯都就成為神之子。他在位年間,羅馬經歷了Pax Romana,羅馬帝國的太平盛世。但在這所謂太平時代,羅馬到處征戰,搶奪許多殖民地,是帝國非常強大的年代。

 

保羅的時候是去到哪一個凱撒呢?奧古斯都之後是提比略(Tiberius),就是他在位年間處死了耶穌。然後相隔兩任凱撒之後就是尼祿,他和之前兩 任都是著名的暴君。但尼祿帝和之前的暴君不同,他比前兩者更具野心,想追及奧古斯都「神之子」的地位。所以在位期間做了很多偽君子的事,希望人民可以尊他 以奧古斯都同等的地位。當時凱撒要求人去拜他,他就既是一個人,也是一個神。回看歷史,第一世紀很多基督徒為甚麼要死呢?因為他們不肯跪拜凱撒像,被羅馬 帝國迫害處死。

 

如何成為羅馬帝國的公民呢?有三個方法。第一個是非法的,而保羅的爸爸也應該是這樣成為羅馬公民,就是用錢買。除此以外還有兩個方法,一就是 civic piety,就是你要認信投入整個羅馬帝國的宗教,即是凱撒的宗教、皇帝崇拜的宗教;另外一個就是所謂的good works,就是為帝國作工,為凱撒的帝國、羅馬城和殖民地做一些建設的工作。這讓我們想起香港英殖時期,用華人管華人。大家可以如此比喻。接受這個帝 國,參與、成為這帝國秩序的一部分,這就是羅馬帝國的福音(gospel)。

 

今天的基督教福音來自希臘文euangélion和拉丁文的evangelium。那Euangélion是甚麼?每當繼承凱撒的男丁出生,或新的 凱撒登基時,就會在整個羅馬帝國境內宣布這個euangélion、這個福音。由此你就知道保羅說的福音或Euangélion是朝著凱撒羅馬帝國的 Euangélion來對著幹。所以當羅馬帝國把凱撒視為神的時候,保羅就說相反的東西,質疑divinity是否真是這樣。保羅提到的神性不是好像凱撒 那樣攻城掠地,佔領殖民地,再在那裡豎立自己的銅像然後強迫人拜他。那個時候甚至有奧古斯都的聖殿在羅馬帝國重要的城鎮裡面。

 

腓立比書的「腓立比」就是當時一個很重要的羅馬殖民地。羅馬帝國那時有三個很重要的城市,第一個是羅馬,第二個是埃及的亞歷山卓 (Alexandria),第三個就是腓立比。所以當時保羅寫這樣一封書信可說很具顛覆性(subversive)。他把神性重新定義:如果這就是神的 話,那基督,或說救世主,就是以奴僕的樣式死在十字架的神。因為他是這樣死去的關係,神要給他一個名字,一個超越所有名字的名字,就是舊約神的名字,一個 不能命名的名字(unnameable name)。

 

在出埃及記中,摩西第一次遇到耶和華的時候就問他是誰。他就回覆「我就是我」(I am what I am)。這一方面是回答了摩西他叫甚麼名字,另一方面也拒絕了把自己命名的要求。所以這是個不能命名的名字。說我就是我、就是自有永有,其實沒有回答摩 西,或至少是一個理智無法完全理解的答案。神的名字在希伯來文是四個字母,YHWH。每逢猶太人讀聖經,讀到這四個字母,就是神的名字的時候,他們並不讀 出聲。他們用另一個希伯來文adonai取代,就是主(lord)的意思。所以保羅和教會稱耶穌做「主」就有兩個意思。第一就是拒絕稱凱撒作主;第二就是 說耶穌就是猶太舊約聖經的那個主。只有當神取了一個人的形態,變成一個奴僕,死在人間的十字架上,才配得到一個高於所有的名字,就是YHWH,這一個拒絕 被命名的名字,一個超越所有名字的名字。

 

Part VI 現代世界的兩大矛盾

 

今天提到不合時宜(untimeliness)和無神(ungodliness),我不是單單想研讀聖經,也想稍連結今日處境。今日引用三段書信,又提到巴廸烏的著作,其實要說甚麼呢?

 

先說第一個看似矛盾的處境。如果大家讀左翼理論就會知道今日的世界有一個結構(configuration),就是一個全球市場(world market),金融資本主義的市場。另一方面,我們身處的狀況也是一個常常強調差異的世界,講文化差異,種族差異,性/別差異,各種各樣不同的差異。今 日文化研究也提到很多身分政治的問題。威廉斯(Raymond Williams)[1]在 七十年代寫過一部文化研究的經典《Keywords》,幾年前又有其他學者寫了一本新的,叫《New Keywords》。這是一本文化研究最扼要的字典。從裡面有甚麼,你就知道那個年代在討論甚麼。而舊版裡沒有,但新版有的一個字,就是「文化多元主義」 (multiculturalism)。這個字是巴迪烏和齊澤克等最憎的;但今日亦最多人認同,包括聯合國也會用的一個字。我們生活在一個金融資本主義統 攝全球市場裡面,這樣說好像很單一(homogeneous);但與此同時我們也生活在一個很多元(heterogeneous)的世界裡面,充滿差異。 巴迪烏說這不是對立的現象,而是一個硬幣的兩面。我們一方面不停強調差異,其實這也是同時對應整個環球金融資本的運作。

 

另一個矛盾的處境是,我們身處於一個最多批判,但行動很少的世紀,至少在香港。這是一個很犬儒(cynical)的處境。譬如說梁振英和唐英年的特 首選舉好像爆出很多問題。但那些醜聞,甚至是違反所有道德價值的東西出現的時候,卻最少政治行動(political act)。這種犬儒的狀態,巴迪烏稱為思想與行動的割裂。他分析保羅,認為這與律法有關,這我不詳細說了。要指出的是,「普世」(the Universal)是一把刀,它既切入了全球市場和文化多元主義,同時也可以重新連接思考與行動割裂的犬儒狀態。

(待續)

註︰


[1] 雷蒙·威廉斯(Raymond Williams)(1921-1988),20世紀中葉英語世界最重要的馬克思主義文化批評家,文化研究的重要奠基人之一。出生於威爾士鄉間的工人階級 家庭,畢業於劍橋的三一學院。戰後至1961年曾任教於牛津大學的成人教育班,1974年起,在劍橋大學耶穌學院擔任戲劇講座教授,直至去世。被譽為「戰 後英國最重要的社會主義思想家、知識分子和文化行動主義者」。

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失約的末日—保羅的普世主義 (Part1-3)

失約的末日—保羅的普世主義 (Part1-3)


編按︰回顧過去,聖保羅(St. Paul)從沒有離開過神學家、聖經學者和哲學家的注視。上世紀七十年代,桑達斯(E. P. Sanders)及「New Perspective」浪潮,將保羅重置初世紀第二聖殿時期的猶太教語境,為保羅研究打開缺口。另一方面, 阿甘本(Agamben)、齊澤克(Žižek)、巴迪烏(Badiou)等大哲亦紛紛回歸保羅,他們如其他無神論者一樣,並不相信保羅就耶穌復活的宣 稱;然而,保羅對復活的思考和回應卻成為重要資源,助他們重思普世真理、主體、法、政治、時間、差異、救贖、身體等課題。

2012年4月,實現會社舉辦了「末日四月」的系列活動。本文整理自陳錦輝於其中一次討論會的講話。他從三段保羅書信的斷片出發,加上巴迪烏於《聖保羅:普世主義的基礎》中的思考,嘗試勾勒保羅與今日政治處境的關連——遙隔二千年,聖保羅如何成為我們的同代人?

輝︰陳錦輝

Part I 引論:

輝:

通常講這些題目,在座會有兩種人:因為有關聖保羅(Saint Paul),所以會有些基督徒。但因為是從阿蘭‧巴迪烏(Alain  Badiou)[1]的觀點說起,所以又會有些左翼朋友。這裡有無神論者,又有恆常上教會的基督徒,因此我接著說的話可能未能滿足兩邊的人。另外,我今天不是特別想說有關耶穌復活的問題,同時也不準備去處理或辯論這些到底有沒有發生過。

Daniel、毛淳宇找我談「末日」這課題,我覺得可以藉聖保羅與及巴迪烏對普世真理(universal  truth)的討論去思考。那麼在進入保羅的書信之前,我想先介紹兩本書,一本是巴迪烏的,第二本是齊澤克(Slavoj Zizek)[2]的。

我高度推薦巴迪烏這本《聖保羅》[3]。 第一因為在他眾多著作中,這本算是比較容易看。第二,雖然不是神學家、聖經學者或基督徒寫的書,但作為基督徒,你會發現它依然很有說服力。而細心看,除了 「復活」是否真實的問題外──巴迪烏不會說是真的啦──其中詮釋的保羅與很多聖經學家所說的保羅其實很吻合。這本書相當值一看。

巴迪烏詮釋的是個很現世的保羅。巴迪烏閱讀保羅書信時,刻意跳過某部份,或就算碰及也表明不重要,那就是保羅的終末論(eschatology)。 這個字有時亦會翻譯作末世論。「eschaton」這希臘文,就是解盡頭(the end),終結的意思。我明白巴迪烏為甚麼不處理這部分,因為他不相信人的肉身──物理(physical)的身體──會在未來復活。他不相信耶穌會再回 來──即所謂的耶穌再臨(second coming),所以他沒有這面向的討論。但如果你要明白保羅眾多書信說甚麼,就不能完全拋棄「復活」這個面向。

另外,我亦想提一提齊澤克。他也時常處理基督教的問題,為此寫過三本著作:《On Belief》,《The Puppet and the Dwarf》、《The Fragile Absolute》。他也是另一個熱衷回歸基督精神的無神論哲學家。他很熱衷一樣正正是巴迪烏較少提及的事,就是末日。

今日弔詭的是,在資本主義最成熟的時候,卻是我們討論末日最多的年代。齊澤克有不少書與神學家對話。看看今次的「延伸閱讀」,會發現齊澤克與一位神 哲學家John Milbank ──著名的「本源正統派」(Radical Othodoxy)——對話的書《Paul's New Moment》,也是要處理保羅。最後篇章就是他們一起探討末日、天啟的個問題。

先不說Milbank,齊澤克指出今日有三種末日觀。第一種是隨著科技發展,以至科技全面框架、統攝著世界而出現的非人(inhuman)/後人 (post-human)想像,一種瘋狂、放肆的變化所帶來的末日處境。很多科幻片都帶有這種未日觀。第二種末日觀是新紀元(New Age)的末日觀,見於西方社會對所謂東方各種宗教精神的狂熱,譬如修禪、冥想、素食。新紀元是個多神論的世界,有精靈、神靈的末日觀。第三種末日觀是一 種由美國福音基要派帶頭的末日觀,很多上教會的基督徒時常聽到。雖然他們未必同意全部細節,但大致同意末日將至、上帝會回來、信徒「被提」[4]等等。

最有趣的是他如何議論這三種末日觀。齊澤克覺得第三種是最恐怖的。但他這樣說並不是要貶低,反而是支持它,因為只有第三種是合理的。特別是要進入政 治實踐,令社會變好一點,瓦解今日資本主義和科技帶來的末日,那只有第三種末日觀是可行的。所以齊澤克認為,不要以為這是來自狂熱的、非理性的基督徒的想 法就放棄它;反而應該挪用這種基要派基督徒的末日觀去重新思考。

恕我囉嗦的說了很長的引言。大家都知道齊澤克和巴迪烏在哲學界是很好的朋友和辯論對象。如果我們把齊澤克所講的末日與巴迪烏講的普世性連結,或許可以見到很多豐富的延伸。

Part II 保羅是我們的同代人?

今日講保羅其中一個困難,就是很少人認真讀過保羅所有書信。今日主要會看三段保羅書信的斷片,討論兩個我覺得與末日有關的主題。它們並不是一些很宏 大或教會很重視的主題。不過它們與末日相關,亦是近來重返保羅思想浪潮的中心。第一個主題是保羅書信的不合時宜(untimeliness)。如果你上教 會,你不會覺得保羅不合時宜;但如果我們想想保羅身處的時代,初世紀希羅文化和猶太教重疊的那個時代,保羅就相當不合時宜。阿甘本(Giorgio Agamben)[5]是另外一個書寫保羅的哲學家,他曾經寫過一本《What Is an Apparatus》,裡面有一篇〈甚麼是當代〉(What Is the Contemporary)。今日這批哲學家說保羅是二十一世紀的同代人(contemporary),但相隔二千年又怎麼會是代呢?為甚麼我們還要讀他的書信呢?阿甘本在〈甚麼是當代〉裡面是這樣解釋「當代」的觀念

"…it is like being on time for an appointment that one cannot but miss… It is important to realize that the appointment that is in question in contemporariness does not simply take place in chronological time: it is something that, working within chronological time, urges, presses, and transforms it. And this urgency is the untimeliness, the anachronism that permits us to grasp our time in the form of a "too soon" that is also a "too late"; of an "already" that is also a "not yet." [6]

當我們仔細思考甚麼是「當代」時,會發現「同/當代」總是不合時宜的:要不就是太早,或是太遲(too soon or too late),總不在合宜的時刻(right moment),而且他們說的東西總是已經發生但又未發生(already but not yet)。我們可以如何理解這種矛盾呢?

大家或者聽過教會的終末論其實就是一種已經發生但又未發生(already-not-yet)的終末論。我們用中文很難思考這種關係但希臘文卻有動詞時態去處理,就是what will have been。我們可以如何想像這東西呢?

Part III 卡在兩個世界中間的「不合時宜」

以下是第一段想和大家看的保羅書信文本。其實十三封保羅書信的主題和對話的對象都不同,不能把它們當成是很完整的神學著作那樣看,因為他寫的時候不 是這樣寫的;他寫的時候是一封一封信寫的。今日我們相信他不只寫了十三封信,但遺留下來的卻只有這十三封。我們今天要看的是哥林多後書裡其中一段,是這篇 書信裡面一個高峰:第五章16-19節:

From now on, therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view; even though we once knew Christ from a human point of view, we know him no longer in that way. So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new! All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us. (NRSV譯本)

如果你上教會,受一百年前的中文譯本「和合本」影響,一般都會將中間一節譯成:「若有人在基督裡,他就是新造的人。」而現代譯本就傾向將「新造的 人」譯成「新的創造」(new creation)。我不去詳細說不同的翻譯了,也不去說是新的人還是新的創造,在此先留個註腳。

今天基督徒讀這段會覺得很熟悉。但如果你活在第一世紀的小亞細亞地中海一帶,很弔詭地,你會發現事情正好相反——所有事物都是舊的狀態,沒有任何東 西變成新的。歷史學家告訴我們,那時的巴勒斯坦到小亞細亞、到希臘、到西歐的羅馬帝國領土,就只有一個社會現實(social fact):就是所有由羅馬帝國創造出來的事物的秩序。那當然是一個政治秩序,也是一個社會經濟宗教的秩序。保羅的身分有點古怪,他是一個羅馬公民,但同 時也是一個猶太人,所以他身處兩個世界觀,有兩種論述/話語:一個是希羅的世界觀,一個是猶太的世界觀,重疊在他身上。因此這番話同時對應了兩個世界。

猶太人的世界就是,用保羅的說法,相信徵兆(sign),相信神蹟(miracle),或用巴迪烏的說法,他們相信一個例外的神 (Exceptional God),這是個例外法則(Law of Exception)的世界;希臘人的世界則服膺於整體法則(Law of Totality)。兩者是相反的,猶太人覺得會有個絕對的神來打救我們;希臘人則覺得我們現在看到的這個宇宙這個世界就是所有。我們要做的就是要通過話 語去找回、展現出這個整體的秩序。所以你可以說希臘的世界和猶太的世界剛剛好是互相配對的:一個就告訴你是全部,一個就告訴你是例外。保羅剛好卡在兩者中 間,或說是這兩個世界的重疊。

這裡我想再處理多一樣東西:保羅講「新的創造」,是甚麼意思呢?是不是物理、肉身世界的創造呢?還是指向一個全新的思考方式(mindset)呢? 他到底在講甚麼呢?巴迪烏認為不是物理的(physical),不是生物的(biological)的,他覺得在保羅書信中,無論是肉身的復活還是死亡都 指向思想(thought)層面的。不過,如果你看創世記就會發現,在猶太人的世界觀裡,創造是用言語來進行的。所以話語和物理世界,或說一個象徵性的世 界和一個實體的世界,在猶太人的觀念裡不是分得那麼清楚,因為這個世界就是神用話語去創造出來的。所以這個新創造是指所有東西。你可以說是指人那個主體 (subject),但你也可以說是我們身處的具體世界,以至我們身處的這個世界裡的所有價值和整個話語體系。

保羅說「在彌賽亞/基督裡面」(in Christ)時,舊的就被轉化成新的,就有一個新的創造。這裡就有一個「不合時宜」、「已經發生但又未發生」(already but not yet)的問題。這個新的創造已經發生了,因為他覺得耶穌,或彌賽亞,已經身體復活了。但如果回到經驗的層面,其實在初世紀,保羅那一代人,根本看不到任 何事物的改變。他們仍然活在各自的世界觀。猶太人依然在等待上帝拯救他們脫離羅馬帝國的殖民管治,但他們怎麼等也未等到。如果你是希臘或羅馬人的話,你也 看不見世界有甚麼新的東西出現,因為世界就是一個整體。無論是政治上、哲學上或宇宙論上,所有東西都是一種整體。這個就是一種不合時宜。

(待續)

註︰


[1]阿 蘭·巴迪烏(Alain Badiou,1937-),法國當代著名哲學家,受過數學和心理學的訓練,關注哲學、政治及現實問題,是巴黎高師哲學教授,並任當代法國哲學研究中心主 任。巴迪烏是法國後結構主義之後,挽救哲學及左翼政治的原創性思想家。其著作《存在與事件》發表十年之後開始受到法國人的關注。至21世紀初,無論在法國 還是英美世界,巴迪烏都成為繼齊澤克之後炙手可熱的人物。過去幾十年出版了大量著作,廣泛涉及本體論、數學、美學、文學、政治學、倫理學和性別政治,逐漸 在各領域產生影響。

[2] 斯拉沃熱·齊澤克Slavoj Žižek)斯洛維尼亞哲學家。目前歐美有名的後拉岡心理分析學學者之一。重要著作有《意識形態的崇高客體》。

[3] 巴迪烏著,陳永國譯《聖保羅:普世主義的基礎》,台北:橄欖出版,2011。

[4] 被提(snatch away),某些基督徒認為末日審判前,一些得救的人會被送到天上與基督同在。此想法因為暢銷小說的宣揚而成為其中一種流行的末日想像。

[5] 喬治·阿甘本(Giorgio Agamben),義大利當代政治思想家、哲學家,以其探討例外狀態(State of exception)和神聖之人(homo sacer)的著作聞名。

[6] Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus? and other essays, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 46-47.

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Sunday, January 18, 2015

细节的剩余——记洪子诚老师

细节的剩余——记洪子诚老师

2015年1月17日 22:24
在 大学时我就觉得当代文学史写得比大部分文学作品都好看。暑假前得知洪子诚老师会在秋季学期来台湾清大开课时,我就盼望着开学见到他。洪老师在我心目中犹如 一座图书馆的化身,但真正看见他时,却觉得亲切得太过分。没有学术权威的气场,也没有散发着智慧气息的仙风道骨,只是一个干净朴素的老人,头髪虽然花白但 却象是小孩细致的软髪,额头饱满光洁,颧骨和脸颊是我们潮汕人常见的方正与削挺。洪老师的面相好,一看就是聪明长寿,气色也红润,我看见他这样健康心里总 是很高兴。

他 背着一个贴身的白色布包,上面还有着北大的字样,估计这样一个轻薄的布包他已经随身多年。他从里面逐一取出保温水杯,一沓手写的讲稿,前后密密麻麻都写满 了,纸上的标记和涂改是谜一样的圈圈和方框,还有许多斜出的字行兴许是突然的遇想。洪老师学术态度扎实严谨自不必说,可有趣的是他的字迹却颇为洒脱烂漫。 比起论述,我觉得字迹才是性格的复合体。洪老师说自己跟北岛一样是"汉语规范化"的受害者:"对50年代之前的读物阅读太少,读的主要是汉语规范化之后的 作品,这影响了他们的语言习惯。"这种表达习惯容不得半点语言"垃圾",非常吝啬虚词与副词,所以北岛在翻译洛尔迦时就拼命删戴望舒版本里的"的",而洪 老师觉得自己的文章"干巴巴"也是因为这种表达习惯造成的文本缺水。我却觉得洪老师的笔法用来作学术是刚刚好的,中正平稳又不失准确深入,即使偶尔的犀利 刻薄,也能给出负责任的解释。

我 坐在离洪老师最近的一个座位,上了两个星期课才告诉他我也是揭阳人。我6岁离开老家去汕头上小学,如今我的普通话已经听不出潮汕口音。洪老师虽然在北方生 活了几十年,他的普通话却还是夹带乡音。有一次他在课上说了一个学者的名字,他自知发音不准,便望向我希望我能听出这口音里的字词好给大家解释一下。我问 是杨绛吗? 他说"不是,是健康的健。杨JIANG。"我们潮汕人对an和ang的发音很不自信,所以我平时没事就会练"官方网站"这个词,经常不能一次性顺利地说出 来。洪老师性情还是比较内向,不喜欢会议致辞,也不喜欢寒暄场合。今年的两岸诗歌学术论坛在我们学校举行,会间休息我特地绕道远一点的洗手间,却发现洪老 师也"躲"到这附近巡看墙上染尘的海报。我高兴得跑过去,像在一个屋檐下避雨聊了一会儿。我告诉他课上提到的一本书我确实找不到,洪老师说有一个老师那里 有,可以帮我去借。我坚持说我自己去借就好。谁知隔几天上课的时候,洪老师就把那本用牛皮纸包着的书拿给了我。

然 而让我最感动不是他对别人的细心诚恳,而是他对自己反思的无情。当我读到洪老师对知识分子的分析时,我在想,一个人只有通过对照自身才能这样深刻地理解这 些人的脆弱、虚伪和理想。他也时不时看似随意地说自己"孤僻""无趣""写不动了",我听不出这自我调侃的背后有没有痛苦。有一次他说到自己写作太保守安 全面面俱到,看似是无可辩驳的对多元的宽容,其实是一种思考的安逸,他用了波伏娃的话:"人们对多元性的接受是资产阶级完美的意识形态,但那其实是对混乱 和困惑的享受,在这种享受中,人们不再争取某种确凿的希望。";"知青们夸耀自己的劳动,称自己成为了'真正的劳动者',但真正的劳动者是不屑夸耀这些 的,这只是知识分子获得另一种本领时的优越感。我当年也热衷于夸耀自己多能干活。"我知道洪老师一直非常警惕自己身上这种知识分子的优越感,也警惕着"解 构带来的快乐和不负责",可会不会由于这过分的警惕,造成了对于自己的某种压抑呢?


这 样一个惯于节制和隐藏自己情感的人,文学作品确实给他提供了一个绝佳的藏匿记忆与感情的地点。洪老师读书时感受是高于评判的,他习惯说"我喜欢""我不喜 欢",而不是"好"和"不好"。我一向认为第二次读仍能被感动的作品才是双重质保的好作品,所以我很爱听洪老师的重读体会。《晚霞消失的时候》虽然节奏拖 沓,语言平庸,但他多年后再看时还是在某个细节处落泪了。我们追问是哪个细节。他说"不能告诉你们"。洪老师自称是个怀疑论者和超级的现实主义者(连做梦 都没有超现实过),所以第一读《爱是不能忘记的》时就"不相信连手都没有握过、相处不足24个小时的两个人,怎么可能刻骨铭心。但现在觉得恰恰是因为手都 没有握过才刻骨铭心,因为刻骨铭心只能存在于不断地想象中。"还有以前不喜欢王朔的痞子气,但后来觉得他对知识分子的嘲讽有些还是很中肯的,在《动物凶 猛》中也读出了王朔粗人外表下的脆弱,就觉得他还蛮可爱的。洪老师和我都非常珍惜他自己在重读时发生的想法的转变,不管这种转变是否意味着成长,它意味着 新的否定或发现。所以最后一节课我让洪老师以后写一本关于自己重读感受的书,他推脱了几句写不动了,最后还是说,好。

这 半年比较遗憾的就是没能见到洪老师经常挂在嘴边的么老师。洪老师虽然和善,但由于内向敏感,不喜人情累赘,让人不敢走得太近太久。所以我很好奇和他相伴几 十年如一日的么老师是怎样的。平时洪老师上课都会早到,唯一一次没来上课是因为么老师生病他实在不能走开。洪老师是不可能会"晒幸福"的人,可他每次提起 么老师,还是会让在座的人会心一笑。最后一节课后聚餐,我们在餐桌上闲聊,说道大陆拼音打字比台湾注音打字要快,因为有智能的拼音联想法。一台电脑用久 了,你打出头几个字母,它就会自动冒出你想要的词语来。洪老师说"可是么老师的电脑就不会联想,她打自己的名字'么书仪'的拼音,出来的总是'么淑 仪'"。我当时就想,得是多亲密的人才会熟悉对方这样琐碎的细节。


我 读到洪老师的一篇文章叫《与音乐相遇》,知道他也会听古典音乐,就把切利比达克指挥的柴五送给了他。送完我心里就踏实了,因为学期结束了,我很不舍得,能 留点东西互作纪念才不怕忘却,包括今天我坐了一个下午写的这些。洪老师的那篇文章里有这样一句话:"生活里这样的零碎细节当然不会得到记载,也很快会销声 匿迹;连同当时的情绪。这是需要细心保护的。"他还说过自己年轻时对于日常细节很傲慢,崇拜那些精神性的理念性的东西,但现在年纪大了,觉得日常的伦理的 反而更可靠。就像汪曾棋的小说里那些细节的堆积,并不会妨碍思想的深刻,也写出了日常琐碎应有的尊严。

所以他现在很喜欢一大早背着那个小白布包去市场,听胡椒饼师傅讲自己的学徒时期,或者静静地看地上的老妇像给孙女绑辫子一样,将自己早上摘的菜用橡皮筋一小撮一小撮地捆起,码好,捆起,码好……
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Saturday, January 10, 2015

TS Eliot: the poet who conquered the world, 50 years on

TS Eliot: the poet who conquered the world, 50 years on

TS Eliot, once a subversive outsider, became the most celebrated poet of the 20th century – a world poet, who changed the way we think. Yet, fifty years after his death, we are still making new discoveries about him

TS Eliot on Love Beach, New Providence Island, while on his honeymoon in the Bahamas with his second wife, Valerie, in 1957. Photograph: Getty Images

It's 2015, the year of the Bullshit Centenary. One hundred years ago a young immigrant poet submitted his poem "The Triumph of Bullshit" for publication in a London avant‑garde magazine. The editor's letter explaining his rejection of the work makes clear he decided to "stick to my naif determination to have no 'Words ending in -Uck, -Unt and –Ugger'." Probably the word "bullshit" was imported from the poet's native US; but so far no one has found "bullshit" in print as a single word before 1915.

The young immigrant poet thought the rejection of his poem disappointingly puritanical. He was finding it hard to get his verse into print. Four years earlier, at the age of 22, he had completed his first masterpiece. Though he had shown it to a few friends in the US and had read it aloud to fellow students in England, in January 1915 it remained unpublished. At least one editor considered it borderline insane; another was "unable to make head or tail" of it. Its title was "The Love Song of J Alfred Prufrock".

The front cover of Criterion Magazine

This year also marks the centenary of the first publication of TS Eliot's most famous early poem. Prufrock's "Love Song" first appeared in the US, tucked away towards the back of a small magazine, probably because the editor did not greatly care for it. Two years passed before this disconcerting poem was published in Eliot's first book, but today most critics realise that it announces the arrival in verse of English-language literary modernism.

At Harvard, where Eliot did most of his studying, there will be an exhibition at the Houghton Library later this year to mark the centenary of Prufrock's emergence in print. The US, long wary of Eliot as a sort of cultural traitor, is coming to terms with its greatest poet.

cats Photograph: pr

It remains to be seen how much attention will be paid to another, more solemn anniversary. Fifty years ago this month (after being nursed through bouts of ill health by his shrewd second wife, Valerie, who had been his secretary and who lived until 2012), TS Eliot died in London. He was by then no longer a young bullshitter but the incarnation of his art form. He was not just the most famous poet alive, but regarded (as many still regard him) as the finest poet of the 20th century. Internationally lauded, he had been awarded the Nobel prize, the Dante Gold Medal, the Goethe prize, the US Medal of Freedom and the British Order of Merit. Adults knew him as the poet not just of "Prufrock", but also of The Waste Land and Four Quartets; theatre audiences had flocked to his plays such as Murder in the Cathedral and The Cocktail Party at the Edinburgh festival, in London and on Broadway; at home and at school, children relished "Macavity", one of the poems from his Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats, just as eagerly as later audiences have delighted in Cats, the musical based on those poems. On 4 February 1965 Eliot's memorial service filled Westminster Abbey.

Fifty years later, "difficult" remains the word most people attach to his verse. Yet we quote him: "Not with a bang but a whimper", the last line of Eliot's poem "The Hollow Men" is among the best-known lines of modern poetry. "April is the cruellest month" begins The Waste Land with unsettling memorability; no reader forgets the strangeness of the "patient etherised upon a table" at the start of "The Love Song of J Alfred Prufrock". Eliot's mastery of the pliancy of language gives his poetry an insistency of sound and image that seems ineradicable.

Yet, in writing his biography, I've come to realise the difficulty in reconciling the po-faced "Pope of Russell Square" (as the older Eliot came to be nicknamed) with the young immigrant poet of "The Triumph of Bullshit". Was it simply that Eliot ossified as he aged? To some extent, yes, respectability clamped him into place; but he understood imaginative freedom. He both recognised and skewered in Four Quartets the routines of "eminent men of letters" who became "chairmen of many committees". As a banker, then as a publisher, he worked at jobs where committees were de rigueur and he accomplished his work with aplomb. Yet part of him always sought an escape hatch, a way to elude his official self. His nephew Graham Bruce Fletcher remembers Uncle Tom taking him as a boy to a London joke shop in the 1960s. They bought stink bombs and let them off at the entrance of the Bedford Hotel, not far from Eliot's workplace in Bloomsbury's Russell Square. With a fit of giggles, Eliot put on a marked turn of speed as, Macavity-like, he and his nephew sped from the scene of the crime, Eliot twirling his walking stick "in the manner of Charlie Chaplin".

Vivacious … Willem Dafoe and Miranda Richardson as Eliot and Haigh-Wood in Tom & Viv

This subversive Eliot, the stink-bombing Nobel prizewinner, takes us closer to the young Eliot of "bullshit". In the early months of 1915 the Eliot who relished that word was living in Oxford ("very pretty, but I don't like to be dead"). He had come there to further his studies in philosophy at the university, but was longing for literary London, where he had made friends with his fellow American poet, the energetic, incisive, and eventually fascist-inclined Ezra Pound. Eliot's parents were suspicious of their son's wild avant-garde artistic associates, and made it clear that they expected him to return to Harvard to become a respected professor. Eliot didn't want that. What kept him in England, though, was less literature than love. After knowing her for three months, he married the nervously vivacious Vivien Haigh-Wood who was, like himself, a fine dancer, a poetry lover, a Francophile. Both he and she were on the rebound from earlier relationships. Their marriage, a brave risk, was a disaster for both of them. More than half a century later, it would be caricatured, Hollywood-style, in the movie Tom and Viv. For Eliot, as he put it in the 1960s, marriage to Vivien "brought the state of mind out of which came The Waste Land". Eventually, painfully, they separated, and Vivien ended her days in a mental institution in 1947. "I love Tom," she once wrote, "in a way that destroys us both."

To understand Eliot means coming to terms with "Tom", not just with "TS". This year, it will become easier to do that – not because there will be vast exhibitions devoted to his work, but because 2015 will bring us fuller accounts of Eliot than we have had to date. My biography's title, Young Eliot, signals an intention to portray with detail and nuance the poet of The Waste Land – a figure who, some contend, was never young. Though this is not an "official" biography (Eliot did not wish his life story to be written), I am the first biographer who has been allowed to quote extensively from the poet's published and unpublished writings. Doing so liberally makes it easier to realise how closely his vulnerable life and his brilliant poetry were sometimes painfully connected.

This is a milestone year for Eliot. In the autumn Jim McCue and Christopher Ricks will publish their long-planned edition of Eliot's collected poems – the first ever edition to bring together fully the verse that he published throughout his career and the poetry that never saw the light of day. Some readers will be shocked to realise that among Eliot's longest works is his series of sexist, racist poems about King Bolo and his Big Black Queen; these frat-boy poems allowed the sexually inexperienced student Eliot to perform a sort of sexual swagger that helped him bond with his Harvard cronies. They are, if you like, the B-side of Prufrock's love song. Meticulous editing by Ricks and McCue promises us not just more Eliot than we have seen before, but also more scholarly footnotes. Equally densely annotated is the complete online prose which is being published by Johns Hopkins University Press. Eliot's graduate student papers on German philosophy, "degrees of reality" and primitive ritual certainly relate to the "Unreal City" and vegetation rites of The Waste Land; many readers may feel they need the academic equivalent of satnav to figure it all out.

Eliot's reputation has taken a battering in recent decades. In particular, he has been accused of antisemitism – a charge he denied. It seems to me that there are moments in his writings – both in material published and in material he kept private – that do invite this charge. There is clear evidence that his parents shared a markedly antisemitic prejudice, and it is hard to argue convincingly that Eliot completely outgrew this. Yet the publication of his complete prose promises to reveal also that he was among writers who spoke out unambiguously against Nazi persecutions; such a stance surely accords with the opposition to totalitarian government in his 1930s play Murder in the Cathedral. Eliot should not be regarded as a saint. Yet nor should he be demonised nor his work reduced to any single issue. He was sometimes wrong, repeatedly brilliant, sometimes insensitive and misogynistic. He was both preternaturally gifted and undeniably a man of his time.

So why does his work still matter? The reasons are hidden in plain sight – or, more accurately, in plain sound. Prufrock's opening words say it all: "Let us go then, you and I … " People often say that the poem begins with a buttonholing, vernacular tone: its voice sounds as if it has just sidled up to you. This is only half true. If the poem started by saying "Let's go", it would sound more vernacular: "Let us go" is slower, more stagey. If you say not "Let's go", but "Let us go", you'll sound less urgent, more mannered, more self-conscious. What "The Love Song of J Alfred Prufrock" introduces into English poetry more intensely than ever before is an acute fusion of modernity and self-consciousness. The modernity hits you like a sniper's bullet when you encounter that mention of "a patient etherised upon a table" in the poem's third line. From childhood, Eliot knew the Boston Public Gardens that contained – and still contain – the weird and wonderful-sounding Ether Monument (late 19th-century Boston was a pioneering centre for anaesthetic surgery); but nobody until Eliot had put such modern surgery into a love song. The wording of "Let us go" is subtler, yet perhaps more profoundly impressive. Those three words initiate the acute self-consciousness of modernist poetry in English. Every poet who writes in English inherits that self-consciousness that has insinuated itself into the language.

Illustration by Kathryn Rathke

Because Eliot was a trained philosopher – he wrote a Harvard PhD on philosophy and his parents wanted him to pursue an academic career in the subject – he knew that the "self" in self-consciousness was unstable. "The Love Song of J Alfred Prufrock" maps an unstable self. The poem anatomises male anxieties about sex – anxieties that its author knew from experience and from inexperience; it hints, too, at how selves are constructed not just out of actions but also out of their lack, and out of language and reading, out of borrowed images. Prufrock, inhibitingly aware that, however indecisive, he is neither Hamlet nor Lazarus nor Salome, alludes (a little stagily) to all those roles. His self seems made out of role playing, or attempted acting; and yet, freighted with irony, there is still a sense of vulnerability and pain. Wittily, Prufrock refers to literature, to roles, but the irony hints at hurt. As it develops, up until The Waste Land and beyond, Eliot's poetry goes on doing this, exhibiting the self as constantly conscious of other possible and impossible selves; and suggesting that literature is a sort of performance self-consciously built on its earlier performances. Through allusion, quotation, echo and resonance, modern life is presented as a repeated ritual, one we can hear more deeply than we see it.

To a greater or lesser degree, this is still how poetry works. It's not so much that knottily difficult poets including Geoffrey Hill and Jorie Graham embed one resonance within another as they write, as that even poets very different from Eliot inherit an acute self-consciousness in their language. Poetry manifests an awareness that language – in its play of sound as much as in its denotation, its meaning – spools and unspools the self. However distinctively inflected, you can hear that in John Ashbery and in Louise Gluck, in Jo Shapcott or in John Burnside.

Though poets in the generations that followed Eliot might have denied it, his influence was unavoidable. In England one impact of this greatest of all immigrant poets was a presence in the work of the most "English" of poets: Philip Larkin's articulation of dingy urban images and bleakly isolated masculinity explored territory that Eliot had mapped out; Ted Hughes, apparently so different from the poet of "Prufrock", drew, like Eliot, on the study of anthropology to help make his poems. In Scotland, Hugh MacDiarmid was one of the first major poets to appreciate Eliot's importance and to transfer some of his insights to a different culture: "TS Eliot – it's a Scottish name" – claims "A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle", though the poet from Missouri politely rebuffed attempts to convey on him Scottish ancestry. In Ireland, more recently, Seamus Heaney told me once how his teachers gave him snippets of Eliot's influential prose "in capsule form, to carry on to the battlefield". Heaney reacted against this. His early "bog poems" are a long way from the humour of some of Eliot's mudless early poems; yet even those bog poems, as with other works by Heaney, show the present as a repetition and reinterpretation of primitive ritual. Such repetition obsessed Eliot, and is indicative of why, when he was constructing The Waste Land, he responded so excitedly to Stravinsky's The Rite of Spring.

Eliot enjoyed the primitive ceremony of Stravinsky's The Rite of Spring. Photograph: Bill Cooper

The TS Eliot of 1915 was just the sort of immigrant who today Theresa May would like to send back to his home country. Having come to the end of his course of study at Oxford, he was hanging around in Soho while "of no occupation". Today, though, Eliot's impact is global. He was more thoroughly educated than any other 20th-century poet – he had studied a daunting range of subjects, from Sanskrit and advanced mathematics to Japanese Buddhism and classical Greek. While most of us in later life screen out huge areas of our education, Eliot maintained that the artist should be very sophisticated intellectually – but also strikingly primitive.

Poetry in a complex era had to reflect, or at least refract, a sense of complexity; yet it needed to reach back, too, to something primal, to sound and re-sound what Eliot termed "the beating of a drum". Decades later, the remarkable Nigerian poet Christopher Okigbo recognised this when, shortly before his death in the Biafran war, he produced – in "Lament of the Drums", "Path of Thunder" and other poems – work at once distinctive and immersed in the cadences and "broken images" of Eliot's verse. When, in our own era, the Australian poet Les Murray produces a poetry that articulates both a totemistic animal presence and an awareness of 21st-century stacked, screen-saturated lives, he inherits an understanding of what Eliot thought poets had to do.

Eliot became a global presence remarkably quickly. The Waste Land in particular made an impression on cultures very different from St Louis, Boston, Paris and London – the cities that shaped him most. In England, the 27-year-old Japanese poet Nishiwaki Junzaburō read it as soon as it appeared in 1922. Nishiwaki carried its influence back to Japan where reference to "April's suffering" marked a recasting of The Waste Land's opening words; after Hiroshima it made all too much sense for poet Nobuo Ayukawa to contend that "the modern world" had become "a waste land".

Much of The Waste Land was written during the aftermath of the first world war. In Europe the poem was heard less as Eliot's mixture of "rhythmic grumbling" and cri de coeur (which it was) and more as a lament for modern European civilisation. In Asia, though, the poem offered metaphors for quite different national catastrophes. Just days after she published the first full Chinese translation of The Waste Land in June 1937, Zhao Luori saw the catastrophic second Sino-Japanese war break out. Suddenly her translation could be seen to articulate modern Chinese cultural and political trauma. As the 21st-century scholar Lihui Liu argues: "The terrible situation of the 1930s moved some young Chinese poets to identify Eliot as virtually their spokesman."

Eliot's profound but unsettling interrogation of ideas of tradition also struck – and still strikes – a deep chord with China. "Tradition and the Individual Talent" was the first of his works to be translated there. Mid-20th-century Chinese poets who engaged with Eliot's work were fascinated by continuity and disruption in their own, and other, cultural histories. So, when I met the influential poet-critic Yuan Kezia in 1986, he was visiting Britain as a poet and translator of modernist literature and as someone to whom Eliot's work had mattered a good deal; yet he was also, as he made sure to tell me, "the translator of Burns". To English readers, it may seem strange to connect Robert Burns and TS Eliot; yet to Scottish or Chinese readers the juxtaposition can make sense: both these poets are tradition-bearers whose ideas blended continuity and disruption, fusing modern literary culture with oral heritage. Some of the most powerful lines in Eliot's work, after all, come from nursery rhymes – whether The Waste Land's "London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down" (a telling line in a poem obsessed with loss of connection), or that distorted nursery rhyme beginning "Here we go round the prickly pear" in "The Hollow Men".

Eliot's work, and not least The Waste Land, resonates on every continent. In South America, Jorge Luis Borges wrote a significant essay on "La eternidad y TS Eliot", while the 21st-century Mexican poet and critic Pedro Serrano likes to align Eliot with one of his most important Mexican readers, the great poet Octavio Paz. In Eliot's native land, Christopher Ricks has argued that Eliot has affinities with a poet of a later generation, Anthony Hecht. Having perforated the refined polite mask of Bostonian society, Eliot himself admired the poetry of a quite different New Englander, Robert Lowell, whose Life Studies managed to articulate in verse something that Eliot could not quite capture in his own greatest poetry – familial love.

Eliot is a great love poet, but his sense repeatedly is of love frustrated, lost or gone wrong. Few poets have dealt so profoundly with the themes of childlessness, of longing, of ageing. Eliot remains one of the greatest religious poets in the language, and that, too, has added to his global reach as well as enriching his adopted and adapted European sensibility. In Greece George Seferis recast Eliot and learned how to fuse (as Eliot does) a feeling for urban modernity with a deep love of the sea. From his childhood, Eliot contemplated the Atlantic Ocean and knew what it meant to face up to death. In boyhood he had lived through a cyclone that destroyed much of his native St Louis; the poet of "Death by Water" was also a young man who had risked his life at sea. In Italy, while it was it was Mario Luzi who recast Eliot's most beautiful maritime poem of loss and longing, "Marina", as a new poem in Italian, it is the Nobel prizewinning Eugenio Montale, a presenter of desolate landscapes and an interrogator of past literary tradition, who is often seen as a kindred spirit to Eliot. Yet there may be an affinity, too, between the poet of The Waste Land and that much younger, Dresden-born poet Durs Grünbein who, like Eliot, hauls back from the world of the Greek and Latin Classics material that resonates with the worst horrors of the 20th century.

In English, Eliot, the greatest poet of London, is also the greatest poet of the second world war – not because he fought in it, but because he registered so fully its struggle and destruction: the houses that turned to dust, the raids, the need to persist against wholly unfavourable odds. Those are some of the elements that power "East Coker", "The Dry Salvages", and "Little Gidding". The last named of the Quartets in particular draws on Eliot's experience as a fire watcher during the London blitz, while "The Dry Salvages", drawing on and addressing his own American past, was written in the period before America entered the second world war and as Britain was facing defeat. Though in no way directly propagandistic, Eliot's poem nonetheless seems geared to encourage Americans to understand the necessity of persisting in struggle. After the second world war, as after the first, Eliot went out of his way to voice his Europhilia, his belief in European unity and "the mind of Europe". All this contributed to his being regarded, rightly, as an Anglophile poet who could contend at one moment that "History is now and England", but who could see, too, the importance of a sense of pan-European civilisation. So, in the decades after 1945, the importance of this poet to whom Dante mattered as much as Shakespeare can be seen as emblematising European cultural politics. There is a European Eliot, an English Eliot, an American Eliot, an Indian Eliot, a Chinese Eliot: this proliferation of Eliots has made him all the more a world poet.

So when, on Monday in London, the Poetry Book Society and the TS Eliot Trustees host a group of contemporary poets for the TS Eliot prize award ceremony, honouring "the best collection of poetry published in 2014" at an event marking the 50th anniversary of TS Eliot's death, whether or not the winning poet echoes Eliot directly is immaterial. More than any other 20th-century poet, Eliot showed how to balance tradition and modernity – that is his true legacy; as poet, publisher, critic and editor, his art opened up the space in which we write and read. Sometimes people try to caricature him; his detractors must grant him his full complexity, just as his fans must acknowledge that his background was not just one of ragtime and high culture but also of familial antisemitism and attitudes to race that trouble St Louis to this day. To appreciate him requires an acknowledgement that his life and work were full of daring, astuteness and a preternaturally acute ear for language. Anything else is bullshit.

Robert Crawford's biography Young Eliot: From St Louis to The Waste Land is published by Cape on 5 February.

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