Wednesday, May 31, 2023

The Case Against the Trauma Plot

 

The Case Against the Trauma Plot

The New Yorker · by Parul Sehgal · December 23, 2021
It was on a train journey, from Richmond to Waterloo, that Virginia Woolf encountered the weeping woman. A pinched little thing, with her silent tears, she had no way of knowing that she was about to be enlisted into an argument about the fate of fiction. Woolf summoned her in the 1924 essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” writing that “all novels begin with an old lady in the corner opposite”—a character who awakens the imagination. Unless the English novel recalled that fact, Woolf thought, the form would be finished. Plot and originality count for crumbs if a writer cannot bring the unhappy lady to life. And here Woolf, almost helplessly, began to spin a story herself—the cottage that the old lady kept, decorated with sea urchins, her way of picking her meals off a saucer—alighting on details of odd, dark density to convey something of this woman’s essence.
Those details: the sea urchins, that saucer, that slant of personality. To conjure them, Woolf said, a writer draws from her temperament, her time, her country. An English novelist would portray the woman as an eccentric, warty and beribboned. A Russian would turn her into an untethered soul wandering the street, “asking of life some tremendous question.”
How might today’s novelists depict Woolf’s Mrs. Brown? Who is our representative character? We’d meet her, I imagine, in profile or bare outline. Self-entranced, withholding, giving off a fragrance of unspecified damage. Stalled, confusing to others, prone to sudden silences and jumpy responsiveness. Something gnaws at her, keeps her solitary and opaque, until there’s a sudden rip in her composure and her history comes spilling out, in confession or in flashback.
Dress this story up or down: on the page and on the screen, one plot—the trauma plot—has arrived to rule them all. Unlike the marriage plot, the trauma plot does not direct our curiosity toward the future (Will they or won’t they?) but back into the past (What happened to her?). “For the eyeing of my scars, there is a charge,” Sylvia Plath wrote in “Lady Lazarus.” “A very large charge.” Now such exposure comes cheap. Frame it within a bad romance between two characters and their discordant baggage. Nest it in an epic of diaspora; reënvision the Western, or the novel of passing. Fill it with ghosts. Tell it in a modernist sensory rush with the punctuation falling away. Set it among nine perfect strangers. In fiction, our protagonist will often go unnamed; on television, the character may be known as Ted Lasso, Wanda Maximoff, Claire Underwood, Fleabag. Classics are retrofitted according to the model. Two modern adaptations of Henry James’s “The Turn of the Screw” add a rape to the governess’s past. In “Anne with an E,” the Netflix reboot of “Anne of Green Gables,” the title character is given a history of violent abuse, which she relives in jittery flashbacks. In Hogarth Press’s novelized updates of Shakespeare’s plays, Jo Nesbø, Howard Jacobson, Jeanette Winterson, and others accessorize Macbeth and company with the requisite devastating backstories.
The prevalence of the trauma plot cannot come as a surprise at a time when the notion of trauma has proved all-engulfing. Its customary clinical incarnation, P.T.S.D., is the fourth most commonly diagnosed psychiatric disorder in America, and one with a vast remit. Defined by the DSM-III, in 1980, as an event “outside the range of usual human experience,” trauma now encompasses “anything the body perceives as too much, too fast, or too soon,” the psychotherapist Resmaa Menakem tells us in “My Grandmother’s Hands: Racialized Trauma and the Pathway to Mending Our Hearts and Bodies” (2017). The expanded definition has allowed many more people to receive care but has also stretched the concept so far that some 636,120 possible symptom combinations can be attributed to P.T.S.D., meaning that 636,120 people could conceivably have a unique set of symptoms and the same diagnosis. The ambiguity is moral as well as medical: a soldier who commits war crimes can share the diagnosis with his victims, Ruth Leys notes in “Trauma: A Genealogy” (2000). Today, with the term having grown even more elastic, this same diagnosis can apply to a journalist who reported on that atrocity, to descendants of the victims, and even to a historian studying the event a century later, who may be a casualty of “vicarious trauma.”
How to account for trauma’s creep? Take your corners. Modern life is inherently traumatic. No, we’re just better at spotting it, having become more attentive to human suffering in all its gradations. Unless we’re worse at it—more prone to perceive everything as injury. In a world infatuated with victimhood, has trauma emerged as a passport to status—our red badge of courage? The question itself might offend: perhaps it’s grotesque to argue about the symbolic value attributed to suffering when so little restitution or remedy is available. So many laborious debates, all set aside when it’s time to be entertained. We settle in for more episodes of Marvel superheroes brooding brawnily over daddy issues, more sagas of enigmatic, obscurely injured literary heroines.
It was not war or sexual violence that brought the idea of traumatic memory to light but the English railways, some six decades before Woolf chugged along from Richmond to Waterloo. In the eighteen-sixties, the physician John Eric Erichsen identified a group of symptoms in some victims of railway accidents—though apparently uninjured, they later reported confusion, hearing voices, and paralysis. He termed it “railway spine.” Sigmund Freud and Pierre Janet went on to argue that the mind itself could be wounded. In the trenches of the Great War, railway spine was reborn as shell shock, incarnated in the figure of the suicidal veteran Septimus Smith, in Woolf’s “Mrs. Dalloway.” What remained unaltered was the scorn that accompanied diagnosis; shell-shocked soldiers were sometimes labelled “moral invalids” and court-martialled. In the decades that followed, the study of trauma slipped into “periods of oblivion,” as the psychiatrist Judith Herman has written. It wasn’t until the Vietnam War that the aftershocks of combat trauma were “rediscovered.” P.T.S.D. was identified, and, with the political organizing of women’s groups, the diagnosis was extended to victims of rape and sexual abuse. In the nineteen-nineties, trauma theory as a cultural field of inquiry—pioneered by the literary critic Cathy Caruth—described an experience that overwhelms the mind, fragments the memory, and elicits repetitive behaviors and hallucinations. In the popular realm, such ideas were given a scientific imprimatur by Bessel van der Kolk’s “The Body Keeps the Score” (2014), which argues that traumatic memories are physiologically distinctive and inscribe themselves on an older, more primal part of the brain.
“If Greeks invented tragedy, the Romans the epistle and the Renaissance the sonnet,” Elie Wiesel wrote, “our generation invented a new literature, that of testimony.” The enshrinement of testimony in all its guises—in memoirs, confessional poetry, survivor narratives, talk shows—elevated trauma from a sign of moral defect to a source of moral authority, even a kind of expertise. In the past couple of decades, a fresh wave of writing about the subject has emerged, with best-selling novels and memoirs of every disposition: the caustic (Edward St. Aubyn’s Patrick Melrose novels), the sentimental (Jonathan Safran Foer’s “Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close”), the enraptured (Leslie Jamison’s essay collection “The Empathy Exams”), the breathtakingly candid (the anonymously written memoir “Incest Diary”), or all of the above (Karl Ove Knausgaard’s six-volume “My Struggle”). Internet writing mills offered a hundred and fifty dollars a confession. “It was 2015, and everyone was a pop-culture critic, writing from the seat of experience,” Larissa Pham recalls in a recent essay collection, “Pop Song.” “The dominant mode by which a young, hungry writer could enter the conversation was by deciding which of her traumas she could monetize . . . be it anorexia, depression, casual racism, or perhaps a sadness like mine, which blended all three.” “The Body Keeps the Score” has remained planted on the Times best-seller list for nearly three years.
Trauma came to be accepted as a totalizing identity. Its status has been little affected by the robust debates within trauma theory or, for that matter, by critics who argue that the evidence of van der Kolk’s theory of traumatic memory remains weak, and his claims uncorroborated by empirical studies (even his own). Lines from a Terrance Hayes sonnet come to mind: “I thought we might sing, / Of the wire wound round the wound of feeling.” That wire around the wound might be trauma’s cultural script, a concept that bites into the flesh so deeply it is difficult to see its historical contingency. The claim that trauma’s imprint is a timeless feature of our species, that it etches itself on the human brain in a distinct way, ignores how trauma has been evolving since the days of railway spine; traumatic flashbacks were reported only after the invention of film. Are the words that come to our lips when we speak of our suffering ever purely our own?
Trauma theory finds its exemplary novelistic incarnation in Hanya Yanagihara’s “A Little Life” (2015), which centers on one of the most accursed characters to ever darken a page. Jude, evidently named for the patron saint of lost causes, was abandoned as an infant. He endures—among other horrors—rape by priests; forced prostitution as a boy; torture and attempted murder by a man who kidnaps him; battery and attempted murder by a lover; the amputation of both legs. He is a man of ambiguous race, without desires, near-mute where his history is concerned—“post-sexual, post-racial, post-identity, post-past,” a friend teases him. “The post-man, Jude the Postman.” The reader completes the list: Jude the Post-Traumatic.
Trauma trumps all other identities, evacuates personality, remakes it in its own image. The story is built on the care and service that Jude elicits from a circle of supporters who fight to protect him from his self-destructive ways; truly, there are newborns envious of the devotion he inspires. The loyalty can be mystifying for the reader, who is conscripted to join in, as a witness to Jude’s unending mortifications. Can we so easily invest in this walking chalk outline, this vivified DSM entry? With the trauma plot, the logic goes: Evoke the wound and we will believe that a body, a person, has borne it.
Such belief can be difficult to sustain. The invocation of trauma promises access to some well-guarded bloody chamber; increasingly, though, we feel as if we have entered a rather generic motel room, with all the signs of heavy turnover. The second-season revelation of Ted Lasso’s childhood trauma only reduces him; his peculiar, almost sinister buoyancy is revealed to be merely a coping mechanism. He opens up about his past to his therapist just as another character does to her mother—their scenes are intercut—and it happens that both of their traumatic incidents occurred on the same day. The braided revelations make familiar points about fathers (fallible), secrecy (bad), and banked resentments (also bad), but mostly expose the creakiness of a plot mechanism. As audiences grow inured, one trauma may not suffice. We must rival Job, rival Jude. In “WandaVision,” our protagonist weathers the murder of her parents, the murder of her twin, and the death, by her own hands, of her beloved, who is then resurrected and killed again. All that, and a subplot with a ticking time bomb.
Trauma has become synonymous with backstory, but the tyranny of backstory is itself a relatively recent phenomenon—one that, like any successful convention, has a way of skirting our notice. Personality was not always rendered as the pencil-rubbing of personal history. Jane Austen’s characters are not pierced by sudden memories; they do not work to fill in the gaps of partial, haunting recollections. A curtain hangs over childhood, Nicholas Dames writes in “Amnesiac Selves” (2001), describing a tradition of “pleasurable forgetting,” in which characters import only those details from the past which can serve them (and, implicitly, the narrative) in the present. The same holds for Dorothea Brooke, for Isabel Archer, for Mrs. Ramsay. Certainly the filmmakers of classical Hollywood cinema were quite able to bring characters to life without portentous flashbacks to formative torments. In contrast, characters are now created in order to be dispatched into the past, to truffle for trauma.
Jason Mott’s “Hell of a Book,” which received the 2021 National Book Award for fiction, begins with a slow pan across the figure of a woman sitting on a porch in an old, faded dress: “The threads around the hem lost their grip on things. They broke apart and reached their dangling necks in every direction that might take them away. And now, after seven years of hard work, the dress looked as though it would not be able to hold its fraying fabric together much longer.” It is tempting to read this as a description of the trauma plot itself, threadbare and barely hanging on, never more so than in Mott’s novel. The narrator, a wildly successful novelist on book tour, finds himself followed by an apparition, who represents both a young Black boy killed by police and a child who witnesses police shoot and kill his own father. But the rangy, sorrowing themes that Mott wants to explore are subsumed by an array of cheap effects, coy hints of buried trauma in the narrator’s own past: amnesiac episodes, hammy Freudian slips, a therapist’s sage but unappreciated insights. Once brought to light, this trauma feels oddly disengaged from the story at hand, as tangentially connected as those two entwined strands in “Ted Lasso,” signalling to the same vague homilies (grief haunts, trauma catches up with you) and unnecessary to Mott’s more powerful points about police violence as a form of terrorism and the painful perpetual mourning it inspires. Mott uses all the possible cranks and levers of the trauma plot, as if imagining a wire of suspense drawing us in. But the machinery is nothing so fine; it chews up his story instead.
I hear grumbling. Isn’t it unfair to blame trauma narratives for portraying what trauma does: annihilate the self, freeze the imagination, force stasis and repetition? It’s true that our experiences and our cultural scripts can’t be neatly divided; we will interpret one through the other. And yet survivor narratives and research suggest greater diversity than our script allows. Even as the definition of what constitutes P.T.S.D. has grown more jumbled—“the junk drawer of disconnected symptoms,” David J. Morris calls it in “The Evil Hours: A Biography of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” (2015)—the notion of what it entails, the sentence it imposes, appears to have grown narrower and more unyielding. The afterword to a recent manual, “Stories Are What Save Us: A Survivor’s Guide to Writing About Trauma,” advises, “Don’t bother trying to rid yourself of trauma altogether. Forget about happy endings. You will lose. Escaping trauma isn’t unlike trying to swim out of a riptide.”
To question the role of trauma, we are warned, is to oppress: it is “often nothing but a resistance to movements for social justice,” Melissa Febos writes in her forthcoming book, “Body Work: The Radical Power of Personal Narrative.” Those who look askance at trauma memoirs, she says, are replicating the “classic role of perpetrator: to deny, discredit and dismiss victims in order to avoid being implicated or losing power.” Trauma survivors and researchers who have testified about experiences or presented evidence that clashes with the preferred narrative often find their own stories denied and dismissed. In the nineties, the psychologist Susan A. Clancy conducted a study of adults who had been sexually abused as children. They described the grievous long-term suffering and harm of P.T.S.D., but, to her surprise, many said that the actual incidents of abuse were not themselves traumatic, characterized by force or fear—if only because so many subjects were too young to fully understand what was happening and because the abuse was disguised as affection, as a game. The anguish came later, with the realization of what had occurred. Merely for presenting these findings, Clancy was labelled an ally of pedophilia, a trauma denialist. During treatment for P.T.S.D. after serving as a war correspondent in Iraq, David Morris was discouraged from asking if his experience might yield any form of wisdom. Clinicians admonished him, he says, “for straying from the strictures of the therapeutic regime.” He was left wondering how the medicalization of trauma prevents veterans from expressing their moral outrage at war, siphoning it, instead, into a set of symptoms to be managed.
And never mind pesky findings that the vast majority of people recover well from traumatic events and that post-traumatic growth is far more common than post-traumatic stress. In a recent Harper’s essay, the novelist Will Self suggests that the biggest beneficiaries of the trauma model are trauma theorists themselves, who are granted a kind of tenure, entrusted with a lifetime’s work of “witnessing” and interpreting. George A. Bonanno, the director of Columbia’s Loss, Trauma, and Emotion Lab and the author of “The End of Trauma,” has a blunter assessment: “People don’t seem to want to let go of the idea that everybody’s traumatized.”
When Virginia Woolf wrote about her own experience of sexual abuse as a child, she settled on a wary description of herself as “the person to whom things happen.” The mask of trauma does not always neatly fit the face. In “Maus,” Art Spiegelman strives to understand his overbearing father, a Holocaust survivor. “I used to think the war made him that way,” he says. His stepmother, Mala, replies, “Fah! I went through the camp. All our friends went through the camps. Nobody is like him!” Mala won’t cede her knowledge of her husband or of life to the coercive tidiness of the trauma plot. There are other doubting Malas. I start seeing them everywhere, even lurking inside the conventional trauma story with designs of their own, unravelling it from within.
Stories rebel against the constriction of the trauma plot with skepticism, comedy, critique, fantasy, and a prickly awareness of the genre and audience expectations. In the Netflix series “Feel Good,” the protagonist, Mae, a comedian dealing with an addiction and disorienting flashbacks, struggles to fit their muddled feelings about their past into any straightforward diagnosis or treatment plan. (“People are obsessed with trauma these days,” Mae says ruefully. “It’s like a buzzword.”) The protagonist of Michaela Coel’s “I May Destroy You,” learning that she has been drugged and sexually assaulted, also finds the ready-made therapeutic scripts wanting; some of the show’s most interesting strands follow the ways that focussing on painful histories can make us myopic to the suffering of others. Conversations about trauma in Anthony Veasna So’s “Afterparties” are seasoned with exasperation, teasing, fatigue. “You gotta stop using the genocide to win arguments,” Cambodian American children tell their refugee parents.
The appetite for stories about Black trauma is skewered in Uwem Akpan’s “New York, My Village” and Raven Leilani’s “Luster.” Scanning the season’s “diversity giveaway” books, Leilani’s Edie, one of the only Black employees at a publishing house, sees “a slave narrative about a mixed-race house girl fighting for a piece of her father’s estate; a slave narrative about a runaway’s friendship with the white schoolteacher who selflessly teaches her how to read; a slave narrative about a tragic mulatto who raises the dead with her magic chitlin pies; a domestic drama about a Black maid who, like Schrödinger’s cat, is both alive and dead.”
The FX series “Reservation Dogs,” set in Oklahoma’s Indian country, draws attention to, and shirks, the expectation that Indigenous stories be tethered to trauma. A sixteen-year-old named Bear and his friends are accosted by members of a rival gang, who pull up in a car and start firing. Bear’s body shudders with the impact, flails, and falls, with agonizing slowness. He is brought down—in a hail of paintballs. It’s a fine parody of “Platoon,” of the killing of Willem Dafoe’s Sergeant Elias. If it isn’t enough to play on one classic narrative of trauma, Bear then has a vision of a Native warrior on horseback, ambling through the mist. “I was at the Battle of Little Bighorn,” the warrior says, as if prepared to give Bear a speech on adversity and heroism. Then he clarifies: “I didn’t kill anybody, but I fought bravely.” He clarifies again: “Well, I actually didn’t get into the fight itself, but I came over that hill, real rugged-like.” Humor protects genuine feeling from sentimental traditions that have left the specificity of Native experience flattened and forgotten. Bear and his friends, we learn, are reeling from the suicide of a member of their group. They face all the present-day difficulties of life on the reservation, but mourning is not the only way they are known to themselves, or to us. They’re teen-agers, and announce themselves in the time-honored ways—their taste, their terrible schemes, their ferocious loyalty to one another.

Thursday, May 11, 2023

FREE ASSOCIATION: On Brian Dillon’s Affinities

 

FREE ASSOCIATION

On Brian Dillon’s Affinities
Aby Warburg, Picture Atlas Mnemosyne, Panel 39 (detail), 1928–29. Photo: The Warburg Institute.

Affinities: On Art and Fascination. By Brian Dillon. New York Review of Books, 2023. 320 pages.

IN THE EARLY WEEKS of the pandemic, I became obsessed with maps of New York City. Cloistered in my apartment in upper Manhattan, I would stare at the subway map for hours, studying every stop on every line. I would wander around Brooklyn on Google Maps, memorizing the order of avenues and streets. I played quizzes where you would look at photographs taken on the street and have to guess the neighborhood. It must have seemed like a sad way to pass the time, but the obsessive scrutiny seemed important.

The Irish critic Brian Dillon, in his new essay collection, Affinities: On Art and Fascination, describes a similar obsession that consumed him around the same time: an idea that he would spend these new, strange hours in isolation staring at images and that “they would go to work on me, leach into soul or sensibility. I fancied I could memorize these photographs like poems.” Such a “monkish task,” he acknowledges, is “idiotic,” naive, perhaps privileged; withdrawn from community, people, politics. But it is done in pursuit of wonder and astonishment, something that must have felt urgent at the time. Affinities gathers close readings of various images—photographs, collages, footage of dance performances or microscopic matter, all that blinds and blinks and twinkles—that have bewitched the author in some way. Originally appearing in publications such as the New YorkerFrieze, the London Review of Books, and Artforum, the essays each unfold alongside one black-and-white image, though Dillon traverses more than is visually reproduced. Interleaved between these texts is a longer, ten-part “episodic essay” on affinity itself: what it is, when it arises, where it leads. 

Dillon’s new book is the last in a trilogy that also includes Essayism (2017) and Suppose a Sentence (2020), likewise collections of watchful exegeses (of essays and sentences, respectively). For years, the critic has filled notebooks in attempts to pin down the undefinable: feelings that remain but are constantly moving and shifting beneath his feet and under his skin. The essay itself, for example, has affinities with verbs, details, lists—and the writing of one has a “ruinous and rescuing” affinity with depression and melancholy—but there are also affinities “between words and things, between the structure of a scene and the shape of a sentence.” Elizabeth Hardwick’s Sleepless Nights is a “work of affinity.”

Everyone Dillon consults has their own idea about the subject. According to Maggie Nelson, affinity is unserious; its attachment is always about to fade; it flirts. According to Oscar Wilde, it’s mood. For William Gass, it’s blue; for Wayne Koestenbaum, it’s Brahms’s Concerto No. 1 in D minor; it’s a “stirring” that brings “no possibility of an argument, no possibility (or so I wished to believe) of ideology.”

When affinity does brush up against ideology, the results are often harmful. Curiously, Dillon does not mention the most famous, and infamous, invocation of his subject in the art world: the 1984 survey “‘Primitivism’ in 20th Century Art: Affinity of the Tribal and the Modern” at New York’s Museum of Modern Art. Juxtaposing modern artworks with “primitive” tribal objects, the exhibition pointed to an affinity or “readiness” on the part of Western art to fold all histories into its formalism; “‘Primitivism’” drew the ire of critics such as Hal Foster and Thomas McEvilley, who influentially argued that the blockbuster show “pretends to confront the Third World while really coopting it and using it to consolidate Western notions of quality.” Although Dillon doesn’t engage with this flash point in art history, he does touch lightly on the difficulty of forging real solidarity through affinity. It is at once a means of “escaping the community at hand,” and “positing a community to come.” The politics of such relationships, Dillon can only say, are “yet to be determined.”

Paraphrasing Koestenbaum, Dillon ventures that affinity is “a kind of crush, and like a crush it tends to mark one out for the moment as faintly mad.” Affinities are manifestly vibes-based, predicated on connections rather than “distinctions.” In lieu of the tightly controlled vocabulary and categories favored by art historians and academics, Dillon describes the “wisps, convolutions, branches” recorded in the polymath John Herschel’s astronomical illustrations from the 1830s, and Thomas de Quincey’s interpretation of one of these images as a “phantom” creature, like Death gloating over his “future empire over man.” Astronomists and critics were alarmed by de Quincey’s analysis, which was anyway based on a debunked theory about formless nebular substance; one writer complained that he wrote more like “one whom the moon has smitten” rather than “one who gazes calmly at the stars.”

One of John Herschel’s hand-drawn stellar nebulae from the 1830s.

Everywhere in Dillon’s various affinity is a certain wispiness: the “lack of focus” in Julia Margaret Cameron’s portraits; the “about-to-be” sense of a Dora Maar photograph; the “explosion of protean matter” in Loïe Fuller’s dances as she contorts herself into “other sorts of being . . . almost immaterial.” “Ambiguity is all of the point,” Dillon writes of Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas, 1928–29, an unfinished attempt to map the “afterlife of antiquity” through hundreds of reproductions of artworks, maps, photographs, and newspaper clippings constellated across seventy-nine wooden panels. Warburg’s method was well suited to Dillon’s idea of affinity; in 1921 he lambasted what he called art historians’ “border-police-bias” against his associative, interdisciplinary habits (which included describing the “shape of his suffering” to insects that would fly into his room at a private asylum), assembling a body of images, Dillon writes, “that scintillates instead of merely signifying.”

Dillon’s prose itself is packed with affinity—his sentences are in unresolved, constant motion, each word in a Fulleresque serpentine dance with the other. He quotes William H. Gass on his “etymological adventure” with the color blue (“A single word, a single thought, a single thing, as Plato taught”) and notes Gass’s “cheap rhyme,” his “bubbles and baubles of alliteration.” In a similar moment of playfulness, Dillon writes of Fuller’s “miraculous metamorphoses suddenly stilled in the sunshine.” Dillon’s language leaps off the page, as though it wants to do, rather than simply be about, as is often criticism’s unhappy condition. Describing the migraines he experienced as a teenager, which seem similar to the behind-the-eyelid stars that come from too much screen time, Dillon writes of a “pure absence, as if one side of reality had simply dropped away.” In a flashback, he gives up on reading his schoolbook, looks away, and “there the nothing was still.” What an arrangement of words. The nothing is a thing, blocking the way to sight. The migraine is so bad that the young Dillon forgets the word “headache,” and instead says, “I have a grenade, a really bad grenade.” (Migraines, like affinity, leave him “stupefied.”) Of William Klein’s wide-angle photography, uniquely adept at capturing not just the subject but a range of background material, Dillon writes: “It’s the else that is often the point.”

How his language embodies! Like Klein, bringing backgrounds into focus, Dillon brings the nothings, the elses, to life, makes them the center of the portrait, graces them with verbs and adjectives of their own. His words contort into unexpected situations; they are bright with affinity: “mundane ecstasies,” an “agony of optimism,” a “world-unmaking oddity.” In an interview Dillon excerpts at length from the BBC, the artist Dennis Potter describes a new flowering blossom as “the whitest, frothiest, blossomest blossom that ever could be,” remarking that “things are both more trivial than they ever were, and more important than they ever were, and the difference between the trivial and the important doesn’t seem to matter.” One is reminded of Joan Didion sitting at her desk trying to contemplate the Hegelian dialectic and finding herself concentrating instead on the flowering pear tree outside her window. And yet, as Walter Benjamin, one of Dillon’s own patron saints, knew—such a discrepancy is false. When it comes to affinity, the dialectic might be the pear tree.

Perhaps the most moving and remarkable anecdote in this collection concerns Dillon’s paternal aunt, Vera. Mean, jealous, petty, self-protective, and enamored with her own powerlessness, Vera inherited from her father—a debt collector for toy stores, of all things, “the ghost of Christmas repossessed”—the problem (Dillon considers using the word project) of suburban neighbors damaging her family garden, stealing roses and encroaching on her property with their fences and trees. Vera became increasingly committed to this state of injury over the course of her adult life, eventually setting up CCTV cameras so she could watch for the culprit all day. She lived with the feeling that “all her borders, intimate or domestic, were ruinously porous, subject any moment to undignified invasion.”

Brian Dillon’s aunt Vera obsessively photographed the borders of her property.

The story is a little sickening, but in a strange way sympathetic. Vera would make anxious trips to the pharmacy to develop her photographs and inspect the “latest evidence,” examining every inch of her property’s border, every means of ingress and egress: hedges, doors, windows, curtains. “Frontiers,” as Dillon calls them. No one ever saw what she saw, even when she showed them the photos. And yet Dillon knows that he has more in common with her than he has ever cared to admit: a “keen, habitual, and even morbid attention to the world . . . a protracted act of close looking.” Vera, too, was obsessed with that which impinged.

In Vera’s case, this shrunk her world, and while the same does not seem true for Dillon, the limits of such obsession can be murky. “You can pursue vigilance and attention into a kind of fugue state,” Dillon writes. This is exactly why the very contradiction of this book works. It’s an intellectual or at least literary exercise in articulating that which defies articulacy; perhaps to have an affinity for something is to somehow cling to it and let it escape at the same time.

Dillon writes that none of his work “pursues an argument or is built to convince.” Maybe affinity, itself impossible to pin down, can never do that. Nevertheless, it seems that what Dillon is exploring—maybe even proposing—are other ways of living and being, of relating to each other and the world: being mad or stupid or monkish; having wild, irrational crushes, letting them sidle up; living with flirtations and seductions over lasting meaning; being disconcerted, lonely, uncomfortable, nervous, desperate; simply floating on vibes, while also having no chill; being completely at the mercy of things. “Ruinously porous.”

Apoorva Tadepalli is a writer living in Queens. Her essays and criticism have appeared in The Point, Bookforum, The Nation, n+1, and elsewhere.

Tuesday, May 9, 2023

 

Perry Anderson Breathes New Life Into Two of the 20th Century’s Greatest Writers

jacobin.com · by Gustav Jönsson

The term “pro-war” must be one of the most abused epithets in our political language, but its use to describe Anthony Powell is undeniably apt. He was in favor of practically any war, provided it was fought for king and country. World War I formed his political consciousness, and he’d lash out at anyone who regretted Britain’s involvement in it — those, as he put it, “who waffle about war being avoidable in 1914.” He found the behavior of the Bloomsbury intellectuals outright shameful; in the poetry of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon he sniffed the mawkish scent of “self-pity.” The son of a soldier who had fought to crush the cause of Irish independence, Powell, even late in life, disliked what he called Ireland’s “national egoism.”

Perry Anderson, in a lucid essay collected in Different Speeds, Same Furies, thus remarks on Powell’s indiscriminate support of British imperial campaigns:

Vindication of the cause of the Entente remains, of course, the standard reflex of official Anglo-Saxon historiography to this day. Less common is Powell’s projections of it backward to earlier conflicts. The Boer War? “Even now,” he complained of David Garnett’s autobiography, “he can produce a paean of praise for the pro-Boers.” The Crimean War? “‘We don’t want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do’ has managed to get a bad name but was a perfectly healthy instinct, especially in insisting that the Russians shall not have Constantinople.” The Napoleonic Wars? Whigs who opposed Pitt were “near Quislings.”

That kind of instinctive militarism served Powell in the sense that he, unlike Guy Crouchback in Evelyn Waugh’s Sword of Honor, felt relieved when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact finally ruptured.

During World War II, Powell served in the War Office. There he liaised with exiled Polish forces, but he was eventually fired for reasons unclear: Powell’s biographer Hilary Spurling implies that it might’ve been because of his objections to British complicity in the Soviet cover-up of Katyn massacre. Before the end of the war, however, he had played (to his great pride) a small role in the neutralization of the Belgian Communist Party.

Though his anti-communism was, in Anderson’s words, “a conviction, not a passion,” he remained ever vigilant of tankie fellow travelers. Quoting Dostoevsky to the effect that liberalism in one generation produces nihilism in the next, Powell reserved his greatest opprobrium for that ideology’s organic intellectuals. “That historically for every British liberal who opposed an imperial war,” Anderson comments, “a hundred had usually supported it, only underlines how much a tiny scattering of literary dissent in August 1914 affected Powell’s angle of vision.”

A Literature of High Toryism

To many people’s minds, Powell came to epitomize what it meant to be High Tory. He came from privilege, belonging on both sides of his family to the minor gentry; he was educated at Eton and Oxford, where he frequented the Hypocrites’ Club. But his financial security shouldn’t be overstated, nor should his snobbishness. Unlike Marcel Proust — Anderson’s point of comparison throughout Furies — Powell had to work to pay his bills; though, as is so often the case for those raised adjacent to power, jobs fell his way without him even trying.

Still, Powell had no trouble socializing outside his class or portraying credible non-aristos in his fiction. Certain provisos notwithstanding — the lower middle class isn’t exactly prominent in the twelve volumes of A Dance to the Music of Time — Powell, more than Proust, had an impressive social range. In Dance, he wrote that

All human beings, driven as they are at different speeds by the same Furies, are at close range equally extraordinary.

Anderson, who finds Proust’s aphorisms both untenable and dogmatic, might’ve noticed that the same could be said of this one of Powell’s: behind the classical rhetoric hides the plain fact that everyone is not, in fact, “equally extraordinary” — that phrase, embraced with uncharacteristic credulity by Anderson, is more than a little self-contradictory. Nonetheless, Powell can rightly be called a democratic novelist. Those critics who have thought his use of recondite terms or his artistic references to be elitist or patrician only evince their own hauteur: they take for granted that learning, love of language, and an appreciation of art belongs to the bailiwick of the upper classes, where “ordinary” people can only be interlopers. Powell, by contrast, had no such sniffy conceits.

Different Speeds, Same Furies collects four of Anderson’s literary essays: the first, roughly one hundred pages long, compares Powell to Proust; the second, originally a talk given to the Anthony Powell Society, is on Powell’s memoirs Keep the Ball Rolling, though in large part it merely restates the first rather less brilliantly; the third is a theory-laden reflection on the historical novel as a literary form; and the fourth treats Montesquieu’s Persian Letters. The chief subject of Different Speeds, Same Furies is the Powell-Proust comparison, with Powell often coming out better, especially in terms of characterology.

Powell, Anderson contends, took more interest than Proust in others, and it shows when one considers side by side the characters they created. Powell is the sharper social historian. Proust registers the passage of time merely by changing fashions and technological progress — electrical lights replace gas lights; motorcars take the place of coaches. His society is in stasis: time signifies only life’s slow crawl toward its terminus. Powell, however, captures how the structure of society changes from the interwar to the postwar era.

Anderson is capable of saying much in a few words — Powell fought a “battle against sonority”; nescience is “the natural epistemology of an artless narcissism” — but this fondness for the intricately coiled phrase can approach the ridiculous. In place of “Powell’s parents” one reads the ungainly, “the extraordinary union that produced Powell and shaped his infancy.” In another passage in the book’s third essay one reads the following pronouncement about the historical novel:

Properly aesthetic are not their referential dimensions, so often shabby ideological messages . . . but their reminders of the plenitude of all human impulses, which along with the blackest of these include the revolutionary-utopian and the temptation of the good.

For fans of Anderson passages like the above are all par for the course. So, too, is an iconoclastic dismissiveness. He is capable of incredible high-handedness toward even the most respected of writers. Philip Larkin and V.S. Naipaul are dismissed as stupid “right-wing cronies,” while “language sheds all compunction in the foul-mouth chic of the best literary periodicals.” I can’t say that I mind such condescension because I’m sure that, if pressed, he could marshal supporting evidence. There is something of a schoolboy’s playfulness in these remarks that is part and parcel of Anderson’s love of the baroque sentence.

For Anderson, Powell created characters that were far more complex and believable than Proust’s. Of course, several critics have found the narrator of the Dance, Jenkins, rather vapid. Anderson concedes that Jenkins may be no Marlow, but his personality is “inseparable” from the novel’s power. It is the wealth of his reflective mind that makes the novel feel so vivid. But he is by no means emotionally frigid, nor is he a mere cipher: the plot, Anderson observes, revolves around him, with the first four volumes of the series forming a classic bildungsroman. It is only in the postwar trilogy that he becomes a passive onlooker. “Prior to these,” Anderson notes, “a wide palette of feeling is at work.”

Round and Flat

Good literary criticism, I often think, requires little more than selecting the right passages to put in block quotes, and Anderson is a master of it. Anderson cites several examples that illustrate Powell’s remarkable talent for encapsulating characters with a few well-chosen words: isn’t, for instance, Powell’s one-sentence portrait of Sunny Farebrother just perfect?

There was a suggestion of boyishness — the word “sunny” would certainly be applicable — about his frank manner; but, in spite of this manifest desire to get along with everyone on their own terms, there was also something lonely and inaccessible about him.

That’s enough to tell us who Farebrother really is, and what it must feel like to be in the same room as him. Or take Powell’s sketch of Dicky Umfraville:

Trim, horsey, perfectly at ease with himself, and everyone around him, he managed at the same time to suggest the proximity of an abyss of scandal and bankruptcy threatening at any moment to engulf him, and anyone else unfortunate enough to be in his vicinity when the crash came.

Powell also created memorable female characters. To take but one example, Moreland’s wife, Matilda, is sympathetically portrayed. But, as Anderson notes, it is only in the postwar trilogy that women are shown to be intellectually equal to the men. Emily Brightman, a historian of late antiquity, is the most erudite character in the whole novel, and Ada Leintwardine’s repartee is second to none; but in the preceding volumes, all professional women are either actors or models. They may be “tough” like Madam Leroy or Mrs Erdleigh, but they don’t discuss politics or art like the men. Anderson is at his best when he’s noticing such social markers. He observes that practically every man is referred to by his surname, while women of the narrator’s generation are addressed by their first names, and those of older generations invariably have their surnames escorted by honorifics. This does not, as Anderson writes, show the narrator’s informality with women but his reserve.

Visually, too, Powell is less sharp with women. To be sure, the male characters spend much time remarking on women’s looks, but their “beauty” stays vague. “Females are very hard to do,” Powell himself said. “I don’t think any male writer has ever done one right.” If every novelist is equally culpable, why single out Powell for criticism? But he couldn’t have believed his own excuse. The passages on women in the Dance can’t compare to the ones on men — even its most lively portraits of women feel blurred. Powell often likened his characters to paintings, usually with great precision, but when it comes to women, he seemed to struggle to pick the right one. Thus, he compares Jean Templer to a whole string of portraits that she can’t possibly resemble all at once. “Each vivid enough in itself,” Anderson writes, “the multiplication of it yields no cogent physical image: Rogier van der Weyden, Noël Coward, Rubens, Delacroix, Goya cancel each other out.”

Anderson claims that Powell’s characters are “round” while Proust’s are “flat” — they may have “plenty of life, but they lack any depth.” They’re mere caricatures, “garish dummies that are a feature of Dickens more than anything in prior French fiction.” The Verdurin salon is full of caricatures repeating their taglines: there’s the poseur Bloch and the snob Legrandin. On the more elevated levels one finds Norpois and Madame de Villeparisis. But even Proust’s most vivid characters — Duc de Guermantes, the Verdurin couple, even the Baron de Charlus — can’t be said to be “credible” human beings, or so Anderson says.

Many of Proust’s characters do have a Dickensian vitality, but why should that make them improbable or uninteresting? Who hasn’t met a figure like Madame Verdurin, the social climber who speaks in clichés? Or seen a hanger-on of Dr. Cottard’s ilk, who’d gaze at Madame Verdurin “with open-mouthed admiration and studious zeal as she skipped lightly from one-stepping stone to another of her stock of ready-made phrases”? Caricature isn’t boring if it illustrates some essential human vice or folly. Personally, I find many “flat” characters more interesting and believable than round ones.

The essence of caricatures is that they do not change. “I never will desert Mr. Micawber,” says Mrs. Micawber in David Copperfield, and of course she doesn’t. But Proust’s characters keep surprising the reader. To Anderson’s mind, this mutability isn’t proof that they’re subtle; rather, it signifies “abrupt characterological capsizal.” Thus, he thinks that Saint-Loup, who goes from being the “impassioned lover of the actress Rachel” to a “brutish pursuer of men,” is totally incredible. But I, for one, see nothing fanciful in the idea that a man who likes a woman is sleeping with other men. Here the lack of imagination is Anderson’s and not Proust’s. Anderson misses the point: it’s not that Proust’s characters change their personalities ex nihilo but that the narrator’s image of them changes. Consider, for instance, Legrandin — whom Anderson calls one of many “grotesques pure and simple.” Legrandin is seen by the narrator bowing in a curious way:

This rapid straightening-up caused a sort of tense muscular wave over Legrandin’s rump, which I had not supposed to be so fleshy; I cannot say why, but this undulation of pure matter, this wholly carnal fluency devoid of spiritual significance . . . awoke my mind suddenly to the possibility of a Legrandin altogether different from the one we knew.

The clumsy gesture collapses the narrator’s mental image of Legrandin. It reminds me of the moment in Saul Bellow’s Herzog, where Herzog’s hatred of Gersbach evanesces when he sees Gersbach, with his fleshy chest, bending over in the bathroom. If the shift seems abrupt, it is only because false impressions shatter abruptly: it is not that Legrandin has metamorphosed into something new; rather, the narrator had fooled himself into thinking that his image of Legrandin corresponded perfectly with the real Legrandin.

This is, of course, one of Proust’s leitmotifs — the risk of lulling ourselves into the belief that others are what we want them to be. Swann thus falls in love with Odette because she reminds him of a woman in a painting. He imposes his own misconceptions on her, and inevitably has to face the fact that she isn’t as he had imagined her. But it is precisely in moments like these, when I disagree with Anderson, that I enjoy reading him most. He is, consistently, one of our time’s most stimulating intellectuals.

Saturday, May 6, 2023

安妮·埃尔诺的经验与日常记忆

 [法] 弗洛朗丝·布西 Florence Bouchy

程小牧 译
        从《空衣橱》到《岁月》,安妮·埃尔诺的作品似乎始终萦绕着一种追问,涉及阐述经验所特有的文学方法。作家先是投入小说创作(自传小说),从《位置》(La Place)开始她放弃了小说。其实在《位置》中,重要的不再是阐述她自己的经验,而是她父亲的经验。她先前作品中所显现的关于父亲的那些有距离的、激烈的、反讽的话语对她来说将不再可能。在埃尔诺与媒体或学术刊物的大量访谈中,当她回顾如何放弃小说时,尤其强调自己在这一时刻所作的选择,她选择了“现实”。小说被有意识地抛弃了,因为它属于虚构。例如,在《小说20/50》学刊的一个访谈中,安妮·埃尔诺声称,《位置》所迈出的一步是“传承了一种形式。抛弃小说并不是转向宽泛的记叙文体,而是转向一种‘非小说’或昂格鲁-撒克逊人所说的‘非虚构小说’。从《位置》开始,在小说的构造之外去寻找现实,这一选择也导致了一种愿望:想要拥有一种几乎‘透明’的写作,让强有力的现实说话。”[1]        或者可以说,想要去传递对现实的经验,使之变得可感,这种经验往往与一种日常经验相混合。日常在伦理层面和审美层面使人意识到这样一种选择。安妮·埃尔诺认为,小说的缺陷其实是它倾向于再现它所谈及的东西。就像她在同一个访谈里说到她的第一部小说时所指出的:
      这部小说再现了(它当然涉及摹仿)一个作为小姑娘的“我”的视野。原本她在自己出身的环境中感到很自在,随着她在私立学校发现了另外的规则、另一个世界,她学着同时在两个世界中生活。开始并不困难,而进入青春期后,她抛弃了第一个世界以及她的父母。
        然而从《位置》开始,再现已经不够了。在埃尔诺看来,再现是一种面对人生某一截面的视角:它可以很好地表达对于这一经验所投射的目光,但它失去了这一经验的亲身经历者的特殊性。因此,《位置》要努力使“她父亲曾生活的那个世界的界限与色彩”[2]变得可感,那也曾是她生活过的世界。就像她在别处所强调的,《位置》如果不叫“位置”,本可以命名为《界限内的经验》,突出一个“只对形而上学和文学感兴趣”的作者苦涩的反讽。        让亲身经历的经验变得可感,这样的意愿也导致了《纯粹的激情》(Passion simple) 的形式选择:
      我不是去写一部关于男女关系的记叙式作品,我不是去讲一个有具体时间线的故事(它已从我记忆中消失了一半)。这里,在对事实的列举和描写中,原本就没有反讽和嘲弄,因为反讽与嘲弄是在经历之后向别人或自己讲述事情的方式,而不是讲述那一刻正在经历的事情的方式[3](《纯粹的激情》)
        但在《岁月》中我们看到,就在埃尔诺放弃小说的时刻,她心中仍萦绕着写一部“总体小说”的欲望。可是
     刚一开始,她就在同样的问题上受挫:如何既再现历史时间的进程,事物、想法、风俗的变化,又同时再现这个女人的隐私,如何把四十五年的时代画卷和寻求外在于历史的自我这两者协调一致,这个自我是她二十岁时所写的《孤独》等诗中所呈现的那些断裂时刻的自我。(《岁月》)。
        从“再现”的意义上说,这样的写作计划一经拟出就失败了,因为她所寻求的东西并不属于再现的范畴,而属于经验的范畴。直至二十多年后,这个计划才最终完成。如果我们遵照埃尔诺所陈述的虚构性的标准,《岁月》并不是一部小说。然而,它有着小说的广度和气息,可以发现其中有一种“总体小说”的意志。在作者定性为“无人称自传”的自传材料之外,我们可以在更形式化的层面上,视之为小说的变种,它将绕过再现的暗礁,以不断被重新定义的对世界的经验来取代再现。
        因此,本文建议回到经验这个概念,展开它所指涉和蕴涵的意义,以此去探究一种回忆经验的写作所提出的文学与伦理问题。        塑造了埃尔诺的写作的这种经验不是科学性经验,类似“实践经验”所包含的意思(尽管有时叙述者会提及这样约定俗成的含义,比如她在《外在生活》中所写的,在短短几分钟内,她“尝试看到所有与她擦肩而过的人”,然后她想到,如果她“跟随这样一种经验,她对世界和对自己的观点将发生彻底的改变”。这种经验也不是随时间所积累的认知的同义语,类似“有了经验”所表达的那样。这种经验更符合“去经历某事”所包含的意思:关于流产、耻辱、控制、恋爱、时间等的经验。这种经验同时关系到身体与意识,实践与思想:这种经验像行动和感觉那样让我们与外部世界相联,并且像思想那样构成一种我们内心生活的关键要素。当埃尔诺在《外部日记》中讲出这些话时,所定义的就是这样的经验:“在这些经验中没有我们在生活中的等级。地点和物所激起的感觉和反思是独立于它们的文化价值的。”从另一种角度来看,经验可以反过来与思想及行动的主动性相对立,尽管“去经验某事”包含着一定程度的施动性,但与显示了意志的行动和思想相反,经验表面上预设了一种被动的、接受的形式,比如,我们不会主动选择去经验痛苦或耻辱。《岁月》的写作计划所显示的就是经验的这一方面:抓住“她生活的而不是她要去记载的世界”,说出“这个世界打在她和她同代人身上的印记”。这种经验有点像蜡板那样起作用,生活的痕迹会印刻其上。因此,当《岁月》的叙述者回想起她和丈夫共同生活的经验时,她必须承认,即使“她几乎从不会想起”她的前夫,“她身上却一直带着他们共同生活的印记,他带给她的对巴赫和宗教音乐的品味、早餐必喝的橙汁等等”。同样,当她思考究竟是什么造就了父母和子女的亲缘关系时,仍然是经验这一概念被强调出来:
     当看着、听着这些变为成年人的子女,我们会自问是什么将我们联结在一起,既不是血缘,也不是基因,只是历历在目的千百个共同度过的日子,话语、姿态和食物,驾车行驶的路线,大量难察其迹的共同经验。(《岁月》)
        对世界的经验、对现实的经验就这样与日常经验相融合,如果我们认识到,日常关涉人类活动,关涉人在日复一日的重复中、在与亲人的关系中永恒的需求,还关涉职业、起居、性爱,以及社会与历史的诉求。日常就是这样一种流动的表象,这样的地点、氛围,这样一种我们所有人始终身处其中的环境,它让我们相互关联。日常对我们来说是共同的,我们共有这样的日常。[4]在《黑色工作室》[5]中,作家埃尔诺在一九八三年十一月十八日将“日常”用大写字母当成重点标识了出来。
        依据一种对时间的知觉,同时属于感觉和智力范畴的经验是某时某刻所经历的。它与生命的喷薄汹涌、瞬间即逝相关(这就是生命本身),但它仍包含着时间性,因为后者建构和改变着个体,并留下痕迹。使经验成为可能的周遭环境的多样性、偶然性,也可以让经验成为极具特殊性的东西。一九九三年二月十六日,埃尔诺在她的日记中这样记录:“不写任何关于我自己的东西。不行的话就这样:这个记忆是我的,不是任何其他人的。这个图景是唯一的,它构成了我,在我身上形成了一种经验。我的自我由这些图景和时代的标记组成,而这些图景和标记属于所有人。”在文学中,我们如此经常地用“不可言喻”这样的说法来谈经验。如果个体经验无法言说,无疑是因为它处于存在中缺失的、被抽空的一边。所以必须将这种空缺、消极转变成充盈、坚实、能被命名的东西。然而,当经验是日常的、具有被分享的形式时,它就成为共同经验:日常是平凡的、共有的,因此也是公共性的。从特殊经验到集体经验的运动,最终还是以另一种形式回归个体,《耻辱》的结构就是如此。如同叙述者所写的,“耻辱体验中最糟糕的地方就是我们相信只有自己在经历它”,然后她又写道:“那个夏天随后发生的事情,在我看来都是为了确认我们的尊严:只有我们是这样的。”她从一种表面看来很个人的耻辱事件出发,在一种集体的日常经验的框架中用所谓“世上众声”——她在《岁月》中用这种和缓的方式为之命名——替换了它。“‘世上众声’毫不松懈、一刻不停地规范着我们所是和所应是,以及所思、所信、所惧、所望”。因为这种耻辱的个人经验,这种创伤、自我贬低,这种只因我们所不是和我们所没有而受缚于日常生活的屈辱,被还原为一种日常的集体经验,被还原为塑造了社会中人的社会统治结构,于是耻辱不再是关于个人尊严的感觉,而是一种共同分享的经验。尤其是,它因不同的社会秩序而异,但却不维系于感觉到耻辱的个体的身份。无法描述的关于缺失、虚无、尊严的个体经验,借助通往集体的路径,变成了一种既可描述,又充盈积极的经验。这种经验使人因与他人的关联而存在,而不是因缺失而存在。因此,二〇〇〇年七月十三日在《黑色工作室》中,埃尔诺确立了这一计划:“组织起个体回忆(我生活的各种“图景”)与历史性的集体回忆。重叙一切。我与世界、历史。从感性经验出发……”因为感性经验将成为共同分享的经验。
        让日常经验变得可感的意愿,在她的日记中找到了一种形式上的表达。日常经验既与星星点点、喷薄汹涌、瞬间即逝的东西相关,又与难以察觉的积累效应相关——对事物的逐渐熟悉、缓慢变形的力量。经验的这两种相悖的关联对应于文本的碎片化形式和“集体日常生活的瞬间的汇聚”。我们记得《外在生活》的叙述者区分了两种对待现实事件的态度:“或者确切地加以详述,或者把它们放在一边等到以后(如有可能)再让它们‘服务’于叙事。”她在这本日记中所做的是以一种方式去转录“郊区地铁快线的场景、人自在的无目的姿态和语言”。我们清楚地知道小说或一般叙事体经常受到的指责就是从一个更大更封闭的整体去观察,其中的一切都被赋予一种功能、一种效用。如果小说是成就一种对日常生活的再现,那么“对现实的照相式写作”或“人种学文本”就是力求让日常经验被感知到,就像它在形成的那一刻被经历到那样,没有目的性。《外部日记》的片段,就像《外在生活》的片段一样,场景被围绕日常生活组织起来,这些场景激起观察者的一种情感。几乎所有这些场景都依托于一个或多个物的在场,通常是这些物承载着情感作用。日常物其实是人们通过经常使用而拥有的,人们会用所有格形容词去指称这些物,表现出那种熟悉感。比如在《外在生活》中,我们会读到关于郊区地铁快线的说法:“我要去乘我的地铁了。”这是表达与经常使用之物的关系和熟悉感的一种方式。
     我的郊区快线:A号线,带我去巴黎,再带我回来,把我送回永远的塞尔吉警察局站。我不假思索地登上它,不需要看站牌就能认出它所经过的每一站。
______________________


[1] 《安妮·埃尔诺或自传问题——与菲利·普维兰的访谈》,载于《小说20/50》学刊,第24期,1997年12月,143至145页。——作者注
[2] 此处原文标注了引文在法文版本中的页码,因考虑到该标注对中文读者无甚关涉,故删除。下文引文页码的处理皆同此例,不再另注。
[3] 引文内的黑体为本文作者所强调。下文引文中的黑体字皆同此例,不再另注。
[4] 上述定义参考了米克尔·舍林海姆的研究,尤其是他的文章《日常的小说性》,收入吉尔·德克莱克、米歇尔·穆拉主编的《小说性》,巴黎:新索邦大学出版社,2004年,255至267页。——作者注
[5] 《黑色工作室》是埃尔诺于2022年初发表的日记,记录了她的写作构思、作品计划、日常思考与感悟等,类似工作日记。



   通过这些提示,叙述者展现出对城市当下感知的特殊性:这种感知先是以经验之名去陈述,这里的经验关乎一种熟悉感,并非单调、无聊的熟悉感,而是一种使用、拥有和归属的感觉。正是因为城市的当下现实是通过都市生活体验的形式被思考的,而不是整体化的认知形式,所以对于这位穿梭于日常中的乘客来说,去再现它是不可能的。她说,“没有任何描写,也没有任何记叙”,只有“一种集体日常生活的瞬间的汇聚”。为了传达对日常事物的这种熟悉性究竟是怎样的,需要重新学习观看,在“所有那些因过于熟悉和普通而看似无足轻重、毫无意义的事物”的喷薄涌动、激起情感的能量中看到日常物。这些日常物与它们所引发的行为不可分离,总是令人想起使用着它们、经验着它们的身体。但这些物所包含的实践又是共同的,因此它们又成为朝向公共性、集体性的经验。
        这样,我们就理解了当经验是一种此刻的日常经验时,如何能够言说它并使之变得可感。瞬间性如同一种闪光,一种无目的的喷涌,它是日常经验的一种等价物。微型场景也能容纳熟悉之物引发的情感:通过避免主题性话语和强加的意义,它解构了突兀的批评话语,并形成了一种只与共同现实相关的共情,带着脆弱与不完美,记录着显而易见的当下。
        但如何言说对经验的记忆?如何言说一种曾经有过、但不再清晰的前后相续的经验?埃尔诺的写作——她的笔记以及整合进作品的评述——显示出了与这种记忆类型相关的困难与问题。事实上,这并不是普鲁斯特意义上的“重现的时光”,也不是通过复现的记忆让过去突然显现(尽管很长一段时间以来,她都相信她所找寻的东西是一种她称为隐迹纸本[1]的经验)。于是她在《黑色工作室》中自问:“用什么方法可以建构过去的现实?这不同于重现的时光。”这里是要“建构”过去的现实,而不是“重构”它。接下来,她还认定,仅仅“感觉(复现的记忆)并不能还原历史”(无论她自己的还是他人的历史),“在历史中我们有着准确的时间”。这就好像只有经验的瞬间性存在于那里,而没有它与时间形式的悖论式的关联,后者难以察觉地改变着事物,或许会留下无意识的痕迹。那么,为什么要去“构建”对世界的经验的记忆呢?
        我们可以再将思考投向物以及不同时代的生活方式。物,由于它被我们使用和操作,是与身体相联系的,会在身体上留下它们的痕迹。这是惯习的组成元素,融入了规则,身体保持着习惯动作的痕迹,同时也有身体被允许或不允许去做某事时被规训的痕迹。言说这些动作、这些带着时代特征的姿势,就是维持身体的记忆,身体本身就保留着生活方式、阶级属性的姿态、日常现实经验的记忆。这在很大程度上构成了写作《位置》这本书的原动力。在《岁月》的一开头,也有类似的召唤:
      “走路、坐下的方式,在街上说话、笑、喊叫的方式,吃饭、拿东西的姿势”,它们“在法国和欧洲的乡村深处,从身体到身体地传递着过去的记忆。一种习惯的集合,农田上的童年、车间里的青春期所塑造的体态,它们逐渐被其他的童年所覆盖,直至遗忘。”
        但这些都是经验留下的痕迹,并不是喷薄涌动的经验本身。因此,它只能成为埃尔诺在《黑色工作室》中所说的“文本主体”的雏形,完整的“前世”,“虚幻的记忆”的解决方案。
    我们会想起叙述者在《岁月》中所写的在家庭聚餐中男人们对战争的讲述:
      这是一种充满死亡、暴力、毁灭的讲述,带着一种兴高采烈的劲头,偶尔夹杂其间的某句庄严而郑重的话“永远也不该再看到这些”似乎又想否认这种兴奋。但他们只说他们所见过的,在吃喝的过程中这一切被重新经历。
        只有经验过、生活过的记忆才是真正的记忆。
        通过历数标志性的物,意图重建生活过的一个特定时代的日常经验,是一种诱人的尝试。在《耻辱》中,在记叙了最初的创伤性经历之后,她就拒绝再去记叙了,而是致力于列举过去的“物质痕迹”。一切都在流逝,叙述者对我们说,“就像时间只能以物的方式计数”。这就是为什么佩雷克的《我记得》[2]需要有参照物的显而易见的原因。这些物也激起了读者同样的情感,似乎证明他们也复活了一种生活过、经验过的记忆。就像在《岁月》中埃尔诺所写下的,我们可以盘点所有促使我们去讲述的东西,“跟随佩雷克的脚步,我记得昂潘男爵[3]、皮格蕾特软糖、贝雷戈瓦的袜子[4]、德瓦盖[5]、马岛战争、班戈牌巧克力粉早餐”。但这些并不是“真正的记忆”,我们在继续“唤起另外一些东西——时代的标记”。我们可能会对最后这句话感到有些惊讶,它似乎包含着某种哀悼。在《岁月》中,当埃尔诺以清单的形式,从书的开头到结尾,唤起她想要“拯救”的记忆,或者当她根据一种累积的顺序提到时代的新事物、一些新品牌时,似乎确实采取了类似佩雷克的方法。当读者也认出这些事物时,会被感动。
        维持并传递对一种经验的记忆,这一愿望会碰到另一个问题,无疑也是最强有力的问题,就像《耻辱》的叙述者所写到的:1995年我所是的这个女人,无法替代1952年的那个姑娘,那个姑娘只认识她的小城、她的家庭和她的私立学校,只有一些匮乏的词语可以使用。真正的自身的记忆是不存在的。”用什么样的形式才能让曾经所是的经验变得可感?用什么样的形式才能表达日常的有意识的记忆(而不是一种无意识的惯习)?如何才能重新经历,并使之复活,就好像经验仍在眼前?如何才能从所记得的事物走向真正的记忆?
        在埃尔诺那里,当然是通过从个体记忆到集体记忆的过渡来克服这些障碍的,但也是通过在同一部作品中让流畅的、几乎是流动的写作(流逝的、带走一切的时间的形象)和碎片化的写作(经验的喷涌和非连续的形象)联合来实现的。这种碎片化以两种方式实现:清单的方式(尤其是列举物体的清单)和通过描写照片而实现的停顿的方式。因此,从个体记忆到集体记忆的过渡所展现的仍是经验。在评论一张一九五五年摄于圣米歇尔寄宿学校花园的照片时,叙述者宣称:
      尽管在现在的这位棕发女人身上,人们认不出海滩上那个编着发辫的小姑娘,因为小姑娘也有可能变成一个金发女人。但正是这个棕发女人,而不是金发女人,承载了这个身体的意识,带着她独一无二的记忆。此刻,通过这张照片里戴着眼镜的十四岁少女的知觉和感受,当下的写作找回了滑落在五十年代的某种东西,捕捉到了个体记忆的屏幕上所映出的倒影。
        自传的所谓无人称性是徒然的,它仍是从叙述者的身体、知觉、意识出发。我们会很自然地联想到本雅明关于“讲故事的人”的文章。[6]文中,本雅明区分了小说和叙事(由一个叙述者来完成),后者是以口语和身体为基础的,目的是传递一种经验,讲述者保证这是切身体验。这种叙述来自“实践意义”,它包含着某种不是信息性而是指示方向的东西。它不是要为一系列相互链接的事件提供明确的解释,而是提供一种使用说明。它处于小说的对立面(从小说的传统摹仿论来看),小说倾向于根据功能逻辑组织其材料,是解释性的。小说寻找并传输原因和理由,它重视意义,因此不能够传递日常经验。日常经验不是知识领域,而是实践领域。传递经验,复现经验,让经验复活(就像家庭聚餐中的男人们高声讲述他们所看到的战争那样),要求人的身体、情感、思想都调动起来。
        因为这涉及到讲述的问题,涉及到让必要的、已然存在的经验变得可感的问题,就像埃尔诺很快就觉察到的,这是“生活与文学之间最小的差异”。为了传递一种经验,必须要能确保这是切身体验。如果集体记忆使人得以超越与个体记忆相关的障碍,那么求助于个人经验也为确立和传递集体经验提供了可能性。
        在《岁月》中,特别打动我们的是谈及六八事件的方式。事实上,我们在此看到了一个原型般的范例。在集体记忆看似一下子就呈压倒之势时,个体记忆会任由自身被历史、被集体记忆的制度化形式所覆盖。然而当《岁月》谈及这一时期时,所有的意义就在于它诚实地讲述了叙述者的经验(当然是隐藏在无人称的“大家”这一代词之后的)。当时叙述者不在巴黎,并且像很多人一样,为家庭和职业的种种问题忧心,这些忧虑使她无法对正在发生的事件有一个即时的估量:
      后来,记者和历史学家们都争相忆起六八年五月事件的前几个月,皮埃尔·维安松-庞特在《世界报》上所说的一句话:法国感到厌倦了!人们很容易发现那时的自己的黯淡形象,充满无尽的苦闷。[……]并且可以肯定,这个凝固在统一的灰暗中的世界对所有人来说都是一样的。电视通过传播一成不变的图像、配上演员们匮乏的语言,建立起一个关于六八事件的不变的版本。它强加给人一种印象:就是那一年,所有人都处于十八岁和二十五岁之间,人们用手帕蒙着脸,朝武装警察扔石块。在相机拍摄的图像的反复强调下,人们会压抑自己所亲身经历的五月的形象,那形象既不是众所周知的样子——那个周日的火车站广场空空如也,没有旅客,报亭也是空的;也没什么光荣而言,那时我们害怕现金短缺(人们争相去银行提款),害怕汽油特别是食品短缺,饥饿的记忆让我们把家乐福的购物车塞得满满的。
        关于个体经历与制度化的集体记忆之间的差异,远在这段话之前,我们就读到过一个类似的评述:
      她的生活与历史没有任何关系,然而历史的痕迹仍然被寒冷的感觉和三月的阴霾天气所固定下来——矿工罢工——带着五旬节周末的潮湿——教宗若望二十三世的死……历史事件的时间也就是社会新闻的时间,那不是她自己的时间。
        通过这些例子,《岁月》这部书显现出一种了不起的独创性。我们常把它作为集体记忆的叙述来阅读,但其实它更让我们去感觉共同经验能够多么深地在历史之外被我们所共有——这就是它的全部力量。如果这本书是对集体日常生活经验的记忆的书写,正是因为它不是一幅突兀的历史画卷,而是通过日常经验对集体的捕捉。
        我们可以借助《岁月》的最后一句话来总结上述思考。当想起柏林墙倒塌后的一九九〇年代时,叙述者宣称:“某种难以捉摸的东西把我们带走了。经验空间失去了它熟悉的轮廓。”最好的说法就是,《岁月》的全部挑战是让经验空间的变化及其所有内涵变得可感。本文缓慢的论证过程重申了埃尔诺以一个简明的短语表明的东西:传递经验的记忆并使之可感,这就是“书写生活”[7]
________________________
[1] 原文为Palimpseste,指可以反复书写的羊皮纸本,用化学方法可使原迹复现。
[2] 法国作家乔治·佩雷克(19361982)于1973年出版了一部形式独特的作品《我记得》,其中列举了自己从10岁到25岁之间的480个记忆片段。
[3] 爱德华-让·昂潘(19372018),比利时商人、昂潘-施耐德电气公司总裁。
[4] 皮埃尔·贝雷戈瓦(19251993),密特朗任总统时的法国总理,因受贿丑闻自杀身亡。喜穿色彩极鲜艳的袜子。
[5] 阿兰·德瓦盖(19422018),法国化学家、参议员,曾提出1986年大学改革方案。
[6] 瓦尔特·本雅明《讲故事的人:论尼古拉·列斯科夫》(1936),收入《本雅明法语作品集》,巴黎:伽利玛口袋本系列,2003年,264298页。——作者注
[7] 法国伽利玛出版社2011年出版的一部收入埃尔诺大部分作品的合集就以“书写生活”为书名,共1088页。

The Truth Is in the Detail

  The Truth Is in the Detail On Paul Celan’s writing between languages. By Lucy Ives Originally Published: 八月 17, 2026 Share Photo: Gisèle C...