Tuesday, February 27, 2018

《容安馆札记》798则(下)_視昔犹今_新浪博客


《容安馆札记》798则(下)



日本風俗繪卷圖畫刊行會1916年刊本改琦繪《紅樓夢圖詠》

七九八(下)

〇第二十八回薛蟠酒令:"女兒悲,嫁了個男人是烏龜。"按此舊謔也,清初咄咄夫《增補一夕話》中即有一婦歎:"奴家好命苦,連嫁了幾個丈夫,都是忘八。"

寶玉看著寶釵"雪白的肐膊,不覺動了羨慕之心,忽然想起'金玉'一事來,再看看寶釵形容,比黛玉另具一種嫵媚風流,不覺又呆了。"按全書寫寶與釵、黛心上溫黁,三曹對案,此節最為著明。本回上文雲兒行酒時所唱"兩個冤家,都難丟下;兩個人形容俊俏,都難描畫",不啻伏筆矣。然寶之用情,仍偏重於黛,亦如 Shelley: "Epipsychidion" 雖云:"So, ye bright regents, with alternate sway / Govern my sphere of being, night & day",而拜月 (Mary) 過於向日 (Emilia);Hugo: "Suzette et Suzon" (Toute la Lyre, "Chansons", no. 1) 雖云"J'adore Suzette, / Mais j'aime Suzon",終捨 Suzette 而守Suzon。蓋愛情中無等邊三角也。【Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit: "It is a very pleasant sensation when a new passion [for Maximiliana Brentano] begins to stir in us before the old one [for Lotte Kestner] has quite died away. When the sun is setting, one likes to see the moon rising on the other side & rejoices in the dual brilliance of both luminaries."】【Villon, Le Testament: "Les regrets de la belle Heaulmière": A qui que je feisse finesse, / Par m'ame, je l'amoye bien! (Though I deceived him some times, by my soul I loved him well).(又見上論第十一回。)】【Sainte-Beuve, Volupté (Amaury et 4 femmes; pour 4 son amour inassouvi pour Mme de Couaën); Flaubert, Éducation sentimentale (Frédéric se portage entre Rosanette et Mme Dambreuse avec "une 3e toujours présente a sa pensée" — Mme Arnoux; cf. Revue d'Histoire littéraire de la France, Jan.-Mars, 1957, pp. 45 ff.】【Maurice Scève, Délie, no. 134: "A luy et Corps et Foy abandonna: / A moy. le Coeur, et la chaste pensée" (H. Weber, La Creation poetique, I, 169).】【F. Brady & F.A. Pottle, Boswell on the Grand Tour, Trade ed., p. 6: "My blood was inflamed by the burning climate [of Naples]... my mind has almost nothing to do with it."】【Nigel Balchin, Seen Dimly Before Dawn, p. 16: "Though vague about detail her...there, I understand the anatomical & physiological mechanisms of sex guide. I also knew a great deal about love as it appears in poetry. But one side of my information was pure anatomy & the other pure literature, & though I knew they were connected & that the physiology tended to produce the literature or vice versa, I had no idea quite why or how."】【A.E. Carter, The Idea of Decadence in Fr. Lit., 1830-1900, on Sainte-Beuve's Volupté: "a divorce between spiritual & physical love, Amaury leads a double existence between his ideal passion for the angelic Mme de Couaën & orgies with the prostitutes he picks up during his nocturnal promenades", cf. Leslie A. Marchand, Byron, vol. 1, p. 62, apropos of his calf-love of Margaret Parker; polyerotism without physical desire: "Pour en parler franchement, je crois que son mari s'est tiré d'affaire devant les hommes, mais je le tiens cocu devant Dieu" (ib., p. 420);  Rétif de la Bretonne,Monsieur Nicolas, éd. abrégée per J. Grand-Carteret, I, p. 35, on his being "polyéraste" not "monéraste"; p. 178: "Jeannette occupait le fond de mon coeur... Mme Parangon possédait mes sens, mon enthousiasme, mon goût..."】

 〇第三十一回,黛玉拍著襲人的肩笑道:"好嫂子,你告訴我",又笑道:"你說你是丫頭,我只拿你當嫂子待";護花主人評:"雖是謔詞,已發襲人之隱";大某山民評:"黛玉稱襲人以'好嫂子'者,因知端委,姑為惡謔,並不是醋。蓋各有身份,若施及卑人,則不成為黛玉矣。"三十七回晴雯亦曰:"你們別和我裝神弄鬼的,什麼事我不知道!"亦發襲人此隱。大某評語,殊有理致,惜僅著眼於名分耳(第八十二回襲人論妾或"傍邊人"云:"想來都是一個人,不過名分裏頭差些")。肌膚之親,不足釀醋。舊日大婦之于妾媵,宜具大度雅量。王百穀《南有堂诗集》卷一《悼亡》第三首云:"豈無佳人,惟汝不妬";彭甘亭《小謨觴館詩續集》卷二《悼亡》第十首云:"禪心自嬾花叢顧,世眼寃將柳氏猜",皆道此而著語令人笑來者也。至於傍淫他色,亦或判身與心為二根,歧情與欲為兩塗,以桑中之喜,兼柳下之貞,若不有其躬而可仍鍾斯愛,形跡浮蕩而衷情貞固者。《板橋雜記》"李十娘"條:"易名貞美,刻一印章。余戲之曰:'美則有之,貞則未也。'十娘泣曰:'君知兒者,何出此言?苛兒心之所好,雖相莊如賓,情與之合也;非兒心之所好,雖勉同枕席,不與之合也。兒之不貞,命也!如何?'"即其例也。【《華陽散稿》卷上《記馬授疇》:"妓泣曰:'有憐我以欲者,無憐我以情者,況以義憐我乎!'"】馬牛之風無它,媾合而已矣。男女之私,則媾合之外,有婚姻焉,有情愛焉。禽簡而一,人繁而三。Stendhal 復從而分情愛為四 (l'amour-passion, l'amour-goût, l'amour-physique, l'amour de vanité — De l'Amour, Liv. I, ch. 1, Éd "Le Divan", I, pp. 27-9),歧中又歧。重以愛慾常蘊殺機,婚媾每行市道,參伍而合離之,人世遂多燕女濫竊之局,文家不乏歌泣笑罵之資。參觀天笑鈔錄《龔定盫集外未刻詩‧驛鼓》(三首皆寄婦之作)第二首前半云:"釵滿高樓燈滿城,風花未免態縱橫。長途借此銷英氣,側調安能犯正聲。"【今釋澹歸《徧行堂集》卷七《李因培真贊》:"士人有一妻一妾,分日當夕,然少艾多偏矣,一夕與其妻宿,妻有怨言,士曰:'我身在他那裏,心却在你這裏。'妻曰:'我讓你的心與他那裏,只要你的身與我這裏。'】【屠隆《鴻苞集》卷一張應文《鴻苞居士傳》記其臨歿作《辭世詞》:"頗有身欲,實無心垢。"】Lord John Hervey, Memoirs of the Reign of George the Second, ed. R. Sedgwick, Penguin Books, 1984, p. 514: "In Queen Caroline's last illness, King George II sobbed with grief. Gazing up at him from her pillow, she urged him to take another wife after her death. While in the midst of this passion, wiping his eyes & sobbing between every word, with much ado he got out the answer 'Non, j'aurai des maîtresses.' To which the queen made no other reply than 'Ah! mon Dieu! cela n'empêche pas!'"; H. J. Hunt, Honoré de Balzac, p. 132: "Could she [Mme Hanska] really have meant it when in 1835 she had given him carte blanche for the indulgence of his physical cravings on condition that he formed no spiritual attachment with other women? 'N'ayez aucun attachement. — Je ne veux que votre constance et votre coeur' (Lettres à l'Étrangère, ed. M. Bouteron, II, pp. 14-5). A letter of August 1846 shows that she actually suggested recourse to prostitutes to satisfy his needs (ibid., III, p. 363)."【Cf. E. Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms, ch. 4, Catherine: "You won't do our things with another girl, or say the same things, will you?" "Never." "I want you to have girls, though."】其見於詩歌小說之犖犖大者:Shakespeare, A Lover's Complaint: "All my offences that abroad you see[1] / Are errors of the blood, none of the mind. / Love made them not" (The Complete Works, ed. G.L. Kittredge, p. 1522); Matthew Prior, "A Better Answer": "And they have my whimsies, but thou hast my heart. //... / So when I am wearied with wandering all day, / To thee, my delight, in the evening I come: / No matter what beauties I saw in my way; / They were but my visits, but thou art my home." (The Literary Works, ed. H.B. Wright & M.K. Spears, p.451); Tom Jones, Bk. XIII, ch. 11 ("Everyman's Library" ed., II, p. 191): "But yet you [Sophia] do me [Tom] the justice to think that my heart was never unfaithful to you. That had no share in the folly I was guilty of; it was even then unalterably yours"; Bk. XVIII, ch. 12 (p. 405): "The delicacy of your sex cannot conceive the grossness of ours, nor how little one sort of amour has to do with the heart." 餘不覼縷。E. Dawson: "Non Sum Qualis Eram": "I have been faithful to you Cynara! in my fashion" 一語可以概括。Abelard 與 Heloise 書函集第二函出 Heloise 手,謂妻之名雖正,而己寧蒙外婦以至妾或妓之目(Et si uxoris nomen sanctius ac validius videtur, dulcius mihi semper exstitit amicae vocabulum; aut si non indigneris, concubinae vel scorti)。一語中包舉男女正側、內外、久暫種種名分,有足與吾國舊俗相印證者,故拈而出之。又參觀前論第十一回兼及二十八回語。【Livy, I. 58; Il Decameron, III. 8; La Mandragola, III. xi; The Rape of Lucrece, 1653-9,第七三三則論。】【Stendhal, De l'Amour, Liv. I, ch. 37: "Je dirais aux pauvres femmes malheureuses par jalousie: 'Il y a une grande distance entre l'infidélité chez les hommes et chez vous... Une mauvaise habitude en fait comme une nécessité aux hommes...' La différence de l'infidélité dans les deux sexes est si réelle, qu'une renne passionnée peut pardonner une infidélité, ce qui est impossible à un homme"[2] (Éd "Le Divan", I, pp. 191-2).】【St-Évremond on the characteristic of les Précieuses: "c'est à aimer tendrement leurs amants sans jouissance, et à joüir solidement de leurs maris avec aversion"[3] (Le Métier d'Écrivain, p. 419); Bussy-Rabutin on Mme de Sévigné.】【Roy Pascal, Design & Truth in Autobiography, pp. 53-4: "Those great autobiographies transformed the psyche, e.g. the recognition that allegedly the exclusive feelings can coexist simultaneously. (Rousseau can have an affair with a charming fellow traveler to Montpellier without feeling that this love was in any way a betrayal of his affection for Mme de Warens, see Conf., VI.) Poets like Catullus & Tibullus have recorded simultaneous love-affairs, & Ronsard was even perplexed by his simultaneous love for two girls. Richardson's Grandison too is 'perplexed by what some would call... a double love.' In the autobiography the problem becomes more insistent. Restif de la Bretonne dwells on the problem. It is not the sudden transition of love from one person to another, like Romeo's switch from Rosalind to Juliet, nor the existence of different types of love, e.g. an idealistic & a sensual."】【Il Decameron, X. 5: "Dove altramenti non si potesse, per questa volta il corpo, ma non l'animo, gli concedi" (p. 619).】【Helvétius, De l'Esprit: à côté, l'amour volupté, il a décrit l'amour passion, dont l'essence est de n'être jamais heureux... il est la complication sociale de l'Amour volupté. (H. Delacroix, La psychologie de Stendhal, pp. 45-6); D.H. Lawrence, "The Novel": "Why didn't Dante & Petrarch chant in chorus: 'My old girl's got several babies that are mine, / But thou be my spiritual concubine'" (Sex, Literature and Censorship, ed. Harry T. Moore, p. 74).】【Boswell, The Ominous Years, ed. C. Ryskamp & F.A. Pottle, pp. 81 ff on "concubinage" ("Suppose a man is too many for one woman"); p. 287: "Johnson agreed with me that a man may be in love with several women at a time."】

 〇第四十回黛玉道:"我最不喜歡李義山的詩,只喜他這一句:'留得殘荷聽雨聲。'"按黛玉詩識如此,宜自運之纖薄無韻味也。義山《十一月中旬至扶風界見梅花》云[4]:"素娥唯與月,青女不饒霜";紀曉嵐評點《瀛奎律髓》卷二十說之曰:"上句謂好之者徒託空言,下句謂惡之者能為實害。"此非黛玉在舅舅家之處境乎?史太君等,素娥也;襲人輩,青女也。惜此豸讀《玉溪集》時,輕心易念,不能解會。【白香山《東南行一百韻》:"日近恩雖重,雲高勢却孤";杜牧之《與池州李使君書》:"怒僕者足以裂僕之腸,折僕之脛;知僕者不能持一飯與僕。"】【Lord Chesterfield, Letters, ed. B. Dobrée, V, p. 2002: "At court, many more people can hurt, than can help you"; Mme du Deffand on her friends: "ceux par qui on n'a pas [à] craindre d'être assassin, mais qui laisseraient faire les assassins" (Montesquieu quoted in C.B. Tinker, The Salon & English Letters, p. 62).】且第三十七回史湘雲《白海棠和韻》云:"自是霜娥偏愛冷,非關青女欲離魂。"撏撦義山,妄加改竄,易"素"以"霜"已屬不詞,"倩女"離魂,未聞"青女",更為疵累。【唐彥謙《紅葉》:"素娥前夕月,青女夜來霜。"】第六十二回香菱引義山"寶釵無日不生塵"一句,則數典而已,非論詩也。

 〇第四十一回妙玉曰:"豈不聞一杯為品,二杯即是解渴的蠢物,三杯便是飲驢了?"[5]按櫳翠菴立茗規以後,攀風附雅之士,無敢言"玉川七椀"者。吳蘭雪《石溪舫詩話》招搖標榜之餘,自誇水不能厄。卷一"徐觀海"條云:"君善琴,余能茗戰,嘗約余聽琴,為飲龍井茶一百甌";卷二"英和"條:"雪水煎茶,余立飲十餘甌。"豈過信徐靈淵《贈徐照》詩所謂"詩清都為飲茶多"耶?抑雖於乾、嘉時游京師,而未讀《紅樓夢》耶?

 〇第四十八回黛玉道王摩詰"墟里上孤烟"還是套陶淵明"依依墟里烟"[6]。按第十七回寶玉擬匾對曰:"編新不如述舊,刻古終勝雕今";十八回寶玉怡紅院詩用"綠蠟";七十六回凹晶館聯句用"爭餅"、"分瓜"。合而觀之,足見海棠社、桃花社中吟朋皆講求出處來歷,而實不離類書、韻府家當者。高蘭墅妻兄張船山《論文》第一首云:"甘心腐臭不神奇,字字尋源苦繫縻。衹有聖人能杜撰,憑空一畫愛庖羲。"《鏡花緣》第五十一回,盜婦道:"我這男妾,古人叫做'面首'。"大盜道:"這點小事,夫人何必講究攷據?況此中很有風味,就是杜撰,亦有何妨?"寶玉問二字"可有出處",湘雲笑"這句不好,杜撰",皆一間未達。胡元瑞《少室山房筆叢》卷四十一稱《水滸》"映帶回護咏嘆之工,真有超出語言之外者",惟"稍涉聲偶,輒嘔噦不足觀。"《紅樓夢》中五、七言,非宋江、林冲題壁之比,然經心刻意,終落下乘。豈為詩真有別才耶?

 〇第六十三回岫烟述妙玉語云:"自漢、晉、五代、唐、宋以來,皆無好詩,只有兩句好,說道:'縱有千年鐵門檻,終須一個土饅頭。'"按詳見余《宋詩選註》論范成大[7]。俞平伯筆記中考二語出典,亦如寶釵輩之稗販類書耳[8]

 〇第六十五回賈璉論尤三姐云:"就是塊肥羊肉,無奈燙的慌;玫瑰花兒可愛,刺多扎手。"按同回興兒論探春云:"三姑娘的混名兒叫'玫瑰花兒':又紅又香,無人不愛,只是有刺扎手。"若據名學類推之法,望文演繹,則三姐為玫瑰花,三姑娘亦為玫瑰花,三姐與三姑娘類聚氣求,遂成一流人物,顧於事則大謬不然。《吕氏春秋‧察傳篇》云:"得言不可以不察,數傳而白為黑,黑為白。故狗似玃,玃似母猴,母猴似人,人之與狗則遠矣。"雖喻轉輾流傳,漸失本意,亦可借取以譬也。Raymond Bayer, Traité de l'Esthétique, p. 50: "Toutes les lois de la sensibilité sont les principes d'une logique de l'analogie opposée à la logique fermée de l'identité comme le contour strict du syllogisme des probabilités." 立言之途有二:曰美、曰信(參觀第七二八論誤以用典為紀事),然往往心異而貌同。Max Black 論 "Emotive vs. referential use of language" 云:"One might as well argue that in a portrait of Hamlet the paint cannot be used in the same way as in a portrait of Stalin. Yet both persons, real or imaginary, are presented in a similar way; the difference of response is induced by our knowledge that one of the two is not intended to be taken as really existing"[9] (Language & Philosophy, p. 207),所以貴知言也。舉此一例,可以反三(參觀第七九四則論李長吉《惱公》詩"歌聲春草露"句)。

 興兒論王鳳姐云:"嘴甜心苦,兩面三刀;上頭笑著,脚底下使絆子;明是一盆火,暗是一把刀。"按十六回鳳姐論管家奶奶云:"'坐山看虎鬥'、'借刀殺人'、'引風吹火'、'站乾岸兒'、'推倒了油瓶兒不扶',都是全掛子的本事!"相映成趣,鳳姐可謂"唯賢知賢"矣。

 〇第七十回寶釵《臨江仙》詞詠柳絮云:"韶華休笑本無根。好風憑借力,送我上青雲。"按《夷堅甲志》卷四載侯蒙《臨江仙》詠風箏云:"未遇行藏誰肯信?如今方表名蹤。無端良匠畫形容。當風輕借力,一舉入高空。才得吹噓身漸穩,只疑遠赴蟾宮。雨餘時候夕陽紅。幾人平地上,看我碧霄中。"

 "風箏隨風去了。眾人都說:'林姑娘的病根兒都放了去了。'"按參觀 David Copperfield, Ch. 15: "I used to fancy, as I sat by him [Mr Dick] of an evening, on a green slope, & saw him watch the kite high in the quiet air, that it lifted his mind out of his confusion, & bore it (such was my boyish thought) into the skies"。

 〇第八十一回賈代儒道:"詩詞一道,不是學不得的,只要發達了以後,再學還不遲呢。"按《水田居詩筏》引諺所謂"進士好吟詩"是也。詳見第七○二則論舉業與學業引袁伯修、董其昌、黎媿曾、鄭梁、汪懋麟、章學誠等語、《照世盃》第一種[10] 、《儒林外史》,第七一九則論《全金詩》卷四十二郝天挺。

 〇第八十二回寶玉講"吾未見好德如好色者也"云:"德乃天理,色是人慾,人那裏肯把天理好的像人慾似的?孔子雖是歎息的話,又是望人回轉來的意思。並且見得人就有好德的,好的終是浮淺,直要像色一樣的好起來,那纔是真好呢。"按此為孔子洞達人情之精語,寶玉所詮,與《王文成公全書》卷五《與黃勉之第二書》、《黃嬭餘話》卷八全同。《論語‧學而章》:"子夏曰:'賢賢易色'";《廣雅‧釋言》:"易,如也",王念孫《疏證》引子夏語,謂即"好德如好色"也。《禮記‧坊記》:"民猶以色厚於德。子云:'好德如好色。'"《大學‧釋誠意》:"如好好色。"《祭義》:"親之所愛,如欲色然";康成注云:"以時人於色厚,假以喻之";沖遠《正義》云:"思念親之所愛之甚,如似凡人貪慾女色然也";王肅解:"欲色,如欲見父母之顏色。鄭何得比父母於女色";馬昭申云:"孔子曰'吾未見好德如好色'者,如此,亦比色於德";張融:"亦如好色,取其甚也,於文無妨。"《日知錄》卷六亦引《正義》而曰:"能以慕少艾之心而慕父母,則其誠無以加矣。"則鄭、孔註、疏已發此旨矣。詳見第七○三則論 San Juan de la Cruz: "Llama de amor viva"。

 〇第八十二回黛玉道:"但凡家庭之事,不是東風壓了西風,就是西風壓了東風。"按《全宋詞》三二二九頁劉辰翁《六州歌頭》(詠賈似道魯港之敗):"說甚東風、怕西風。"

 〇第八十七回妙玉"獨自一個憑欄站了一回,忽聽房上兩個貓兒一遞一聲廝叫。那妙玉忽想起日間寶玉之言,不覺心跳耳熱。"按《揚州畫舫錄》卷十六法淨寺僧平山《詠貓》云[11] :"春叫貓兒貓叫春,看他越叫越精神。老僧也有貓兒意,爭敢人前叫一聲?"《雲自在龕隨筆》卷四則謂此乃牛山詩。

 〇第九十七回紫鵑想道:"寶玉成日家和我們姑娘好的蜜裏調油。"按《水滸》第四十五回:"他兩個當夜如膠似漆,如糖似蜜,如酥似髓,如魚似水。"《金瓶梅》七十二回:"你和來旺兒媳婦子蜜調油也似的。"馮維敏《海山堂詞稿》卷三《仙子步蟾宮‧詠妓十劣》其十曰"鑽龜"者,為龜奴所狎也,有云:"比蜜調油,如魚得水,似漆投膠。"馮作《僧尼共犯》雜劇第二折:"正不過法眷每蜜調油,師傅每貓瞧鼠,徒弟每柳貫魚";第四折:"一弄兒油調蜜,一團兒膠共漆。"又按"鑽龜"即第六十五回尤三姐所謂"俗語說的'便宜不過當家'"。

 〇第九十八回黛玉道:"我的身子是乾淨的。"按與第六十六回柳湘蓮云"你們東府裏除了那兩個石頭獅子乾淨罷了"遙相呼應。

 〇第一百二十回襲人嫁城南蔣家一節。按與第九十七回黛玉焚稿一節,皆蘭墅續書中最警策之文。黛玉焚稿,寫厭生者之心堅意決。身亡命絕,而亦求聲名俱滅,神理不存。斬葛斷藤,燒灰揚燼。王彥章曰:"豹死留皮,人死留名。"耽詞章者,臨歿而摧燒生平吟咏,則皮之不存,才魄妖魂離散浮沉。【《儒林外史》20 回牛布衣臨歿以兩本詩交老和尚:"替我流傳,死也瞑目!"Virgil 臨沒而欲焚 Aeneid 稿 (igitur in extrema valetudine assidue scrinia desideravit, crematurus ipse — Suetonius, De Poetis, "Vita Vergili", Suetonius, "Loeb", II, p. 478)[12] ,則"良工不示人以璞",出於矜惜其名。】借但丁語,謂之一死而兼"第二死"(la seconda morte — Inferno, I. 117)[13] 可也。襲人嫁夫,寫忍死者之意轉心回。委蛇迤邐,情逐事遷,由忍死而不忍死,漸易初衷,仍萌故態。使四十回中更多此類筆墨,則曹規高隨,庶乎可爾。


[1] 此句原作"All my errors that abroad you"。

[2] "homme"原作"femme"。

[3] "If you want to know wherein lies the highest merit for the précieuses, it is in loving their lovers without sensuous pleasure, and in deriving solid satisfaction from their husbands with aversion" (Quentin Manning Hope, Saint-Evremond and His Friends, Genève: Librairie Droz, 1999,  p. 142).

[4] 原文脫落"風"字。

[5] 原文脫落"物"字。

[6] "四十八"原作"四十四"。

[7] 《宋詩選註》:"例如他的《重九日行營壽藏之地》說:'縱有千年鐵門限,終須一個土饅頭';這兩句曾為《紅樓夢》第六十三回稱引的詩就是搬運王梵志的兩首詩而作成的,而且'鐵門限'那首詩經陳師道和曹組分別在詩詞裡採用過,'土饅頭'那首詩經黃庭堅稱讚過。"

[8] 指俞平伯《讀紅樓夢隨筆》《陸游詩與范成大詩》一節。

[9] 原文脫落"way"字。

[10] 《七松園弄假成真》:"原來有意思的才人,再不肯留心舉業。那知天公賦他的才分寧有多少,若將一分才用在詩上,舉業內便少了一分精神。"

[11] "淨"原作"靜"。

[12] "Therefore in his mortal illness Vergil constantly called for his book-boxes, intending to burn the poem himself."

[13] 黃國彬譯但丁《神曲‧地獄篇》第一章:"第二次死亡"。


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Monday, February 26, 2018

Unenlightened thinking: Steven Pinker’s embarrassing new book is a feeble sermon for rattled liberals


Unenlightened thinking: Steven Pinker's embarrassing new book is a feeble sermon for rattled liberals

To think of this book as any kind of scholarly exercise is a category mistake. The purpose of Pinker's laborious work is to reassure liberals that they are on "the right side of history".

"Opposing reason is, by definition, unreasonable." Steven Pinker is fond of definitions. Early on in this monumental apologia for a currently fashionable version of Enlightenment thinking, he writes: "To take something on faith means to believe it without good reason, so by definition a faith in the existence of supernatural entities clashes with reason." Well, it's good to have that settled once and for all. There is no need to trouble yourself with the arguments of historians, anthropologists and evolutionary biologists, who treat religion as a highly complex phenomenon, serving a variety of human needs. All you need do is consult a dictionary, and you will find that religion is – by definition – irrational.

Similarly, you don't need to bother about what the Enlightenment was actually like. By any standards, David Hume was one of the greatest Enlightenment thinkers. It was the sceptical Scottish philosopher who stirred Immanuel Kant – whose well-known essay on Enlightenment Pinker quotes reverently at the start of the book – from what Kant described as his "dogmatic slumber". Pinker barely mentions Hume, and the omission is not accidental. He tell us that the Enlightenment is defined by a "non-negotiable" commitment to reason.

Yet in A Treatise of Human Nature (1738), Hume wrote: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Hume believed being reasonable meant accepting the limits of reason, and so too, in quite different ways, did later Enlightenment rationalists such as Keynes and Freud. Pinker's Enlightenment has little in common with the much more interesting intellectual movement that historically existed.

One of the consequences of this unhistorical approach is that Pinker repeats fallacies that have been exposed time and time again. He is an evangelist for science – or, to be more exact, an ideology of scientism. Along with reason, humanism and progress, science features as one of the core Enlightenment values that Pinker lists at the start of the book. But for him science is more than a bunch of methods that are useful in conjecturing how the world works: it provides the basis of ethics and politics.

He summarises this claim in a formula: "Entro, evo, info. These concepts define the narrative of human progress, the tragedy we were born into, and our means of eking out a better existence." Here, "entro" denotes entropy, the process of increasing disorder that is identified in the second law of thermodynamics. "Evo" refers to the evolution of living organisms, which absorb energy and thereby resist entropy. "Info" is information, which when collected and processed in the nervous systems of these organisms enables them to wage their war against entropy.

For Pinker, the second law of thermodynamics doesn't simply identify a universal regularity in the natural world, "it defines the fate of the universe and the ultimate purpose of life, mind, and human striving: to deploy energy and knowledge to fight back the tide of entropy and carve out refuges of beneficial order".

There is nothing novel in scientism. The Victorian prophet of social evolution, Herbert Spencer, believed that the universe, life and society were moving from undifferentiated simplicity to a higher state of complex order. In politics, this meant a movement towards laissez-faire capitalism. In social contexts, "survival of the fittest" – an expression Spencer invented after reading Darwin's On the Origin of Species – meant that anyone unable to stay afloat in such a society would struggle, sink and then disappear. Spencer welcomed this process, since for him it was evolution in action – the movement from lower to higher forms of life.

Pinker is an ardent enthusiast for free-market capitalism, which he believes produced most of the advance in living standards over the past few centuries. Unlike Spencer, he seems ready to accept that some provision should be made for those who have been left behind. Why he makes this concession is unclear. Nothing is said about human kindness, or fairness, in his formula. Indeed, the logic of his dictum points the other way.

Many early-20th-century Enlightenment thinkers supported eugenic policies because they believed "improving the quality of the population" – weeding out human beings they deemed unproductive or undesirable – would accelerate the course of human evolution. When Pinker touches on eugenics in a couple of paragraphs towards the end of the book, he blames it on socialism: "The most decisive repudiation of eugenics invokes classical liberal and libertarian principles: government is not an omnipotent ruler over human existence but an institution with circumscribed powers, and perfecting the genetic make-up of the human species is not among them." But a theory of entropy provides no reason for limiting the powers of government any more than for helping the weak. Science cannot underwrite any political project, classical liberal or otherwise, because science cannot dictate human values.

Exponents of scientism in the past have used it to promote Fabian socialism, Marxism-Leninism, Nazism and more interventionist varieties of liberalism. In doing so, they were invoking the authority of science to legitimise the values of their time and place. Deploying his cod-scientific formula to bolster market liberalism, Pinker does the same. Scientism is one of the Enlightenment's bad ideas. But bad ideas do not evolve into better ones. They keep on recurring, often in cruder and sillier forms than in the past. Pinker's formula for human progress is a contemporary example.

To be sure, for Pinker there are no bad Enlightenment ideas. One of the features of the comic-book history of the Enlightenment he presents is that it is innocent of all evil. Accordingly, when despots such as Lenin repeatedly asserted that they engaged in mass killing in order to realise an Enlightenment project – in Lenin's case, a more far-reaching version of the Jacobin project of re-educating society by the methodical use of terror – they must have been deluded or lying. How could a philosophy of reason possibly be implicated in murderous totalitarianism? Like the faithful who tell you Christianity is "a religion of love" that had nothing to do with the Inquisition, Pinker stipulates that the Enlightenment, by definition, is intrinsically liberal. Modern tyrannies must therefore be products of counter-Enlightenment ideologies – Romanticism, nationalism and the like. Enabling liberals to avoid asking difficult questions about why their values are in retreat, this is a popular view. Assessed in terms of historical evidence, it is also a myth.

Many Enlightenment thinkers have been avowedly or implicitly hostile to liberalism. One of the most influential, the 19th-century French positivist Auguste Comte – not discussed by Pinker – promoted a brand of scientism that was overtly anti-liberal. Human progress meant following the path of reason and moving from magical thinking to scientific inquiry. In a society based on science there will be no need for liberal values, since moral and political questions will be answered by experts.

Comte admired the Middle Ages as a time when society was healthily "organic" and unified by a single orthodoxy; but the organic society of the future would be ruled by science, not monotheism. The superstitious faith of earlier times would be supplanted by what he called "the Religion of Humanity" – a rationalist creed in which an imaginary version of the human species would occupy the place of the Supreme Being. Comte's core ideas – reason, science, progress and humanism – are precisely those that Pinker lists at the start of this book as the central values of the Enlightenment. Interestingly, neither of them mentions freedom or toleration.

The link between the Enlightenment and liberal values, which Pinker and many others today assert as a universal truth, is actually rather tenuous. It is strongest in Enlightenment thinkers who were wedded to monotheism, such as Locke and indeed Kant. The more hostile the Enlightenment has been to monotheism, the more illiberal it has been. Comte's anti-liberalism inspired Charles Maurras, a French collaborator with Nazism and the leading theorist of Action Française – a fascistic movement formed during the Dreyfus affair – in his defence of integral nationalism. Lenin continued the Jacobins' campaign against religion as well as their pedagogy of terror.

Instead of acknowledging that the Enlightenment itself has often been illiberal, Pinker presents a Manichean vision in which "Enlightenment liberal values" are besieged on every side by dark forces. Amusingly, he is in no doubt as to the identity of the intellectual master-criminal behind this assault. The Professor Moriarty of modern irrationalism, the "enemy of humanism, the ideology behind resurgent authoritarianism, nationalism, populism, reactionary thinking, even fascism" can at last be revealed:

If one wanted to single out a thinker who represented the opposite of humanism (indeed of pretty much every argument in this book) one couldn't do better than the German philologist Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche helped to inspire the romantic militarism that led to the First World War and the fascism that led to the Second. The connections between Nietzsche's ideas and the megadeath movements of the 20th century are obvious enough; a glorification of violence and power, an eagerness to raze the institutions of liberal democracy, a contempt for most of humanity, and a stone-hearted indifference to human life.

Searching for some intellectual authority for this wild diatribe, Pinker cites Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy, where Russell denounced Nietzsche as a Romantic enemy of reason who preached a life of instinct and emotion. Published immediately after the end of the Second World War, Russell's assessment of Nietzsche was understandably crude. Today it would not pass muster in a first-year undergraduate's essay.

A lifelong admirer of Voltaire, Nietzsche was a critic of the Enlightenment because he belonged in it. Far from being an enemy of humanism, he promoted humanism in the most radical form. In future, humankind would fashion its values and shape its destiny by its own unfettered will. True, he conferred this privilege only on a select few.

He recognised no principle of human equality. But where does concern with equality come from? Not from science, which can be used to promote many values. As Nietzsche never tired of pointing out, the ideal of equality is an inheritance from Judaism and Christianity. His hatred of equality is one reason he was such a vehement atheist.

The message of Pinker's book is that the Enlightenment produced all of the progress of the modern era and none of its crimes. This is why he tries to explain 20th-century megadeaths by reference to Nietzsche's supposedly anti-Enlightenment philosophy. Here he has shifted his ground. In The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011), Pinker represented the Hemoclysm – a term referring to the early 20th-century spasm of mass killing, which he uses to lump together the two world wars, the Soviet Gulag and the Holocaust – as not much more than a statistical fluke. What explains this change of view? Pinker cites no change in the historical evidence that is available on the subject.

Instead, there has been a shift in the mood of liberals. Less than a decade ago, they were confident that progress was ongoing. No doubt there would be periods of regression; we might be in one of those periods at the present time. Yet over the long haul of history, there could be no doubt that the forces of reason would continue to advance. Today, liberals have lost that always rather incredible faith. Faced with the political reversals of the past few years and the onward march of authoritarianism, they find their view of the world crumbling away. What they need at the present time, more than anything else, is some kind of intellectual anodyne that can soothe their nerves, still their doubts and stave off panic.

This is where Pinker comes in. Enlightenment Now is a rationalist sermon delivered to a congregation of wavering souls. To think of the book as any kind of scholarly exercise is a category mistake. Much of its more than 500 pages consists of figures aiming to show the progress that has been made under the aegis of Enlightenment ideals. Of course, these figures settle nothing. Like Pinker's celebrated assertion that the world is becoming ever more peaceful – the statistical basis of which has been demolished by Nassim Nicholas Taleb – everything depends on what is included in them and how they are interpreted.

Are the millions incarcerated in the vast American prison system and the millions more who live under parole included in the calculus that says human freedom is increasing? If we are to congratulate ourselves on being less cruel to animals, how much weight should be given to the uncounted numbers that suffer in factory farming and hideous medical experiments – neither of which were practised on any comparable scale in the past?

It would be idle to pursue such questions. The purpose of Pinker's laborious graphs and figures is to reassure his audience that they are on "the right side of history". For many, no doubt, the exercise will be successful. But nagging questions will surely return. If an Enlightenment project survives, what reason is there for thinking it will be embodied in liberal democracy? What if the Enlightenment's future is not in the liberal West, now almost ungovernable as a result of the culture wars in which it is mired, but Xi Jinping's China, where an altogether tougher breed of rationalist is in charge? It is a prospect that Voltaire, Jeremy Bentham and other exponents of enlightened despotism would have heartily welcomed.

Judged as a contribution to thought, Enlightenment Now is embarrassingly feeble. With its primitive scientism and manga-style history of ideas, the book is a parody of Enlightenment thinking at its crudest. A more intellectually inquiring author would have conveyed something of the Enlightenment's richness and diversity. Yet even if Pinker was capable of providing it, intellectual inquiry is not what his anxious flock demands. Only an anodyne, mythical Enlightenment can give them what they crave, which is relief from painful doubt.

Given this overriding emotional imperative, presenting them with the actual, conflict-ridden, often illiberal Enlightenment would be – by definition, one might say – unreasonable. Judged as a therapeutic manual for rattled rationalists, Enlightenment Now is a highly topical and much-needed book. In the end, after all, reason is only the slave of the passions.

John Gray's new book, "Seven Types of Atheism" will be published in April by Allen Lane.  

Enlightenment Now: the Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress
Steven Pinker
Allen Lane, 576pp, £25


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Saturday, February 24, 2018

Inside the OED: can the world’s biggest dictionary survive the internet?


Inside the OED: can the world's biggest dictionary survive the internet?

For centuries, lexicographers have attempted to capture the entire English language. Technology might soon turn this dream into reality – but will it spell the end for dictionaries?

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Fri 23 Feb 2018 01.00 EST Last modified on Fri 23 Feb 2018

In February 2009, a Twitter user called @popelizbet issued an apparently historic challenge to someone called Colin: she asked if he could "mansplain" a concept to her. History has not recorded if he did, indeed, proceed to mansplain. But the lexicographer Bernadette Paton, who excavated this exchange last summer, believed it was the first time anyone had used the word in recorded form. "It's been deleted since, but we caught it," Paton told me, with quiet satisfaction.

In her office at Oxford University Press, Paton was drafting a brand new entry for the Oxford English Dictionary. Also in her in-tray when I visited were the millennial-tinged usage of "snowflake", which she had hunted down to a Christian text from 1983 ("You are a snowflake. There are no two of you alike"), and new shadings of the compound "self-made woman". Around 30,000 such items are on the OED master list; another 7,000 more pile up annually. "Everyone thinks we're very slow, but it's actually rather fast," Paton said. "Though admittedly a colleague did spend a year revising 'go'".

Spending 12 months tracing the history of a two-letter word seems dangerously close to folly. But the purpose of a historical dictionary such as the OED is to give such questions the solemnity they deserve. An Oxford lexicographer might need to snoop on Twitter spats from a decade ago; or they might have to piece together a painstaking biography of one of the oldest verbs in the language (the revised entry for "go" traces 537 separate senses over 1,000 years). "Well, we have to get things right," the dictionary's current chief editor, Michael Proffitt, told me.

At one level, few things are simpler than a dictionary: a list of the words people use or have used, with an explanation of what those words mean, or have meant. At the level that matters, though – the level that lexicographers fret and obsess about – few things could be more complex. Who used those words, where and when? How do you know? Which words do you include, and on what basis? How do you tease apart this sense from that? And what is "English" anyway?

In the case of a dictionary such as the OED – which claims to provide a "definitive" record of every single word in the language from 1000AD to the present day – the question is even larger: can a living language be comprehensively mapped, surveyed and described? Speaking to lexicographers makes one wary of using the word "literally", but a definitive dictionary is, literally, impossible. No sooner have you reached the summit of the mountain than it has expanded another hundred feet. Then you realise it's not even one mountain, but an interlocking series of ranges marching across the Earth. (In the age of "global English", the metaphor seems apt.)

Even so, the quest to capture "the meaning of everything" – as the writer Simon Winchester described it in his book on the history of the OED – has absorbed generations of lexicographers, from the Victorian worthies who set up a "Committee to collect unregistered words in English" to the OED's first proper editor, the indefatigable James Murray, who spent 36 years shepherding the first edition towards publication (before it killed him). The dream of the perfect dictionary goes back to the Enlightenment notion that by classifying and regulating language one could – just perhaps – distil the essence of human thought. In 1747, in his "Plan" for the English dictionary that he was about to commence, Samuel Johnson declared he would create nothing less than "a dictionary by which the pronunciation of our language may be fixed, and its attainment facilitated; by which its purity may be preserved, its use ascertained, and its duration lengthened". English would not be merely listed in alphabetical order; it would be saved for eternity.

Ninety years after the first edition appeared, the OED – a distant, far bulkier descendant of Johnson's Dictionary – is currently embarked on a third edition, a goliath project that involves overhauling every entry (many of which have not been touched since the late-Victorian era) and adding at least some of those 30,000 missing words, as well as making the dictionary into a fully digital resource. This was originally meant to be completed in 2000, then 2005, then 2010. Since then, OUP has quietly dropped mentions of a date. How far had they got, I asked Proffitt. "About 48%," he replied.

The dictionary retains a quiet pride in the lexical lengths to which it will – indeed, must – go. Some time in the late 1980s, Proffitt's predecessor as chief editor, John Simpson, asked the poet Benjamin Zephaniah about the origins of the noun "skanking". Zephaniah decided that the only way to explain was to come to OED headquarters and do a private, one-on-one performance. Skanking duly went in, defined as "a style of West Indian dancing to reggae music, in which the body bends forward at the waist, and the knees are raised and the hands claw the air in time to the beat".

The tale touches something profound: in capturing a word, a sliver of lived experience can be observed and defined. If only you were able to catch all the words, perhaps you could define existence.


The first English dictionary-makers had no fantasies about capturing an entire culture. In contrast to languages such as Chinese and ancient Greek, where systematic, dictionary-like works have existed for millennia, the earliest English lexicons didn't begin to be assembled until the 16th century. They were piecemeal affairs, as befitted the language's mongrel inheritance – a jumbled stew of old Anglo-Germanic, Norse, Latin and Greek, and Norman French.

The language was perplexing enough, but in the mid-1500s it was getting ever more confusing, as political upheavals and colonial trade brought fresh waves of immigration, and with it a babel of recently "Englished" vocabulary: words such as "alcohol" (Arabic via Latin, c1543) and "abandonment" (French, c1593). Scientific and medical developments added to the chaos. In 1582, the schoolmaster Richard Mulcaster issued a frantic plea for someone to "gather all the wordes which we use in our English tung … into one dictionarie". Such a book would stabilise spelling, a source of violent disagreement. Also, there would finally be rules for "proper use".

In 1604, a clergyman named Robert Cawdrey attempted a stopgap solution: a slender book entitled A Table Alphabeticall. Aimed at "Ladies, gentlewomen and other unskillful persons", it listed approximately 2,500 "hard usuall words", less than 5% of the lexis in use at the time. Definitions were vague – "diet" is described as "manner of foode" – and there were no illustrative quotations, still less any attempt at etymology. A Table Alphabeticall was so far from being completist that there weren't even entries for the letter W.

Robert Cawdrey's 1604 A Table Alphabeticall. Photograph: www.bl.uk

Lexicographers kept trying to do better – and mostly kept failing. A new "word book" edited by John Bullokar appeared in 1616 (5,000 words); another by Henry Cockeram in 1623 (8,000 words and the first to call itself a "dictionary"); yet another by Thomas Blount in 1656 (11,000 words). But no one could seem to capture "all the wordes" in English, still less agree on what those words meant. The language was expanding more rapidly than ever. Where would you even start?

Comprehensive dictionaries had already been produced in French, Italian and Spanish; Britain's failure to get its house in order was becoming an international embarrassment. In 1664, the Royal Society formed a 22-person committee for "improving the English language", only to disband after a few meetings. In 1712, Jonathan Swift published a pamphlet on the subject, pouring scorn on sloppy usage and insisting that "some Method should be thought on for ascertaining and fixing our Language for ever" – arguing that English should not merely be exhaustively surveyed, but that its users should be forced to obey some rules. This task defeated everyone, too. It wasn't until 1746, when a consortium of publishers managed to convince Samuel Johnson to take on this "great and arduous post", that it seemed remotely likely to be completed.

Johnson's Dictionary, eventually finished in 1755, was a heroic achievement. He corralled 43,500-odd words – perhaps 80% of the language in use at the time. But in some eyes, not least the editor's, the book was also a heroic failure. In contrast to the jaunty Enlightenment optimism of his 1747 Plan, with its talk of "fixing" and "preservation", the preface to the published Dictionary is a work of chastened realism. Johnson explains that the idea of taming a fast-evolving creature such as the English language is not only impossible, but risible:

"We laugh at the elixir that promises to prolong life to a thousand years; and with equal justice may the lexicographer be derided, who being able to produce no example of a nation that has preserved their words and phrases from mutability, shall imagine that his dictionary can embalm his language, and secure it from corruption and decay."

Much as lexicographers might fantasise about capturing and fixing meaning – as Johnson had once fantasised – a living language will always outrun them.


Still, the dream lingered. What if one could get to 100% – lassoing the whole of English, from the beginning of written time to the present day? Numerous revisions or rivals to Johnson were proposed, though few were actually created. After a Connecticut schoolteacher named Noah Webster published his American Dictionary of the English Language in 1828 (70,000 entries), British pride was once again at stake.

In November 1857, the members of the London Philological Society convened to hear a paper by Richard Chenevix Trench, the dean of Westminster, entitled "On Some Deficiencies in our English Dictionaries". It was a bombshell: Trench argued that British word banks were so unreliable that the slate needed to be wiped clean. In their place, he outlined "a true idea of a Dictionary". This Platonic resource should be compiled on scholarly historical lines, mining deep into the caverns of the language for ancient etymology. It should describe rather than prescribe, casting an impartial eye on everything from Anglo-Saxon monosyllables to the latest technical jargon (though Trench drew the line at regional dialect). Most of all, it should be comprehensive, honouring what Trench called – glancing jealously at Germany, where the brothers Grimm had recently started work on a Deutsches Wörterbuch – "our native tongue".

The quest to capture the language in its entirety may have been centuries old, but, like a great railway line or bridge, this new dictionary would be thoroughly Victorian: scientific, audacious, epic and hugely expensive. Building it was a patriotic duty, Trench insisted: "A dictionary is a historical monument, the history of a nation".

For the first two decades, the New English Dictionary, as it was called, looked as if it would go the way of so many previous projects. The first editor died a year in, leaving chaos in his wake. The second had more energy for young women, socialism, folksong and cycling. Only after it was taken over by Oxford University Press, who in 1879 were persuaded to appoint a little-known Scottish schoolteacher and philologist called James Murray as chief editor, did things begin to move.

James Murray and his staff compiling the first edition of the New English Dictionary, published in 1928. Photograph: Alamy

Murray's masterstroke was to put out an "appeal" in newspapers and library books for volunteer readers to search for quotations, which would illustrate the ways words changed over time – a "corpus" of data that would make the dictionary as accurate as possible. More than 2,000 enthusiasts from across the world and all walks of life assembled some 5m quotations to feed Murray's team of lexicographers as they churned through the alphabet, defining words as they went. Even when it became evident that it would all take far, far longer than scheduled – after five years they were still halfway through the letter A – Murray kept the dictionary going. "It would have been impossible without him," says the lexicographer and OED historian Peter Gilliver.

The first part was published in 1884, A to Ant, and instalments emerged at regular intervals for the next 40-odd years. Although Murray died in 1915 – somewhere between "Turndun" and "Tzirid" – the machine churned on. In 1928, the finished dictionary was eventually published: some 414,800 headwords and phrases in 10 volumes, each with a definition, etymology and 1.8m quotations tracking usage over time.

It was one of the largest books ever made, in any language: had you laid the metal type used end to end, it would have stretched from London to Manchester. Sixty years late it may have been, but the publisher made the most of the achievement, trumpeting that "the Oxford Dictionary is the supreme authority, and without a rival".


Yet if you knew where to look, its flaws were only too obvious. By the time it was published in 1928, this Victorian leviathan was already hopelessly out of date. The A-C entries were compiled nearly 50 years earlier; others relied on scholarship that had long been surpassed, especially in technology and science. In-house, it was admitted that the second half of the alphabet (M-Z) was stronger than the first (A-L); the letter E was regarded as especially weak. Among other eccentricities, Murray had taken against "marzipan", preferring to spell it "marchpane", and decreed that the adjective "African" should not be included, on the basis that it was not really a word. "American", however, was, for reasons that reveal much about the dictionary's lofty Anglocentric worldview.

The only solution was to patch it up. The first Supplement to the OED came out in 1933, compiling new words that editors had noted in the interim, as well as original omissions. Supplements to that Supplement were begun in 1957, eventually appearing in four instalments between 1972 and 1986 – some 69,300 extra items in all. Yet it was a losing battle, or a specialised form of Zeno's paradox: the closer that OED lexicographers got to the finish line, the more distant that finish line seemed to be.

At the same time, the ground beneath their feet was beginning to give way. By the late 1960s, a computer-led approach known as "corpus linguistics" was forcing lexicographers to re-examine their deepest assumptions about the way language operates. Instead of making dictionaries the old-fashioned way – working from pre-existing lists of words/definitions, and searching for evidence that a word means what you think it does – corpus linguistics turns the process on its head: you use digital technology to hoover up language as real people write and speak it, and make dictionaries from that. The first modern corpus, the Brown Corpus of Standard American English, was compiled in 1964 and included 1m words, sampled from 500 texts including romance novels, religious tracts and books of "popular lore" – contemporary, everyday sources that dictionary-makers had barely consulted, and which it had never been possible to examine en masse. The general-language corpora that provide raw material for today's dictionaries contain tens of billions of words, a database beyond the wildest imaginings of lexicographers even a generation ago.

There are no limits to the corpora that can be constructed: at a corpus linguistics conference in Birmingham last year, I watched researchers eavesdrop on college-age Twitter users (emojis have long since made "laughter forms" such as LOL and ROFL redundant, apparently) and comb through English judges' sentencing remarks for evidence of gender bias (all too present).

For lexicographers, what's really thrilling about corpus linguistics is the way it lets you spy on language in the wild. Collating the phrases in which a word occurs enables you to unravel different shades of meaning. Observing how a word is "misused" hints that its centre of gravity might be shifting. Comparing representative corpora lets you see, for example, how often Trump supporters deploy a noun such as "liberty", and how differently the word is used in the Black Lives Matter movement. "It's completely changed what we do," the lexicographer Michael Rundell told me. "It's very bottom-up. You have to rethink almost everything."

But while other dictionary publishers leapt on corpus linguistics, OED editors stuck to what they knew, resisting computerisation and relying on quotation slips and researchers in university libraries. In the 1970s and 80s there was little thought of overhauling this grandest of historical dictionaries, let alone keeping it up to date: it was as much as anyone could do to plug the original holes. When the OED's second edition was published in March 1989 – 20 volumes, containing 291,500 entries and 2.4m quotations – there were complaints that this wasn't really a new edition at all, just a nicely typeset amalgam of the old ones. The entry for "computer" defined it as "a calculating-machine; esp an automatic electronic device for performing mathematical or logical operations". It was illustrated by a quotation from a 1897 journal.

By astonishing coincidence, another earthquake, far bigger, struck the very same month that OED2 appeared in print: a proposal by an English computer scientist named Tim Berners-Lee for "a large hypertext database with typed links". The world wide web, as it came to be called (OED dates the phrase to 1990), offered a shining path to the lexicographical future. Databases could be shared, and connected to one another; whole libraries of books could be scanned and their contents made searchable. The sum of human text was starting to become available to anyone with a computer and a modem.

The possibilities were dizzying. In a 1989 article in the New Yorker, an OUP executive said, with a shiver of excitement, that if the dictionary could incorporate corpus linguistics resources properly, something special could be achieved: "a Platonic concept – the ideal database". It was the same ideal laid out by Richard Chevenix Trench 132 years before: the English language over a thousand or more years, every single word of it, brought to light.


The fact that so much text is now available online has been the most cataclysmic change. Words that would previously have been spoken are now typed on social media. Lexicographers of slang have long dreamed of being able to track variant forms "down to the level, say, of an individual London tower block", says the slang expert and OED consultant Jonathon Green; now, via Facebook or Instagram, this might actually be possible. Lexicographers can be present almost at the moment of word-birth: where previously a coinage such as "mansplain" would have had to find its way into a durable printed record, which a researcher could use as evidence of its existence, it is now available near-instantly to anyone.

Anyone, and anywhere – when the OED was first dreamed up in the 1850s, English was a language of the British Isles, parts of North America, and a scattering of colonies. These days, nearly a quarter of the world's population, 1.5bn people, speak some English, mostly as a second language – except, of course, that it isn't one language. There are myriad regional variants, from the patois spoken in the West Indies and Pidgin forms of West Africa to a brood of compound offspring – Wenglish (Welsh English), Indlish or Hinglish (Indian/Hindi English), and the "Chinglish" of Hong Kong and Macau. All of these Englishes are more visible now than ever, each cross-fertilising others at greater and greater speed.

"The circle of the English language has a well-defined centre but no discernible circumference," James Murray once wrote, but modern lexicographers beg to differ. Instead of one centre, there are many intersecting subgroups, each using a variety of Englishes, inflected by geographical background or heritage, values, other languages, and an almost incalculable number of variables. And the circumference is expanding faster than ever. If OED lexicographers are right that around 7,000 new English words surface annually – a mixture of brand-new coinages and words the dictionary has missed – then in the time you've been reading this, perhaps two more words have come into being.

Most people, of course, now never go near a dictionary, but simply type phrases into Wikipedia (used more often as a dictionary than an encyclopedia, research suggests) or rely on Google, which – through a deal with Oxford Dictionaries – offers thumbnail definitions, audio recordings of pronunciations, etymology, a graph of usage over time and translation facilities. If you want to know what a word means, you can just yell something at Siri or Alexa.

Dictionaries have been far too slow to adjust, argues Jane Solomon of Dictionary.com. "Information-retrieval is changing so fast," she said. "Why don't dictionaries respond intelligently to the semantic or user context, like figuring out that you're searching for food words, and give you related vocabulary or recipes?" And not just words: "I'd love to include emojis; people are so creative with them. They've become a whole separate language. People sometimes need explanation; if you send your daughter the eggplant emoji, she might think that's weird."

Some have dared to dream even bigger than polysemous aubergines. One is a computer professor at the Sapienza University of Rome called Roberto Navigli, who in 2013 soft-launched a site called Babelnet, which aims to be the dictionary to beat all dictionaries – in part by not really being a dictionary at all. Described as a "semantic network" that pulls together 15 existing resources including Wikipedia, Wiktionary and Microsoft Terminology, it aims to create a comprehensive, hierarchical root map of not just English but of 271 languages simultaneously, making it the largest lexicon/encyclopedia/thesaurus/reference work on the web. Navigli told me that his real aim was to use "semantic technology" to enable the holy grail for software engineers everywhere: autonomous machine-reading of text. "This is the dream, right?" he said. "The machine that can read text and understand everything we say."

Machines already understand a lot, of course. Some have talked of "culturomics", a form of computational lexicology that uses corpus tools to analyse and forecast trends in human behaviour. A 31-month study of Twitter tried to measure the shifting sentiments of the British population about austerity, and there is even a claim – somewhat disputed – that a "passively crowd-sourced" study of global media could have foretold the Arab spring. At least on a large scale, computers, and the information giants who own and lease the data, may be able to comprehend language better than we comprehend it ourselves.

For lexicographers and Google alike, one linguistic frontier remains stubbornly inaccessible. Whereas it's now easy to assemble written-text corpora and open a window on how language functions in a particular environment, doing so for spoken language has always been far harder. The reason is obvious: recording speech, then transcribing it and creating a usable database, is both time-consuming and hugely expensive. Speech corpora do exist, but are notoriously small and unrepresentative (it's easy to work with court transcripts; far harder to eavesdrop on what lawyers say down the pub).

For lexicographers, speech is the most precious resource of all, and the most elusive. If you could capture large samples of it – people speaking in every context imaginable, from playgrounds to office canteens to supermarkets – you could monitor even more accurately how we use language, day to day. "If we cracked the technology for transcribing normal conversations," Michael Rundell said, "it really would be a game-changer."


For OED's editors, this world is both exhilarating and, one senses, mildly overwhelming. The digital era has enabled Oxford lexicographers to run dragnets deeper and deeper through the language, but it has also threatened to capsize the operation. When you're making a historical dictionary and are required to check each and every resource, then recheck those resources when, say, a corpus of handwritten 17th-century letters comes on stream, the problem of keeping the dictionary up to date expands to even more nightmarish proportions. Adding to that dictionary to accommodate new words – themselves visible in greater numbers than ever before, mutating ever-faster – increases the nightmare exponentially. "In the early years of digital, we were a little out of control," Peter Gilliver told me. "It's never-ending," one OED lexicographer agreed. "You can feel like you're falling into the wormhole."

Adding to the challenge is a story that has become wearily familiar: while more people are consulting dictionary-like resources than ever, almost no one wants to shell out. Sales of hard-copy dictionaries have collapsed, far more calamitously than in other sectors. (OUP refused to give me figures, citing "commercial sensitivities". "I don't think you'll get any publisher to fess up about this," Michael Rundell told me.) While reference publishers amalgamate or go to the wall, information giants such as Google and Apple get fat by using our own search terms to sell us stuff. If you can get a definition by holding your thumb over a word on your smartphone, why bother picking up a book?

"Go to a dictionary conference these days and you see scared-looking people," Rundell said. Although he trained as a lexicographer, he now mainly works as a consultant, advising publishers on how to use corpus-based resources. "It used to be a career," he went on. "But there just aren't the jobs there were 30 years ago." He pointed to his shelves, which were strikingly bare. "But then I'm not sentimental about print; I gave most of my dictionaries away."

Even if the infrastructure around lexicography has fallen away or been remade entirely, some things stay pleasingly consistent. Every lexicographer I spoke to made clear their distaste for "word-lovers", who in the dictionary world are regarded as the type of person liable to scrawl "fewer" on to supermarket signs reading "10 items or less", or recite "antidisestablishmentarianism" to anyone who will listen. The normally genial John Simpson writes crisply that "I take the hardline view that language is not there to be 'enjoyed'"; instead, it is there to be used.

The first edition of the New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, published in 1928. Photograph: Alamy Stock Photo

But love is, most grudgingly admit, what draws people to spend their lives sifting and analysing language. It takes a particular sort of human to be a "word detective": something between a linguistics academic, an archival historian, a journalist and an old-fashioned gumshoe. Though hardly without its tensions – corpus linguists versus old-school dictionary-makers, stats nerds versus scholarly etymologists – lexicography seems to be one specialist profession with a lingering sense of common purpose: us against that ever-expanding, multi-headed hydra, the English language. "It is pretty obsessive-compulsive," Jane Solomon said.

The idea of making a perfect linguistic resource was one most lexicographers knew was folly, she continued. "I've learned too much about past dictionaries to have that as a personal goal." But then, part of the thrill of being a lexicographer is knowing that the work will never be done. English is always metamorphosing, mutating, evolving; its restless dynamism is what makes it so absorbing. "It's always on the move," said Solomon. "You have to love that."

There are other joys, too: the thrill of catching a new sense, or crafting a definition that feels, if not perfect, at least right. "It sounds cheesy, but it can be like poetry," Michael Rundell reflected. "Making a dictionary is as much an art as a craft."

Despite his pessimism about the industry, he talked with real excitement about a project he was about to join, working with experts from the Goldfield Aboriginal Language Centre on indigenous Australian languages, scantily covered by lexicographers. "Dictionaries can make a genuine difference," he said. "They give power to languages that might have had very little power in the past; they can help preserve and share it. I really believe that."

Throughout it all, OED churns on, attempting to be ever so slightly more complete today than it was yesterday or the day before. The dictionary team now prefer to refer to it as a "moving document". Words are only added; they are never deleted. When I suggested to Michael Proffitt that it resembled a proud but leaky Victorian warship whose crew were trying to keep out the leaks and simultaneously keep it on course, he looked phlegmatic. "I used to say it was like painting the Forth bridge, never-ending. But then they stopped – a new kind of paint, I think." He paused. "Now it's just us."

These days OED issues online updates four times a year; though it has not officially abandoned the idea of another print edition, that idea is fading. Seven months after I first asked how far they had got into OED3, I enquired again; the needle had crept up to 48.7%. "We are going to get it done," Proffitt insisted, though as I departed Oxford, I thought James Murray might have raised a thin smile at that. If the update does indeed take until 2037, it will rival the 49 years it took the original OED to be created, whereupon it will presumably need overhauling all over again.

A few days ago, I emailed to see if "mansplain" had finally reached the OED. It had, but there was a snag – further research had pushed the word back a crucial six months, from February 2009 to August 2008. Then, no sooner had Paton's entry gone live in January than someone emailed to point out that even this was inaccurate: they had spotted "mansplain" on a May 2008 blog post, just a month after the writer Rebecca Solnit had published her influential essay Men Explain Things to Me. The updated definition, Proffitt assured me, will be available as soon as possible.

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The End of Literary Studies?


The End of Literary Studies?

François Berger for The Chronicle Review
By Steven G. Kellman February 22, 2018 Premium

According to the Latin Vulgate, the authoritative version of the Bible for more than a thousand years, academic departments of literature might as well close up shop. Psalm 70:15 praises the righteousness of the Lord, "quia non cognovi litteraturas" — because I have not known literatures. According to the 14th-century Wycliffe translation, the Psalmist can proclaim God's glory because "I knew not by literature, by man's teaching, but by God's revelation." Thus, an education in secular literature distracts us from important matters.

Though the word in the Hebrew original is sifrut, most commonly translated as literature, its root, sfr, also generates the verb for counting. Most modern translations render the line not as an attack on literature but as proclaiming that God's greatness exceeds man's ability to measure it. The King James Version, for example, reads: "My mouth shall shew forth thy righteousness and thy salvation all the day; for I know not the numbers thereof." In the most popular translations, literature is no longer impugned.

However, whether or not reading John Donne and Franz Kafka constitutes an obstacle to communion with the Deity, the study of literature in American colleges and universities has been suffering sustained, perhaps fatal, assault from other sources. When Calvin Coolidge, who spent part of his honeymoon translating Dante, was a student at Amherst, a college graduate was expected to be familiar with Homer, Virgil, and Shakespeare. Later in the 20th century, Lyndon Johnson was exclaiming: "I don't want anything to do with poets," and George H.W. Bush was insisting: "I can't do poetry."

Today, the president of the United States does not read books, and even many English majors do not know the difference between Keats and Yeats. Though books abound, a cynic might conclude that writers outnumber readers. The academic study of literature is in crisis.

Departments of literature in American universities are often underfunded, understaffed, and demoralized. Concentrations in French, German, Russian, and other languages have been terminated, and many of those that remain have trimmed their offerings in literature. In a recent article in The Chronicle ("Facing My Own Extinction"), Nina Handler reports that her institution, Holy Names University, is even eliminating the English major.

"Why should I be forced to read Ralph Ellison or Margaret Atwood?" asks the student who went to college to train to be a radiologist, tax accountant, or volleyball coach. "You shouldn't," colleges reply, anxious about applications, enrollments, and their bottom lines. Neglected in favor of STEM specialists, tenure-track scholars of literature — and their attendant horde of poorly paid, insecure adjuncts — must contend not only with diminished resources and resentful students but also with a failure of nerve within their own discipline. Frustrated by their institutional impotence, they turn their hostility against one another.

Literature has been displaced by movies, TV, comics, pop music, and social media as the focus of "literary studies." Mesmerized by the perplexities of the present, scholars have abrogated their role as custodians of the literary heritage. An undergraduate syllabus is as likely to include Fifty Shades of Grey as the poetry of Thomas Gray. As Yeats (not Keats) would put it, "Caught in that sensual moment all neglect/ Monuments of unageing intellect." But there is something less sensual than consensual about this melancholy moment. Our collective decisions have brought it on.

In The Hatred of Literature (Harvard University Press, 2018, trans. Nicholas Elliott), William Marx, a professor of comparative literature at the University of Paris Nanterre, surveys the long history of antipathy toward literature, from Plato to the present. Assessing what Socrates, in The Republic, calls "the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry," Marx finds that it is not just philosophy that has been hostile toward imaginative writing. Alongside the history of literature, he outlines a parallel and parasitic tradition of anti-literature, statements and actions that would deny authors their authority.

Among the overlapping bases for anti-literature that he traces, Marx finds that, in its earliest stages: "It is a question of power." Plato felt compelled to banish poets from his ideal Republic because he wanted to free its citizens from the pernicious influence that the Homeric epics were continuing to exert over the lives of Athenians. If, as Percy Bysshe Shelley proclaimed, "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world," there are many who would deny them the right to legislate.

Anti-literature has also been proposed as a matter of truth. Plato dismissed poetry as a mere imitation of an imitation of eternal Forms. A poem about a bed merely represents a physical bed, which itself is but an imperfect version of the ideal, paradigmatic Bed. In the 16th century, in An Apology for Poetry, Sir Philip Sidney summarized this enduring Platonic rejection of literature as rooted in the belief that it is "the mother of lies," as if fiction is synonymous with falsehood. In the modern university, the paragon of truth-seeker is housed and generously funded in the College of Sciences, not within the threadbare outposts of literary dilettantes.

In 1959, C.P. Snow delivered his infamous "Two Cultures" lecture that claimed epistemological priority for the scientific mind over the humanistic imagination. Despite the glaring defects in Snow's argument that Marx points out — its "approximations, oversimplifications, absurdities, and untruths" — it still holds sway among trustees, who shrink the budgets for literary studies, and politicians, who disdain literary studies as, in contemporary parlance, "fake news."

In fact, poets themselves have often denied any truth claims for their art; if poetry no longer professes veracity, it cannot be reviled for mendacity. Sidney's own defensive strategy was to contend that the poet — a synecdoche for all creative writers — "nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth." Nevertheless, maintaining that literature says nothing is hardly likely to assuage critics who would banish it from the university. If, according to Archibald MacLeish's famous formula, "A poem should not mean / But be," it becomes natural to dismiss the poem as meaningless.

Morality is another of Marx's historical bases for anti-literature. Because he mistrusted the passions, Plato denounced the literary fantasies that arouse them. Not only have the ranks of poets been filled by boozers, junkies, traitors, thieves, murderers, and other assorted malefactors, but, warn the champions of anti-literature, their poetry infects readers with their vices. Puritans of various eras define vice differently, but what the fiery tomecides of Savonarola and Hitler have in common is a fear that books can induce abnormality. In contemporary classrooms, fears that books may be too disturbing have led to trigger warnings and outright prohibitions: Purge Ovid's Metamorphoses from the curriculum because it seems to condone rape, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn because it uses the N-word, The Divine Comedy because it consigns Muhammad to the eighth circle of Hell.

The avant-garde is, by etymology and definition, a frontal attack on conventional values. And, if much of modern literature is designed to shock, provoke, and destabilize, it seems hard to justify its study in an institution supported by the state or high-powered donors interested in maintaining the status quo. It may be that the greatest literature is profoundly moral, that the overt eroticism of the Song of Songs is really an allegory for the love of God, and that Jonathan Swift's suggestion that eating Irish babies solves the famine problem is really a satirical broadside against English Hibernophobia. Still, it would be difficult to recuperate the works of the Marquis de Sade, William S. Burroughs, and Kathy Acker for use in courses filtered for morality.

A final case against literary studies is on the grounds of social utility. For whose benefit other than the insular industry of pedants is a monograph on Edmund Spenser? How does a seminar on Emily Dickinson prepare its participants to be productive citizens? The Battle of Waterloo might have been won on the playing fields of Eton, but certainly not in its Latin classes, and it is Mandarin snobbery to think that an elite education in classical texts prepares one for leadership.

Marx quotes a striking simile coined by the 17th-century French poet François de Malherbe to deny social responsibility: "Un bon poète n'est pas plus utile à l'Etat qu'un bon joueur de quilles." ("A good poet is no more useful to the State than a good skittles player.") If skittles had been an Olympic sport, its best practitioners might at least have brought glory to their nation, whereas anti-literature denies that poets even do that.

To make matters worse for defenders of literature, many modernists abjured any claim to social utility. "All art is quite useless," insisted Oscar Wilde. After Wilde, there might seem to be no use in defending the academic study of an otiose subject.

Anti-literature, however, is the tribute that detractors pay to literature. The premise sustaining anti-literature is a belief that literature possesses power and is therefore worth attacking. Poetry ceases to be hated when it ceases to seem threatening, but, according to Ben Lerner's 2016 book The Hatred of Poetry (Farrar, Straus and Giroux), the aversion remains alive and well. However, worse than antipathy, for the defenders of literature, is indifference. Marx concludes his book with the disturbing possibility that one day literature might merely be ignored and with the fervent wish that "the gods prevent that day from ever arriving."

Perhaps that day has arrived. In 1870, when Charles Dickens's last (and unfinished) novel, The Mystery of Edwin Drood, was published, 20 percent of Americans could not read it, on account of illiteracy. In 2016, with literacy widespread in the United States, 26 percent of Americans reported not having read even part of a book — print, electronic, or audio — during the past year, according to the Pew Research Center.

Though fiction still outsells other literary genres, even the "literary novel" — the kind that is studied in colleges — is becoming, like ikebana, the exquisite art of floral arrangement, the rarefied specialty of a happy few connoisseurs. Before he ceased writing literary novels, at 79, Philip Roth offered this prediction about the future of the genre: "I think it's going to be cultic. I think always people will be reading them but it will be a small group of people. Maybe more people than now read Latin poetry, but somewhere in that range."

And yet Americans still read tax forms, cereal boxes, and Twitter messages. Some even read Danielle Steel, though almost never Richard Steele. Merve Emre calls this material "paraliterature," and reading specialists contend it can be an effective gateway drug for developing the reading habit. Start with a take-out menu, and it is on to Proust. In Paraliterary: The Making of Bad Readers in Postwar America (University of Chicago Press, 2017), Emre is interested not only in the consumption of noncanonical texts but also in alternative methods of consumption.

Seizing on Vladimir Nabokov's magisterial distinction between "good readers" (those who apply the techniques of close reading championed by New Criticism) and "bad readers" (for Emre's purposes, "individuals socialized into the practices of readerly identification, emotion, action, and interaction that Nabokov decried"), Emre examines bad reading in the middle of the 20th century. At the same time that universities were enforcing techniques of studying texts as richly nuanced, autonomous verbal units, "bad readers" were perusing memoirs, diaries, committee reports, and other paraliterature. They were also using their textual skills to master crossword puzzles and decipher recipes, and in other ways not sanctioned by the academy.

Emre is particularly interested in how extramural reading positioned the United States as a world power during the Cold War. She examines the internationalization of American Studies through the creation of a literary canon that, through academic programs, publishing practices, and diplomatic initiatives, enshrined Melville, Whitman, and James and was exported by passionate travelers. At home, such scholars as Alfred Kazin, F.O. Matthiessen, and Robert Spiller adhered to the academic orthodoxy of close, dispassionate reading, but, through study-abroad programs, Fulbright grants, and the Peace Corps, the same scholars encouraged emotional responses to texts chosen not for their autonomous stylistic graces but to spread American ideals and influence.

Emre studies the "paranoid reading" performed by black nationalists such as John A. Williams, Richard Wright, and James Baldwin who sought to mobilize action against racism. She also examines a fascinating case of failed bad reading — a presidential commission that Dwight Eisenhower created in order to present an inspiring portrait of leading American authors to readers throughout the world. Called the People-to-People Initiative, it disintegrated amid bickering among participants including Saul Bellow, Edna Ferber, Donald Hall, John Steinbeck, and William Carlos Williams and the debilitating tippling of its chairman, William Faulkner.

To avoid extinction, disciplines must adapt and evolve. The department of astrology that Pope Leo X founded at the University of Rome in the early 16th century has long since disappeared, but astronomy has thrived by moving beyond geocentric and then heliocentric models. Feminism, critical race theory, ecocriticism, reader-response theory, New Historicism, queer theory, and other approaches have made the 21st-century English department quite distinct from the one that formalists dominated in mid-century. The demographics of instructors and students has also changed dramatically. Courses in travel writing, science fiction, cookbooks, and other paraliterary genres are common. Topics such as Bollywood, Black Lives Matter, and Food as Cultural Capital would have made the fastidious Yale formalist William K. Wimsatt shudder.

Necrophilia, mermaids, and Australian cinema are no doubt worthy topics in themselves, but since life is short and academic years are not long enough, should they be supplanting Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton? It is hard to believe that Game of Thrones, or even the George R.R. Martin fantasy novels on which the TV series is based, might serve as a gateway drug to a lifelong addiction to Virginia Woolf. Since its origins in Aristotle's accounts of Greek drama, literary studies has proved remarkably resilient, but how far can it stretch before it ceases to be literary studies?

Steven G. Kellman is the author of The Translingual Imagination (U. of Nebraska Press) and Redemption: The Life of Henry Roth (Norton) and a professor of comparative literature at the University of Texas at San Antonio.


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唐晓峰: 历史地理离每个人都不远

唐晓峰: 历史地理离每个人都不远

2018-02-24 本报记者 于颖 文汇学人
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"在中国,一个有意思的情况是,地理学界不重视历史地理学,但整个学术界(尤其是史学界)是非常重视的。中国其实是世界上最重视历史地理学的国家。"唐晓峰在接受《文汇学人》访谈时说。他也谈到了学问的致用:"作为学术的地理学,应该有能力用最理想的目标去修正人类一时冲动所干出来的事情。中国现在太需要这样的地理学了。"而历史地理学,恰恰可以提供比较宏观的历史经验,理解地的稳定性,认识所发生的变化。唐晓峰希望,有更多人可以知道这样一个知识门类。
- 由于强调历史地理学属于地理学,就有意无意间忽略了在历史文献上下功夫,是一种损失 -
文汇报:您曾表示,很多历史事件,只有把地理加上了才完整明白,历史地理学不是不可以看成历史和地理的相加,关键看怎么"加"。可否请您谈谈,历史地理学与历史学、地理学之间是怎样一种关系?
唐晓峰:学科是学科,事实是事实,这是两个范畴的东西。学术界划分学科,是一种权宜办法,当然也有助于分析和认识事情的多维性质。我们都知道,一个学科只是关注事情的一个侧面,历史是一个侧面,地理也是一个侧面,两个学科相加,就是两个侧面相加。它们原本就是合在一件事情上的,合起来当然有助于从整体上认识事物。简单说,历史加地理,就是把一件事情的这两个侧面合起来。所谓加得不好,就是把这件事情的历史侧面合到另一件事情的地理上去了。
当然,地理学家要有特殊的责任,要有特殊的能力,要明了地理侧面的价值、地理侧面的复杂性。专业的地理学家就是要深入观察并思考地理侧面的这些复杂性,这有助于对事情的理解。如果对地理侧面的复杂性想得很浅,就没有太大价值,也没有设立这个专业的必要性。地理意识,每个人都有,但要是没有超过常识性的地理意识,就不是一个好的历史地理学家。
即使在地理学内部,还可以分出不同的侧面,比如经济地理、政治地理、文化地理等等。我在美国雪城大学(Syracuse University)地理系念书时,他们就强调不能只顾一个侧面,要求每个研究生必须钻研至少两个地理学的侧面,我当时除了历史地理学,还选了文化地理学。在资格考试时,两个方向都要考。另外,到美国大学的东亚系找工作,也不允许你只教一个国家的历史。当年雪城大学的同学王晴佳,为了这个,赶快补了日本史,才找到教职。


总而言之,不管做什么学问,你掌握的侧面越多,就越接近事实。但这是一件不容易把握好的事情,所谓专与博的关系,这是个老话题,不必多说了。




文汇报:如果说历史地理学研究的是"过去",与之对应的现代地理学研究的就是"现在"。那是不是意味着,历史地理学不触及当下,现代地理学也不过问过去?


唐晓峰:是有这个情况,历史地理学不大注意当下,现代地理学也不过问过去。但这是一般性的状况。而一位深刻的人文地理学家,应该打通古今。古对于今的意义,说得较多,所谓"温故知新"。其实,今对古也是有意义的。这就是马克思说过的,"人体解剖是猴体解剖的一把钥匙",换句话说,就是认识后面的东西,有助于解释前面的东西。例如对于甲骨商史的研究,许多都是用后面的事情(周代的),去破解商代刚刚露头的东西。考古学研究也常常这样。例如发现新石器时代遗址中有埋下的牛骨,就可以根据后世的祭祀活动,去确认那是一个祭祀坑或祭祀遗址。


当然,逆向考察历史也要注意,否则容易以成败论英雄,或者忽略历史的曲折性。还有,也容易用今天的价值观去选择历史主题,这也是会出问题的。例如研究地理学史,就要避免所谓"辉格史"的现象。


具体到历史地理学方面,尽管很多人不太关心今天的地理问题,但有一项是每个人都必须关注的,那就是今天的地名。所有古代的地理事件都需要复原到今天的地理位置上。《中国历史地图集》因此要古今对照。地名的古今关系甚至是历史地理学的基本功。


除了地名以外,其实还有不少古今之间的关联问题。比如水系,我国平原地区的水系在历史上变化复杂,今天的水系状况可当作一个标准坐标。研究古代水系要说明白与今天水系的关系,而这种对照中还包含对变化的解释,这就更重要了。从某种意义上说,在历史地理这里,古今的关系是斩不断的。




文汇报:历史地理学的研究方法有哪些?地图在历史地理学中的重要性如何?从古到今,地图经历了一个精准化、科学化的过程,功能窄化,您觉得这对历史地理学有什么影响?


唐晓峰:历史地理学基本的研究方法就是文献研究与实地考察研究,两种方法是相互参照的。不过,只是这样讲大道理,用处不大。关键是要明白,当面对具体问题的时候,二者的轻重会有变化,要具体问题具体对待。该以文献为主的,就要好好看书;需要实地考察的,就积极出门。或者反过来,喜欢看书的,选文献题目;喜欢跑野外的,选实地工作题目,都不错。另外,无论是文献研究还是实地考察,又都有新方法、新技术出现,尤其是实地考察,新技术更重要。当年的地质学、生物学、气候学水平直接影响自然地理考察的水平。现在的遥感技术以及其他检测技术都可能打开一块新天地。


利用历史文献做研究,是研究中国各类历史问题都要具备的能力。有时候,由于强调历史地理学属于地理学,就有意无意间忽略了在历史文献上下功夫,这是一种损失。中国历史文献是很复杂的,并不是写了的就是材料,就是事实,就可以拿来用。即使不做历史研究,最好也保持对历史研究的阅读兴趣。好的史学论著,对研究历史地理问题,在基本处理史料方法、眼光、时代把握等方面都有帮助,加强这方面的造诣,肯定没错。


地图是地理学研究工作的基本工具(地图本身也是一类研究成果)。研究的问题多了,地图的花样也随之增加。古代地图上的信息是珍贵的,虽然科学性差一些。使用古地图,用不着批评它如何如何不准,而是要善于在里面找出有价值的信息。每一幅地图都有主题,在主题表达上,按照作者自己的标准,都是达标的,达标就是一种准确。所以看古地图,首先要把握主题。






谭其骧先生主编的《中国历史地图集》完成了许久以来关于编纂古今对照地图的愿望,是一个划时代的巨大成果。地图集主要表现的是全国历代行政区划的布局(也有山脉河流),也是一套具有科学性的基本底图,可以在它的基础上展开各类历史地理问题的研究。任何研究中国历史地理的人都离不开它。侯仁之先生主编的《北京历史地图集》是一部区域历史地图集。区域综合研究,是现代地理学提倡的一种研究范式。在区域地理研究中,要将各类地理要素做综合考察,从而揭示区域综合地理体系的特点。北京是一个区域,在历史发展中,北京城的出现与壮大,是这个区域中引领性的地理事件,各类地理要素都在这个引领事件的发展中产生影响或发生变异。《北京历史地图集》就是力图展现这个全区域地理系统的历史变迁。当然,限于材料的局限,有些方面表述详备,例如水系、聚落、道路、城区;有些方面表述简略,例如植被、郊区、山区。这套历史地图集是侯仁之先生学术思想的一项实践,具有示范意义。


现在,有些专题历史地图集正在研编,这是历史地图的进一步发展,是学界的一个越来越重视的工作。GIS技术与历史地图研编的结合,也是一项重要创新,在这个方向上,会有越来越成熟的成果推出。








- 地理学的发展背景是文化传统与国情 -


文汇报:在中国地理学近代化的过程中,您认为有些传统的东西被置换了,也就是在引进西方地理学的过程中,被否定掉了。现在回过头来看,我们传统的地理学有没有优势或者独特的地方?


唐晓峰:被置换的不是传统地理,而是传统地理学,是那个研究套路、解释系统被置换了。中国大地不可能被置换。历史中关于大地上各类地理信息的记载也没有被置换,相反,它们都是非常珍贵的研究材料。西方现代地理学是在科学方法与人文精神的双座引擎推动下发展起来的。科学方法对于我们曾经是陌生的,利玛窦讲的地球的真实面貌、中国在世界上的位置等等,曾震动中国人的古老灵魂。中国传统的解释自然界的那一套,基本上被西方的现代地理学置换了。


但人文的东西就不那么简单了。虽然西方现代理论对于解释社会人文问题颇有其长处,但人文论证中包含文化论证,就这一部分来说,中国古人的一部分人文地理论证在今天依然有效。眼下是春节,千军万马的返乡大军在西方人文地理现象中是没有的,这是由中国的人文空间行为结构决定的。家乡的价值、家乡(一个地方)与春节(一个节日)的关系是文化大道理,而恶劣天气、交通状况、人的身心负荷、摩托车的拖载能力在此刻都是小道理。公路上壮观的返乡场面,显示了大道理的力量。


在地理研究这个方面,传统文化留给我们一项优势,那就是文字记录下来的材料极其丰富(有意记录的或无意记录的),在时间上,又延续数千年,这在外国很少有。在这些材料上形成的一些议题,是中国独特的。另外,一些传统地理学的解释原理(风水)、价值取向(山水审美),在今天都已经转化成独特的地理文化,它们是中华传统文化的组成部分,甚至是重要的组成部分,比如山水审美文化。在今天,其文化意义还是很大的,规划建设里有很多项目还需要它们。




文汇报:当前国际历史地理学的发展如何?在西方掌控全世界地理学主要研究范式的情况下,中国历史地理学今后的前途和方向在哪里?


唐晓峰:我对最近外国的历史地理学的情况了解不多,但总的感觉是各国的学者都在研究各自的具体问题。研究自己的国家(地区)是历史地理学的一大特点。过去,英国著名历史地理学家达比(H. C. Darby)基本上研究英国问题,美国的索尔(C. Sauer)也是研究美洲问题,加拿大的哈里斯(C. Harris)主编过《加拿大历史地图集》,美国的梅尼格(D. Meinig)教授,就研究美国。他在美国换过几个地方,在每一个地方都是研究当地的问题,换一个地方就换一个题目。外国学者中专门研究中国历史地理问题的很少。相比之下,日本学者研究中国历史地理问题的较多些。


H.C. Darby


Carl Sauer


就整个地理学来说,现代地理学的研究范式是在西方诞生的,没错。但是地理学本是一个具有区域独特性的学科,这主要是指主题特点,由于主题特点不同,又会发展出不同的研究特点。即使在西方,英国、德国、法国,还有新大陆的美国,地理学的特点都不同。这种情况早就表现出来了。法国充满人文精神,英国全球视野强(特别是在殖民主义时代),德国重思想理论(康德一人身兼哲学家与地理学家。美国早期地理学家到德国去取经的很多),美国重文化。中国当下的地理学重环境、经济。总之,地理学的发展背景是文化传统与国情。


在中国,一个有意思的情况是,地理学界不重视历史地理学,但整个学术界(尤其是史学界)是非常重视的。中国其实是世界上最重视历史地理学的国家。我国的历史地理学研究机构的规模,无人可比。由于我国地理学界长期不重视社会、文化、人文的问题,而历史地理学揭示的许多问题都在这个范畴里,所以得不到地理学界主流的重视。这倒没关系,历史地理学的研究成果,在整个学术界的影响范围,超过不少地理学的其他分支,其学科的价值并没有被埋没。





文汇报:最近复旦的《中国行政区划通史》刚刚出全,《中华大典·交通运输典》也出版了,还有哪些类似的、非常基础的工作等着我们去做?中国历史地理学还有哪些值得投入的大方向?



唐晓峰:我们目前的历史地理学研究,最受关注的是以地理事件的门类为主线做纵向系统研究,在气候、政区、人口、农业方面的纵向研究相对比较成熟。这类研究在地理学中称作部门地理学。与其相区别的还有综合地理学,或可操作性强一些的区域地理学。区域历史地理学的研究成果也很多,但受关注度不如部门研究。因为区域研究只涉及一个地方,其他地方的人不一定感兴趣。而那些部门研究,既覆盖全国,又纵贯历史,关心的人当然多。这些研究也具有基础研究的性质。有学者提出做断代历史地理研究,这也是一个重要选题。过去强调达比的"系列剖面"的方法,侧重变迁研究,而做一个时代的综合地理研究也是地理学的一个学科的特点,地理老师不是总说"我们是做综合的"嘛。


其实,个案研究总是学术工作的基石,这类历史地理学的研究很多,主要是论文的形式。有些热门问题,在学术史上反复被关注。现在历史地理学者们的问题意识越来越好,刊物上的内容越来越丰富。当然,良莠不齐,这是正常的。如何提高个案研究的水平,有一点,就是要有跨学科的能力,即前面说过的,从以学科为中心转变为以问题为中心,为了深入剖析问题,该借助什么学科,就去启用什么学科,不怕"串行"。就像研究经济地理问题,必须借助最好的经济学来加强分析力度,否则地理特征叙述完了,经济的深度却没出来。


我个人比较关注地理学思想史的问题,这是理解一门学术的必要途径。研究地理学思想,不是只看地理学家自己的东西,还应该在大背景下来理解地理思想,地理思想是整个社会意识形态的一部分,不能割裂。最近,格拉肯(C. J. Glacken)的《罗德岛海岸的痕迹》被翻译出版了,这本书很值得阅读,格拉肯要尽可能展现历史上欧洲人环境意识形态的全景。多年前在雪城大学时,有个美国同学跟我说,只有真正的学者才会读这本书。我想,写都写了,还怕读吗?今天这本书全文被翻译成中文,本身就是一个成就。




- 缺少文化地理,就弱化了对中国大地的文化属性的论证与捍卫能力 -


文汇报:您是学考古出身,怎么看待考古学在历史地理学中的作用和价值?有人说,城市考古的目标就是为了还原城市面貌,但在还原城市面貌的过程中,实际发挥基础作用的仍然是历史资料和图像,考古所得的作用非常有限。您怎么看?



唐晓峰:考古学与历史地理学的关系很密切,只有这两门学科的学者最关心大地上的人类遗迹,他们可以肩并肩地做野外考察,许多遗迹信息对两门学科都有用。当然最终思考的方向不同,结论不同。现在这两门学科的合作越来越多,甚至生出了自立门户的"后代",比如环境考古学。


有些历史地理问题的研究对考古学的依赖大一些,比如古代城市研究。首先是城市位置,城址遗存的发现是决定性的,比如西周北燕的分封,其都城所在,就是由考古发现一锤子定音:北京房山琉璃河。遗址没有发现之前,曾有各种猜测,都落实不了。城市历史研究,方面很多,有些问题只有书里讲,像城市各个部分的名称、历史事件与城市的关系等等,另有些问题却只能到现场看,像城市各个部分的规模与方位,即所谓硬件部分的状况等。城市历史地理研究关注的,还包括城市周围的环境要素,尤其是一些产生直接影响的地理要素,像地貌、水系、交通等,这也需要到现场看。


所以没有必要说哪门学科最重要,没有前提地讲这类话,都是无意义的。谁重要谁不重要,是问题决定的。研究明清北京城,考古不重要。研究上海,考古更不重要。但是研究殷墟呢?我们最好多讲学科合作,不讲学科分家。




文汇报:中国古代城市地理有没有一套完整的体系?在现今城市建设普遍强调保留历史记忆、保护历史遗存的背景下,我们怎么对待传统经验和特色?


唐晓峰:历史地理学一般研究城市的两类体系,一个是环境体系,另一个是规划建设体系。环境体系是因地而异,没有一套完整通用的体系。古代城市规划建设倒是有较一致的体系特点,那主要是指都城建设。如果把《考工记》中讲的那段话做一个抽象的归纳,可以作为都城规划体系的要点,即方正外形、正相交的街道格局(英文称grid)、中轴对称、朝宫居正位。


今天的城市建设不可能再遵循《考工记》的原则,但在一些文化特征上,可以保留传统风格,这也包括社区格局。北京的胡同社区、院落形态都有保留价值。街道景观也可以采用传统要素,如牌楼、灯饰等。


城市还有一个体系,即城市群构成的体系。古代城市那么多,不会是一盘散沙,但是体系的问题又不是凭外观就可以说定的,需要用社会科学的各种判断方法去揭示体系中的机制。外观可以类似,但性质可能完全不同。比如,运河两岸的城市,因为运河具有社会体制特征,其沿岸的城市可以成为体系。但是天然河流两岸的城市就未必,因为天然河流不一定具有社会体制功能。所以,城市体系存在与否是需要论证的。目前的城市历史地理研究,对于单个城市区域的研究比较成熟,而关于城市群的体系的研究并不理想。几十年前读施坚雅(W. Skinner)的研究,他认为中国古代没有全国性城市体系,只有区域性城市体系。这是从经济角度说的。我们习惯了从行政角度认识城市,认为存在全国一盘棋的治所城市体系,听他这么一讲,觉得很意外,但马上感到城市体系问题是复杂的。


中国城市绝大多数都是历史城市,今天城市要现代化,一个麻烦的问题就出来了:怎样做到既有现代风貌,又保护好历史遗产?原则性的话好讲,问题都在具体个案上,面对一座具体的古建筑时,是拆还是留,往往有很大争论。所以现在这类问题已经不是空讲原则的事情,而是权力一方的抉择问题。目前我们还没有一个在这类问题上能对权力方进行制约的机制。所以要看权力方的觉悟。
文汇报:人文地理学在国外似乎很火,比如大卫·哈维(David Harvey)的那些研究。国内学者做的人文地理和他们有什么异同?可有能借鉴的地方?您一直强调人文地理学,要重视文化地理环境损失巨大这个问题。能否同时谈谈人类活动与城市空间形态变化的关系?
唐晓峰:很多国家的确比我们更重视人文地理学,这不是一天两天的事,我们几十年来就不重视人文地理学。1950年代受苏联影响,是一个方面,但还有些东西不是苏联影响,而是我们自己的问题。一个是总体意识形态,我们强调科学,强调应用(主要是国家建设上的应用),地理学主要是围绕这两个方向发展,具体表现就是只重视自然地理学、经济地理学这两项。另外,我们把地理学限定在理科,容纳经济地理已经不容易了,那些社会问题、文化问题,地理学没有必要管。前一代的地理学家都有这样的认识。现在青年一代地理学家的研究面宽了许多,比老一代人重视人文地理、文化地理,但还是受体制(理科式管理)限制,发展不快。我认为缺少文化地理,就弱化了对中国大地的文化属性的论证与捍卫能力。
在美国,地理学属于社会科学,很明确,所以地理系里有大批社会科学、人文学科的教授,人文地理研究很活跃。大卫·哈维是地理学出身,但他完全不在意学科门类,只要是喜欢的问题,认为是重要的问题,就研究。他这样的人在美国也是极少数,但影响很大,属于学术界的正能量。
人与城市空间的关系是个复杂问题,几句话说不清楚。这里只想谈一点感受。我在美国念书时,到图书馆找研究城市的书,先到史学类的书架找,怎么不多呢?又到地理类找,也是不多。后来到社会学书架去看,好家伙,全在这儿!这让我一下子明白城市的一个本质是社会性。那么,我们就需要关注社会学观察问题、研究问题的那套办法,然后结合地理学的空间意识,才能把城市人文空间的问题研究得深。美国芝加哥大学的历史地理学者惠特利(P. Wheatley),研究城市起源很有名,写过《四方之极》(The Pivot of Four Quarters)这部书。在1980年代,惠特利不仅是地理系的教授,也是芝加哥大学社会思想研究委员会的主席,他的这个多重的学术职位,反映出他的学术特点,也可以理解他那部名著的特色。研究城市地理问题要有广泛而深入的社会思考力。
- 历史地理学的致用,主要还是提供比较宏观的历史经验 -
文汇报:您曾表示,地理学并非一个简单的客观记录,其思想的最高层有一个定向,就是对国土的定性、定向。您认为历史地理学在国家发展中有什么作用?或者说,对过去的了解和学习,能为今天提供什么借鉴?
唐晓峰:地理最朴实的层面是日常地理知识,这是生活需要的,没有大方向的问题。但地理问题一旦提升起来,就会受到意识形态的影响。这主要指人文地理学。既然受意识形态的影响,当然就会有社会价值观,价值观就是大方向。我国古代的价值观在王朝体制上,地理学的发展也就在这个方向上发展,我称其为"王朝地理学"。到了现在的改革开放的时代,地理学就沿着现代化的方向发展。"发展是硬道理",于是发展也是地理学里面的硬道理。这是地理学的一个方面。但地理学还可以有另一个方面,即对理性、人性、和谐世界的追求,这是不能放弃的终极目标。作为学术的地理学,应该有能力用最理想的目标去修正人类一时冲动所干出来的事情。中国现在太需要这样的地理学了。
关于历史地理学的经世致用问题,不能是简单地到处求用,这样做,并不真的懂经世致用。什么事情可用,以什么方式来用,都要明白。我的体会,历史地理学的致用,主要还是提供比较宏观的历史经验。虽然有些历史经验是没有用的,但地理经验却是另一回事。因为地的稳定性,与地有关系的经验也相对稳定。知道过去的情况,对今天、未来都有参考价值。
举个例子,当年史念海先生做军事历史地理考察,就是受时任兰州军区司令员皮定钧将军的委托,很有实战意义。皮定钧将军说:"假定现在就要进行一场战争,我作为司令员,进入阵地,部队部署,粮草运输,作战计划,大致都已就绪,我要再听取一下,以前在这个地区曾经发生过什么战争?战争的两方各是由什么地方进军的?又是分别由哪些道路退却的?粮秣是怎样运输的?战地的用水又是怎样取得的?其中获胜者是怎样取得胜利的?而败北者又是怎样招致失败的?"(引自《河山集》四集"自序")史先生是带着将军的问题来到一处处古战场的。所有的问题都具有现实性。
英国的达比教授也讲过欧洲的例子。"在1914—1918年的大战结束之后,所出现的最有价值的地理著作之一,就是鲍曼(Isaiah Bowman)的《新世界》(The New World)。鲍曼博士现任美国约翰斯·霍布金斯大学(Johns Hopkins University)校长,那时正是美国地理学会的干事。他的书是1924年出版的。名之为'新世界',其实却是讲的旧世界;副题曰'政治地理',但你打开书篇一看,其中却充满了早于1800年以前的参考叙述。为什么呢?因为地理学中的新问题,是生根在旧事之中的:波兰走廊、意大利北部边疆、捷克斯拉夫边疆、以及马其顿、西里西亚等问题,都不是1919年的新问题。这些问题没有一个是不参考以往的事实,就可加以讨论的。"(达比1946年2月在利物浦大学的演讲)旧的地理是新的地理的基础。我们今天大讲"一带一路",所用的概念难道不是来自历史吗?
相对来说,技术性的东西,不需要历史,例如引水路线,不需要古人告诉我们,拿现代仪器一测,清清楚楚。历史中的宏观地理大势,这是仪器测不出来的。例如,永定河的引水路线怎样走好,我们不需要古人说(虽然古人做过),现代仪器可以更精确地告诉我们。但永定河在历史上糟糕的表现,却是需要历史地理研究告诉我们,引起我们警觉的。
历史地理研究还可以服务于历史文化遗产保护工作,在这个方面的例子很多。国内一些省市邀请历史地理学者进入政府参事室工作,主要就是要他们发挥这个方面的作用。在欧洲,历史地理学者有较多的参与城市规划建设的机会,他们在研究与制定历史遗产保护法规上发挥着较大的作用。
文汇报:历史和地理知识,基本人人都有,但"具有知识"不代表"明白道理"。在刚面市的《给孩子的历史地理》中,您也提到了"知识"和"道理"的区别,您希望读者从这本书中有怎样的收获?
唐晓峰:中国人,每个人都有一份历史地理标签,那就是祖籍。你可能根本没去过那儿,但你属于那儿。每个人也都愿意了解祖籍,这就是历史地理学习。历史地理离每个人并不远。
写《给孩子的历史地理》是一个尝试,在少年儿童读物中还没有这个题目,他们能不能读进去,要看实际情况了。不过,至少,让他们知道有这样一个知识门类,有这样一种启发智慧的方式。地理里面有智慧,这是我最想让他们知道的,所以我反复讲,地理不光是知识,还有道理。道理离不开知识,知识要组合成道理才更有意义。
对于少年儿童的教育,我是外行,但总有一种感觉,那些让孩子看一本扔一本的书,并不是最好的读物。少年儿童应该有一些能够伴随他长久一些的读物,这样的读物会引导出一条知识路径。历史地理应该是一个吸引人的领域,这些知识不仅仅对孩子成长有益,对成年人,也可以在加深阅读中获得更深的对世界、社会、生活的认识。

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