Sunday, September 25, 2022

约西亚·奥博谈古典学与政治学

古希腊罗马史里,古典时期的雅典民主政治自十九世纪以来一直是重要问题。不过,随着各种后现代文化与批评理论进入古典学,西方学者们一方面越来越抛弃希腊史里的雅典中心论的倾向,另一方面也强调政治制度以外的社会文化研究。可以说,在北美大学的古典系与历史系里,从事雅典民主政治研究的学者在减少,而在政治学系里,雅典民主政治研究仍然有其一席之地。雅典民主政治研究从历史学到政治学的学科范式转变下,著名学者约西亚·奥博(Josiah Ober)是绕不开的关键。1989年,他的著作《民主雅典的精英与大众:演说术、意识意态和人民权力》(Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People,下文简称《精英与大众》)出版,立即成为西方学界研究雅典民主政治最具影响力的典范作品。此后,奥博又出版了《民主雅典的政治异见者:对大众政治的知识批判》(Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule,下文简称《异见者》)与《民主与知识:古典雅典的创新与学习》(Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens,下文简称《民主与知识》),这两部作品与《精英与大众》一起成为奥博著名的雅典民主政治研究"三部曲"。在此过程中,他也从普林斯顿大学古典系转到斯坦福大学政治系任教,完成了由希腊史学者向政治学者的转变。博并没有离开古典学界,在2019年秋季,奥博成为加州大学伯克利分校古典系的年度萨瑟讲席教授(Sather Professor of Classical Literature),做了题为"希腊人与理性:工具理性的发现"(The Greeks and the Rational: the Discovery of Practical Reasoning)系列讲座,这一主题与1949年E. R.多兹(E. R. Dodds)在伯克利的萨瑟讲座——"希腊人与非理性"(The Greeks and the Irrational)相应和。奥博在伯克利做的该系列讲座的同名书在11月将由加州大学出版社出版,上海人民出版社也准备推出中译本。而在今年5、6月,国内出版界先后推出了《精英与大众》(郑州大学出版社)与《希腊人与非理性》(生活·读书·新知三联书店)的中译本,在此之际,《上海书评》专访了约西亚·奥博,谈谈他的治学经历。


采访︱何彦霄

您的成名作《精英与大众》是您的第二本书,受法国理论影响,偏政治文化研究。而您的第一本书《阿提卡堡垒:雅典陆地边防》(Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier,1985年由博睿出版社出版)是传统的军事史著作,可否谈谈是什么促使您有了这样的转变?奥博:我在密歇根大学读博士时,是在非常传统的古代史项目里,我们主要关心军事问题,虽然也对文化问题感兴趣,但总体研究路子是非常传统的。我在写博士论文时,主要关心伯罗奔尼撒战争后的雅典防御策略。在阅读公元前一世纪前所有和雅典有关的史料时,我注意到一个矛盾,即演说家们有时将自己展示为精英而强调对手不够精英;有时则会将对手展示为精英,把自己展现为普通雅典民众。这是非常奇怪的,我将其记在笔记卡上,以备之后进一步思考。我的博士论文是关于军事的,很多要基于考古田野。因此,在1980年代早期,我向希腊考古的相关部门申请,在雅典与麦加拉的边界考察一些从来没有被调查过的区域。这些地区一般不易到达,我认为,我有能力做这件事,为此筹了不少钱,也招募了一些志愿者学生。但是,很快希腊政府换届,他们不允许做任何调查。当时,我只是一位年轻的助理教授,希望得到终身教职,于是只能转而进行B计划,就是研究雅典演说辞里的精英陈述。非常幸运的是,我得到了一个研究中心的资助去访问。那里的学者正好在进行人文与社科的交叉研究,我从他们那里学到很多。受社会科学家研究精英与非精英关系的启发,以及引入和思考像福柯这样的法国理论,我对权力问题进行了深入思考。同时,我在蒙大拿州立大学任教,这里的历史与哲学合为一个系,除我之外,学校里没有其他古典学家,我甚至是整个蒙大拿州唯一的古典学家。因此,某种程度上,我是在"真空"里工作,尽管我的工作涉及社会科学和法国理论。不过这也使我可以按照自己的想法去研究。我感到非常幸运,《精英与大众》得到了很多好评,而不是被看作一本偏离主流的书,而且它也对二十世纪末与二十一世纪的古典学研究产生了不少影响。2019年您在伯克利演讲,莱斯理·刻尔克(Leslie Kurke)教授介绍您时,回忆了《精英与大众》对她研究品达的影响。我对此并不惊讶,在希腊文学领域,您这本书可能是被引用最多的希腊史著作。某种程度上,这本书也是融合希腊史与希腊文学的典范。您在写这本书时是否有这样的跨学科意识,让希腊文学研究者也能阅读?奥博:这是非常好的问题。我在写这本书时,其实并没有意识到它能对文学研究者有那么大的影响。我的读者定位主要还是希腊史学者,还有一些社会科学学者。不过,我当时认识到,我研究的材料属于希腊文学范畴,材料都是文献而非档案,特别是关注希腊演说家的修辞;而这些演说之所以流传下来,是因为它们被视为伟大的文学作品。因此,我意识到我在处理一些被看作经典文学的材料,但我也觉得可以做一些和传统文学研究者不一样的工作。我们可以将这些演说辞看作社会意识形态的反映,演说家用相应的策略去影响特定的人群,无论是陪审员还是公民大会上的听众,听众拥有理解这些演说的背景知识,而演说家又要考虑听众在思考什么问题,进而说服听众按照他们预期的方式去投票。不过,我当时并没有意识到文学学者对此非常感兴趣,算是无心插柳。您的书出版于1989年,是国际政治格局风云变动的一年。这本书获得了美国语文学会(American Philological Association,现已改名为"美国古典学会")最高奖"查理斯·古德温功勋奖"(The Charles J. Goodwin Award of Merit),除学术外,或许也有大环境原因?——当然,您在写这本书时肯定无法预料未来的形势,但它的确与时局贴合,您怎么看?奥博:其实这本书的思想起源可以追溯到1960年代和1970年代,那时我对美国的种族关系非常感兴趣。当时,我的父亲在参与公立教育问题,他对民权问题非常投入。我们兄弟姐妹都去了"内城学校"(inner city school),在那里黑人学生比白人学生要多。我父亲认为在美国创造社会公正无比重要,拥有相对精英背景或中产阶级的人需要去关心下层民众。因此,我将《精英与大众》这本书献给我的父亲。他的实践促使我去提出相应的假设,去思考在民主社会里拥有较多资源的人如何与拥有较少资源的人发生关联。的确,在这本书出版的1989年,整个世界天翻地覆,也和这本书的主题相呼应。其实,这本书关心的大众与精英的问题,本质是关心民主政治如何运行,去理解精英与非精英之间的对话,普通民众不仅仅促使对话,也是参与者。之后,您又出版了《异见者》,如果《精英与大众》关心的是精英演说家如何与普通民众交流,这本书关心的则是精英们对大众政治的不满。而彼时,您也从蒙大拿州立去了精英学校普林斯顿。普林斯顿的环境在何种程度上促使您写《异见者》?奥博:其实,我还在蒙大拿州立大学时就已经开始写作《异见者》了,因此和普林斯顿没有直接关系。不过,我大约在1987年完成《精英与大众》一书时,就意识到我的研究还可以有后续,民众与精英只是我关心的问题的一部分,因为民主政治不仅仅要求普通民众参与其中,也需要相应的批评者,有人站出来说,这个世界还可以变得更好。没有这样的批评,就会成为大众暴政。我认为,大众权力与批评是民众政治的一体两面。《精英与大众》已经表明,是民众(demos)控制着话语权力或者葛兰西意义上的意识形态霸权。但是,如果这一前提有效的话,不考虑普通民众的态度,我们就无法理解像修昔底德、柏拉图、亚里士多德这些精英作家的作品。学者通常认为,柏拉图与亚里士多德思考的是民主政治的失败,他们经历的世界正在坍塌,我的立场是,他们的批评实际是在应对民主政治的成功,而非失败。他们所做的是将《老寡头》里的精英抱怨——应该由我们这样受过良好教育、拥有大量财富的人掌握权力——转化为哲学思考,即我们如何去思考看似提供公共益处的民主政治,我们如何解释民主政治在伯罗奔尼撒战争后期崩溃后又再次重建?因此,柏拉图、亚里士多德是论证民主政治的确存在问题,而不是仅仅像一般人那样抱怨:如果雅典由精英统治会变得更好。如果你想从哲学的角度去批判民主政治的话,你需要穿过表面现象去思考民主政治的本质是什么,从知识论的角度去思考世界看上去是什么样、实际是什么样。因此,《异见者》关心的是雅典民主,不仅仅是雅典演说辞生产背后的机制,也是哲学话语生产的机制。这本书进一步关心民主的本质、在民主环境下产生的文学。这本书是我到了普林斯顿七八年后才完成的,普林斯顿对这本书的确有很大影响。在这里,我有极棒的同事,他们教我怎么阅读哲学文本、思考文学问题。写作过程中我也与剑桥思想史学派有很深的互动,将文学文本放到历史语境下去阅读。在我看来,《异见者》一书仍然属于古代史范畴,属于思想史或文化史。但后来的《民主与知识》《坊社民主》(Demopolis)越来越属于政治学范畴,而《古典希腊盛衰》(The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece)尽管属于历史学,但也运用了大量政治学方法,特别是新制度主义(New Institutionalism)。您是如何从历史学转向政治学的?奥博:当我完成《异见者》时,我还没有处理的问题是:什么样的机制推动了对民主政治的哲学批判?当这些哲学家试图解答民主成功或幸存而非失败时,问题在哪?在知识论层面,在《异见者》里,我没有回答的问题是,雅典社会是如何组织民众的知识体系的?雅典如何将一些对国家治理毫无概念的民众组织起来?民主政治又是如何组织起一套政策体系,让安全福利体系得以运行,进而使国家在遇到内乱时也可以持续?我试图继续像《异见者》一样,用思想史的方法来处理这些问题,但没有得到满意的结果。我意识到,不能再用思想史的办法了。这时候,我得到了斯坦福大学行为研究中心(Center for Advanced Study in the Behavior Sciences)的一笔资助,在该中心访问一年。在那里,我遇到了不少聪明的人,他们帮助我思考,给我建议。最后,斯坦福大学政治学系决定聘用我。这让我非常惊讶,我和系主任说,我没有政治学学位,我不是政治学家。不过,系主任认为我是,并且强调大家读过我的研究,说我的研究是按照政治学的范式来做的。因此,我加入了斯坦福大学政治系,深度参与一些同事的项目,比如巴里·维恩盖斯特(Barry R. Weingast)、詹姆斯·费伦(James Fearon),他们都是博弈论的元老,对推动政治科学的进步做出了贡献。我学习他们的观点,他们也回答我的问题,帮助我思考与知识有关的问题——每一个个体都不知道如何运行一个社会,但当我们将这些个体结合起来时,就有了让社会运行的足够知识。因此,我的问题就变成,这一叠加状态在雅典是如何运行的?这一叠加知识如何成为法典形式的政策与法律?又如何付诸实践?对于每一个问题,社会科学都给予我相应的工具。与此同时,在斯坦福大学我还受到朋友布鲁克·曼威尔(Brook Manville)的影响。我们一起合写了关于民主政治如何帮助公司运行的书(采访者注:这里指A Company of Citizens: What the World's First Democracy Teaches Leaders about Building Great Organizations,2003年由哈佛商学院出版社出版)。布鲁克帮助我思考知识是如何管理与组织的,这是当代组织管理理论的一大问题。因此,一方面是集体社会科学,另一方面是组织理论,这些都对我的研究非常有帮助,我也进入了学术生涯的下一个阶段。另外,斯坦福大学还有研究经济史极好的同事,我意识到,可以将社会科学、积极创造理论结合起来,去重新思考希腊世界的经济发展,这是《古典希腊盛衰》一书的起源。您在即将出版的《希腊人与理性》里,用博弈论重新解读了一些希腊文本。这与1949年多兹在伯克利的萨瑟讲座《希腊人与非理性》相对应。您可否谈谈是如何想到写这本书的?奥博:伯克利邀请我成为萨瑟讲席教授时,我还无法拿定主意应该讲什么。思考了几种可能后,我认为可以与多兹的讲座相对应,在七十年后,谈谈我们对这个问题能否有新的思考。我的路径是,将博弈论与古典学结合,探究公元前五世纪和公元前四世纪的希腊思想家是否和二十世纪的博弈论学者一样,用类似的方法提出问题?在之前关于古希腊的研究里,我已经运用过博弈论,我认为这有助于解释一些问题,但下一个问题是,在这些事件发生的古希腊环境里,人们是否理解发生了什么?希腊人是否有相应的理论对其进行解释?这是一个值得探索的问题。经过一些初步研究,我认为这不是一个疯狂的想法。在日常生活中,我们在某种程度上运用着博弈论,尽管我们没有意识。我的工作是要表明,像柏拉图、亚里士多德这样的哲学家是理解博弈论的。多兹的《希腊人与非理性》今年刚刚出了中译本。如果出版社邀请您作为多兹的挑战者,去为多兹的书写导读,您会怎么写?奥博:我会强调,多兹是在他所处的时代写作的。他是在1949年做的萨瑟讲座,在那个年代,古典学对非理性的东西还非常不友好。像尼采,以及F.M.科恩福尔德(F. M. Cornford, 1874-1943,英国古典学家)所属的剑桥仪式学派,希望挑战这一对非理性的偏见。二十世纪中叶出现了新的人类学范式,大家意识到,以弗雷泽《金枝》为代表的二十世纪早期人类学行不通。多兹的创新之处与新的人类学理论相关,那时科学范式的人类学在发展中,人类学尝试去理解仪式行为是如何成为社会不可或缺的一部分以及其它非理性行为。这些研究为多兹的创新创造了条件。从表面上看,我和多兹在唱对台戏;其实,我是他的崇拜者。作为古典学家,他在那个时候就有意识阅读以人类学为主的社科理论,也尝试让著作浅显易懂——不仅仅是写给古典学者,也能为社科学者所理解。他很明确,他想做的是重要的跨学科工作。他的工作非常成功,为之后新一代学者奠定了基础。之后,大家开始关注魔法、迷信、宗教等等希腊文化礼仪化的形式,弥补了我们对希腊世界理解的空白。不过问题是,当一场智识革命发生时,总是要推翻旧的一切。因此,我觉得在七十年之后,是对多兹的学术进行重估的时候了。如果说,多兹让我们意识到,希腊世界和我们的世界非常不一样,拥有像魔法这些难以理解的文化形式,我们可以问的是,希腊文化在哪些部分和当代世界有对应?因此,我认为我们不应该将婴儿和脏水一起倒掉,理性仍然是希腊文化的一部分,多兹的解释并不是唯一的路径。我们需要反思一些"多兹主义"——古希腊和现在非常不一样;我们可以说,在有些方面,希腊人还是和我们拥有一致性。


在伯克利时我曾和您简单提过,在考虑将您解读希腊材料的方式用到先秦中国材料上的可能。您在研讨课上推荐过《策略博弈》(Games of Strategy),我发现本书的三位作者——苏珊·斯克丝(Susan Skeath)、阿维纳什·迪克西特(Avinash Dixit)与戴维·赖利(David Reiley)都为其中译本写了前言,三位作者强调早期中国有类似的思想资源,并且希望中国学界能运用本土思想资源去丰富博弈论理论。总体上,我认为按照《希腊人与理性》的方式,运用博弈论去写《中国人与理性》这样一本书是完全可能,并且是可以预见的。如果有中国学者或汉学家希望做这样的工作,您会有什么建议?奥博:我的建议是,你需要做充分准备,因为这是一项有挑战的大工程,不是花几个月就能完成的,需要对相应的文本有总体性的把握和深刻的理解,而不是生硬地将博弈论套入这些文本里。另外,你也需要花时间去掌握博弈论。当然,你不用掌握相应数学工具,因为博弈论的创造者们为了让博弈论易于理解,并没有为其建立数学模型。对于古代中国的博弈论思维,已经有学者在做相关研究。据我了解,穆磐石(Peter Moody,圣母大学政治学系教授)对于韩非子已经做过一些这样的工作,比如他发表于《政体》(Polity)杂志上的论文"Rational Choice Analysis in Classical Chinese Political Thought"(《古典中国政治哲学里的理性选择理论》)。因此,你需要去了解之前学者的相应工作,去学习既有的成果,然后看自己能做什么,进而进入这一浩大工程。就您提到的,找到古希腊和当代社会的对应,您的学术成功实践了这一古今对话,证明了古代研究者进入当代研究领域的可能。除您之外,哈佛大学的丹妮尔·艾伦(Danielle Allen)——她是您在普林斯顿大学教过的本科生——也成功走了这条路。我认为,相对于研究当代问题的社科学者,研究古代的学者更容易进入对方的研究领域。对于希望进行古今对话的古代研究学者,您有什么建议?奥博:如果对古代文本只有一些肤浅认识的话,要将其带入到当代语境里,必定是误导人的。我们做的所有工作,去掌握古代语言,去掌握相关的方法都是会有回报的。确实有一些研究当代问题的学者并没有足够的对于古代领域的了解,只是从古代找一些听上去不错的案例,从古代作家那儿找一些段落。因此,我的建议是:首先,你要理解古代,并且谦虚地将古代研究带入当代领域。——当然,我们没有办法掌握所有古代文明,没有人能同时精通古代中国、亚历山大帝国与古典雅典。我们能做的是,当有人说某某事是不可能时,我们可以站出来说,这是可能的,因为在从前已经发生过,然后对相应的过去进行论证,对这些只基于当代例子和数据的观点进行反驳。我们是可以根据过去看到未来,过去发生的事在未来会重复。另外,我认为我的论著的一个共同之处在于:一方面,我有考虑古代与现代的差异;另一方面,我也试图展示人类发展具有延续性。无论是基于集体还是个人,人的行为具有跨越时间的延续性。我们不能仅仅说过去是一个异国,那只是遥远的过去。尽管每一种文化及每一个历史时间段都具有独特性,我们不能因为这些独特性去放弃更深刻的、从总体上去认识人类的可能性。我认为我们可以做的是,通过研究古代去认识到人类能做什么,人类是如何组织起来的。

Tuesday, September 13, 2022

“他们都是人类,多么浅显的道理”:反思人文学科中的文化相对论

"他们都是人类,多么浅显的道理":反思人文学科中的文化相对论
"They Were All Human Beings - So Much Is Plain": Reflections on Cultural Relativism in the Humanities
作者:恩斯特·贡布里希(E. H. Gombrich1909-2001
译者:陈荣钢


引用[Chicago]Gombrich, E. H. 'They Were All Human Beings: So Much Is Plain': Reflections on Cultural Relativism in the Humanities. Critical Inquiry 13, no. 4 (1987): 686-99.

这篇文章最初是贡布里希在1985年8月在哥廷根举行的第七届国际日耳曼研究大会(Seventh International Congre Germanic Studies)上发表的讲话,一年后付梓,再一年,英译本出版。
***尊敬的舍内教授(Professor Albrecht Schöne),衷心感谢你邀请我这个不做日耳曼研究的人来日耳曼研究的专家会议上发言,我感到非常意外,也觉得配不上这份殊荣。我们因为讨论"新旧之争"而聚在一起。我在歌德(Goethe)的《温和的警句》(Zahme Xenien)第四节发现了四行诗句,它们体现了"新旧之争"的主题,我希望它能把日耳曼研究和其他人文学科联系起来。
"是什么让你与我们如此遥远?"
我一遍又一遍阅读普鲁塔克。
"他传授了什么教训?"
"他们都是人类——多么浅显的道理。"
就在歌德写下这些诗句的19世纪20年代,黑格尔不断举办历史哲学讲座。一开始,他提出了相反的观点,我想简单地把它描述为"文化相对论"cultural relativism):
每个时代都有特殊情况和个别状况,因此必须且只能自我参照地进行阐释。最浅显例子的莫过于"大革命"时期的法国人经常诉诸希腊和罗马。这些民族的性质和我们自己时代的性质极其不同。
当然,这里的问题不是黑格尔的断言(时代差异和民族差异)。我们都知道,歌德这位细心的读者、旅行者也知道,罗马的狂欢节与宾根的圣罗克节(Feast of Saint Rochus)有本质上的不同,他对这两者都有过深情的描述。黑格尔的结论使文化史家成为文化相对论者。文化和生活方式不仅不同,而且完全不可作比。换句话说,将一个地区或一个时代的民族与其他地区的人类做比较是荒谬的,因为没有共同点可以证明我们这样做是合理的。在《历史决定论的起源》(The Origins of Historicism)中,弗里德里希·梅尼克(Friedrich Meinecke研究了这种信念的根源和兴起。当然,文化相对论者正是秉持这种天真的信念,因为他们拒绝承认所有变化表象背后存在相同人性的常数。黑格尔或许会指出,加图(Cato)代表着比歌德更早的自我实现(self-realization)阶段;马克思会争辩道,奴隶制社会经济环境的意识形态上层建筑一定不同于早期资本主义的魏玛共和国(Weimar);奥斯瓦尔德·斯宾格勒(Oswald Spengler)会断然否认,浮士德式的文明可以与一个古典时代的人对话;种族理论家应当指出,地中海人的心理与北欧人的心理完全不同。我希望你们能原谅我,我不详述这些理论和伪理论。想要强行打开一扇门的人很可能会摔个"狗吃屎"。如果他试图强行打开一扇上了锁的门,结果可能更加令人不快。我只关心一件事。人文学科从我们的词汇中剔除了""的观念,与自然科学中的概念相反,这个概念并不描述任何有形的、明确定义的东西。没有人比威廉·狄尔泰(Wilhelm Dilthey)在这个问题上更挣扎的了。他为人文学科的发展方向做出了巨大贡献,尤其是在德国。无论狄尔泰如何提及心理学对人类文化研究的价值,他仍然质疑将研究建立在人类本性之上的合理性。狄尔泰写道:"个人只是文化制度的一个节点,是与个人存在密不可分的组织节点。那么它又如何为理解(understanding)提供依据呢?"因此,与自然科学家相比,人文主义者必须放弃因果解释,放弃对合理规律的发现。他关心的不是解释(explanations),而是理解,是阐释学(hermeneutics),一个尚待建立的知识分支,它该让我们这些不断变化的人能够阐释人类生活不断变化的现实。我们当然要感谢狄尔泰和他的追随者,因为他们从历史决定论的学说中得出了如下结论——人文主义者应该永远对个别的、不可重复的事实感兴趣。尽管如此,我认为,我们人文主义者不应允许任何人禁止我们偶尔从具体研究中抬起头来、甚至转过身去,问一问我们手中的问题可以在哪个更广泛的背景下被探究?我们这样做的频率和程度可能取决于我们的性格,但只要我们口对着心说,我们就会意识到,即使是我们最初选择的研究对象,也以一个明确或隐含的科学理论为前提。这些问题在我们今天的许多研究领域已成为非常热门的话题,我几乎不需要详述这个事实。一方面,意识形态对人文学科的影响越来越大;另一方面,不要任何理论框架的愿望使人文学科陷入了死胡同。过去几十年来的要求是既要寻求解释,又要谋求理解,但我认为,这些要求该扫入废纸堆了。如今,大写的""Man)已经完全从我们的视野中消失了。我们面对的只有文本(text)。无论我们怎么理解文本,都是我们自己的理解,而不代表作者的意图。歌德在普鲁塔克的文本中发现了什么?我们在我引用的歌德诗句中发现了什么?这归根结底还是我们自己的事。文化相对论抛弃了所有学术工作中最宝贵的遗产——自己从事的是对真理(truth)的追求。既然过去的证据必然不再被视为证据,那么我们只是在玩一场聪明人的游戏,它不为思想服务,只是智力炫技。我不想在这里列举所有解构学术事业的做法。我谨向各位推荐一位勇士,他的战斗口号很适合我。诺伯特·博尔茨(Norbert Bolz)的论文《奇迹与终结:从人到神话》(Odds and Ends: From Man to Myth)向海德格尔(Heidegger)、拉康(Lacan)、列维-斯特劳斯(Lévi-Strauss)、阿多诺(Adorno)和理查德·瓦格纳(Richard Wagner)致敬了一番,后以一句"因为人并不存在"达到高潮。作者会不会把智人和英国作家刘易斯·卡罗尔(Lewis Carroll)的讽刺搞混了?说笑归说笑,我很清楚,可能也是由于我的年龄,我对那场运动的经典文本知之甚少,但因为我不是一个文化相对论者,我并不相信每个时代都有自己的真理。我更愿意依靠我的同龄人,比如伟大的文学研究者艾布拉姆斯(M.H. Abrams),他对这个学派非常关注,并得出结论,必须将其视为一种短暂的知识流行。"人的终结"可能对年轻人有吸引力,因为它让追随者看不起那些不仅相信圣诞老人和送子鸟,而且相信人和理性的"可怜门外汉"。他们自认为看清所有这些都是胡闹,是孩子的童话,我们早就不需要了。他们因此获得自尊心。我相信,这种观点听起来很有说服力,因为不可否认,在我们阅读文本时,不可避免会有误解的危险。害怕误解的人现在可以舒服地退回到怀疑论中,并将一切理解视为天真和过时的东西。"人非圣贤,孰能无过",这种见解并不新鲜,我也不认为它让我们对知识的进步感到绝望,除非我们对自己的期望值过高。年轻人"不成功便成仁"的要求提醒着成熟的人文主义者,我们必须谦逊一点。你可以从这个建议中听到我的朋友卡尔·波普尔(Karl Popper)的声音。他让我相信,无论是在科学领域还是在人文领域,我们都不能以"完全解决问题"为目标,但我们仍然有权利继续探询和摸索,因为我们可以从错误中学习。这个教训也能帮我们理解其他民族、其他时代。毫无疑问,我们不能从"他们都是人类"这一事实得出结论,认为他们也一定像我们一样思考和感受,这是一种谬论。人种学早已证实,偏远部落的一些制度和思想比其他部落更难理解。在这里,文化相对论当然会受到欢迎,因为它限制我们将自己的文化标准应用于其他社会。然而,我们不要夸大其词,因为否定一切标准只能导致荒谬。我想到了经过广泛讨论的论点,它否认我们有权将对现实的任何影响归因于广泛的、魔法般的实践,因为我们对现实的概念植根于我们的语言和文化,因此在这些狭窄的范围之外不适用。人们不禁要问,这些论点是否只是时髦的花招?无论何时,民族学都有一些纠偏方法,以防止文化相对论支配整个领域。毕竟,旅行者已经见识过外国同胞的欢笑和泪水、玩耍和争吵。任何有幸看过与世隔绝部族生活和行为的影片和照片的人,比如爱任纽·艾布尔-艾伯斯费尔特(Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt)《人类行为的生物学》(The Biology of Human Behaviour)书中的佐证,都不能再怀疑某些人类反应确实是人类共有。历史学家往往缺乏这些约束。他们基本依靠传统和巧合留下的"过去的证据",包括法律实践、文学、艺术和宗教崇拜的文献。消失生活方式的见证,使人们特别关注人类的多变性。这不足为奇。大自然憎恶真空,人类的心灵也是如此。在没有证据的地方,想象力填补了空白,因此我们开始根据自己艺术中获得的印象来塑造过去时代的人物形象。伟大的人文主义者——比如约翰·赫伊津哈(Johan Huizinga)和恩斯特·罗伯特·库蒂乌斯(Ernst Robert Curtius)都警告我们,不要走这种心理捷径,我把它称为"观相谬误"(the physiognomic fallacy)。我必须承认,我自己的研究领域(艺术史)需要为诸多此类误解负责。艺术史常常声称,每个时期的风格可以而且必须被阐释为一种症候(symptom),用俗话说就是具体时代、具体民族精神的表达。所以,七十五年前,艺术史上的德国表现派(expressionism)倡导者威廉·沃林格(Wilhelm Worringer)在《哥特精神》(Der Geist der Gotik)一书中宣称:"对于艺术史来说,人本身和艺术本身一样不可能存在。这些都是意识形态上的偏见,使人类的心理状态陷入贫瘠。"因此,中世纪艺术品的装饰和织物风格让沃林格得出惊人的结论:"北欧人不喜静,这个民族的全部创造能力都用在无拘无束的运动理念上。"他显然没有问过自己,这个全体北欧人都有"多动症"的结论有没有旁证。扬·范艾克(Van Eycks)、扬·维米尔(Jan Vermeer)和卡斯帕·大卫·弗里德里希(Caspar David Friedrich)的艺术不见得能证明他的观点,毕竟这些人可能也是"北欧人"。第一眼用直觉做确认,再找支持第一眼直觉的所谓"证据",这样就形成了一个阐释学的怪圈,阐释退化成循环论证。因而,以某种风格呈现的空间被阐释为那个时期人们"看待"世界的方式,并理所当然认为这就是那个时期人们表现的特殊性——但没有人问,不懂透视法的人难道就不知道躲到柱子背后可以藏身吗?也没有人问,绘画中不讲究光影的中国人难道就不能在炎炎夏日躲到树荫下吗?我相信,诱使艺术史采纳文化相对论的谬误也发生在人文学科的其他领域。这是"默证"(ex silentio),认为过去的生活和思想只能表现出那些我们从艺术创作中已知的特征。一位古典语文学家曾经提出一个著名的观点——古希腊人一定是色盲,因为他们形容颜色的词汇太少。要是这样,我们也必须得出结论,我们也是色盲,因为我们语言中的颜色词汇比我们能感知的色调少得多。诚然,这个结论基于对语言性质的误解,因为语言如果要起到交流的作用,就必须有选择性。语言的这种选择性无疑给译者带来了巨大的困难,但我必须再次同意波普尔的观点,他警告我们,不要把"困难"和"不可能"混为一谈。不管用另一种语言来表达一个句子的意思有多难,也不管我们是否必须借助于注解和迂回的解释,意义总是可以被理解。为了"达",翻译可能会损失"信"和"雅"。其他时期和文明的伟大文学作品一定也面临着类似的困难。它们涉及的概念、人际关系、制度等,都需要不断加以解释。但是,我们不该就此将我们在外国文明的诗歌和散文中遭遇的世界等同于它们背后的日常现实。我们在文本中遇到的传统主题(topoi)、类型从未反映经验的无限多样性,只是反映了文学流派自己的传统。奥尔巴赫(Auerbach)的《模仿论》(Mimesis)告诉我们,新的表达手段完全可以接纳新的经验,但哪怕在新经验未曾进入文学的地方,我们也无权假定这些经验在日常生活中从未发生过。诚然,我们不能明确知晓这一点。显然,普鲁塔克的文本也依赖古代世界的传统和惯例,并留下了许多未解的问题,这些问题或许会引起现代精神分析学家的兴趣。歌德说:"他们都是人类。"这并非终极真理,而是一个假设。哪怕面对遥远的外国和年代,我们也一定会和那些与我们有几分相似的人们打交道——尽管这个假设偶尔经不起进一步的考验。我可以在此穿插一则小故事,它应该比冗长的方法论反思更能说清我的信念。我想到一次关于文艺复兴时期思想史的讨论,在那次讨论中,我被激怒了,说我们不应该把"文艺复兴时期的人"当作一个独立的"物种"。激怒之后,我说,那时候的人都喜欢在早上赖床。这是一个冒险的论断,但我的运气好得不得了,因为我能够在下一个场合告诉我的对手,达芬奇描述过托斯卡纳床架上的象征性雕刻,旨在警告懒汉不要在床上浪费太多时间:"特别是在早上,当一个人从睡梦中清醒,就应该准备好新的劳作。"我想说一个简单的道理。在谈论人的时候,不能忽视"老亚当"(Old Adam),那个坚持满足人类共有驱力的"老亚当"。诚然,各种文化在应对我们自然本能的咄咄逼人时,会产生无数的变化,但无论采用何种具体的解决方案,都无法想象在某种生活方式中,欲望满足和文化需求之间的张力不能得到表达。文学通常面对这些张力。想想堂吉诃德(Don Quixote)和桑丘·潘萨(Sancho Panza)的对比。一个人的头脑被他的文化理想改变,另一个人仍然是一个农民,知道自己想要什么,就像莫扎特《魔笛》(Magic Flute)中的塔米诺(Tamino)和帕帕盖诺(Papageno)一样。古代印度戏剧中也有类似的对比,一个人是讲梵语的高贵英雄,另一个人是"小丑"(Vidushaka)的喜剧人物,尽管后者属于婆罗门种姓,却操着一口古印度土语(Prakrit),而且总是放纵自己的食欲。因此,在谈到理解外国文化及其价值的困难时,我们决不能忽视这方面的重要差异。墨菲斯托(Mephistopheles)对浮士德(Faust)说:"最坏的伙伴会让你感到自己是个好人,这并非没有道理。"最坏的伙伴会让你觉得自己是"人上人"。因为说话的墨菲斯托是魔鬼,所以我们可以理解他的意思。在所有人的表皮下面,都有一层动物性的东西:
我们觉得自己如此野蛮,
如同五万头猪猡。然而,我们不应忘记,这种退化的时机也取决于特定的文明。有些文明禁止饮酒,他们不懂这种公开的放纵。另一方面,对歌德和他同时代人来说,也有更高尚的方式来释放文化约束中的自由:
大大小小都高兴地喊叫,
在这里做人是我的权利。"这里"当然是指城市以外的大自然,那里有一种自由。但这种解放的感觉仍然属于特定的文化。也许在卢梭(Rousseau)之前这种自由并不存在,尽管田园诗的传统提醒我们,牧羊人拥抱大自然的生活早就被渴望远离文明压力和忧虑的城镇居民理想化了。我们要相信席勒(Schiller)的话,只有在特殊的时刻才能抛开这种负担,他在《欢乐颂》(Ode to Joy)中写道:无情的时尚隔开了大家,靠你的魔力重新聚齐;在你温柔的羽翼之下,人人都彼此称为兄弟。

(钱春绮 译)席勒说的"时尚"(fashion/Mode),是"惯例"。换言之,这是和希腊人的"自然"(physis)相对立的命题。诗人说,摆脱了习俗的约束,所有人都一样。也许理性时代过度简化了这种对比,但正是由于这种崇高的简化,我们才有了人权和人道主义的概念。这种简化也反过来解释了"历史决定论"的回应,它不必等待黑格尔的到来。两百年后的今天,传统与自然的两极分化肯定不足以对文化生活的无限多样性做出公正评价。我们的生物遗传包含的外显性状少于可以在群体生活中发展或萎缩的性格。无论是在动物中还是在人类中,所有这些发展都不可逆。一些行为模式确实成为第二天性(second nature),并创造了某些人类类型,各有他们的心态、潜能和局限。对该复杂过程感兴趣的人文主义者不得不转向心理学,因为无论这门科学中存在多少流派和问题,它们都离不开亚历山大·蒲柏(Alexander Pope)的箴言:"要研究人类,就要研究大写的人。"诚然,既然心理学力求成为一门科学,它就不能屈从任何教条,甚至不能屈从人类统一性的教条,但我支持当代的文化相对论反对者。我和他们一样认为,我们必须从如下假设出发——在人类的精神世界中,确实存在着人文主义者可以思考的常量。当然,我们不能期望太高。也许你认为,所有常人共有的节奏感微不足道,但如果没有这种基础特性,我们就不会产生各种类型的舞蹈,也就没有精巧的节奏形式,它们在西方和印度的音乐中开花结果,而且在所有民族的诗歌中创造了奇迹。我相信,视觉艺术也以类似的方式建立在生物学基础上。我们都享受光芒和辉煌,它们让我们快乐。人是一种趋光性生物。如果人类畏光,像白蚁一样,那么人类就会一直避开光线。因此,光芒四射的壮丽与闪耀一直被视为世俗权力和宗教权力的特权,它可以打动人,也可以征服人。诚然,完全参考这些天生的积极反应来解释艺术的起源,完全是一种误导。只有满足与否定、满足的延迟与期望的超越之间的相互作用,才能产生我们称之为艺术的东西,而要实现这一点,就需要一个健全的传统。但是,这些结构和序列可能由这些元素的相互作用而产生,它们都在张力之内运作,而这些张力的能量来自人类普遍反应的原始极性。在任何社会群体中,每一种颜色、每一种声音,每一个词汇都有一种感情基调,决定了它在这个系统中的确切位置。显然,面对这些不同的系统,如果不经过移情作用,外人就无法理解,但很多证据表明,它们都有足够多的共同特征,使我们有理由能够理解。一般来说,每一种所谓的感官模式都会唤起其他感官的共鸣,这种对应关系有助于我们去理解。语言的普遍能力(诉诸"共鸣"的隐喻)一定基于这种天生的性情。这些见解早已在学者研究的经典文本中得到了阐述。我向你们推荐格林兄弟编纂的《德语词典》(Deutsches Wörterbuch),我有幸在这本词典中找到了通感(synaesthetic)的隐喻。我想用它来说明我对某些心理反应的普遍有效性的信念。我建议你们查阅这本词典中的"süss"(甜蜜)一词。该词条连同其派生词至少有七八列。我们知道,"süss"这个词最初并不表示一种味道,后来被应用于其他感官方式,比如"甜美的笑容"、"甜美的和声"、"甜美的梦乡"。这个词最初似乎指"触感柔和",是温和、愉悦的同义词——也就是说,它指向我所谓的"感觉的积极一极"。正因如此,这个词也表示生物上令人愉悦的味道。然而,这种狭义的含义只是与其他味道形成了对比,即苦味和酸味,而苦味和酸味又反过来指向更广泛的感觉。"süss"的一个衍生词是"süsslich"(大致相当于英语中的"syrupy","糖浆般甜腻")。于是,这个词有了贬义的内涵。自18世纪以来,这个词开始表达反感。因此,它有了"kitschig"的含义(大致意思是"腻味")。我们不再用这个词来认可我们的审美。毕竟,我们已然生活在一个对"媚俗"(kitschig/kitsch)广为恐惧的时代,它拥抱那些违背规则的艺术创作。1638年,西蒙·达赫(Simon Dach)创作了一首诗,这首诗的前两节很贴合这个情境,因为它会把我们带回日尔曼研究。这首诗的标题是《新郎在他心爱的新娘第一次拜访他的房子时对她说》:欢迎,欢迎,你是我的宝贝,你是我心中的慰藉。哦,你多么阳光,多么快乐。你的出现让灿烂的光辉照耀着这房子,你闪着金色光芒。

一切都在向你问好,与你欣然相见的每一块砖头,每一片瓦片,都向你微笑致意。你眼前的墙壁将很快变成黄金。

毫无疑问,训练有素的文学系学生能向我们解释这首诗与新婚颂诗(epithalamia)传统的关系,也能解释这首诗在西蒙·达赫作品中的地位。我们必须同意解构主义者的观点。我们要拒绝弗洛伊德主义者。"灿烂的光辉照耀着这房子"这句诗可能暗指"撩拨",这种阐释被让狂热的弗洛伊德主义者认为,这是新娘打破单身汉舒适生活模式后的焦虑症状。我们还要拒绝马克思主义者,他们会用正统的马克思主义看出新娘想卖掉房子的迹象("墙壁"将"变成黄金")。我们不需要任何人剥夺我们的信念,我们可以享受和理解这些精美的诗句,因为它们本来就等着被理解——尽管所谓的巴洛克时代的中产阶级文化与我们自己的生活方式有很大的不同。如果我们的想象力不能弥合这一差距,那么它还有什么用呢?确实,按照文化相对论者的说法,如果不从弗洛伊德主义或马克思主义的角度作出解释,这首诗就难以解读。如果这些障碍确实不可逾越,我们就不得不永远离开歌德"世界文学"(world literature)的梦想。但如果歌德在阅读荷马、莎士比亚、哈菲兹(Häfez)、迦梨陀娑(Kalidasa)和普鲁塔克之后并不笃信"他们都是人类",他就不可能创造出"世界文学"这个词汇。

Wednesday, September 7, 2022

Seriously Susan

 Sontag: Her Life

by Benjamin Moser
– What do we want from biography?
Facts, certainly. Names, dates, places. What happened. Some setting of the record straight.
– More than that.
To go back in time. To see the individual in their context.
– More than that.
For the act of reading to take on the intimacy of a meeting. For the page to become flesh.
– More than even that.
To go inside. To understand what made a person tick.
– What made Susan Sontag tick?
According to Benjamin Moser, an alcoholic mother. But there was also a dead father and a desert childhood – both senses. What made Susan tick might have been shame.
– Why ‘shame’?
Because she lied about her past. Because she was determined to leave it behind. Because she believed she could make herself into the person she wanted to be. Reality was disappointing. She preferred dreams. But she was not dreamy. Moser: ‘A belief in the reality of dreams had created Sontag and kept her going through a difficult life’. He notes the epigraph to her first novel, The Benefactor (1963) reads, ‘Je rêve donc je suis.’
– Tell me about the father.
Jack Rosenblatt. Born in New York in 1905. Died in China when Susan was five years old. The son of poor Jewish immigrants from Austrian-controlled Poland. Grew up in tenement housing. Ended up more than comfortably middle class. Homes in Tianjin, China (then the treaty port of Tientsin) and Great Neck, Long Island (the inspiration for Gatsby’s ‘West Egg’). First job: delivery boy at Julius Klugman’s Sons on West 38th Street, aged ten. Sent East to buy furs from Mongolian nomads, aged sixteen. Running his own import-export business, aged 25. To Susan, an unfathomable and exotic life. The template for a life that fell far from the tree. A hook on which to hang certain longings.
– Tell me about the mother.
Mildred Jacobson. Born in New Jersey in 1906. The daughter of middle-class Jewish immigrants from Russian-occupied Poland. Lost her mother, aged fourteen. Vivacious and extravagant with first husband, Jack. Vain and needy with second husband, Nat Sontag. Whole days spent in bed with vodka, masquerading as water, on the nightstand. Put on a good show when other people were around (done up like a movie star, airs and graces like a royal). To Susan, a stunted and incurious life. The template for a life concerned with appearances. A mirror in which to discover certain horrors.
– What idiosyncrasies of the mother were visited upon her daughters?
Didn’t tell her daughters their father had died until after the funeral. Didn’t tell her daughters the truth about his cause of death. Didn’t tell her daughters the whereabouts of his burial site. Didn’t tell her daughters about her remarriage until after the wedding. Expected her daughters to treat her like suitors. Susan: ‘She was “feminine” with me; I played the shy adoring boy with her’. Moser: Susan’s letters to her mother from college ‘read more like those of a concerned parent, or a passionate spouse, than those of a young daughter’.
– What were the daughters’ presiding memories of their mother?
For youngest daughter Judith, Mildred was a woman who preferred pretty lies to hard truths: calls her ‘the queen of denial’. For eldest daughter Susan, Mildred was a woman who was ice-cold unreachable: ‘I was (felt) profoundly neglected, ignored, unperceived as a child’. She told friends and lovers, ‘I had no mother.’
– How are we to understand this statement?
The same way Adrienne Rich understands Emily Dickinson’s famous statement, ‘I never had a mother’: ‘surely she meant in part that she felt herself deviant, set apart, from the kind of life her mother lived; that what most concerned her, her mother could not understand’.
– What specific idiosyncrasies of the eldest daughter were derived from the mother?
A tendency to pretention and secrecy. A fear of being alone.
– What specific idiosyncrasies of the eldest daughter were contrived in opposition to the mother?
An appetite for bizarre foods. A suspicion that sleep was a sign of weakness. A determination to see life’s purpose in terms of self-improvement.
Which brings me to an inevitable tension in any biography of Susan Sontag, including this one.
– Yes?
The biographer’s job is to explain by looking backwards. But Susan self-consciously willed herself into being by looking forwards.
– Tell me more.
Biographers seek what Sidney Lumet called ‘“rubber ducky” explanations’ of character: i.e. ‘Someone once took his rubber ducky away from him, and that’s why he’s a deranged killer’. But the subject of this biography was fundamentally at war with this understanding of what constitutes a self. Susan lived life, and conceived of it, in the future tense.
– Who were witnesses to, or recognised, a life lived in the future tense?
Walter Flegenheimer, childhood friend: ‘I knew she’d become famous’. Harriet Sohmers, first girlfriend: ‘You have a great destiny’. Eva Kollisch, friend and lover: ‘It took away some of the joy to be with someone who is always thinking of her epitaph’. Michael Krüger, German publisher: ‘She was not a woman with a past’. Yoram Kaniuk, Israeli novelist she admired: ‘Susan rejected her history’.
– What succession of acts, or pronouncements, prove a life conceived of in the future tense?
As a child she was ‘obsessed with longing to grow up’. At eleven she determined not to be ‘asthmatic, helpless, unpopular Sue Rosenblatt’ anymore (and succeeded). At fourteen she primped in her journal for posterity. At fifteen she dreamed of moving to New York and writing for the Partisan Review (and succeeded). At 26 she described herself as ‘only the hope of a self’. At 27 she claimed she had ‘willed’ her relationships with her professor Philip Rieff and artist María Irene Fornés. At 66, she called an attempt to write her biography ‘a futile or unserious enterprise’ because her life, she felt, was far from over. At 71, on her deathbed, she refused to farewell friends and family.
– What evidence is there in the writing, fiction and nonfiction, to prove a life lived, or conceived of, in the future tense?
It’s no accident Susan’s early fictions take from the nouveau roman a refusal to provide psychological justification for their characters’ behaviour. It’s no accident that Susan celebrated works like Godard’s Vivre Sa Vie, which rejects causality by showing ‘that something happened, not why it happened’. It’s no accident that Maryna Zalenska, protagonist of Susan’s final novel In America (1999), is an actress who lacks ‘an essence’ and possesses a ‘penchant for exertion’. Susan’s journals are brimming with what she calls, in an essay on Cesare Pavese’s diaries, ‘prospective thinking’: I want to [‘live in an intellectual atmosphere’, ‘sleep with many people’, ‘write like Djuna Barnes’, etc.]’. Lists of books to read and vocabulary to deploy at a later date abound. As son David Rieff said, her journals are the manual of a person who ‘self-consciously and determinedly went about creating the self she wanted to be’.
The point being there is something incongruous about a biography that looks for answers in the past of a person who, herself, believed she was always in a state of becoming.
– Should the views of the subject of a biography override the expectations readers have of biographies?
The author of this biography has let an opportunity go begging: to challenge what Sainte-Beuve called the ‘botanical’ approach – i.e. the genre’s habit of beginning with the father, the mother, often going even further back. Susan did not believe in roots of the inherited kind. She told Jonathan Cott in 1978: ‘My sense of things is that I’ve come very far. And it’s the distance I have travelled from my origins that pleases me. I’ve spent my whole life getting away. I think of myself as self-created. I like the fact that I did it myself’.
– Does Moser suggest that Susan’s career as a writer has roots of the inherited kind?
Moser admits: ‘Nothing in her family or education had given her any orientation in that world’. She came from nowhere. Or as Lillian Ross is said to have put it, far less kindly: she was a ‘Nobody’.
– Why did a ‘nobody’ from Tucson, Arizona dream of becoming, of all things, a writer?
Picture it: the concrete slab house, four tiny rooms, the dirt road, rattlesnakes … But she wasn’t from Tucson. There were eight different addresses in four different states before that. And one house after that: a stucco bungalow in the flatlands of suburban Los Angeles.
– But why a writer?
Precocity. Ample evidence for it. Produced her own newspaper – the Cactus Press – aged twelve. Admitted to UCLA Berkeley aged fourteen. Her professors at the University of Chicago, including the literary critic Kenneth Burke, said she was – in the words of Robert Boyers – ‘the most brilliant student they had ever met. Precociously, obviously, unmistakably brilliant. And she had read more than any other seventeen-year-old they had ever met’.
– Precocity does not explain an orientation towards literature.
Susan gave a talk about precocity two years before she died. ‘For the precocious,’ she said, ‘vocations seem to emerge without encouragement’. Her evidence was ex-lover, Jasper Johns. She asked him once why he had decided, aged six, to become a painter. He replied, ‘I must have seen a box of crayons.’
By this logic, books made Susan a writer. But there were other reasons. She would later say that reading had afforded her ‘relief from the tiresome duties of being a child’ and had the power to liberate a person from the ‘prison of national vanity, of philistinism, of compulsory provincialism’.
– Which books made Susan a writer?
First book read: Eve Curie’s 1937 biography of her mother Marie Curie. Made her, at seven or eight years old, ‘want to be a biochemist and win the Nobel Prize’. The latter ambition endured. Became depressed when J. M. Coetzee won the prize in 2003. (No chance she, another English-language writer, would win anytime soon.) Other books read: what Clive James termed ‘sludge fiction’ – i.e. what lower-middle class kids read because their parents don’t put the right books into their hands. (Not a problem for Susan’s son, David who was given Homer, Candide and Gulliver’s Travels at four.) Young Clive read Biggles; young Susan read the swashbuckling tales of Richard Halliburton. Susan: ‘Halliburton was my first vision of what I thought had to be the most privileged of lives, that of a writer: a life of endless curiosity and energy and countless enthusiasms.’ It took a teacher to suggest to both writers that the habit of reading wasn’t enough, that there were harder and more interesting books that deserved their attention.
– Who was that teacher for Susan?
‘Obscure, eccentric’ Mr Starkie from the Arizona Sunshine School.
– Which books did Mr Starkie recommend?
Serious books from Central Europe. Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther. Theodor Storm’s Immensee. He loaned Susan his own tattered copies. They would ‘set the standard for what is exalted and intense’ for the rest of her life. At sixteen, she paid a visit to Thomas Mann after reading The Magic Mountain. At seventeen, she stole a copy of Dr Faustus from the Pickwick Bookshop in Hollywood. She would make a career of introducing serious Central European writers to Anglophone readers. Edmund White says she was the first to extol the virtues of Elias Canetti, W. G. Sebald and Danilo Kiš. The taste for Central European seriousness would never waver. The demeanour of seriousness would never slip. Seriousness became her calling card. Like literature, seriousness ‘drove a knife’ into her past and ‘warded off the drivel’ in the present.
– Tell me more about her seriousness.
She took subjects like pornography and science fiction movies seriously. She did not smile readily for men or cameras. She did not do irony or self-deprecation. She knew nothing of star signs. She was, Moser says, ‘humourless and excessively earnest.’ He understands Susan’s seriousness as a form of camp, which seems mistaken. Susan in ‘Notes on “Camp”’: ‘Camp sees everything in quotation marks. It’s not a lamp, but a “lamp”; not a woman, but a “woman”’. But Susan’s seriousness was not ‘seriousness’. Susan in an early draft of ‘The Aesthetics of Silence’: seriousness meant being ‘prepared to act on it, put your body on the line, put your money where your mouth is’. Susan feared that ‘seriousness itself was in the early stages of losing credibility in the culture at large’ in the 1960s. She knew that ‘the very idea of the serious (and the honourable) seemed quaint, “unrealistic,” to most people’ by the 1990s.
– Why did a woman who believed in putting one’s body on the line dream of becoming, of all things, a critic?
Susan did not dream of becoming a critic. She dreamed of becoming a novelist. She considered the fact that her essays were valued more than her fiction as ‘a species of neglect’.
– And should Susan’s essays be valued more than her fiction?
There is what we can do, and then there is what we wish for. As the verbose John Barth once said of his urge to write short stories, ‘The clown comes to want to play Hamlet, and vice versa; the long-distance runner itches to sprint’.
– But why a critic?
A habit, formed early, of turning to art in order to escape ‘the cultural desert of home’. An avidity to ‘see more, to hear more, to feel more’. A desire to impress people by having strong opinions. A love of quotation, aphorism and namedropping. An inclination to instruct bordering on imperiousness. A sense that she yearned to become ‘that persona, a writer’ but had nothing to say. If there is an object, then a critic always has something to say.
Or perhaps Susan became a critic because she met a man at a party.
– Which party?
A party hosted by Roger Straus – of Farrar, Straus and Giroux – at his townhouse on the Upper East Side in 1962.
– Which man?
William Phillips, co-editor of the Partisan Review.
– How did the conversation with William Philips proceed?
SS: How does one get to write for your magazine?
WP: You ask.
SS: I’m asking.
– Why did she ask?
An early brush with the Partisan Review at a Hollywood newsstand, aged fifteen. She found the magazine ‘completely incomprehensible’ but was determined to ‘crack the code’. It instantiated her fantasies of reinvention: ‘My greatest dream was to grow up and come to New York and write for Partisan Review and be read by 5,000 people’.
– What happened after she asked?
One short review of an Isaac Bashevis Singer book later and she was sharing equal billing with Gore Vidal, Norman Mailer, Adrienne Rich and Robert Lowell on the cover of the inaugural New York Review of Books. Two years later she was dining at Elaine’s with Leonard Bernstein, Richard Avedon, William Styron, Sybil Burton, and Jacqueline Kennedy. Moser: ‘It was the White House and Fifth Avenue, Hollywood and Vogue, the New York Philharmonic and the Pulitzer Prize: as glitzy a circle as existed in the United States, and indeed the world. It was one Sontag would inhabit for the rest of her life.’
– Inconceivable that writing criticism could land you at such a table.
Moser concedes its prima facie preposterousness: ‘reviews of Simone Weil were not the stuff of which celebrities were made’. He says numerous friends were ‘fascinated’ and ‘haunted’ by her fame ‘because it was so unprecedented’. Stephen Koch, for instance, couldn’t understand ‘why and how Susan became as famous as she did, and how she sustained that fame for decades, even through her most reader-unfriendly phases’.
– The twentieth century was the only century in history when being reader-unfriendly was a short-cut to literary fame.
Certainly, Susan endorsed difficulty: ‘We should not expect art to entertain or divert any more. At least not high art.’
– Does Moser explain exactly why Susan got to be so famous?
She was charismatic without trying. She was beautiful without effort. She had energy to burn, and even then she took amphetamines to eliminate the need to sleep. In the early years especially she would read and write and view things around the clock, only getting up, Moser says, ‘to pee or to empty the ashtray, or get her next coffee’. She was, in her own words, ‘violently, naively ambitious’.
– That doesn’t explain how a critic got to be so famous.
She wrote the first truly contemporary criticism. She was one of the first to bridge the divide between high and popular culture: ‘just because I love Dostoevsky doesn’t mean that I can’t love Bruce Springsteen’. She had the knack of arresting juxtapositions: ‘the feeling (or sensation) given off by a Rauschenberg painting might be like that of a song by the Supremes’. She had the knack of being epigrammatic: ‘Religion is probably, after sex, the second oldest resource which human beings have available to them for blowing their minds’. She wrote appreciatively: as she puts it in the note to Against Interpretation, hers was a criticism of ‘passionate partiality’.
– Nor does that.
Her criticism was championed. Roger Straus published her essays as collections, he paid her generous advances, he kept all her books in print during her lifetime. She also had the talent – like Woody Allen’s Zelig 
– She literally appears in Zelig.
…to be in the right place at the right time: Warhol’s Factory in the 1960s, Vietnam in the 1970s, Berlin in the 1980s, Sarajevo in the 1990s.
– Why did Susan think she became a famous literary critic?
‘You find some limb, and you go out on it’.
– Why did her contemporaries think she became a famous literary critic?
Norman Podhoretz explained it in his 1967 memoir, Making It: ‘Her talent explains the rise itself, but the rapidity with which it was accomplished must be attributed to the coincidental availability of a vacant position in the culture. That position was Dark Lady of American Letters, a position that had originally been carved out by Mary McCarthy in the thirties and forties. But Miss McCarthy no longer occupied it, having recently been promoted to the more dignified status of Grande Dame as a reward for her long years of brilliant service.’ She was, in other words, an exceptional woman.
– There was room for only one woman?
Elaine Reuben explained it in a 1972 journal article: ‘For a woman below the Grande Dame it would seem there has been only one female role in the (male) world of culture, and the nature of that role is such that there can be only one Dark Lady per party. Or even per generation.’
– And do you think there was room for only one woman?
That is how patriarchal culture perpetuates itself. Let a woman in every now and then and you get to call it a meritocracy.
– And did Susan think there was room for only one woman?
She understood the inequalities underpinning the exceptional woman. See, for example, her 1973 essay, ‘The Third World of Women’: ‘Every liberal grouping (whether political, professional or artistic) needs its token woman. Her good fortune is like the good fortune of a few blacks in a liberal but still racist society. Any already liberated woman who complacently accepts her privileged situation participates in the oppression of other women.’ But she also understood it was not in her best interests, as an exceptional woman, to fight for flatter structures. See, for example, her 1969 essay ‘Trip to Hanoi’: ‘Of course, I could live in Vietnam, or an ethical society like this one – but not without the loss of a big part of myself. Though I believe incorporation into such a society will greatly improve the lives of most people in the world (and therefore support the advent of such societies), I imagine it will in many ways impoverish mine’.
Nevertheless, Moser draws the wrong conclusion about Susan’s feminism.
– What conclusion is that?
He claims she was a fair-weather feminist. That she shunned feminism’s imperatives the second they became unfashionable. That she mothballed three key essays on feminism from the early-1970s. That she declined invitations to be included in anthologies of women writers. That she, who had the power to make writers famous, celebrated mainly men.
– Why is Moser wrong?
Because he omits certain facts. For example, he barely mentions her overtly feminist play Alice in Bed (1991), written when the backlash was in full swing. And because he presupposes feminism must look a certain way. Susan was no Adrienne Rich: she didn’t march arm-in-arm with other women in the streets or insist on sharing literary prizes with them as a protest against patriarchal competition. But a distaste for the collective does not necessarily entail a repudiation of feminism. Demanding to be taken seriously as an intellectual was, for a woman in the twentieth century, a feminist act. Being seen to demand to be taken seriously as an intellectual made her a feminist role model: ‘If Sontag had not had a lineage when she was a young woman,’ writes Camille Paglia, ‘she had come to represent a lineage for the younger generation, who aspired to emulate her’.
– Why does Moser get it wrong?
As Victoria Glendinning once explained, ‘it’s no good finding all sorts of strangenesses and curiosities in our subject if in fact a lot of people were feeling like that at the same time’. A biographer must also be a social historian, and it turns out many women writers did feel like Susan when it came to feminism, including her heroes Hannah Arendt and Elizabeth Hardwick. But Moser sometimes doesn’t use context to tenderise his portrait of Susan, leading to moral judgements that temper our faith in him.
– What is another example of a moral judgement that leads to a loss of faith in him?
His condemnation of Susan for not coming out in her lifetime. It is a presentist argument, which Gillian Beer defines as the error of taking ‘now as the source of authority, the only real place’. Moser’s praise for Susan’s visits to besieged Sarajevo, likewise, is premised upon a peculiarly contemporary thought: that we should become personally involved in events halfway across the globe that we do not have any connection to. In short, readers of biography do not need to be told it was wrong that Susan didn’t come out, or right that she rushed to Sarajevo. Readers of biography need to understand why Susan took strong stands on issues that she had no clear part in and was inclined to abstain from issues that she did.
– Should a biographer stifle his own ideological commitments, or those of his generation, when and where they clash with his subject’s?
A biographer should see such moments as an opportunity to ponder what startling revelation about his subject or her context that he might notice where there is such a clash.
– And what startling revelation about Susan is there in all of this?
That she was a woman who did not find empowerment in leaning in to any of the social identities she had to choose from: woman, queer, Jew. She preferred to escape from them. And there was a label that allowed escape from them: ‘writer’. Wrote Susan in her journal in 1959: ‘My desire to write is connected with my homosexuality. I need the identity as a weapon, to match the weapon that society has against me.’ This is not a million miles from Charlotte Brontë in 1849 writing to her publisher, ‘I am neither a man nor a woman but an author’. A writer might write about AIDS but never feel the need to come out. A writer might write about cancer but never feel the need to say she had it. It is this urge to claim the label ‘writer’ that even goes some way to explaining how awful she was.
– Tell me more.
She believed ‘good writers are roaring egotists, even to the point of fatuity’. She believed she would never be one until she stopped wanting to be ‘good, liked, etc.’ and allowed herself ‘real arrogance, real selfishness’. This is the message of Alice in Bed: that, unlike her famous writer-brothers William and Henry, Alice James was a ‘career invalid’ because she failed to muster ‘the egocentricity and aggressiveness and the indifference to self that a large creative gift requires in order to flourish’. Think of the models for literary success of her time: Saul Bellow (blackballed Susan for a Macarthur Grant), Norman Mailer (called her a ‘lady writer’), Gore Vidal (told her, after struggling through The Volcano Lover, never to write fiction again). Hard for her not to think that being awful was the path to greatness. It is almost a credit to her that other people’s suffering, even in the abstract, became a preoccupation of her writing later in life.
– What was the nature of Susan’s awfulness?
She would leave you to foot the bill for a sumptuous multicourse caviar dinner if you stood her up for dinner. She would betray her friends by sleeping with their partners. She would be treacherous with other people’s secrets. She would make promises she never intended to keep. She would spread gossip about the sexual lives of her friends and acquaintances. She would reward largesse with condescension. She would renege on promises not to use material. She would lift sentences from other people’s work without conscience. She would shine her sun on you and then abandon you. This became a recurring pattern in later life: taking an emerging someone under her wing and then, suddenly and with no explanation, dropping them completely. She was grandiose, insensitive, dishonest, abusive. And it all got worse the older and more affluent Susan became. Joan Acocella says spending time with Susan was ‘like being in a cave with a dragon.’
– How does Moser explain Susan’s awfulness?
Daughter of an alcoholic (fears of abandonment). Overzealous amphetamine use (Cluster B personality disorder). Sense of invulnerability due to beating cancer (killed off the critical inner voice). An increasingly lavish lifestyle (limos, first-class tickets, private chefs, penthouse in Chelsea, holiday homes in the Hudson and the Seine). But the problem is that the worse Susan gets, the less Moser seems to want to get inside. ‘By what art,’ writes the biographer Lytton Strachey in his Elizabeth and Essex, ‘are we to worm our way into those strange spirits? Those even stranger bodies?’ Moser does not worm.
– Say more.
The biographer’s problem is the sculptor’s: how to bring back the dead. Language and stone must somehow make the subject live. The solution for biography, Janet Malcolm says, is to ‘rush massive transfusions of quotation to the scene’. Moser does this: the biography is bursting with the testimony of Susan’s associates. But the effect is distance and a kind of premature rigor mortis. Like the majority of her friends yet without their justifications, he withdraws from her. Throughout the second half of the book we stand on the outside looking on, not in. She becomes object. The butt of multiple gruesome anecdotes. The reader’s sympathies start to lie elsewhere. Moser’s loyalty appears to be with the living who have agreed to talk to him and not the dead who he has been charged to animate. We are left with the very thing we most wanted exorcised: the diva.

Works Cited

James Atlas, ‘Como Conversazione: On Literary Biography’, The Paris Review 151 (Summer 1999).
Gillian Beer, Arguing with the Past: Essays in Narrative from Woolf to Sidney (1989).
Jonathan Cott, Susan Sontag: The Complete Rolling Stone Interview (2013).
William Hemecker and Edward Saunders (eds), Biography in Theory (2017).
Sidney Lumet, Making Movies (1995).
Janet Malcolm, ‘A House of One’s Own’ (1995).
Andrew O’Hagan, ‘Not Enough Delilahs’. London Review of Books (June 2019).
Camille Paglia, ‘Sontag, Bloody Sontag’ (1994).
Jay Parini, Empires of Self: A Life of Gore Vidal (2009).
Norman Podhoretz, Making It (1967).
Elaine Reuben, ‘Can a Young Girl from a Small Mining Town Find Happiness Writing Criticism for the New York Review of Books?’ College English (October 1972).
Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (1976).
Daniel Schreiber. Susan Sontag: A Biography, Trans. David Dollenmayer (2014).
Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (1966).
–––, Alice in Bed (1991)
–––, ‘The Artist as Exemplary Sufferer’ (1962).
–––, ‘At the Same Time’ (2004).
–––,The Benefactor (1963).
–––, ‘Godard’s Vivre Sa Vie’ (1966).
–––, ‘Homage to Halliburton’ (2001).
–––,In America (1999).
–––, ‘Literature is Freedom’ (2003).
–––, ‘Notes on “Camp”’ (1964).
–––, ‘Pilgrimage’ (1987).
–––, ‘Precocity’ (2002).
–––,Reborn: Journals and Notebooks, 1947-1963 (2008).
–––, ‘The Third World of Women’ (1973).
–––, ‘Thirty Years Later …’ (1996).
–––, ‘Trip to Hanoi’ (1969).
Virginia Woolf. ‘The Art of Biography’ (1939).
–––, ‘The New Biography’ (1927).

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