Tuesday, February 22, 2022

他的一生,是觀看的

他的一生,是觀看的

 

文 靖

 

 

 

 

「六一」那天,何老輕輕的走了。

他把自己活成了一首詩,揮一揮衣袖,變成一朵無聲的雲彩。

—文靖

 

 

 

《上班記》十幾年前就寫好了,因為聊的時候都混在一起,和《上學記》幾乎同時完成,最多只差了半年。何老囑我先別發表,「因為有的人還活着,說了會惹麻煩」。的確,《上學記》給他惹了一些麻煩,某甲、某乙不依不饒。何老天生從來就不喜歡與人爭,聽了只是點點腦袋,用一種「我也可以理解」的語氣,說:「馮友蘭的姑娘有不同的意見,不過……」不過,從來他沒有公開回應,就算別人敲鑼打鼓吵翻天,他也任他們說。

 

這就是何老,一位最謙和的老人,他有他的堅定。一生遠離政治、遠離紛爭、遠離一切世俗功利,他只躲在自己的書房裏,做份內的事,讀自己感興趣的書。所以,他永遠都不會被外面的世界亂了心性,正如網友說的那樣:「他如同一個小孩看街景一般,這個街景是喧鬧的、醜惡的,而他是一個安靜的孩子,只是隔着自家的玻璃窗看兩眼。這個狀態是他一生面對時變世變的態度,始終如一,所以可愛,所以難得。也正因為此,幾十年間的世態浮沉在他眼中就像一個魚缸,金魚海藻一目了然。」

 

我很喜歡這段話。所有我感受到的美好,你們也都感受到了,你們都是解讀密碼的精靈。他用一生默默堅守着的那份美好,終於蕩漾開來,濺起了更多的漣漪。

 

 

我不是一個建功立業的人,一生滿足於旁觀者的角色,不過是浮生中一個匆匆的過客。這就像演戲一樣,何必人人都上臺表演,做個觀眾不也很好?正如《浮士德》中燈塔守望者一邊唱一邊說的兩句話:“To see I was born, to look is my call.”(「我的一生就是來觀看的。」)

 

如果能夠做一個純粹的觀者,能夠在思想裏找到安慰,我以為,就足夠了。

 

「大時代中的小人物」是何老對自己的定位,但我想說:那個洶湧、兇險的大時代從來沒有摧毀他,他的內心始終都在追求崇高,是大時代在這「小人物」前敗下陣來。它,配不上他。

 

 

 

1

 

 

關於這兩本書的緣起,常有人問,說了你們也不會信的。

 

2001年我還在讀研究生,一個炎炎夏日的下午,騎輛二手自行車晃到了照瀾院。那是片生活區,就在清華「二校門」的南邊,銀行、飯館、超市、書店,還有各種修理,面積不大,啥都有。再往南是教師住宿區、清華附小,梁思成、林徽因等等住過的小洋樓就在那邊,很漂亮。那天我去照瀾院郵局,好像是投稿。因為我總有一點心病,以為滿懷虔敬送出去的才最保險,隨便扔到郵筒裏的都不會被刊用。可巧呢,碰見了何先生。

 

那時候何先生已經不教書了,偶爾做一次講座,我慕名去聽過。講的甚麼全然記不得,大概是「十七、十八世紀以來……」他最常常講那部分了,而且我覺得,他一生的精神就源自那裏。何先生屬於老派的那種講法,用今天「張牙舞爪」的標準,未必精彩。他的聲音不高,也不搖頭晃腦,不屬於特煽惑的那種,但一字一句都很有條理。從來沒有一句話翻來覆去說好幾遍,那樣的人很多,一般都是因為腦子趕不上嘴。何老不介, 他從來不在別人的耳朵裏打草稿。這樣的老先生,學問好,人也和善,絕對不會為難學生,很阿彌陀佛的。

 

那天下午,何先生也在郵局,正全神貫注的黏一個信封。他幹甚麼都認真,樣子可愛極了。忽然我就想嚇他一下!猜他的耳音不好,或者好不好的都沒所謂,反正我就想嚇他。學生要頑皮,是誰也攔不住的。幾步上前,對着他的耳朵大喊:

 

「何先生好!!!」

 

他怔住了,看來真的被嚇了一跳,大概以為我要搶他的膠水。抬起頭,從老花鏡的上邊定神看了看,確定只是個不認識的學生,趕緊點點頭,說:「哦─,你好、你好。」那一刻,他也是認真的。

 

我見過很多老人,有的越活越囂張,就像一株會移動的仙人掌,全人類都欠揍一樣。有的越活越精明,有的越活越糊塗,有的越來越好為人師,有的越來越冷漠,把自己變成了沙漠裏的胡楊。但是何老,把自己活成了老神仙。他的內心是充盈、飽滿的,卻從不事張揚。他不會打擾任何人的,跟誰他也不較勁。他有一種天真,而所有的「天真」都是一輩子修成的正果。

 

那天我本無聊。自從唸了哲學,經常我會處在一種無聊的狀態,像一顆紮不下根的蒲公英。我把我的感受寫成詩,但我懷疑那些郵筒其實是粉碎機,把我的句子都吃掉了。

 

那天的我照例無聊,因為邂逅了何先生,還嚇了他,一瞬之後的心情大好。他的那種不緊不慢、不慌張,和我周遭的一切都不一樣。世界像沒頭蒼蠅似的緊忙活,他有他的鎮定,用一種「你不煩我、我不煩你」的方式去活。溫和的霸氣,最溫和、也最霸氣,這一點我特別欣賞。但我還做不到,於是,他在我心裏就變得不可磨滅了。等又過了些年,在我更加迷惑、沮喪、更找不到北的時候,就又想起了何先生,以及照瀾院的那個下午。

 

一切都是上帝的安排吧,牧師不老那麼說:誰把誰送到誰的近前。

 

我願變成那樣的人。這次我已經準備好了,我願去聆聽、我願去修行。在他的故事裏,我登上了我的方舟。

 

 

唉,說了你們也不信,因為它聽起來毫無意義。

 

但其實,所謂「意義」都是後添的。包括歷史上的大事件,幾乎所有的緣由都亂成一團。只不過那些有話語權的人,為了自詡,或者痛打落水狗,才事後扒拉扒拉,挑一個最耳順的理由說給你聽─然後,你就信了。因為你希望歷史是邏輯的,揚善懲惡、圓滿的,所以你就好糊弄。曾經我在廣播電臺做嘉賓,一個不停插播天氣、主要給出租車司機聽的欄目。當被問起《上學記》的機緣,我講了那次夏天的邂逅,真自討沒趣。因為他們根本不以為然,才不要聽甚麼「膠水」、「信封」之類。他們需要一個硬邦邦的,扔到地上能聽見響兒,有着歷史感、道義感的理由,一個可以高舉的「大拳頭」。他們需要「意義」,那種有勁兒的東西,用以針砭時弊、批判現實。

 

我編不出來。

 

只能說,那是一種直覺,我樂意。何以我的感受就那麼不值錢,非得捨近求遠,在歷史的長河中撈一個甚麼甚麼?還必得深刻、有啟發性。嘿,我不也萬物之靈?

 

何老有一種高尚,是無欲無求之後的高尚。他有一種智慧,是捫心自問之後的智慧。這是歲月打磨出來的,卻在瞬息之間就能感覺到的「真」。所以,雖然我和他的差距那麼遠,他的學養、他的經歷,我都攀不上。但總覺得很近、很親切,那是一種心靈的距離。拋開一切浮華、喧囂,我不要一切花衣裳,皇帝老子的話我都不想聽。我只想搬個小板凳坐在他邊上,這不就是最充分的理由?

 

至於何先生,他家的大門向所有人敞開,甚麼時候打擾都歡迎。他就像個鐘擺,奉茶一杯,到點兒開講。

 

 

2

 

 

書像一面鏡子,你心裏有甚麼,就會尋找甚麼、看到甚麼——其實,你看到的是你自己。「一言以蔽之」太武斷了,若一定要用幾句話說一本書,我也未必能說得更好,只能代表我自己。

 

在我看來,《上學記》是一本談「幸福」的書,難以忘懷的美好。在「萬惡」的舊社會,生活困頓、戰火連天,對政府透頂失望。但有一批最優秀、最漂亮的年輕人,在簡陋的教室裏,聽滿腦子學問、半肚子牢騷的先生論古今。從未放棄,而且「正因為打仗,所以好像直覺地、模糊地,可是又非常肯定地認為:戰爭一定會勝利,勝利以後一定會是一個非常美好的世界,一定能過上非常美好的生活。」正是那份遙遠的、模糊的,卻又十分肯定的幸福感,讓今天焦躁的我們羨慕不已。

 

而它的續篇《上班記》講的是「荒誕」,人間「大不幸」。春風得意的新社會,自信滿滿、幹勁十足。但在理想主義旗幟下,以革命的名義,狂颳「瞎指揮風」(毛語)。一忽兒這樣、一忽兒那樣,做盡了荒唐。深深淺淺的,它釋放了人性最卑劣的惡,無辜的人死去,真誠的人不得活。

 

這段離我不十分遙遠,尚屬於「活人」的歷史,經常也聽老人們講。很多事不是說說就能了的,而是扎在了他們的肉上,家家都有掩不住的傷心史。掠奪,「共產風」之下的掠奪,幾代人的財富忽然就歸零了,重新洗牌。天天、天天政治學習,一遍、一遍又一遍的彙報思想,不問就裏表忠誠。於是,屬於「真」的越來越少,最終都變成了虛偽,各個都猴兒精了。「覺悟」有先有後,浮誇、造假的人被大大獎勵,忠於良心、講真話的被打入另冊。人禍終於造就了「天災」,魯迅說「吃人」只是比喻,卻在所謂的「災荒年」屢屢發生。好不容易緩和了幾年,卻是新一波、又一波的瞎折騰。「忠字舞」把人都跳傻了,沒有世外桃源,沒地方可以躲。如果你不選擇做一個惡人,就得活在「老實交代」的恐懼中。

 

和別人一樣,何老也講苦難、饑餓,講不公,但他總用淡淡、淡淡的語氣,更多的是反思。所以在他的敘述中,你只能讀到淡淡的悲傷,然後又忍不住要笑。包括以後的人看這段歷史,它既是殘酷的,也是滑稽的。大幹了那麼多年,「甚至吃一塊豆腐還要限量」?在「革命」的、「理想」的名義下,處處是荒唐。可以說,建政將近三十年革命不斷,卻是一場場淌着人血的荒誕劇。徹徹底底與願違,完全不是料想中的「天堂」,而是人間地獄、「修羅場」。那麼,當時代碾過每一個人,何以堅持你的底線?何以選擇自己的路,何以解脫?

 

 

走訪何老之前,我還是個「小紅粉」,很小很小,自己都沒感覺。因為很多東西天天灌,二十幾年後,它必然進入了身體,成為你的一部分。

 

比如,我也學了很多年的音樂,程度不算低。但在我琴弦上,門德爾松的e小調沒有雍容華貴,而多了一點兒殺氣騰騰的革命腔,以及腰鼓、紅綢的「村氣」。沒辦法,這才是你耳濡目染、浸到骨子裏的東西,很難改變。曾經我給何老拉過一次琴,以為他會很開心。結果,當天晚上他就進了校醫院,因為胸口疼,我總以為和我不無關係。

 

再比如語言。永遠我都缺少真正的優雅,沒有細流般的平和、不能夠溫柔,而總硬鏘鏘的,就像《新聞聯播》,老那麼有戰鬥性。它是毛時代遺留下來的、烙在民族性裏的軟特徵,不經意間代代傳。現如今,長袍馬褂沒人穿了,拱手、作揖也要滅絕了─那些被割裂的傳統,已經被徹底砸爛了太多年,硬要斂吧斂吧往回撿,總覺得假模假式。總之,恢復舊時代的傳統是一件很難的事。但,至少在看不到邊的n多年裏,哪怕你站在反方,毛時代的影響都不會徹底消失,一張嘴就露餡兒了。

 

那時候的我剛上班,剛從「象牙塔」裏走出來,忽然就趕上了單位的一次革命。簡言之,就是一場自下而上的民主運動,在紙媒、知識階層內引起了轟動。雖然我也位列「群眾」,但對於這事的開頭、結果,以及背後的那個整體,總有點「大吃一驚」的感覺。因為我們自小受了很多年的教育,都是服從這個、服從那個。更高一層的人更智慧,最高的就是太陽,永遠放光芒。為了追求一個人類的甚麼甚麼宏遠目標,你要忽略自己、成全高邈。「為……偉大理想奮鬥終身」,你要去「奉獻」,犧牲個人而讓幹嘛幹嘛。因為你是渺小的,你得聽話。

 

忽然有一天,你發現,那些都是虛、妄。

 

不要說那些最高的人,就是離你最近、只高一點點的人,原來都是有私心的。嘴裏說着振振有詞的漂亮話,心裏不定打着甚麼小算盤,甚至是陰溝裏的腌臢。等你終於發現了這一點,它和你一直以為的不一樣,就會對周遭的一切產生普遍的懷疑。那些看起來有雄心、有抱負的人,那些慈愛、慈祥的,讓你忍不住交心的人,在他轉過去的時候,下一秒又變成怎麼樣的一張臉?從來我都沒經過那樣的訓練,分不清呢,到底哪個是真的,哪些是屁話?到底誰才可以信賴?

 

所有的烏托邦都有一個假設:每個人都像天使一樣,或者植物一樣的心無雜念。沒有私心就沒有「惡」,這是最起碼的。如果不僅僅是活着,還要完成人類的一個這樣、那樣的共同理想,就得再加一條:絕對忠誠。但是,你忽然發現人心的不可測。那個完美的終極理想,就算每經一道手只打了九折,0.9×0.9×0.9×……×0.9,傳到你手裏的時候,也所剩無幾了。

 

我們不是天使,也不是白菜,不可能沒有私心。我們不是螞蟻,不是蜜蜂,它們可以做到百分之百的忠誠,甚至犧牲了「性」以成就總體,早就實現了「共產主義」。但我們是人呢,勉強去做螞蟻、蜜蜂,「無私」最後就變成了「無恥」。所謂的「忠誠」都只停在嘴上,在一個巨大的高帽子下,人人掛着一張假臉,最終成就的都是兩面派。一張人類最宏偉的藍圖,近看佈滿了蛆蟲,細細碎碎的全都是欺騙。被壓抑的私欲從沒停止過橫流,無恥之徒在狂歡。

 

等你發現了這一切,就覺得:太陽每天都從東方升起,怎麼忽然,就沒了?你以為是花崗岩的,轟然坍塌碎了一地,只剩下升騰的齏粉、你驚愕的臉。

 

 

我也後知後覺,屬遲鈍的那一類。原本讀的工科,但一直以為,只有一樣技術值得追求:如何把核彈頭、可樂瓶子還原成空氣、土壤和水。現代化,最終就是一個垃圾場。不想跟他們一起禍害地球,我就賴在校園裏不走了,改學文。而且是哲學,一門高處不勝寒的學科、萬種學問的媽,幾乎沒有任何前途,所以也沒甚麼人讀。我還挺得意的,以為自己快成仙了。卻發現,搞哲學的也不盡是聰明人,有的很俗氣、有的很愚蠢,甚至更愚蠢。後來總算畢業了,決定不問就裏隨一回大溜,別抬頭。結果就像高臺跳水,終於鼓足了勇氣,卻一頭栽到了水泥地上。

 

一直我都心存幻念,以為成年人的世界也愛憎分明,釘是釘、鉚是鉚,鹿就是鹿、馬就是馬。不是埋怨我的原單位,我社乃業內翹楚,最頂級的。但正因為這樣,讓我覺得哪裏都一樣,別處甚至更糟糕。全部是利益之爭,勾心鬥角罷了,哪有那麼多的「共同」,還「理想」?切!

 

正當我的心情無處着落,萬幸呢,又遇見了何先生。

 

何先生說:「我現在也八十多歲了,回想這一生最美好的時候,還是(西南)聯大那七年……」這話說的,多唸幾遍就嚼出了悲傷。所以,他的故事、我的心事,他的過去有我可以預知、借鑒的將來。而且,他有一種我非常嚮往的,不只是學問,不只是人品,往他身邊一坐我就覺得心定。包括他的北京腔、他的那種淡然,聽他講話,你會覺得很療傷:唉,沒甚麼大了不得,甚麼都可以放下,一切都能一笑了之,世界荒誕不是你的錯。

 

那時候的我還年輕,沒人像我這麼有閒工夫,也沒人這麼較勁,因為我的內心充滿了困惑。剛從一個看似光芒萬丈、實則高估了人性、乃至一切皆為虛妄的信仰裏爬出來,我渴望着換一個視角,重估人的價值,渴望着解脫。所以對我來說,走訪何老這事不像一件秋天的外套,拿起、放下都無所謂。而更像一個跌倒的人,渴望着一根拐杖。

 

一直以來,都不僅僅是他的故事。

 

在那個「高尚的人該死」的年代裏,他沒有放棄高尚,而像一棵休眠的橡樹子,不失自我、活下來。在他的敘述裏,我在尋找他的邏輯,尋找自己的答案。

 

 

「一個人的性格或者思想大多初步覺醒於十二三歲,等到二十四五歲思想定型,就形成了比較成熟、確定的人生觀、世界觀。此後或許能有縱深的發展或者細節上的改變,但是不是還可以有本質的改變,我想是非常罕見的。」的確,我總有一種感覺,包括他的語言、他的思維還停留在「毛時代」以前。自嘲「生在白旗下,長在白旗下」,民主、科學是那一輩精英的底色。我發現,何老一生沒有被「赤化」,或者說「改造」,始終跟聲勢浩大的新思想格格不入,全在這層抹也抹不掉的底。

 

「作為學術來說,馬克思有他非常深刻、非常正確的東西,但我不相信任何人能『字字是真理』。」「『字字是謬論』的恐怕也極少,古今中外都是這樣,哪能真理都讓你一個人包了?」質疑本身就是科學的態度,凡一家之言就不必全「信」,更不用去「仰」。他的那層底色讓他更相信邏輯、信普世價值,屬於普遍的原則都鑽石一樣恒久遠。而對一忽兒這樣、一忽兒那樣的事,就像流動的沙,始終他都是警惕的。所以,革命的高調很難打動他,時代的洪水捲不走他。即便不得不振臂高呼「萬歲」,不得不舉起拳頭表達忠誠,他的內心始終在嘲笑。

 

可以說,正是那層「資產階級思想」的底色保全了他,沒有當官發財的念想也救了他。沒有「野」可以隱,那就隱於市,與時代保持距離,最終保全的是「自我」。

 

「我」之所以為「我」,在精神自由,在獨立的頭腦。但新時代是不大喜歡頭腦的,恩威並施,把眾生一層層收買為信徒。交出你們的良心,交出你們的忠誠,最好你們都是大傻子,能對「畝產萬斤」這樣的話深信不疑。因為最終會有一顆頭腦來替所有人思考,你們只需要執行,然後叫好、鼓大掌。但他不願意,又無可奈何。於是,就活在自己清清淺淺的水灣裏,安靜極了。

 

人只不過是一根葦草,是自然界最脆弱的東西,但他是一根能思想的葦草。

 

 

這是帕斯卡爾的話,何老特別欣賞,乃至於把自己也活成了葦草。不爭、不求,被吹歪了也不折腰,修成一根有思想的葦草。待泥沙盡落,至少屬於「我」的那一泓水就清了。

 

 

記得在2007年,中文系請何老講了一次,題目叫「談詩與真─歷史和歷史學」,就在圖書館報告廳,是清華「哲學與人生」的系列講座之一。快結束的時候,有位大一女生舉手,說:「請問何教授,歷史學的意義是甚麼?人生的意義又是甚麼?」臺下一陣噓聲,有人合上了筆記本。的確,這種空泛的話題太老套、太幼稚了,而且沒有邊際,讓人怎麼答?沒承想,何老不假片刻的思索,拿起話筒就說:

 

「歷史學本身沒有意義,它的意義是歷史學家所賦予的。人生本來也沒有意義,它的意義,是你所賦予的。」

 

 

哈,多精彩!呱呱呱呱……(掌聲)

 

所以說,千萬不要被任何烏托邦的幻想唬住。甭管甚麼宗教、主義,不論它多麼壯闊、多麼的美輪美奐,只要一世俗化就完蛋。包括自由主義,這是我師兄補充的,自由主義也是一種烏托邦。當我讀亨廷頓的書,意識到「普世主義也是一種意識形態」的時候,又一次陷入了恐慌。如今,左派、右派都迷失了,整個人類陷入了信仰危機。但,人生依舊值得追求,人生必須值得追求。讓你堅若磐石的,不在任何高邈、虛幻的人類理想,而是那個需大寫的 “I”─自我。

 

那,才是你最終的救贖。

 

 

 

3

 

 

《上班記》早就寫好了,何老囑我先別發表,說:「版權都是你的,等我死了你再發,將來惹了麻煩也是你的。」這話他說過好幾次,像句玩笑,彼此卻都當真的。

 

加之前書曾被這樣、那樣的人議論,《上班記》更不敢怠慢,隨口的話也得查一查。比如說到林彪,「人已經叛國死了十八天,還叫人民跟着他幹革命。」又比如困難期間,全國人大不再公佈國家預算數字、決算數字。我是效率極差的人,為這些話,在電腦上一查就是幾個小時,倆眼都快瞪成二郎神了。

 

又比如,蒙文通被打屁股致死。孤證不立,何况一代國學大師,竟如此下場?所有記載中,只寥寥幾個隱約的字,說他被「白晝繫縲於『牛棚』之中」(蒙默語),「負傷歸家,旋即病卒」(吳天墀語),而這兩位先生早已去世多年。老編輯說删了吧,不能求證的句子,別給自己惹麻煩。但我覺得,不該有人這麼白白死掉。電話給四川大學歷史系,幾經輾轉,真就找到了見證人,蒙文通的弟子、耄耋之年的張勛燎教授。老先生耳音不大好,幾近顫抖一遍遍高聲嚷,生怕我聽不見。不幾日,又親訪蒙家後人,確認了種種細節,特意寫成文字寄過來。我的老天爺,這事竟然還能核實,我是不是該佩服一下自己?

 

包括兩篇附錄,原本只為了註釋,結果越寫越長,最後都成了文章。跟北大唐曉峰教授聊起來,他正痛風,耐着性子聽我得意了半天,嘆口氣,說:「這是最起碼的呢,寫文章就該這樣。」

 

一句話我就泄氣了。唉,都是份內之事,其實也沒甚麼好吹噓的。

 

《上學記》之後,有朋友約我再做口述。那些選題都意義重大,但我已傾盡所能,吐血一樣完成了我的作品、我的救贖,就足夠了。你們若有同樣的心情,恰好遇到了合適的人,一定也能成就好的作品。又有人勸我做策劃,那就更使不得了。因為我覺得,誰也不比誰聰明多少,沒有甚麼是只有你想到、而別人想不到的東西。但我可以把我的經驗告訴你,那就是:

 

親力親為、別偷懶,把你自認為最閃光的東西,一求到底。這個世界從不缺少瘋子、狂徒和自以為了得的聰明人。殊不知,唯獨珍貴的是傻子,你要去做其中的極品。

 

 

4

 

 

感謝《記憶》主編烏扎拉先生耐煩我,又開放了私家書庫任我亂翻。感謝葉師母留飯,私釀的果酒棒極了。感謝丁東、小群夫婦鼓勵,願你們的房子不被強拆。

 

感謝萬聖書園劉蘇里先生。感謝上海季風書園嚴搏非,雖隔了幾重山水,先生從不敷衍,每問必查個水落石出,由是感激。感謝人民日報社劉學先生。感謝臺灣《民生報》林英喆先生,失聯很久了,願你的牙齒都在,一切如常。

 

感謝北京三聯書店的前輩董秀玉、吳彬女士,以及我同年生的酒肉朋友劉蓉林小姐。你們是我「娘家」的大枕頭,傷心的時候可以抱一抱,謝謝你們待我一如當初。

 

感謝四川大學張勛燎教授。感謝《徐鑄成日記》整理人徐時霖,先生博聞廣識,每聊必到手機沒電,由是感激。感謝北大唐曉峰教授,雖然對我的打擊更多一些,不過打掉的都是虛驕。感謝清華唐少傑、師兄唐文明教授。兄從不以為我無知,且不像別的哲學家那樣囉嗦,總能一語破的,由是感激。感謝同窗梅賜琪教授,或者副教授?無妨,反正早晚會是的。感謝工物系蒲以康教授,作為原子彈專家,先生熱衷於民間史料搜集,多有指點。還有未及留下姓名的學界中人,感謝各位不吝賜教。

 

感謝本書責編哼女士,我之較勁我知道,您之查漏補缺令我兩眼放光芒。感謝出版家林道群先生,讓我覺得背後不再空蕩蕩,而是立着又一堵堅實而勇敢的牆。

 

 

何老於我有再造之恩,我之於他,不過是個忘年小友、頻頻登門的客。做口述那兩年,我們幾乎每星期都見。後來他換了股骨頭、做心臟手術,他的姐姐過世、愛人過世,他的朋友一個個都不在了。而我也要生孩子,先是六斤半的大姑娘,幾年後又「非法」超生了二姑娘。生活就像催人老的快鏡頭,與何先生見面的機會越來越少了。

 

漸漸的,他出不了門了。

漸漸的,他下不了床了。

漸漸的,他的聲音變得古怪。

 

最後兩次,他竟認不得我了。敲敲頭,用力想了老半天,還是那股子認真勁兒,指着我問:「你是誰?」

 

人活一百歲是種甚麼感覺呢?曾經他說,「與我同輩的人大部分都不在了,包括我的親友,我的同事、同學,以及比較熟的人,幾乎都去世了,只剩我一個……」於是,他越來越輕了,要以一種塌縮的方式,穿過宇宙的蟲洞,拋開一切去找舊相識。而我真後悔呢,沒在他尚且記得我的時候抱一抱,臨了還從他的記憶裏清零了。

 

每一想到此,我就要掉眼淚,滿臉都是大海的味道。

 

 

初稿於2021.3.26

昨天沒有霾,杏花謝了,桃花開

 

定稿於2021.9.10

又是秋天,雨打沙灘萬點坑

Wednesday, February 9, 2022

特德·姜:站在领先现实一小步的地方认识现实

Dzolan


出生于1967年的特德·姜现在55岁了。

从1990年发表第一篇科幻小说《巴比伦塔》至今,他的写作生涯迈入第22个年头。他没写过长篇,现有的作品加起来只有17部短篇,其中一些篇幅较长的,例如《你一生的故事》、《软件体的生命周期》也被看作中篇。相对目前的年纪和资历,他算是低产的作家,他不靠写作为生,本职工作是技术写作。他拿过四项星云奖和四项雨果奖,这只是他所获奖项里的一部分。2003年,他曾拒绝了雨果奖对他一篇小说的提名,理由是这篇小说没有达到他想要的高度。
在互联网上,除了这些,能找到的还有他成为作家之前的一些经历。他的父母是华裔移民,他出生在纽约,大学学了计算机。他一直以来都是科幻小说爱好者,从高中起向杂志投稿。1989年,他参加了写作坊,次年,一本叫《奥秘》的杂志刊登了他的处女作,也就是上文提到的《巴比伦塔》。仅有的资料里,能想象出来的特德·姜大概是低调沉稳的,一如他出现在公众视野里始终不变的形象,半框眼镜,扎个马尾,表情有些严肃。他珍视每个到来的写作灵感,有很高的要求,只在做好准备时出手。他最被读者熟知的作品应该是《你一生的故事》,2016年被好莱坞导演维伦纽瓦改编成电影,片名叫《降临》,讲一个语言学家在学习外星人语言的过程中,预见自己的未来。
这篇小说写于1998年,拿到了当年的星云奖最佳中篇。小说开始,名叫露易丝的女人向女儿讲述自己将经历的故事,她会结婚,生下女儿,女儿去世后,她和丈夫分别开始新生活。随后,故事切回现在,一名军人和物理学家走进露易丝的办公室,要求她破译一段外星人的录音。小说就是这样写成的,一条线是露易丝向女儿的告白,讲述她们相处时的片段;另一条线是露易丝前去跟外星人交流,学习外星人的语言。两条线构成完整的闭环,女儿一生的故事,正是露易丝在学习这种语言时预见的,那位物理学家后来成了她的丈夫。电影《降临》剧照
特德·姜似乎并不钟情庞大、炫酷、出现在读者眼前时带有压倒气势和未来感的科幻元素。《你一生的故事》里的外星人叫“七肢桶”,造型接近瘦长的章鱼,仿佛人类尚未发现的远古生物。他的头部周围有一排眼睛,能够看见四面八方。他们通过硅制的“视镜”与露易丝交流,用肢体在视镜上写下墨汁状的圆形符号,这是他们的文字,类似中国古代书法的变体。
习惯向前看,写字时从左到右、从上到下的我们活在线性思维里,时间永远向前流逝,过了今天才有明天,事物有因才有果。借七肢桶圆形的视觉文字和能看到四面八方的眼睛,特德·姜想要塑造的是一种跟人类不同的思维感知,他们不用思考先写什么再写什么,圆形文字能同时表达他们想说的一切,正如他们睁开眼,看见前方也看见后方与左右,过去、现在与未来同时出现在他们脑海。随着露易丝逐渐掌握这种语言,她的思维方式产生了变化:“一瞥之下,过去与未来轰轰然同时并至,我的意识成为长达半个世纪的灰烬,时间未至已成灰。一瞥间五十年诸般纷纭并发眼底,我的余生尽在其中。还有,你的一生。”为了让读者更好理解语言对一个人思维的改变,特德·姜在小说里举了个现实的例子,一个父母都是聋子的人从小到大一直用手语,当他思考时,内心的语言是变化的手势。电影《降临》剧照
特德·姜习惯在每篇小说后附一段后记,分享小说写作的灵感来源。《你一生的故事》基于他对物理学中变分原理的喜爱,加上他曾看过的一个讲主人公的妻子与乳腺癌抗争的话剧和他身边有个朋友生孩子的经历。这是一个理论、科幻和现实叠加的小说,很难说清科幻的成分在小说里的比重,剥除七肢桶、视镜、圆形文字这些为数不多的科幻元素,小说真正要讲述的似乎与一个女人如何对抗癌症没太大分别。科幻在这里更像是一个引子,一只打破“现实天平”平衡的手,这只手让露易丝看到她余生里女儿早逝、与丈夫分离之类的痛苦,与痛苦相伴的同样有爱的部分,如果因为畏惧要回避这痛苦,是否有足够的勇气割舍爱?在这样的人生之外会有一种更值得过的人生吗?
特德·姜的这篇小说里,一个人预见命运后试图抗拒的自由意志失去了分量,露易丝明白,自己要义无反顾地投入这样的命运,“未来的必经之路。我循路而前,满怀喜悦,也许是满怀痛苦”。说到底,她的人生是所有人现实人生的影子。父母知道孩子有天会离开,孩子知道有天父母会去世,许多事物在到来之时已经写好消失的结局,我们所能做的是看着手里未来信念的火炬,在反复握紧与松开的过程中向结局走去。《你一生的故事》是特德·姜最被熟知的小说,大概也是最能代表他的小说。有的科幻作家雄心勃勃地想象“科幻”这门超前又带有预言性的艺术会给人类文明带来怎样天翻地覆的改变时,特德·姜着眼于小而具体的事物,一对铝制的人工肺(《呼吸》,2008);一个机器保姆(《达西的新型自动机器保姆》,2011);一面有美颜功能的审美干扰镜(《赏心悦目:审美干扰镜提案纪实》,2019)。有时他会故意回到过去,重构一段关于神话(《巴比伦塔》,1990),或者虚构19世纪,热力学萌生前后人类如何依靠名字驱动机器(《七十二个字母》,2000)。
总之,过于新潮、前卫的东西离特德·姜的科幻世界太远。你可以说他保守,但正是这份保守,让我们所处的现实不必太费力,只需跨上一小步就能跟上他笔下的世界,也正是这一小步——或者说特德·姜仅仅只用这一小步,就足够让我们在认知自我和世界这件事上经历一次强烈的情感共振。
2013年,特德·姜写了《双面真相》,一篇在主题和结构上与《你一生的故事》类似的短篇,继续探讨语言对人类的影响。小说的一条线是一名记者的自述,科技发展的三十余年里,他的妻子离开了家,女儿长大成人,在美术馆工作,她不再拥有书写能力,取而代之的是一种能够将内心想法转换成文字的视网膜投影仪。与此同时,一种名叫“会忆”的能全方位记录生活的搜索工具诞生,引起记者的忧虑:它是否会取代一个人自然记忆?
另一条线里,十三岁的吉金基生活在没有文字,只凭口语交流的土著部落,他认识了欧洲传教士莫斯比,第一次见到书面文字。在莫斯比的邀请下,吉金基开始学习文字。
早在下笔《你一生的故事》前,特德·姜学了很多语言学的知识,构思《双面真相》时,他读了传媒学者沃尔特·翁的《口语文化与书面文化》,书里讲到一些部落如何用口述的故事更改真实发生过的种族历史,以便让历史更好地适应现状。这也是吉金基学会文字后面临的困惑,族长口述的族谱与英国人记录在案的族谱并不一致,已经习惯用文字思考的吉金基更相信白纸黑字,而在族长看来,现有的族谱更有利于部落的发展,至于纸上写了什么并不重要。
吉金基体验的,同样发生在调查“会忆”的记者身上。记者时常想起幼时在缝纫机上忙活的奶奶笑着看他玩玩具,这个未被记录的瞬间让他觉得迷人。自然记忆存在对过去的修饰,如果他通过“会忆”回顾这一幕,会不会发现它只是再平常不过的。“镜头无法捕捉事件中蕴含的情感维度”,这种情感随时间流逝不断积蓄,“会忆”会破坏这个过程,将它推倒重来。
更重要的一点是,记者觉得自然记忆帮他修复了和女儿的关系,淡化了妻子离开后的裂痕。某次查看“会忆”,记者发现事实不是自己一直以为的——他主动谅解了女儿,而是女儿做出了让步。特德·姜再一次将故事的落点放回人类私密的情感,同时引导我们用更客观的方式理解一种新工具的诞生。经历从口语到文字的迭代更新,我们习惯并熟练借“事实”处理与现实的关系,“会忆”——这种数字记忆未必会将现状引入极端的境地,前提是要懂得怎样利用它。特德·姜给出一个很好的参考:(数字记忆)关键不在于证明你是对的,而在于承认你是错的。特德·姜至今最长的小说是2010年的《软件体的生命周期》,讲一个小群体用二十年的时间抚养一种名叫“数码体”的人工智能。与其他科幻作品中的人工智能不一样,数码体生来没有行动自如的肢体和超级计算机般的大脑,自然也缺乏情感能力,他更接近没有身体的婴儿,需要养护者投入时间和精力去养育,故事里的二十年恰好也是一个人从婴儿变为成年人的大概时间。
这个故事让人想起21世纪初风靡互联网的QQ宠物,玩家需要喂食宠物,带它玩,让它上学、打工,到了一定等级宠物可以结婚生子。小说里,从动物园离职的安娜与新同事德雷克加入数码体的开发工作,各自拥有了数码体。虚拟世界不断更新,高效成为主流,数码体不再被看好,他所生存的虚拟空间慢慢消失,安娜和德雷克尽力让数码体成长下去。故事之外,QQ宠物在2018年停止运营。
虚拟成为另一种现实在今天已经不是新鲜事。小说里,动物园没落,虚拟形象成为一代人追捧的对象,没有真实可感的接触,人类的情感似乎丢失了支撑点,大多数人并不能像安娜和德里克一样,付出二十年去养育一个不够真实的虚拟物。
这个故事再次说明,特德·姜是一位务实的科幻作家,他提出了人人心知肚明却不太愿意谈及的现实问题,所有人都能照料一个孩子长大成人吗?能养好一只狗或一只猫?用心维护一段亲子、婚姻或恋爱关系?虚拟世界没有道德和义务的约束,数码体可以随时被“挂起”,真实的世界不是这样的,维护一段关系,付出长久的情感往往困难得多,放弃的代价更大。只有在现实世界,大多数人才有机会成为故事里的安娜或德里克。
读特德·姜的感受便是这样,站在领先现实一小步的地方重新认识一切。他不是为某种不得已的紧迫感匆匆动笔的作家,他那如简笔画一样简单干净的文字,与其所描绘的静默的世界妥帖地融合在一起。如果你细细看,会发现一些均匀的孔洞,那是容许现实流出的地方。

The Order of Things: Jennifer Croft on Translating Olga Tokarczuk

What It Took to Render The Books of Jacob Into English


Olga Tokarczuk’s twelfth book, the novel The Books of Jacob, first published in Poland in 2014 to great acclaim and considerable controversy, kicks off in 1752 in Rohatyn, in what is now western Ukraine, and winds up in a cave near Korolówka, now eastern Poland, where a family of local Jews has hidden from the Holocaust. Between mid-18th-century Rohatyn and mid-20th-century Korolówka, Olga traverses the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in search of the manifold secrets of Jacob Frank, a highly charismatic real historical figure, beloved and despised by his contemporaries, the leader of a wildly heretical Jewish sect that converted in different moments to both Catholicism and Islam.

The novel is divided into seven books: The Book of Fog, The Book of Sand, The Book of the Road, The Book of the Comet, The Book of Metal and Sulfur, The Book of the Distant Country and The Book of Names.

It is the second book that most concerns us now. It opens as follows:

Bywa, że Bóg męczy się swoją światłością i ciszą, mdli go od nieskończoności. Wtedy, jak ogromna, wszechwrażliwa ostryga, której ciało, tak nagie i delikatne, czuje najmniejsze drganie cząsteczek światła, kurczy się w sobie i zostaje po nim trochę miejsca, gdzie od razu z zupełnie niczego pojawia się świat. Najpierw świat przypomina pleśń, jest delikatny i biały, ale rośnie szybko, pojedyncze nitki łączą się ze sobą, tworząc mocne poszycie. W końcu twardnieje i odtąd zaczyna nabierać kolorów. Towarzyszy temu niski, ledwie słyszalny dźwięk, ponura wibracja, która wprawia atomy w niespokojne drżenie. Z tego właśnie ruchu powstają cząsteczki, a potem ziarnka piasku i krople wody, które dzielą świat na pół.

Teraz jesteśmy po stronie piasku.

This section of the book—the novel doesn’t have chapters in a traditional sense—is titled “O tym, jak ze zmęczenia Boga powstaje świat,” which, taking a certain poetic license—a license it is imperative I take, lest I fall prey to Robert Frost’s 1959 definition of translation as “that which is lost out of both prose and verse”—means something along the lines of “Of how it was the world was born of God’s exhaustion.” A somewhat scandalous suggestion on the part of Olga’s narrator that only gets bolder as we continue to read.

“Bywa, że Bóg męczy się swoją światłością i ciszą, mdli go od nieskończoności,” that first paragraph starts. “It happens, that God tires of his brightness and quiet, he sickens of infinity.” That is as close to a literal, word-for-word translation as I can muster without breaking all the rules of English grammar. For now, I have left the original Polish punctuation, even though the Polish conventions surrounding punctuation differ significantly from the ones we have in English. The Google version of this opening is: “It happens that God is tired of his light and silence, fainting him from infinity.” My own first sentence: “Every now and then, God wearies of his own luminous silence, and infinity starts to make him a little bit sick.”

The words of the text are the embodiment of its past. Its sentences, on the other hand, lead the way into its future.

“Every” echoes the Polish “bywa,” meaning “it happens,” or “it so happens,” implying “sometimes”: the third-person singular present tense of the frequentative imperfective form of “to be.” In Polish, this first word lends a somewhat folksy feel to a first sentence that soon vaults into the metaphysical. God tires or is tiring—Polish does not have a present continuous tense like English or Spanish, so the translator must choose based on context clues—of his (own) light or brightness and quiet or silence. The word for quiet or silence is the usual word: “cisza.” The word for light or brightness, meanwhile, is the usual word for light—światło—plus an -ść ending that raises the register a bit. This word, literally “lightness,” often comes up in the context of religion, and more particularly, the Catholic faith that predominates in Poland. It is used, for instance, in the so-called Prayer for the Eternal Rest:

Eternal rest grant unto them,
O Lord, and let perpetual light
shine upon them. May the souls
of all the faithful departed, through
the mercy of God, rest in peace.

Where it says “perpetual light” in English (“lux perpetua” in Latin), in Polish it says “światłość.” Yet this “perpetual” is part of the word’s unfathomable background, and I also can’t use it in my translation because it is too close to what comes next: “mdli go od nieskończoności,” literally “sickens him from infinity.”

The words “światło”—“light”—and “światłość”—lightness or perpetual light—both contain the word “świat,” which is “world.” This will become very important in a moment.

“Every now and then, God wearies of his own luminous silence, and infinity starts to make him a little bit sick.” The trochaic meter of the opening clause is in keeping with the structure of Polish—in which the stress is always on the penultimate syllable of the word—and the particular rolling rhythm of Olga’s writing. The words “wearies” and “luminous” are relatively formal, elevated—as is shifting from noun to adjective, a not uncontroversial choice—while “starts to make him a little bit sick” is informal, in keeping with the deckle edge of Olga’s sentence, which is both humorous and profound.

One drawback to my version is that it weighs in at a whopping twenty-one words, versus the original’s modest thirteen. Because English does not have grammatical case, we need prepositions like “with”; because English can’t abide a run-on sentence, we need to add an “and”; to mark an infinitive, we require a “to.” Translations of Slavic languages into English are generally about thirty percent longer than their originals. But it’s mostly my decision to start with “every now and then” that tips the scales, and I will have to see if I can compensate for that with something pithier over the course of the next few lines.

So now we know from the section title—“Of how it was the world was born of God’s exhaustion”—and the first sentence of the main body of the text that our narrator has determined to rebel against any story of creation with which we might have been familiar, in order to suggest instead that God has weaknesses and failings—that God might even suffer from as humiliating a complaint as ordinary boredom. And as if that weren’t enough, she will now go on to suggest that the world, a world, presumably our world, is a product of that sad malady—that humanity is nothing more than a diversion, the result of some irritation and an almost animal reaction to the same.

Language can’t be separated from the people who create and connect with one another through it.

This is where the connection between the Polish words pertaining to “light” (“światło” and/or “światłość”) and “world” (“świat”) makes itself felt. While there is not a way to reproduce this resonance identically, I got lucky with English, which connects “world” with “word.” I have tried to take advantage of this stroke of luck throughout this vast and treasure-laden tome.

For the connection between light and this particular version of the creation of the world is in no way arbitrary. Olga’s provocative rendering is drawn from a much older provocation, first arising in Isaac Luria’s version of Kabbalah, the most influential and resistant strain of Jewish mysticism. Unlike earlier kabbalists, Luria treated creation not as a positive event, but as a negative one. Before creation, divine light filled every available space, meaning that in order to create the world, God had to endure the process of tzimtzum, a Hebrew word that attained special power in Lurianic Kabbalah, where it became a term for God’s self-diminishing, or shrinking, to make room.

“Without contraction, there is no creation, as everything is Godhead,” writes Gershom Scholem, the German-born scholar who revolutionized the study of Kabbalah. “Therefore, already in its earliest origins, the creation is a kind of exile, in that it involves God removing Himself from the center of His essence to His secret places.” Scholem (a close friend of Walter Benjamin, whom we will come to in a moment) will be a guiding light for Olga throughout The Books of Jacob, which is after all a chronicle of exile and the quest to undo that original absence and every removal that came after.

But let’s get back to the sentence in question for now. “Wtedy, jak ogromna, wszechwrażliwa ostryga, której ciało, tak nagie i delikatne, czuje najmniejsze drganie cząsteczek światła, kurczy się w sobie i zostaje po nim trochę miejsca, gdzie od razu z zupełnie niczego pojawia się świat.” “Then, like an enormous, all-sensing oyster, whose body, so naked and delicate, feels the smallest vibration of particles of light, contracts inside itself and there remains after it a little space, where right away out of absolutely nothing there appears a world.” The Google version: “Then, like a huge, all-sensitive oyster, whose body, so naked and delicate, feels the slightest twitching of light particles, it shrinks in itself and leaves a little space after it, where the world immediately appears from nothing.”

Slavic languages do not have articles, definite or indefinite. English requires them; ending this sentence with “there appears world” is not an option unless intelligibility is not something we care about. The translator must intuit, then, the definiteness or indefiniteness of a noun from its context; in this case, although we may already suspect that the world in question is our world—and thus a definite, specific world—what the preceding sentence tells us is that this happens “every now and then.” In which case, each time it happens, “a” new world is created, freshly nacred and luminous and bored.

Let us not forget the oyster. The Polish word for “oyster” is feminine, so every adjective that applies to it in the original describes a feminine being—no doubt not a coincidence in the work of a proudly feminist writer like Olga Tokarczuk. The oyster is first of all “ogromna,” which I always like to translate as “enormous,” due to the confluence of sounds between the two words. It is “wszechwrażliwa,” which is a highly unusual compound word made up of “wrażliwa,” sensitive, and the prefix “wszech,” which appears in slightly more common adjectives like “wszechmocna,” omnipotent, or “wszechwiedząca,” omniscient, suggesting “omni” as the appropriate divine prefix in the English translation: “omnisensitive.”

Preserving Polish word order in English necessarily makes for less fluid sentences, and it sometimes results in complete incomprehensibility.

Thus the oyster is enormous and omnisensitive. Now for its body. Its body, so naked and delicate, feels—or can detect—the slightest tremor in particles of light, scrunches up into itself, and—now the sentence switches subjects—there remains after it a little space, where at once from completely nothing appears a world. Or, perhaps, we maintain the same subject in the translation: it leaves a tiny space where a world immediately appears, out of nowhere. Where a world comes to be out of absolutely nothing. It leaves a tiny space for a world to arise or emerge or come about or be born.

What to do with this final clause?

The “theres” in “there remains after it a little space” and “there appears a world” are not there in the original; English requires we add something to help smooth out the different syntax. But these filler “theres” are clunky and don’t exactly suit the scene. “Appears a world” is as impossible in English as “there appears world”: not in fact impossible, but enough of a departure from what Anglophones expect that it must necessarily shift the reader’s focus from what to how: rather than experiencing Olga’s context, the reader will experience a disruption of the English language, which might distract her completely from the molluscoid god of Books of Jacob, propelling her into a consideration of how English works and why.

This consideration might well not be in vain, and we can return to such disruptions as indeed strategies for provoking larger reflections, but let us agree for now that my goal in this translation is instead to beautifully render Olga’s ideas. Part of an idea is how it’s ordered. And of all the questions that have come up in this paragraph so far, having to do with rhythm, register, and the balance of sanctity or profundity and humor, the trickiest one is this one.

Let’s think about syntax, why it’s hard to translate (why there are mixed opinions in translation studies about how to handle it), why it matters and possible ways to move forward.

The word “syntax” comes from the Ancient Greek “σύνταξις,” meaning “coordination”: “syn,” or “together,” and “táxis,” or “ordering.” Today, in English, it designates the “set of rules and principles in a language according to which words, phrases, and clauses are arranged to create well-formed sentences,” or “the ways in which a particular word or part of speech can be arranged with other words or parts of speech.” These are, respectively, the ethical and intersubjective aspects of the word.

For words are similar to selves in constitutive qualities and behavior and can be productively considered according to categories proposed for understanding the nature of selfhood in a range of philosophical works, among them Oneself as Another by Paul Ricoeur and Kathleen Blamey, Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor and After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre. Though very different from one another in style and purpose, all three of these texts wind up speaking of selves as comprised of three facets: the narrative, the intersubjective and the ethical.

A self is narrative because it must see itself in terms of a life story. It finds those terms in conceptual apparatuses such as language and time. It conceives of the former by way of the latter and expresses the latter by way of the former. Each self’s life story contains causes and effects, arising from a beginning and leading to an end.

Kate Briggs points out that “literary translation, as a labour of changing words, and changing the orders of words, is always and from the outset wrong.”

A self is intersubjective, or “transpersonal,” as Taylor says, because it cannot achieve its telos without the collaboration of other selves, whether these selves function as helpmeets or as obstacles to be overcome along the self’s “journey.” Nor can the self conceive of itself as such except in conjunction with and in contradistinction to its others.

Finally, a self is ethical because it grounds its sense of selfhood in judgments of value. Self-esteem depends on the degree to which the self lives well and for others in justice, as Riceour points out particularly. “To know who I am,” writes Taylor, “is a species of knowing where I stand.” Metaphorically, “where I stand” refers here to what I consider to be right and wrong with regard to my behavior and that of others, while also harking back to the historical positioning of the self in its society, in relation to other selves, and what its roles as a member of that society are.

For a word, narrative identity is etymology: the origins and evolution over time of the word. The ethical facet of a word is what values it holds, meaning what its definition is. This facet is the easiest to swap out from one language to the next, even when it requires several words to translate one. But while “wskazówka” may mean something like “clue” in Polish, and “pista” may (partly) mean something like “clue” in Spanish—that is, may hold similar semantic values—their histories and narrative identities, and thus their connotations, will be completely different.

A word’s intersubjective facet is how it behaves in a phrase and how it interacts with its neighbors. You can try to stop time, and you can try to prevent time from doing something (like advancing), and maybe these attempts will be equivalent, but how they play out in a sentence will differ enough to change the rhythm of the text.

For Riceour, ethics means “living well with and for others in just institutions.” MacIntyre, meanwhile, argues that modern selves are adrift, unlike pre-modern selves, who “inherit a particular space within an interlocking set of social relationships; lacking that space, they are nobody, or at best a stranger or an outcast. To know oneself as such a social person is however not to occupy a static and fixed position.”

Very few words function well on their own. The ones that do are mostly interjections and emphatic particles, like the German “doch,” or the Argentine “che.” The vast majority of words, however, must coexist in a manner that is productive (of meaning, for example) with other words, in institutions called grammatical sentences; in grammars that haven’t crumbled over time, the noun’s role is clear from its case, as we have discussed. Precisely because of this, the position of a Polish noun in a sentence is not fixed.

In Slavic languages, because the endings of nouns change depending on their purpose in a sentence, word order varies considerably more than it does in English, where we can only know what the subject of the sentence is, versus its object, by following the order in which they appear. “Jennifer Croft eats pizza” is a really different sentence in English than “Pizza eats Jennifer Croft” (although what a way to go!). But imagine if we did have a full case system in English, and the accusative case of a noun, which indicates a noun being acted upon, generated an ending of “#.” Then we could say “Pizza# eats Jennifer Croft,” or “Jennifer Croft eats pizza#,” and the only thing that would change would be what gets emphasized, and what we know when.

I come up for air or clamber out of the water, and holding onto the original is like striving to maintain all the moisture on my skin as the sun lifts it away from me drop by drop.

What we know when is extremely important to narrative; if we were told in the first sentence of Daphne du Maurier’s Rebecca what had really happened to Maxim de Winter’s wife, and how, and why, and what would become of Manderley, would we even keep reading? The reader has to live the process of apprehension, experience a world in an order, not all at once. The Polish phrase “gdzie od razu z zupełnie niczego pojawia się świat” is not the same as “gdzie świat pojawia się z zupełnie niczego od razu,” just as “Along Comes Mary” is not the same as “Mary Comes Along.” In the former, the emphasis is on the specialness of Mary, the unexpectedness of her, her out-of-nowhereness.

And the rhythm is different. Think of the anonymous children’s rhyme:

Itsy bitsy spiderClimbed up the waterspout;
Down came the rain
And washed the spider out;
Out came the sun
And dried up all the rain;
And the itsy bitsy spider
Climbed up the spout again.

“The rain came down” would have massively less effect than “down came the rain” does. “Down came the rain” starts with deluge; “out came the sun” offers an unanticipated twist. We might have been expecting something else after “out came”: the stain? The blame?

It’s microsuspense, and it happens so fast we might not even think we notice, but it affects our reading all the same. It accumulates over the course of the story; it is the tiny space left by an oyster-author for the emergence of a world.

Since if I say: “like an enormous, omnisensitive oyster, its body, so naked and delicate, feels the slightest tremble in the particles of light, scrunches up inside itself, leaving just enough space for a world to come completely out of nowhere, at once,” then the reader encounters world before nowhere and before at once—and in that case, why are nowhere and at once even there?

The principal quality of suspense is finitude; we are always aware of its imminent end, which permits us to cherish it. Microsuspense is even more precious due to the proximity of the full stop: soon we will know, and from that point forward, we will never unknow—a gain that feels more like a loss.

Recent writing on translation has emphasized the unique creative practices of individual translators. Whenever I translate, I first immerse myself in the original as though taking a dip in a lovely cove, far from the eyes of anyone, where the water’s always warm. (I hope it does not undermine all that I have said so far to confess that in life I am not a good swimmer, and that I have never gone swimming in a cove.) By immersing myself, I can feel weightless as the body of the work suspends me—my preoccupations, much of my subjectivity, which merely acts as a filter—and I can allow the images generated by the words of the original to wash over me, feel them all around me, form them afresh in my cleared head.

This sort of suspension is temporary, too. I come up for air or clamber out of the water, and holding onto the original is like striving to maintain all the moisture on my skin as the sun lifts it away from me drop by drop. Now the words of the original find their reflections on the surface of the ocean, as if my translations of them were inevitable, even though others would opt for other words. Now I rearrange the original’s sentences, letting them conform to the different conditions of the shore. I rearrange them with a mind to move on from here soon, with my next destination in my sights.

Kate Briggs points out that “literary translation, as a labour of changing words, and changing the orders of words, is always and from the outset wrong.” But she, like me, believes that that’s not what translation is.

In Slavic languages, because the endings of nouns change depending on their purpose in a sentence, word order varies considerably more than it does in English.

When it comes to verbal disposition and disordering, we might look back at an essay we have mentioned already. Although it arose out of his own translation practice, in the century since its original publication, Walter Benjamin’s “Task of the Translator” introduction has flummoxed and bewildered readers concerned with the practice of translation by carrying notions of poetry, magic and spirit even further to enter into the territory of the messianic, of a pure language likely to be reconstituted on the day of humanity’s salvation, a pure language we can only get a glimpse of now thanks to translation, which acts as afterlife to the original and in so doing keeps up the connections—which are mostly concealed by communication, or the desire to communicate—between the mortal languages of man.

Not that helpful when you’re trying to wrangle a paragraph of Polish into English.

Translator Chantal Wright notes: “In fact, Benjamin’s text feels calculated to produce this tension, marked as it is by syntactic and lexical idiosyncrasy, by re-definitions of terms and by slippery signifiers.”

On the other hand, maybe Benjamin is the only one who can help here, as we struggle to seize Olga’s slippery oyster god.

For Samuel Weber’s innovative book Benjamin’s -abilities posits as follows:

When Benjamin writes that the specifically poetical signification cannot be identified simply with what is meant, with the meaning of the phrase, but rather has to do with “how the meant is bound to the way of meaning in the determinate word,” he indicates both that the semantic dimension of meaning plays a role in binding the way of meaning to particular words, and that the configuration of such binding is not itself determined semantically. Rather, it is syntactical. For what is decisive is how an object or concept is bound to an individual word, and through it, to a particular way of being-meant. And this idea of being bound to or up with individual words depends on a spatial arrangement that can be designated both as syntactical and as singular.

What this boils down to is not exclusively mysterious. Benjamin calls for word-for-word translation, for keeping the syntax of the original intact in the translation, even at “the risk of madness,” as Weber rightly notes.

The Slavic languages order their words differently from the Germanic and the Romance languages. Preserving Polish word order in English necessarily makes for less fluid sentences, and it sometimes results in complete incomprehensibility. This predicament becomes more dire when the distance between languages is increased.

Chamini Abesiriwardhane Kulathunga translates from Sinhala into English. Sinhala is, like English, an Indo-European language, but it is a member of the Indo-Aryan branch of the family, at a significant historical from the European branch. Kulathunga translates the opening of Tennyson Perera’s 1967 Cogwheel Buddha, the first novel ever banned in Sri Lanka, as follows: “Somebody once said that the Maitree Buddha would be enlightened under the giant tamarind tree at the public library. That somebody was a drunk, and his statement has remained deep-seated in my mind.” Translated word for word, these two sentences (“මහජන පුස්තකාලයේ දැවැන්ත සියඹලා ගස යටදී මෛත්‍රී බුදු හාමුදුරුවෝ බුදු වනු ඇතැයි කිසිවකු කියනු මට ඇසී ඇත. බීගත් අයෙකු විසින් කරන ලද ඒ ප්‍රකාශය මගේ සිත තුල කිඳා බැස ගියාක් වැන්න.”) become: “Public library (in) huge tamarind (tree) under Maitree Buddha attain enlightenment that someone saying me heard. Drunken someone by made that statement my mind inside sunken deep like.”

Again, Sinhala is still related to English, albeit distantly. Many of the world’s languages bear no known relation to ours. What happens, then, in a translation that’s determined to preserve the syntax of a language such as Amdolese or Aymara, Japanese or Javanese, Wolof or Zuni?

For a word, narrative identity is etymology: the origins and evolution over time of the word. The ethical facet of a word is what values it holds, meaning what its definition is.

“But a relation to language in which syntax—the sequential arrangement of words—takes precedence over the time-and-space transcending rules of grammar and semantics; in which the ways of meaning, their distribution and relations, have priority over what is meant—this would be a language that seems to approach what Benjamin ‘means’ by ‘pure language,’” Weber suggests. If this is what we’re going to do, then Olga’s sentence in English reads as follows: “Then, like an enormous, omnisensitive oyster, whose body, so naked and delicate, feels the slightest tremble in the particles of light, scrunches up inside itself and remains after it a bit of space, where at once from completely nothing emerges world.”

This is probably largely intelligible, but I would argue that the way of meaning here’s completely wrong. What has been removed are the people: Olga and myself. All that’s left is bare language—yet language is a human innovation, the thing that humans made that made us human.

The sentence “Drunken someone by made that statement my mind inside sunken deep like,” on the other hand, tells us almost nothing about what’s going on, or what’s about to happen, within the novel Cogwheel Buddha. If it does make inroads into the pure language that awaits us when all individual languages finally fall away—which may as well be some future version of AI, an evolved-to-be-functional Google Translate—it nonetheless so obscures the “semantic dimension of meaning” that it would be hard for us to glimpse such possibility. It also razes all of the more elusive elements of literary works, such as atmosphere and tone.

With a couple of careful modifications, a syntactically disruptive translation might make visible the structure of a daily language readers take for granted, might make people aware of convention in such a way as to even enhance the power of individual words stripped of obvious connections, as if spotlit—but such careful modification would be directed by human intention, and Benjamin’s appeal to the translator is that she not have any goal in mind.

Language can’t be separated from the people who create and connect with one another through it. I don’t share Benjamin’s faith in a pure language to come. But I do think he’s right that it is syntax that ushers the original work into its “afterlife,” as he calls it.

The words of the text are the embodiment of its past. Its sentences, on the other hand, lead the way into its future, and in so doing, they also pass through the vast, dynamic labyrinth of the translator’s imagination.

Chantal Wright roundly ignores Benjamin’s “call for syntactic fusion.” Susan Bernofsky, the wonderful translator of German literature into English, writes this about her process of revision in translation:

Sometimes the best translation is one whose syntactical structure bears little resemblance to that of the original. At the same time, it is important to be conscious of the order in which information arrives. Every sentence is a journey that begins with a particular phrase or image and takes the reader somewhere. So what does the itinerary of a particular sentence look like, and where does it lead?

This strikes me as an extraordinarily helpful modification to Benjamin’s suggestion: try, when possible, to keep the original end—the destination the author appointed as the sentence-journey’s goal.

In which case, here’s my version of the whole opening of Book II of The Books of Jacob, The Book of Sand:

Every now and then, God wearies of his own luminous silence, and infinity starts to make him a little bit sick. Then, like an enormous, omnisensitive oyster, its body—so naked and delicate—feels the slightest tremble in the particles of light, scrunches up inside itself, leaving just enough space for the emergence—at once and out of nowhere—of a world. The world comes quick, though at first it resembles mold, delicate and pale, but soon it grows, and individual fibres connect, creating a powerful surrounding tissue. Then it hardens; then it starts to take on colours. This is accompanied by a low, barely audible sound, a gloomy vibration that makes the anxious atoms quake. And it is from this motion that particles come into being, and then grains of sand and drops of water, which divide the world in two.

We find ourselves now on the side of sand.

To the extent that the map can change the territory by determining an undetermined space or feature, by designating its use or at least suggesting it by name, I have likely both narrowed and expanded Olga’s original text in my translation here. I did not succeed in cutting down the size of any of the other sentences of this opening paragraph, though I’m not convinced of the necessity of such perfect matching. What I hope to have generated is microsuspense: the desire to keep reading, the drive to turn the page.

__________________________________

The Books of Jacob by Olga Tokarczuk (translated by Jennifer Croft) is available now from Riverhead.

Tuesday, February 8, 2022

《电影的本性:物质现实的复原》(1960)

 《电影的本性:物质现实的复原》(1960)


[素材和方法]

克拉考尔重点关注的是素材的美学,重点在电影的内容,而别的理论则优先考虑电影的形式问题。他的目的在于通过对各种类型的电影的考察,找到一个最适合电影发展的路线。

电影媒介是题材和处理方法的综合产物,是电影素材和电影技巧的综合。在审美的领域里,这种综合是独一无二的,因为它并不创造一个新的“艺术世界”,而只展现自己的素材。它也不去创造一个抽象或充满想象力的世界,而是驻足于真实的物理世界。传统艺术的目的是用特殊的方法转换世界的存在形态,而电影最深层和最本质的目的却是如实展示生活。别的艺术在创造中消解了素材,电影则如实地展示它的素材。
在一幅画面前,我们的认识超越了对象,而电影则使我们回到对象本身。

克拉考尔的素材美学包含两方面:现实和电影的技术性能。虽然摄影发展(而且在继续发展)成了记录现实的方式,但实际上它只能记录现实的某些方面。而且,从另一方面说,物理现实是由很多方面组成的,其中有些方面显然更具“上镜头性”。所以在克拉考尔看来,电影创作者的任务就是要正确地了解现实和媒介,然后采用合适的技巧表现合适的题材。他把电影看作发掘现实的特定层面的科学工具。

在他看来,电影继承了照相术及其与现实间的天然联系。因此,电影的题材就应当是照相术的服务对象:充满“偶然事件”(accidental occurrences)和无限细微反应的“无尽的”,“自发的”客观世界。

他将电影方法分为两组:基本方法和技术方法。
基本方法就是摄影。
虽然摄影也受制于技术,但他选择了忽略技术的限制。在他看来,世界不是已被摄影的,就是有待摄影的,对创作者来说,整个世界都是可用的素材。通过对摄影基本问题的回避与忽略,他坚决反对形式主义理论的立场,即在客观现实和用特殊方式提取的影像现实之间,存在一个充满差异的世界(也是充满艺术潜能的世界)。在形式主义者看来,摄影是技术,而对克拉考尔来说,摄影是自然的一部分。

克拉考尔将摄影的基本方法与电影素材联系起来,而将电影媒介的其他成分定义为“次要的技术部分”,包括剪辑,特写,镜头变形,光学效果等。他还明确指出,电影的技术方法和内容之间只存在间接的联系,因此,对电影来说,基本方法(摄影)是最重要的。他建议创作者最好只将技术手段运用于实现电影的根本目标:记录(recording)和揭示(revealing)周围的客观世界。

非写实电影就像是具有科学装置的玩具,也许看来有趣和刺激,但终究是一种娱乐消遣。

克拉考尔认为,所有的艺术都是形式和内容的博弈,而在电影艺术中,内容占了上风。所以建立一种“素材”美学比形式美学更重要。如果内容对电影至关重要,那么对电影内容进行分析,就应该能够发现这种媒介的本质)。

除了克拉考尔明确表示不在研究范围内的动画片和极端的实验电影外,所有的电影都是通过电影技巧来记录现实。

他认为,正确的电影手法应当是理想而自然的摄影术的延伸。对电影的其他使用手段(尤其是用于模拟舞台剧,绘画和音乐)都是边缘的。因为摄影是电影最基本的要素,它使电影永远和自然世界联系在一起。
然而克拉考尔也必须承认,并非所有的照片都能恰当地表现它的主题。在摄影界,如同在电影理论界那样,形式主义和写实主义也总争论不休。不过,既然已经认定摄影是决定电影素材的根本力量,克拉考尔的摄影观点就只能是写实派了。
这个论点的缺陷是显而易见的,而且这个问题在克拉考尔的“视觉真实”(visible reality)论里变得更加尖锐。现代科学已经对物质世界(视觉真实)提出极大质疑,而电影揭示的只是宇宙的可视部分。克拉考尔说,人们已经不再知道什么是真实了。

这种开放的自然观使克拉考尔无法对电影素材和技术(因为技术也只有服务于自然时才有意义)做出精确的界定,但是,他还是能够指出一些模糊却真实地存在着的电影“倾向”。他发现,自然和人类会在摄影中趋于一致,并达到一种新的紧密的和谐。他由此发展出一套著名的分类。他首先列举出自然中适合摄影和电影的层面:无尽的,自发的,极大的,极小的等。人类无法通过别的形式来接触这些层面的自然,自然也似乎一直在等待摄影的诞生以表现自己。

结束了对自然的讨论,克拉考尔开始思考人类灌注在摄影上的热情。他讨论了他称之为“电影手段”的各种长处。当然,这种电影手段就是写实的手段,它显示出人类追随自然,融入生命之流的倾向。显然,人类不愿意局限在个人想象出的固定结构中。电影的特殊技术使人类的这些倾向能够实现。所以,克拉考尔觉得,应当对媒介的历史作一番考察,看看这种手段何时得到了最佳的利用,何时被用于微不足道的目的。他也能从两个方面来判断电影创作者是否尽到了责任:一是主题的倾向,即自然本身;二是他为主题所运用的工具的倾向。

因此,电影创作者的心中有两个对象:真实和对真实的电影化记录。他有两个目标:利用工具的基本特性来记录真实,恰当地利用媒介适用的所有手段(包括那些很华丽的)揭示真实。他可能具有两个动机:写实主义和形式主义。如果后果失去控制,就会破坏电影手段;如果恰当地运用,则能帮助创作者实现他的双重责任:展示真实,然后洞穿真实。
为了缓解这种普遍存在的二元论带来的尖锐对立,克拉考尔建议将之前的“非此即彼”(either/or)改成“即此即彼”(both/and)。因此,创作者应该做到既注重写实又注重形式,能够做到既记录又揭示,必须达到既展示真实又洞穿真实。当然,在这些要求里面,前者还是居首要地位。
这样看来,克拉考尔的写实主义,实践起来也并非那么激进和绝对。他承认创作者必须(也应当)展现自己的真实观。他所要求的是一种人道的写实主义,一种基于意图而非事实的写实主义。

“克拉考尔将这个立场发展到了自身逻辑的终点,即只要动机纯正,创作者没有任何禁区。他可以将他对物质存在的感受用纪录片的方式反映出来,他可以将幻觉和心理画面呈现在银幕上,他可以沉浸在节奏方式的创造里,或讲述一个我们关心的故事等。所有这些创造性的努力都会符合电影手段,只要它们对这种媒介真正关注的可见世界有所帮助......一切都有赖于写实化倾向和形式化倾向之间的“平衡”。只有后者不压制前者,而是跟随前者的引导,这种平衡才能真正实现。

克拉考尔和先前所有的理论相对抗。他对“电影首先必须是艺术”提出了质疑。巴拉兹,爱因汉姆和明斯特伯格都在以各种方式证明电影可以是艺术,克拉考尔则认为效法传统艺术会使电影失去它的特色。艺术是人类意义的表达,它形式统一,且导向完满的封闭状态。它的成功在于利用想象力超越素材本身,如果跟随这些理念,电影就无法完成它的首要任务。相反,电影要表达的不是人类的意义,而是世界的意义,在人们可以看见的范围之内,它应该是模糊的,不确定的,在结构上是开放的,而非封闭的。它存在的目的不是为了超越素材,而是服务于素材。当然,创作者必须有艺术感,或者说拥有艺术家的敏感性,但是到最后,他必须将想象力和技巧用到永恒流动的世界上,而不是追求纯粹的艺术形式或主观的内容。

[组成形式]

创作者有两种方法将电影素材形式化。一是就影像而言,可以如实地记录对象,或者使用艺术化的摄影方式将之变形;二是就结构而言,可以自由选择影像的呈现顺序,以充分显示自己的想法。电影的各种类型就是第二种方法的实践成果。克拉考尔把这个过程称为“构成”(composition)。
和巴拉兹一样,克拉考尔对主题进行分解,以叙事电影为主要类型,其他类型都以它为标杆。他又将非叙事电影分为真实电影和实验电影。这些类型经常瞧不上叙事电影,认为它们是“文学的”,“娱乐的”,而不是“纯粹”的电影。

实验电影作者一般在三个相关的“意图”之下处理电影的素材:
1.希望根据自己的节奏感组织素材,而不是模仿自然的形式。
2.希望创造形式,而非记录或发现已有的形式。
3.希望通过画面传达的内容是自己视角的外化,而非画面本身的含义。
克拉考尔认为这类作品是彻底反电影的(anti-cinematic):
“实验电影者,不论是喜欢音乐节奏式的抽象,或对心理的超现实表现,都是以远离现实的观念来制作电影的,而现实才是电影特殊力量的来源。创作者对形式的渴望得益于现代绘画和文学的成就,但是,在很大程度上,正是对自由创作的偏爱阻碍了摄影机的探索,扼杀了创作者对现实的好奇。艺术家在将电影从故事中解放出来的同时,又使它受制于传统艺术形式。事实上,就是他们硬将艺术延伸到电影里面去的......艺术家的自由正是电影创作者的桎梏所在。”

克拉考尔发现了一种介于实验电影和写实电影之间的有趣类型:关于艺术,建筑和雕塑的电影。他主张创作者在处理艺术作品的时候,应该把它们看作独立存在的物质实体,而非精神或心理性存在。在这点上,巴赞持相同观点。(评《毕加索的秘密》)

他真正愿意谈论的是传统的纪录片,因为在这些影片里,人类改造现实的冲动和直接记录现实的愿望发生了碰撞。虽然电影的基本摄影功能是克拉考尔理论的基石,但比起单纯的记录,艺术家的想象力和写实之间的张力更吸引他的兴趣。

至于那些脱离情节和结构限制,展现众多题材或某一题材之不同层面的电影化的纪录片,克拉考尔自然是怀有无限的敬意的。但这还不是他心目中的完美类型。因为它们“受到定义范围内的限制,只能描述环境,错过了那些只有通过个人介入才能展现出来的潜在的课件的真实”。

为避免激进,克拉考尔急切地想要使剧情片成为电影的主流:
“基于事实的电影只能表现世界的某一部分,新闻片和纪录片表现的都是人的外在环境,而不是个人的内在的冲突......所以,故事的悬疑性既有助于纪录片,又使其相形见拙。”

他认为恰当的电影形式是纪录片和故事片之间的一种平衡,纪录片能表现现实的混沌之感,故事片则于其中打上人类活动的烙印。

克拉考尔将剧情片按认可度从低到高分为三类:舞台化的故事(theatrical film),改编故事(adaptation),找到的故事或插曲(found-story or episode)。
找到的故事或插曲作者绝不会像舞台化的故事的作者那样,让故事和现实脱离关系。从定义上就可以看出,找到的故事或插曲是建立在混乱的,不可预测的生活之流基础上的,因此是开放的,自然的,不确定的。

“找到的故事或插曲”的提出标志着克拉考尔对电影形式问题的探索走到了终点。他以一篇恰当命题为“内容问题”(Matters of Content)的概要来总结他的理论立场:“我们应当可以认定,有些内容是适合用电影来表现的,有些则完全不适合。”
不适合电影表现的内容以“概念推演”(conceptual reasoning)和“悲剧”(the tragic)为最好例证。
表现理念问题的电影必须用封闭的逻辑来对问题进行视觉化阐释。
而悲剧题材“过分集中在人类事物”上,假设了一个“有限的,确定的小宇宙”,排斥“偶然和意外”,缺乏对“意向的使用”。

在所有天然具有电影性的故事形式和主题中,“侦探推理主题”是最好的代表。这种惯常的文学情节设置(侦探寻找事实的过程)能使创作者和观众回到生活中去寻找有意义的线索。这种文学设置使得事实比想象更重要。它迫使我们运用想象力寻找周围世界的意义。

[电影的目的]

克拉考尔从对于科学失败而导致的荒原社会,到否定艺术无法使人们感受到真实的自然,最终得出了一种结论:能将我们从这种隔绝的狭隘中拯救出来的,是摄影师和(更重要的)电影创作者。与传统艺术家不同,他们的创作不是对现实的掠夺,而是对现实完整的呈现。他们跟随自然本身的模式,而不将人类的思维模式强加于自然。电影是一个由下而上的技术过程,它从自然入手,使我们的思维模式与自然相合。它使我们重新发现那个已经被科学知识占领,被我们遗忘的世界本身。
克拉考尔的电影目的论以及有关“电影化手段”的谏言,与他关于历史学的作用和其研究方法的理论有密切的关系。电影和历史本身并非哲学,但它们最终的目的却是服务于哲学。
克拉考尔认为科学使我们与事物的接触越来越抽象,所以,只有依靠历史,摄影和电影这些半是艺术半是科学的媒介,才能使我们真正接触到万物。通过这些媒介的调和,人们与生活和谐相处。因为媒介既不受制于现实(因为它们总在组织和创造),也不盲目服从于想象力(因为它们排斥超越事实的组织和创造)。所以,这些媒介才是真正具有人文关怀的,使我们能够真正以人的方式活在一个真实的世纪里。

和平与和谐。

[反驳]

克拉考尔最初的三个预设无法证明:
1.电影的主要功能是摄影,而非剪辑或者其他形式技巧;
2.摄影的主要功能是忠实记录事物,而非转换事物形态;
3.因此,电影必须忠实记录它所捕捉的事物,亦即应该在形式上(他称之为“构成上”)写实,因为其意象是写实的。

克拉考尔的电影形式写实论发轫于传统的艺术“模仿”(imitation)论:“严肃的写实主义文学,通过避免意识形态,以及摹写人类生活经验的复杂性和多样性,将能引导我们走向永久的和谐之路。”—埃里希 奥尔巴赫(Erich Auerbach)

克拉考尔并不能证明只有写实的电影才是电影化的。
20世纪50年代《电影手册》派批评家(巴赞和弟子们)等都试图将一种普遍的现象学理念与克拉考尔的基本主张结合起来。他们相信电影画面的写实功能,同时也认为使用画面的方式不止一种。电影素材的写实功能并不构成对电影形式的限制。

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